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Library of Philosophy.

EDITED BY J. H. MUIRHEAD, M.A.

ERDMANN'S

HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY.

VOL. II.

THE LIBRARY OF PHILOSOPHY.

THE LIBRARY OF PHILOSOPHY is in the first instance a contribution to the History of Thought. While much has been done in England in tracing the course of evolution in nature, history, religion, and morality, comparatively little has been done in tracing the development of the thought upon these and kindred subjects, and yet "the evolution of opinion is part of the whole evolution."

This Library will deal mainly with Modern Philosophy, partly because Ancient Philosophy has already had a fair share of attention in this country through the labours of Grote, Ferrier, and others, and more recently through translations from Zeller; partly because the Library does not profess to give a complete history of thought.

By the co-operation of different writers in carrying out the plan, it is hoped that a completeness and thoroughness of treatment otherwise unattainable will be secured. It is believed also, that from writers mainly English and American fuller consideration of English Philosophy than it has hitherto received from the great German Histories of Philosophy may be looked for. In the departments of Ethics, Economics, and Politics, for instance, the contributions of English writers to the common stock of theoretic discussion have been especially valuable, and these subjects will accordingly have special prominence in this undertaking.

Another feature in the plan of the Library is its arrangement according to subjects rather than authors and dates, enabling the writers to follow out and exhibit in a way hitherto unattempted the results of the logical development of particular lines of thought.

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To these has been added, by way of Introduction to the whole Library, an English translation of Erdmann's "History of Philosophy," long since recognised in Germany as the best

J. H. MUIRHEAD,
General Editor.

(JUST PUBLISHED.)

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SWAN SONNENSCHEIN & Co., LONDON.
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A

HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY.

BY

JOHANN EDUARD ERDMANN,

Professor of Philosophy in the University of Halle.

ENGLISH TRANSLATION,

EDITED BY

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IN THREE VOLUMES.—VOL. II.

MODERN PHILOSOPHY.

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PREFACE TO VOLUME SECOND.

THE part of the History of Philosophy of which the present volume treats I attempted to present in an extended work, the first division of which appeared thirty-three years ago, and was separated from the last division by a space of twenty years. I may be permitted to say something respecting the relation in which the present, probably my last published work, stands to that earlier, which was my first. That it is a very different one, part by part, every one will readily understand, who considers that the first division of the larger work was written when its author had reached his fourth climacteric year, the last division, when he had reached the seventh, and that now, when he is approaching the ninth, he must naturally find the first to be more remote and foreign than the last. In fact, although still firmly convinced to-day, as I was when I began my youthful work, that the history of modern philosophy begins with Descartes, that its first period, the philosophy of the seventeenth century, is pantheistic, its second, that of the eighteenth, anti-pantheistic or individualistic, that the latter, however, develops in two opposite directions, which terminate in the French sensationalist and the German rationalist Enlightenment,—I am nevertheless so dissatisfied with the way these thoughts are worked out in my earlier book, have vexed myself so often with the review of the same, that, although a father does not easily cast off his first-born child, and I hence have sought to save as much as possible of what was there said, I confessed to myself when the first twenty sheets of this volume were ready, that they would have been easier for me to prepare had I not myself treated of this period before,

and now, besides the study of the philosophers themselves, had only such expositions of their doctrines before me as had been given to the public since the appearance of my work. That among these I had in mind especially the expositions of Kuno Fischer, every attentive reader of my book will perceive. To avoid misconceptions, I note that I was able to use the second edition of Fischer's splendid work only on Cartesianism. When the Spinozism appeared in the altered exposition, my manuscript was already in the hands of the printer.

It was quite otherwise with regard to the third period. With the exposition of this period, which I gave in the last two-volume part of my larger work, and which also appeared under the special title, *Entwickelung der deutschen Speculation seit Kant*, I am still in entire fundamental agreement. In this case it was not so much a question of saying something quite different from what I had said before; it was only necessary to say it much more concisely. A *résumé* of my own book, which should compress into twenty sheets what originally filled nearly a hundred, I could the more readily permit myself to give, as that work—a confession very painful to my literary vanity—belongs to those silent and forgotten ones, which have not even called forth a review, much less can flatter themselves that they are well known. The abridgment, however, made it necessary to omit all citations, and this circumstance may explain the frequent reference to my larger work, where the citations are to be found.

The explanation that I am still in entire agreement with what was said in the *Entwickelung der deutschen Speculation* might really have excused me, if I had closed my exposition with § 330. My honoured friend and publisher would probably have been rendered a service, if the second volume had contained precisely as many leaves as the first. Nevertheless, I regarded myself as in duty bound to add an appendix of upwards of ten sheets, which, if the worth of a piece of work were estimated according to the labour it involved, would be decidedly the best in my book. But I now regard it as the

least rounded and complete part. In the entire absence, however, of predecessors, it was not possible for me to give more than I have given. Some years ago a brilliant writer, to whom I complained that no one had undertaken to write the history of this part of modern philosophy, said that he believed that he could do it, but that he was too lazy. He did not attempt it, and has now passed away. No other has undertaken it, and so I have made a feeble beginning. To the critic, who complains that I have not characterized, indeed not even named, this or that philosopher, or this or that book, I reply, not with the proud consciousness that I have done it well, but with perfect sincerity, because I wish, so long as I live, that it may be done, "Do it better."

Without altering the economy of this work, there could be added to this appendix, as a second, an exposition of French philosophy in the nineteenth century, and as a third, one of English. If these *Outlines* should ever find French or English translators, it would properly be their matter to supply these additions. Yet again, did its author retain enough of the sanguine hope of youth to persuade himself that his work would see new editions, and had he by that time acquired a sufficient knowledge of the latest French and English philosophy to write instructively respecting it, he would himself promise two such appendixes for the future. Since, however, the first condition will hardly be realized, and the second as yet is certainly wanting, he may be allowed for the present to send forth an appeal to German, French, and English scholars to communicate any information respecting the latest important phenomena in the philosophical worlds of those two peoples, and thus fill a void in our literature, which we feel only too keenly. The more he himself has come to know the difficulties which beset such a work, the greater will be the appreciation with which he, at least, will greet every contribution towards it.

J. E. ERDMANN.

1866.

PREFACE TO THE SECOND EDITION.

HERE also, as in the case of the first volume, the preface which accompanied this volume at its appearance is reprinted without alteration, and the present preface will speak only of the differences of the two editions. The designation of the present edition not only, like the second edition of the first volume, as "revised," but as much "enlarged," was rendered necessary by the fact that three-fourths of the additions made—six sheets of the earlier print—belong to the second volume. They will, I think, moderate, if not do away with, some of the criticisms received. The consideration which Hermes, Bolzano, Windischmann, Molitor, Beckers, Deutinger and Wilhelm Rosenkrantz have received will show that my confession has not prevented me from attentively observing the philosophical movements within the Catholic world. That I have attempted to do more justice to Beneke, Fortlage, F. A. Lange and Czolbe than heretofore, should appease those who complained that I pass hastily over everything which differs widely from my own standpoint. And again, may the completely opposite stricture, that, oddly enough, precisely those whose views I more nearly share are treated too briefly by me, be silenced, now that Von Fichte and Kuno Fischer are considered so much more fully than before. Further additions were made necessary by the fact that those who had once been taken up in my book could rightly demand that it should now be said what they had done since its first appearance. This is particularly true of one who I have just heard to-day has been taken from us, Leopold Schmid. It is also the case with George, Trendelenburg, Fechner, and Lotze. Finally, additions could not be omitted, where new names had made themselves known.

I know that what has been added will not satisfy all. I must beg critics, however, to pay more regard in the present volume than is generally done to the purpose, ability, and freedom of its author. Yes, to his purpose! For, when the "Appendix" promises expressly an exposition of "*German* Philosophy since Hegel," and a complaint is raised against the

author in France because he has totally ignored the French ; or one arises from the theological quarter, because neither the conflict with the Ultramontanists nor that between the different critical schools is mentioned, both seem to me an encroachment upon the liberty, in virtue of which I myself alone determined my theme. In like manner, I of course grant every connoisseur the right to expel me as incompetent from the circle of expounders of the history of philosophy. If he allows me to remain within, however, then it is unjust to expect a giant's labour from a dwarf. In justice he can only ask, "What, according to his powers, has the man accomplished? Has he spared trouble and labour to make it easy for himself?" And these questions will not cause me to blush. Finally, however, I should like to remind the reader who demands more, that what is free to the author of a new book, he frequently cannot do with a new edition. His book is no longer his ; he shares the property with the publisher.

When the latter, as mine has done, makes no inconsiderable sacrifices in order to keep the work as accessible to his circle of readers as it has been hitherto, he has a right to demand that this should not be made too difficult for him. The position of the author, however, who together with these requirements is at the same time besieged with the requests of friends, to be sure not to leave this or that out of the new edition, is too much like steering between Scylla and Charybdis not to be uncomfortable. For more than a year I have had to think, day after day, how what I would like and was able to do could be harmonized with what I felt free to do. Now that the passage is made, and I am happy that I can go my way without stopped ears, it would be cruel to remind me by criticisms of that painful conflict. Spare me, then, reader, and follow for my benefit the words of a better than I, with which I close:

Vive, vale! Si quid novisti rectius istis,
Candidus imperti; si non, his utere mecum!

HALLE, 1869. J. E. ERDMANN.

PREFACE TO THE THIRD EDITION.

If in the case of the worst, indeed of quite unheard-of crimes, the open confession of the accused is taken as a ground for mitigating the punishment, why in the case of a misdeed, which is surely bad enough, but against which, on account of its frequency, our sense has become blunted, may the culprit not also hope for this benefit of the law: in the case, namely, where one has had printed what is worthless? That this is his case, the author of the present work confesses, not indeed respecting his entire second volume—he is still too proud for that—but respecting the last eleven sheets of the same, precisely the part which has cost him the most trouble and labour. While my exposition of the history of modern philosophy down to the death of Hegel, and that part of the Appendix which treats of the dissolution of the Hegelian school, has to my eyes gained in completeness and proportion with each new edition, and now in view of what I have added to the earlier treatment on Spinoza, on Clarke at Zimmermann's instigation, on Adam Smith, on Kant, on Gruppe and others, the third edition pleases me much better than the first and second, it has gone just the opposite way with what the last five sections contain. I myself was most nearly satisfied when eleven years ago I attempted for the first time to delineate contemporaneous philosophy for the reading public; already much less satisfied, when three years later the second edition was printed; to-day even the most angry critic cannot be more convinced than I am myself, that what I give does not meet the demands which one may make of such a delineation. This is not, however, inexplicable. Already in the first edition, I had admitted, in § 343, that I was not able to study thoroughly all the philosophical works that then appeared. And at that time whole movements which control the present, such, for example, as I recently heard called the brochure-philosophy, had not arisen. And to-day? Only the lack of predecessors and coadjutors remains. For although I at once acknowledge

with thanks that I have obtained fruitful suggestions from the critical characterizations of special lines by Von Hartmann, Vaihinger and others, I have nevertheless always had first to weld these works, like single reviews, into a whole, in order to see what shape the judgments I had passed upon writers took in those of different opinions. Only a single book that gives in its title contemporaneous philosophy as its sole subject has fallen in my way. I cannot say, however, that it has helped me much, much less that its author seems to me to be he whom my preface to the first edition has conjured up by its exorcism, "Do it better"!

Under these circumstances, it will readily be believed that when it was announced to me that the second edition was sold out, the pleasure of a third was quite destroyed by the thought of the "Appendix." I said to myself that if my book was to be complete in itself and evenly worked out, one of two things must be done, neither of which it was free to me to do:—*Either* I could—and I thought of this seriously for some time—combine the first part of the Appendix, the dissolution of the Hegelian School, under some such title as the "Reception and Fate of the Hegelian System," with the exposition of this system, and thus incorporate it into the book itself, which would then, since the second half of the Appendix would be suppressed, appear without supplement. I recollected, however, that I did not occupy in reference to the public the free position of an author who laid a new work before it; that to those of my readers to whom precisely this part was most important, an injustice would be done if they did not find in the new edition what above all they wished to know, namely whether I to-day judged of the phenomena which were wholly new eight years ago, as I did then; how I viewed the latest, etc. *Or* I might attempt, so far as my powers were adequate to the task, to describe the events since Hegel with completeness. Then the Appendix to my *Outlines* would become a third volume; and this was forbidden me by a second obligation, that namely which rests

upon one who does not write a new book, but revises an old one—to consult the publisher's interest. This straitened position, to which my preface to the second edition alluded, and which even then poisoned the pleasure of a new edition, has turned my pleasure at this third edition, as already said, to disgust. For I have not concealed from myself for a moment that the public has a right to demand more than I have here given. This explains the fact that I have confined myself to those writers who were already referred to in the earlier editions; when, however, these have since that time rewritten earlier works, or published new ones, I have of course given an account of the same. This is the case with Lange, Strauss, Czolbe, Von Fichte, Wilhelm Rosenkrantz, Von Hartmann, Ulrici, Fechner, Lotze, and others. New names I have either entirely passed over, or only mentioned in order to indicate the place which I assign to their bearers. The exception I have made in the case of Dühring is the result, not *merely* of the latest events, which have reminded many of what the Vaudois—then subject to Berne—said to Voltaire: "*Vous avez écrit contre le bon Dieu; c'est fort mal, mais Il vous le pardonnera. Vous avez écrit contre Jésus Christ; c'est pis encore, mais Il vous le pardonnera. Mais n'écrivez pas contre Leurs Excellences, Elles ne vous le pardonneraient jamais.*" That with such disproportionate treatment no good, indeed no tolerable, book can result, goes without saying. My work does not wish to pass for such. It professes to give nothing more than a collection of material, or rather, only a contribution towards such a collection, which might assist any one who undertook actually to characterize all the philosophical works of the last three or four decades. May the judges of what I have done not fail to bear this in mind, and accept it as an extenuating circumstance.

J. E. ERDMANN.

Bad Vichy,
27th Aug., 1877.

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MODERN PHILOSOPHY.

INTRODUCTION.

§ 258.

In spite of its breach with the Middle Ages, and of its opposition to them, the modern world is still characteristically Christian. Christianity, indeed, no longer consists in being spiritually minded, *i.e.*, in enmity to the world. Instead of this, it now requires that man, while living altogether in the world, should also live an inner and altogether spiritual life. The solution of this problem is found in the transformation of the world by Christianity, *i.e.*, by the new spirit (of reconciliation, *vid.* § 118). This spiritualizing of the world implies at once a positive and a negative relation towards it, so that modern thinkers have fallen heir to the problems which Antiquity and the Middle Ages had to face. In the period of transition, pagan love of the world, or worldly-mindedness, appeared side by side with the hatred of the world, or unworldliness, that characterized the Middle Ages. This is not what is looked for now. Man is to overcome the world. He is no longer to be merely worldly-minded: he is to be that, and something more than that. This problem transcends the two earlier ones by combining them. Its solution lies in finding satisfaction in a world born of the Spirit.

§ 259.

Joh. Gottl. Buhle: *Geschichte der neueren Philosophie seit der Epoche der Wiederherstellung der Wissenschaften.* Göttingen, 1800–5. 6 vols. Ludw. Feuerbach: *Geschichte der neueren Philosophie.* Vol. I. (from Bacon to Spinoza). Ansb., 1833. 2nd vol. (Leibnitz), 1837. My own: *Versuch einer wissenschaftlichen Darstellung der Geschichte der neueren Philosophie.* Three parts in six vols. Leipz., Vogel, 1834–53. Kuno Fischer: *Geschichte der neueren Philosophie.* Mannheim, Bassermann, 1854 ff. (So far six volumes. Of vols. I.–IV. a second edition ap-

peared 1865–69, in which the first two are thoroughly revised, and the next two [Kant] but little altered. The fifth [1869] goes as far as Fichte inclusive; the sixth, which treats of Schelling, gives his biography in the first book [1872]). [Later editions of Fischer's works have since appeared. Munich, Bassermann.—ED.]—Chr. A. Thilo: *Kurze pragmatische Geschichte der neueren Philosophie.* Cöthen, 1874.

In accordance with the character of the different epochs, modern philosophy has to rise above the philosophical wisdom of the ancients and the theological wisdom of the Middle Ages. No theories will meet the requirements of modern times, nor deserve the name of philosophy (*vid.* § 4), except such as recognise both the here, or real, of antiquity, and the hereafter, or ideal, of the Middle Ages, and attempt to reconcile the two. Any system which left one of these sides out of account, or which did not admit that there was a point where the two coincided, would cease to be philosophical. And the difference between systems depends upon the different manner in which these two sides are conceived of (as extension and thought, as nature and spirit, as real and rational, etc.), and in a special degree upon the different methods of reconciling them. In the latter lies the main feature, and, therefore, the real principle of any system of modern philosophy. In the period of transition from the Middle Ages, there appeared side by side the philosophers who forgot God, and the mystics who despised the world. They showed where the point was to be found from which both natural and supernatural knowledge are seen to be subordinate and partial aspects of a whole. For the Microcosmos of the former, and the Microtheos or, "God in miniature," of Böhme, is man, whose function is to introduce thoughts of God into the world, to lead it to God. When philosophy becomes knowledge of man, it does more than merely transcend the one-sidedness of knowledge of the Cosmos, and of knowledge of God; it now for the first time corresponds to our idea of it (*vid.* §§ 2 and 3). Henceforth the path that philosophy follows is not to reach self by starting from the world or from God, but to start from self and find one's way back to a world and to God.

§ 260.

If the mind is to find satisfaction in a world of its own construction, it must begin by destroying that which it finds in

existence, in order to make room for the new and to get material in the ruins of the old. The modern era accordingly begins with a denial of the existing order of things, and a protest against it. This protest, in the various spheres in which it makes itself felt, is limited by that without which the sphere itself would be impossible; but in no sphere is it the ultimate end, everywhere it is only a means towards reconstruction. That organization followed immediately upon this protest, is therefore not an inconsistency, but just the true and logical result.

§ 261.

Accordingly in the *Church*, where it was first definitely expressed, this protest did not extend to the validity of Holy Scripture. Rather, the revelation there given, as the germ of Church doctrine, was acknowledged to be unassailable. The protest was directed solely against what had been added to it. Such a course cannot be called incomplete. Nor is there anything inconsistent in the fact that so soon after the protest had found expression, an orthodoxy was developed resting upon creeds, and maintaining all the decisions of the Œcumenical Councils. For, henceforth, they are binding, not because they are decisions of Councils, but because they are according to Scripture. The individual repeats within himself the process by which the κήρυγμα passed into the δόγμα (*vid.* § 131). Thus he really admits only what he has himself made (out of the message of salvation), and therefore what he maintains is not the old dogma, but a freshly formed one. Within these limits, demanded by the nature of the case, the protest was directed against everything that was characteristic of the Roman Catholic Church in its existing condition. In the *first* place, then, it was directed against everything in which the Church had secularized itself, or by which it had become Jewish or pagan (*vid.* § 179). With the Jewish hierarchy and salvation by works, were contrasted the priesthood of all believers, and justification by faith alone. The levity and the carnal mind, which admitted the children of the world into the Church, and taught men to deify things of sense, were opposed by the seriousness that demanded a Church consisting solely of priests, and by the ideal conception, according to which salvation is present, not in the actual sensible object, but in its being consumed (*i.e.*,

annihilated), so that it becomes not bread and wine, but flesh and blood (in him who enjoys it). Similarly, it was directed in the *second* place, against everything in which the now dreaded Church had opposed itself to the rational and justifiable interests of the world (*vid. supra*, § 227). The fact that Luther married and set up a household, was the most daring protest against monastic vows; and it was one of his greatest acts of reformation. For he did not, like so many modern heroes of the faith, become a Reformer in order that he might marry. It was rather the other way.

§ 262.

If we turn now to the *State*, we find that the pressure of the Church from above, and the independence of the great vassals beneath, had prevented it from attaining sovereign power. The revolt against the authority of the Church and the subjugation of the vassals,—both the work, for the most part, of the same princes,—mark the breach with the existing state of affairs, the protest directed against it. (The purely negative character of this task makes the men that perform it wear an aspect that is almost diabolical.) In place of the time-honoured powers there is all at once set up another, and that a power which is a direct product of the human mind. This is politics, which, just because it is a thing of the mind, appears to be more powerful than what have hitherto been regarded as realities—the Church, privileges of birth, chartered rights, and which has therefore justly earned the name of the modern fate. In form, this new power is an idea, a work of the mind; what it really signifies, is the sovereignty of the State. For the guiding principles of the great exponents of politics,—the great English queen and the still greater French minister,—are, in foreign affairs, the balance of power, and at home, absolute monarchy, before which everything, even the monarch himself, must bow.

§ 263.

Lastly, we come to *the relation between Church and State.* In classical times religion had been looked upon as entirely national, and entirely an affair of the State. In the Middle Ages the condition of things was completely reversed, and a situation arose which is very aptly described by the term "Church-State." This latter was in turn found inadequate;

and the demand for an absolute separation of the two spheres was the protest against what had hitherto been in vogue. This purely negative attitude sufficed only for a short time. In theory and in practice the entirely novel idea of a national Church and a national episcopate asserted its supremacy over men's minds. Here, too, just as in purely ecclesiastical and purely civil life, the (negative) protest against the existing state of affairs received its (positive) completion in the impulse to organize. If the principle of protest be called Protestantism, and if the application of the word be extended beyond the sphere of religion, the modern spirit which breaks with the past, may be called Protestantism. But since this negative activity everywhere has as a complement, the positive impulse towards reconstruction, the first period of the modern era may fitly be called the period of *organization.*

FIRST
PERIOD OF MODERN PHILOSOPHY.

PHILOSOPHY OF THE SEVENTEENTH CENTURY: PANTHEISM.

§ 264.

INTRODUCTION.

MEN's minds were so much occupied with the work, that they were not at once conscious of the sense in which, and the principle on which, organization was proceeding. It was not until the seventeenth century that philosophy formulated what had been a motive of action as early as the sixteenth. When dogma was being once more established, no question was asked, save what the sacred spirit predominant in the community said ("*nostri docent*"); where the individual appealed to the powerful (individual) spirit within him, Luther would have none of it. Further, in politics nothing was heard of save the good of the State, or the general weal; to such an extent was this the case, that the well-being of every individual, even of the king and his minister, was sacrificed to the well-being of the whole. Finally, the constitution of the Church, in the spirit of the strictest territorialism, delegated rights only to the national Church, and none to individual communities or individual persons; people were not allowed even to wear hats according to their own taste. For all these reasons the only general maxim to which the philosophy of the seventeenth century could give expression, was to pay no heed to the individual. In other words, it was bound to exhibit that tendency which is called pantheistic because most of those who took account only of the whole or the all, have called this whole God. If that word is to be avoided, and if such new names as Totalism, Pantism, or Universism are not to be employed, it may be expressed otherwise by saying that in this period systems of

Substance were of necessity set up in which truth and value was assigned only to that from which the individual springs as from its substance. The maxim just referred to, dominated the philosophy of antiquity, and accordingly, though we cannot call the first period of modern philosophy a complete return to this, we may say that it is a repetition of it in a higher form. Nor need we be surprised that it culminates in a man who, brought up in pre-Christian beliefs, has so many points in common on the speculative side of his thought with the pre-Christian theories of Parmenides and the anti-Christian views of Averroës and Giordano Bruno, and on its practical side with Hobbes, who deified the world.

§ 265.

In respect of what has so far been stated as characteristic of modern systems, no difference will be found between the first of the series and the others. Like all systems of the modern era, it will contain the two sides that require to be reconciled, and the point that has been already indicated as the principal one. And further, like all systems of the first period, the earliest of them will exhibit a tendency towards pantheism. On the other hand, it will be distinguished from all the rest. For, as the first and therefore the farthest from the end, it will keep the two sides as far apart as possible, or, to put it differently, will be more distinctly dualistic than any of them. If, however, in this respect it falls behind the more advanced position of the others, there is a fourth point in regard to which it will prove itself superior. For, as the "epoch-making" system, it will have to give expression to the protest that marks the breach with the past. And in this case the protest does not find, as it did in the particular spheres mentioned above, limits which it cannot assail; it will appear as a protest against everything hitherto regarded as valid. We shall see that all the features enumerated in this section are found only in one system—that which Descartes propounded; and this is a clear proof that with that system any account of the history of modern philosophy must necessarily begin.

FIRST DIVISION.

Descartes and his School.

Francisque Bouillier: *Histoire de la philosophie Cartésienne.* 2 vols. Paris, 1854 (3rd ed. 1868). M. Ph. Damiron: *Essai sur l'histoire de la philosophie en France au xviime Siècle.* 2 vols. Paris, 1846.

§ 266.

Descartes' Life and Writings.

René Descartes was born on March 31st, 1596, at La Haye in the province of Touraine. To distinguish himself from the older members of the family, he took the surname of Perron, from an estate which he afterwards inherited. In Latin he appears as *Renatus Cartesius*, but he himself always objected strongly to the Latinizing of his family name. From his eighth to his eighteenth year he was educated at the Jesuit College of La Flêche, recently founded by Henry IV. The study of poetry, mathematics, and philosophy resulted in his falling into the scepticism that was so common among the cultured men of his day; and during a considerable period, he entirely eschewed scientific pursuits. For a while he gave himself up altogether to aristocratic accomplishments and amusements, especially gaming. Even then, however, his theoretical cast of mind asserted itself. Not only did he fence, but he also composed a treatise on the art of fencing. This dissipation, which belongs to the period of his first stay in Paris, lasted only a short time. Then Descartes suddenly vanished from the circle of his acquaintances, and for two years led the life of a recluse in the very heart of Paris. The conviction that he would attain to a knowledge of the true nature of man, not in solitude, but amid the stir of the world, led him to volunteer for military service. At first he entered the army of the Netherlands. While the troops were in winter quarters at Breda, he made the acquaintance of the mathematician Beeckmann through the solution of a mathematical problem; and for him he wrote at this time (1618) his *Compendium musicæ.* Leaving Holland, he entered the Bavarian and then the Imperial service, and took part in several campaigns during the Thirty Years' War. From his school-days

he had been accustomed to treat geometrical problems algebraically and *vice versâ;* and the good results which had flowed from this, suggested to him the idea that a combination of the logical method with the two former might prove helpful to all branches of knowledge. This method he afterwards called the deductive, meaning by that, something very different from the syllogistic process which adds nothing to our knowledge. The first glimpse of it, and, therefore, of the first principles of the fundamental science or *mathesis universalis*, of which he speaks later, was the great discovery of November 10th, 1619, which he made at Neuburg in Germany. This was the decisive point in his career. Henceforward the unalterable purpose of his life was to treat, first the other sciences and then philosophy according to this new method, which is at once analytic and synthetic, inasmuch as effects are explained by causes, causes demonstrated by effects. He now gave up military life, and returned for a time to Paris. After setting his affairs in order and selling his estates, he spent several years more in travel, visiting, among other places, the shrine of Our Lady of Loretto, to which he had vowed to make a pilgrimage, if he saw light amid his doubts. Then he left his native country and retired to Holland. During his residence there, he lived in thirteen different places, including Franeker, Amsterdam, Utrecht, and Leyden. His correspondence with France was carried on through Père Mersenne, the friend of his school-days at La Flêche, and the only man in the country who knew his place of abode. From his letters we can see that immediately after his settlement abroad, he began to busy himself with a work which bears the title of *Le Monde*, and in which the theory of light was to play an important part. The year 1633 was mentioned to his friend as the probable date of its completion. The condemnation of Galileo by the Pope alarmed the author, whose whole "philosophy," *i.e.* physical science, depended upon the motion of the earth. At first he talked of destroying the work, and, though he afterwards gave up this idea, he would never consent to its publication. Instead of it there appeared in quarto, at Leyden in 1638, the *Essais Philosophiques*, which were finished in June, 1637. Here, in the *Discours de la Méthode*, he gives a sketch of the long-sought-for *science universelle*, or *mathesis universalis*, through which, as he writes in April, 1637, to a friend of Mersenne (*Epist.* ed. Elzev. i., 110),

with the help of experience, one would be in a position to decide everything. To this treatise are appended three others, which he himself calls examples of its application. Of these, he tells us, the *Dioptric*—a part of his *Monde*—deals with mathematical physics, the *Meteors* with pure physics, and the *Geometry* with pure mathematics. All these four treatises have had a most important effect on the developement of science; the first and the last have been epoch-making. Although the work appeared anonymously, every one knew who the author was, more especially as he was mentioned by name in the very flattering Privilege from the King. Accordingly the Latin translation, which was executed in 1643 by Etienne de Courcelles, and which does not contain the *Geometry*, bears the title: *Renati Cartesii specimina philosophica.* In 1641 there followed: *Meditationes de prima philosophia*, written in Latin, and really his most important work. Before being printed, this was communicated to several men of learning, and their objections, together with the replies of Descartes, were printed and laid before the public along with the original work. There were six sets of objections; the seventh, those of Père Bourdin, did not appear until the second edition. This great work was first translated into French in 1647 by the Duke of Luynes, then by Clerselier, and lastly by Fède. It was followed in the year 1644 by the *Principia philosophiæ*, also written in Latin, and translated into French by the Abbé Picot in 1647. Of the four parts of these *Principia*, the first, as Descartes himself says, repeats in a more exact form the thoughts of the *Meditations.* Lastly, in 1646: *Traité des Passions de l'Ame* was written out for the Princess Elizabeth of the Palatinate, with whom Descartes was very intimate at the Hague; but it was not till 1649 that it was published, at the urgent request of a friend. Immediately after the author's death, a Latin version was brought out by Elzevir. Summoned by Queen Christine of Sweden to her court, Descartes was with difficulty persuaded to comply with the request. The climate, the life, and especially the constraint, which was such a contrast to the perfect independence he had hitherto enjoyed, did not suit him. He fell ill, and died on the 11th of February, 1650. After his death, two works were published from the papers he had left behind him: *De l'Homme* and: *Traité de la Formation du Fœtus* (Paris, 1664, 4to). The former of these treatises is merely a part of

Le Monde, ou Traité de la Lumière, edited in 1664 by an unauthorized hand, and much more correctly by Clerselier in 1667. In this we have, at least in outline, the work with which Descartes began his literary activity. Before it appeared, Clerselier had edited the Letters of Descartes in three volumes (1657–67), a Latin translation of which was soon afterwards published by Elzevir at Amsterdam. The same publisher also brought out in 1701: *Renati Descartes Opera posthuma mathematica et physica*, which included *Regulæ ad directionem ingenii*, a work belonging probably to an earlier period. Of these *Rules*, originally intended to consist of three books, there exist only the first and second, the latter of which is incomplete. In all probability they were composed in French. On the other hand, the *Inquisitio veritatis*, a dialogue, likewise unfinished, seems to have been written in Latin. All the writings mentioned are contained in the Latin quarto edition, published in nine volumes by Elzevir in 1713, as well as in the French octavo edition in eleven volumes, which Cousin had published by Levraut, at Paris (1824–26). The latter has the merit of giving the Letters in chronological order. As these letters, as well as the works of Descartes, were written partly in French and partly in Latin, those who wish to read his writings in the original, must use both editions. In 1859 Count Foucher de Careil began to publish from manuscripts of Leibnitz: *Œuvres inédites de Descartes*, containing youthful writings which were supposed to have been lost. [Completed in 1860, Paris.—ED.]

§ 267.

DESCARTES' DOCTRINES.

1. The sceptical doctrines of Montaigne and Charron had fallen into the intellectual life of France like a fruitful seed. In religiously disposed minds, such as that of Mersenne, the result was a sceptically-tinged toleration towards all philosophical views, which was quite compatible with a decided attitude on theological questions. Most men, however, had developed a much more thorough-going scepticism, which made Mersenne lament over the general and wide-spread atheism. If we suppose that Descartes experienced similar attacks of scepticism, which disturbed him in what gave him

most delight,—research and knowledge,—his attempt to rid himself of doubt by refuting it, becomes intelligible. Both the *Discourse on Method* and the *Meditations*, as well as the beginning of the first part of the *Principia*, contain this train of reasoning in almost identical language.—The senses often deceive us, and accordingly we cannot trust them. Further, we cannot depend unconditionally even upon reason, inasmuch as it is at least conceivable that it is of such a nature that its right use leads to error. Seeing that the only two sources of knowledge send forth such troubled waters, there is no course open to us, but to question everything that has hitherto been accepted as certain. It is evident that in the demand *de omnibus dubitandum*, of which Descartes expressly says, that it is not to be looked upon as being, in the interests of scepticism, the end, but only as the means of attaining the end, there is contained that protest against everything hitherto accepted, which in § 265 was emphasized as the fourth point that would be found in this epoch-making system. The fulfilment of that postulate levels the ground on which the new building is to be erected. But this is not all, for it appears that the "methodical doubt," as Cartesians called this absolute questioning, provides also the material for the new structure. For, however far I may carry the doubt, one fact remains irrefragable, nay, even becomes more certain the more I doubt, namely, that I, who doubt, exist (*Medit.* ii.). But, by the Ego which remains so irrefragably certain, must of course be understood, only *the* Ego that doubts, and so far as it doubts, or,—since doubt is only a species and form of thought,—the Ego that thinks. *Cogito, ergo sum*, then, is the one proposition which cannot be questioned, if we question everything. This proposition is not to be looked upon as a conclusion that might be drawn from the more general proposition, "Whatever thinks, exists." Rather, this general proposition could only be deduced from the certainty that in my Ego thinking and existing coincide, because my existence consists in thought only. That proposition, then, which for this very reason might equally well be stated as: *Sum cogitans, sum dubitans, ego res cogitans sum*, and so on, is not a deduction but a certainty intuitively perceived. Only because it is this, can it be employed, as we shall see shortly, as a basis for further deductions. For Descartes maintains, employing the very words of Aristotle (*vid. supra*, § 86, 4), that there are

certain ἁπλᾶ which are beyond demonstration and definition, which are apprehended by absolutely clear intuition, and from which deductions are drawn (*Règles pour la Direction de l'Esprit. Règle* 12. Ed. Cousin, xi. p. 274). In contrast to the declaration of Sanchez: "The more I think, the more doubtful I become," Descartes says: "The more I doubt, the more I think, and the more certain I am of my existence." But it must never be forgotten, that I am only certain of my existence as a thinking being, not of my bodily existence. I am conscious of myself, as one whose existence consists solely in thinking (*Disc. de la Méthode*, ed. Cousin, i., p. 158), and accordingly the best way to apprehend one's own nature, *i.e.*, that with the cessation of which one's own existence comes to an end, consists in doubting of the external world, for an intensification of this doubt intensifies the existence of the doubter. By the thought of which doubt is a form, Descartes understands, as he repeatedly declares, nothing but consciousness. That which is endowed with this, or the thinking subject, he call *mens*, *animus*, *intellectus*, *ratio*, and so on, expressions which we can hardly translate by any other word than "mind" (*Princ.* i., 8, 9, *Medit.* ii., p. 11, edit. iii., Elzev.). If the mind is thus certain of its own existence, the principle of all knowledge has been attained, the desired foundation has been discovered on which philosophy is to rest (Letter to Clerselier, ed. Elzev. i., 118, *Méthod.*, ed. Cousin, i., p. 158). Everything which stands or falls with this certainty, which is as certain as that I myself exist, I must and therefore may regard as true. The proposition that nothing can be produced out of nothing, is so often treated by Descartes as being of this character, that Spinoza certainly did not misrepresent him when, in his account of the Cartesian philosophy, he declared that with the denial of this proposition the *cogito ergo sum*, too, falls to the ground. To say that the effect cannot contain more than the cause, is, the Schoolmen had already taught, merely a special application of this axiom; anything more would have to be produced out of nothing. Subsequently, as we shall see, use is made of this proposition, which is as incapable of being doubted as the proposition "I am."

2. *Ego sum cogitans.* Now, if we reflect upon what is contained in the individual processes of thought or consciousness, *i.e.*, in the ideas, it becomes clear that an idea, being a copy, and therefore an effect of something, cannot possibly repre-

sent more than is contained in that something of which it is a copy. The *ideatum*, or original of the idea, must contain at least as much as is contained in the idea itself, possibly more; in the former case it contains *formaliter*, in the latter *eminenter*, what is contained in the idea *objective*, which in old mediæval phraseology meant representatively (*Medit.* iii. p. 18, 19. *Rationes more geom. disp. Def.* 3 *Axiom.* 3–5). Instead of *objective*, some Cartesians say *repræsentative*, and others again *intentionaliter*. Some ideas, for example that of a doubting being, it is plain that I could have, even if I existed quite alone; they would be copies of myself, I myself should be their *ideatum*. But there is *one* idea which would in such a case be impossible, namely that of an infinite being. I cannot obtain this from myself, for I am finite. Nor can I, as some think, form it by abstraction from my own finitude, for all abstraction is negation; and consequently, though I may arrive by abstraction at the thought of a negative infinite, an *indefinitum* which is free from limitations of a sort, *e.g.* infinite space, I can never attain to the perfectly positive conception of the *infinitum*, or that which is free from all limitations, and of which the finite must rather be called the negative, as presupposing the idea of the infinite (*Princ.* i. 27. *Medit.* iii., p. 20, 21. *Respons. ad prim. object.*, p. 59). The mere existence of the idea of the infinite in us is a proof that there actually is an infinite being, or God, outside of us, who is at once the original and the author of that idea; inasmuch as He has implanted it in us, it is produced in us by His power (*Princ.* i., § 18. *Medit.* iii., p. 24). Just as from the existence of the idea of God in me I must conclude that God is, so too from my own existence I must conclude that there is a cause not merely of my having been created in the past, but also of my being created every moment (*Rat. mor. geom. disp. pr. ii., c. dem. Respons. ad prim. obj.*, p. 57). Such a cause would be necessary even if I had existed from all eternity, for without it I should not have endured. To be maintained in existence is to be continually created. Besides these proofs *a posteriori*, there is another. Quite apart from the question as to what we start from, and how we arrive at the idea of the infinite, we are bound to conclude from this very idea, that God is. For just as the idea of triangle contains the idea of three-sidedness, which we must for this very reason predicate of the triangle, so in the idea of the infinite

there lies that of necessary existence. There can no more be a height without depth, than a God who is non-existent (*Princ.* i., 14, 15, 16, and elsewhere). These proofs of the existence of God were of importance not merely as links in the argument, but also because the prevailing scepticism had undermined the belief in God in many quarters. They formed one of the chief points of attack. They are criticized in almost all the objections printed along with the *Meditations;* in every case the line of attack varies with the point of view of the assailant. Gassendi, who had denied that any knowledge of the infinite was possible, questions the fact that we have a definite idea of it. Descartes' answer to this is, that just as one who is not familiar with geometry, has nevertheless the idea of the triangle as a whole, so we, although we have no exhaustive knowledge of the infinite, yet apprehend not merely a part of it, but the infinite in its entirety (*Resp. quint.*, p. 66). The point, however, in regard to which he had most frequently to defend himself, was his attempt to deduce the existence of God from what is contained in the idea of God. This seemed to be merely the ontological argument of Anselm; and one of his critics objected that it had already been refuted by Thomas Aquinas. Descartes replies (*Resp. prim.*, p. 60), that there is a very great difference between a conclusion drawn from the meaning of a word, and his own argument. The proof that Thomas found fault with, is of the former character. His own depends upon two facts. In the first place, when we think of God, we must think of Him not merely as existing, which we do with everything while we are thinking of it, but as *necessarily* existing. In the second place, this thought of ours is not an arbitrary figment of the mind, but a necessary, because an innate or God-given, thought. As Descartes here and elsewhere always places his deduction from what is contained in the idea of God side by side with that drawn from its necessary presence in us, it almost seems as if he intended the reader to combine the two, and say that the existence of God is certain, because God Himself testifies to Himself within us and demonstrates His existence. Others again (*Object. secundæ*), employing almost the same language that Cudworth and Leibnitz did later (*vid.* § 278, 3, and 288, 7), find fault with what they say is a newly-discovered gap in the reasoning; viz., it must first of all be proved that the conception of an infinite being is possible, and does not

contain a contradiction. Descartes allows this (*Respons. secund.*), but shows that such a proof need occasion no difficulties. This is precisely what Leibnitz subsequently did.

3. As certainly as I exist, so certainly does God exist, the Infinite Being, who is free from all limitations. Accordingly He is free from all limitations of His power; God is the absolute cause of Himself as well as of everything else, inasmuch as all things have their being from God. If we hesitate to call God the *causa efficiens* of Himself, we may call Him the *causa formalis* of Himself. At all events we are not to take in a merely negative sense the statement that He is *a se* or *causa sui*. God is the positive cause, at least of His being uncaused (*Respons. prim.*, p. 57 ff.). This, however, implies that God is free from every imperfection, and is possessed of every perfection, for an absolutely almighty being can, and therefore will, clothe himself with all perfections. None of these is of such importance for us as the absolute truthfulness, in virtue of which God is incapable of wishing to deceive us (*Princ.* i., § 29). But God could not be acquitted of the intention of misleading us, if the reason which He has given us, tells us what is incorrect. The Divine truthfulness, then, guarantees to us that whatever we apprehend plainly and clearly by reason, is true. Now, since the initial doubt rested on the possibility of reason deceiving us, at this point, but not till this point, this doubt must be given up, and we have now a perfectly certain canon established: Whatever is apprehended plainly and clearly, is true (*Princ.* i., 60. *Med.* iii., p. 35). This result, too, which he had attained by refuting for himself the original doubt, Descartes had to defend against objections. There were two points in particular, against which the assailants directed their attacks. In the first place, it was said, too much was proved here, for the reasoning would justify the conclusion that we could never make a mistake. Descartes replied, that error does not consist in the imperfect apprehension of anything, but in approving and affirming what we apprehend imperfectly. This affirmation, as an act of will, lies within our own power. (Compare the old saying, *Nemo credit nisi volens.*) If, then, we come to any conclusion in regard to what we have not apprehended clearly, or what transcends our limited power of apprehension, the mistake which we make is our own fault, not the fault of Him who gave us a limited power of apprehending and an unlimited

power of willing. Every error is self-deception (*Princ.* i., §§ 34, 35, 38). The second criticism was, that Descartes was really reasoning in a circle. He began by saying: Everything that is as evident as that I exist, is true. In virtue of this he concluded that God exists. But from the existence of God he concluded that everything that is made evident to us through the reason, is true. Descartes justifies his position by drawing distinctions. He begins by pointing out the difference between the first kind of thought, which is quite unreflecting and depends upon what is immediately evident, and that which rests upon reflection, and can give the reason why it is to be depended upon (*Resp.* iv., p. 134. *Resp.* vi., p. 155. *Resp.* ii., p. 74); then he draws attention to the fact that it is quite possible to make the "I am" the *principium cognoscendi* of God, and again to make God the *principium essendi* of the Ego and of its certainty of its own existence, and to call the "I am" an innate idea (*Medit.* iii., p. 24).

4. After the original doubt has been disposed of, and the rule of evidence discovered, Descartes, as we might expect, advances more rapidly. But he always starts from the thinking Ego, which is firmly established as irrefragable. If we review all the acts or ideas which exist in the Ego, we find, in the first place, some which are more particular determinations, *i.e.*, limitations of other ideas, without which they could not become objects of thought. Thus the conception of triangularity presupposes the idea of figure, and that of pain cannot be thought of without the help of the idea of feeling, and so on. Those thoughts which cannot be conceived of without the help of others (*per aliud concipiuntur*), Descartes calls "modes"; so that triangular is a mode of figure, pain of feeling, and so on (*Notæ ad progr. quodd. in Ren. des C. Medit.*, ed. Elzev., 1650, p. 183). If we inquire further, we find that figure and feeling are in turn modes, determinations of other ideas, and that all ideas are ultimately to be traced back to a small number which are primary and, as such, *per se concipiuntur*. These Descartes calls "*attributa*," because, as he says, going back to the derivation, they are given by nature to things (*a natura tributa sunt*), as the main qualities which go to make up their essence and nature (*essentiam naturamque constituunt*). (*Notæ ad progr.*, p. 179. *Pcip.* i., § 53. Cf. *Lettre à Vatier*, 17 Nov., 1642.) Of such highest or primary ideas Descartes speaks of only

those of *extension* and *thought*, each of which is intelligible without the other, and even without any other idea at all. Only these two are mentioned by him, although he admits that in God, in whom there are of course no modes, which would be limitations, *multa sunt attributa* (*Notæ l. c.*). Although extension and thought differ from figure and triangle or from feeling and pain, as primary from secondary and tertiary, still we find an analogy between the two former in this respect—they are both predicates, and in virtue of their (adjectival) character require to be supplemented by a (substantival) substratum on which to rest. These independent objects endowed with attributes Descartes calls substances, and accordingly defines a substance as that which can exist and be conceived of without the help of anything else—that which is absolutely independent, for, as he himself expressly says, a *substantia incompleta* is a contradiction in terms (*Respons. quartæ*, p. 122). He admits at the same time, that if the definition be taken strictly, there is only one substance, namely God (*Princ.* i., p. 51). In a wider sense, however, we can apply the term substance to created things, if they can be conceived of without the help of anything else at all, and can exist without the help of anything else that has itself been created, in other words, if they are independent of each other,—not, of course, of God,—and can be conceived of and exist without one another and without anything else. This does not hold good of modes and attributes, for the former are always attached to attributes, the latter to substances. We find then within us, besides the idea of substance in the proper sense, the ideas of (created) substances. They are of two kinds, depending on the two attributes already mentioned,—extended substances and thinking substances. The latter are called minds (*mentes*), and their sum is the *natura intellectualis;* the former are the *corpora*, and taken together they form the physical world. The existence of both is vouched for by the truthfulness of God, since reason compels us to assume originals (*ideata*) of these ideas, and we cannot assume, what would be essentially inconceivable, that God calls forth the ideas of such substances within us immediately. Just because they are substances, they are mutually exclusive, for in this the nature of substances consists (*Resp. quart.*, p. 124); but still more because their attributes are opposite (*Notæ progr.*, p. 178). Thought is

purely internal, it is consciousness, and belongs solely to the Ego. Extension, on the other hand, is external and has no analogy with what belongs to the Ego. There can, therefore, be no possible community between them, the two worlds are absolutely separated; what belongs to the one, is for that very reason excluded from the other. This extreme dualism was indicated in § 265 as a feature which would be found in the first system of modern philosophy. One consequence of it is, that the two parts of this system, physics and mental philosophy, fall completely asunder. They are not even so far related that one presupposes the other, and accordingly it does not matter with which our account begins.

5. To such an extent has Descartes devoted the principal part of his activity to *Physics*, that he very often calls it, especially in his letters, his philosophy. Its aim is to give an account of all that can be discovered of nature through thought. It is clear, however, that we must set aside what the evidence of our senses would lead us to regard as the quality of bodies; for these sensible qualities are only states of the subject that feels them, and have as little resemblance to the body that produces the sensation, as words have to the thoughts which they are employed to communicate (*Le Monde*, ed. Cousin v., p. 216). "All sensible qualities of things lie within ourselves, *i.e.* in the soul," was a proposition repeated by all Cartesians. Further, we must set aside everything which does not so much belong to the body itself as come to it through its connection with something else, for example, number, time, and the like, which are relations, and therefore *modi cogitandi*. What strikes us, on reflection, as the real nature of bodies, is their extension in length, breadth, and thickness. Space and matter accordingly coincide, an empty space is a contradiction in terms; and by a body is to be understood simply what is understood by it in stereometry. Every internal impulse which would bring the extended matter nearer the thinking mind, every force which would be anything else than extension, weight for example, must be distinguished from body (*Princ.* ii., § 4. 64. *Meditat.* iv., p. 40.)—This assertion, that a body is nothing but the space it occupies, had also to be defended by Descartes against attacks. These proceeded both from physicists, who objected that on this hypothesis condensation and rarefaction would be impossible, and from Catholic theologians, who

grounded their scruples on transubstantiation. To the former he replied that a sponge, when filled with water, was not thereby increased in extension, and that every rarefaction, like the alteration in the sponge, consisted in a widening of the pores (*Princ.* ii., § 6, 7). As regards the second objection, Descartes attempted to show, in his answer to Arnauld, (*Respons. quart.*) that the qualities of bodies could remain the same, even where the bodies were changed. For proof of this he relied on the fact that our sensations are called forth by the surface of bodies, *i.e.* by their border, which belongs neither to them nor to the surrounding air. Many were satisfied with this; but when he afterwards attempted, in letters to the Jesuit Mesland, to make the change itself intelligible by analogies with physiological processes, and the correspondence was published against Descartes' will, a fresh outcry arose. These occurrences gave occasion to a number of inquiries which were collected under the title of a *philosophia eucharistica*, and they serve to explain why, among the propositions rejected by Jesuitical and other theologians, there always occurs the dictum that the nature of bodies consists in extension. (Compare on this point Bayle's *Recueil de quelques pièces curieuses*, Amst., 1664, and Bouillier in the work referred to.)—As the physical and the mathematical point of view thus coincide, we can understand how Descartes claims for his physics the distinction of being as plain as geometry (Letter to Plempius of 17 Nov. 1637). A further consequence is, that the Cartesian physics completely excludes the conception of an end, a conception that is foreign to mathematics, and the absence of which from the teaching of Pythagoras had been noted by Aristotle. Descartes does not indeed deny that God pursues ends in the physical world, but he considers it presumptuous to desire to know them. It becomes not merely presumption but pride, if we assume that man is the end of the world. Everything which follows from the conception of extension must naturally be affirmed of bodies and of their combination; what is contrary to it must be denied. Neither atoms, nor limits, accordingly exist in the physical world (*Princ.* ii., 20, 21). The capacities for being formed and for being moved are, like divisibility, bound up in the conception of extension. That these possibilities may be realized, the intervention of another cause is necessary, and this is the Being that is also the ultimate ground of extension,

that is, God. He produces this effect by dint of motion, *i.e.* the transference of a body into other surroundings. Thus all the varieties, even of division and form, have their ultimate ground in motion, and nothing is necessary for the creation of the world save extension and motion (*Princ.* ii., 23). All real or formal differences of bodies, then, are merely various motions of themselves or of their parts. If we draw a distinction between the expressions, universe (*universitas*), and world (*mundus*), and make the latter mean the system of *different* bodies, it becomes possible to do as some Cartesians did, and maintain at one and the same time the infinity of the universe and the limitation of the physical world, beyond which exists motionless and therefore obscure matter. So Geulincx, *Disp. phys. isag. cont.* Descartes is therefore quite right in affirming, as he does in his letters, that with him mechanics is not a part of physics, but that his whole physical philosophy is mechanical and, as a consequence, mathematical (Letter to Beauce, of April 30th, 1639). As the cause of motion, God, is unchangeable, the effect too must be of this character; and the first of all the laws of nature, indeed the united result of them all, is this: The sum of motion is always the same (*Princ.* ii., § 36, and elsewhere). From this there follow, as deduced or secondary laws,—(1) That every body continues in the state in which it is; (2) That a body which is moved, maintains the direction in which it was set in motion, and moves in a straight line so far as it is not affected by extraneous causes; (3) That if a body which has been set in motion strikes another body, a transference of the motion takes place (*Princ.* v., 37, 39, 40). (Where Descartes begins to lay down particular rules for the transmitting of motion, he frequently comes into conflict with experience.) In his *Monde*, he gives an imaginary picture of the creation of the universe. An entirely new world is to be created with the help of nothing but matter, and motion conforming to the laws laid down. In the beginning, God divided matter into innumerable parts of various (moderate) sizes and various forms. None of them, however, were round or gave indication of a centre, *i.e.* something within them. Once for all He imparted to these a quantity of motion in the most various directions, and then left them to themselves, or rather continues to preserve unchangeable, *i.e.* to maintain, what He has once done. The natural consequence is, that through the collision

of bodies, and through the chaotic medley of directions in which they are moving, one portion of those particles of matter will consolidate into larger masses; another portion, by having the corners rubbed off, will become extremely small globules, of which there are perhaps millions in every grain of sand; while yet a third portion will produce a much finer dust, that *matière infiniment subtile*, which is often called the substance of ether. The parts of the last-mentioned are inseparable and can assume every possible form, so that we have here to deal with something which is continuous. This *materia subtilissima* may be called the element of fire. Descartes usually calls it the first element, and makes the sun and the fixed stars consist of it. The first-mentioned kind of matter, on the contrary, he calls the third element or element of earth; out of it are formed, among other things, the planets. The bodies which consist of this, are fluid or solid according as their particles are easily moved and displaced, or the reverse. Between the two comes the second element, which consists of small globules, and which may be called the element of air. Of this the heavens are composed. The phenomena of light are produced by the vibratory motion of its particles, which is communicated in straight lines with infinite swiftness. Their rotary motion is the cause of colour, while warmth and heat are due to the motion of the first element (*Monde*, Chap. 5, and elsewhere). The various motions intersect one another and, as a consequence, deviations from the straight line take place. Further, since all motion goes on in a plenum, when a body changes its position, the surrounding bodies press into its place, so that ultimately circular movements arise. These are the famous vortices, which explain not only the revolution of the planets round the sun, but also the falling of bodies to a centre. It is neither an *actio in distans* of the centre, nor yet an inward impulse that brings them thither, for, in a letter to the Princess Elizabeth, Descartes expressly maintains that no movement can be produced without shock and contact; but the fine matter that envelopes bodies pushes them forward, just as objects that have found their way into a whirlpool are pushed towards the centre (*Princ.* iii., 46, ff.). The more he goes into detail, the more frequently is he obliged to adopt auxiliary hypotheses; for example, that in the case of the magnet the small particles that exercise the pressure are of corkscrew shape,

and so on. Still, Descartes' account of creation remains the most successful attempt to give a full statement of how everything admits of a purely mechanical explanation. Even organic bodies he holds to be mere machines; when they cease to act, the stoppage is called death. The real principle of life and, if this may be called soul, the soul of the animal, is the blood, in the circulation of which life consists. Harvey's discovery of the capillary canals is gratefully acknowledged by Descartes; but he finds fault with Harvey for assigning as the cause of circulation the contraction of the walls of the heart, for this itself requires to be explained. It is rather the warmth that has its seat in the heart, and by which the blood is forced into the lungs in the form of vapour. From thence, cooled and therefore liquid again, it returns into the heart, to spread out once more into the arteries, to pass from these through the capillary canals into the veins, and to be brought back to the heart through the *venæ cavæ*. The blood is conducted by a very direct road, and therefore in a very warm condition, to the brain, which not merely cools it but, acting like a filter, separates from it the most volatile particles of the third element and changes them into "animal spirits" (*spiritus animales*), very volatile substances, of which the nerves are the repositories. The movement produced in the ends of the nerves by external impressions is communicated, like the vibration of a string, to the part of the brain in which all the nerves do not indeed meet, but through which all vital spirits certainly pass, and which, since all impressions are concentrated here as at the point of a cone, may be called their *conarion*. It lies in the pineal gland, which, especially in man, as we shall see by-and-by, has another function besides that of separating the phlegm, the one usually ascribed to it. In addition to being the point towards which sensations from without tend, it is also the point from which the operations of the body on the external world proceed. From thence the movement of the vital spirits is communicated to the parts of the nerves that set the muscles in motion; and this is the reason why an animal runs away when it sees a wolf, or cries out when it is struck. This is a process which is not in any way distinct from that by which the note of an organ gives forth a sound when struck; an animal is just as much a machine, as an organ is. (For a long time it was fashionable among zealous Cartesians to torture animals in a frivolous

spirit, in order to show that their theory was seriously meant.) The human body, to the more detailed account of which the work *De l'Homme* is devoted, is also a machine. It would, like the bodies of ordinary animals, be nothing more than this, were it not united with a spirit, a point that will be discussed later on.

6. Distinct from but parallel to physics, is the *philosophy of mind.* Descartes often calls it metaphysics, although this word is frequently employed by him to denote the *science universelle.* While the former, like mathematics, cannot be elaborated without the help of imagination, the organ of the metaphysician is thought pure and simple. This gives it a much greater degree of certainty than physics, inasmuch as it deals with what is the most certain and most evident of all things (*Princ.*, i. § 11, *Respons. prim.*, p. 55, and elsewhere). But, on the other hand, it is a very abstract science, and Descartes writes to the Princess Elizabeth on June 18th, 1643, that while he devoted several hours daily to his mathematical studies, only several hours a year were given to metaphysics, and he was satisfied with having established the principles. Just as the nature of bodies consisted in extension, so the attribute of mind is thought. This is true of all mind, and therefore of the mind of God; for God's mind differs from the finite mind, as an infinitely large number differs from two or three; if we imagine the *natura intellectualis* set free from limitations, we have the idea of God, and the idea of God as limited, gives the idea of a human soul (Letter of 1638, ed. Cousin, viii. p. 58). For this very reason we could deduce the existence of God from the existence of our own mind; but it could no more be deduced from the existence of the physical world, than sounds could be deduced from colours (*Respons. secund.*, p. 72). Of course this distinction must never be lost sight of, that God, as the Infinite, knows no limitations, and that therefore He has no modes, but only attributes; He does not feel, but certainly thinks (*Princ.*, i. § 56). Just as body, because extension is its attribute, is not conceivable and cannot exist without extension, so mind always thinks or, in other words, is always conscious (*Respons. quint.*, p. 60; *Respons. tert.*, p. 95). As light always lights, and warmth always warms, mind always thinks (*Epistolæ*, ed. Elz., i. 105). Accordingly Descartes does not hesitate to admit, in a letter, that the child is conscious before birth.

That we cannot remember what our thoughts in sleep have been is no objection, because memory is a purely physical condition. Descartes calls the individual acts of thought ideas; it is obvious, then, that all thought, even the Divine thought, consists of ideas (*Ration. mor. geom. disp. Defin. ii. Respons. tert.*, p. 98). In man they are divided, in respect of clearness, into adequate and inadequate, or perfect and imperfect (Letter of 1642, i. 105, Elz.); in respect of origin, into self-made (*fictæ*), borrowed (*adventitiæ*), and innate (*innatæ*) (*Medit.*, iii. p. 17); and lastly, in respect of their purport, into more passive acts of perception, ideas in the narrower sense, and more active ones, acts of will. The latter are never found without the former, for we are conscious of all our acts of will, *i.e.*, we have an idea of them, or perceive them (*De passion.*, i., art. 19); on the other hand, there are acts of pure perception, where no will is exerted. To this latter class, however, judgment does not belong, as some suppose it to do; rather, every judgment involves an assertion or a denial, that is, an act of will. Like the position which, in antiquity, the Stoics partially, and the Sceptics unconditionally, took up towards συγκατάθεσις (§ 97, 2), like the often-repeated mediæval dictum: *Nemo credit nisi volens*, Descartes' doctrine is, that our assent may be withheld at pleasure, and may be given at pleasure. This indicates how error is possible, and further how it may be avoided. In the mere conception of the chimera, for example, there is no error involved, but there certainly is in the affirmation or assertion that it exists. If we would give our assent only to that which we know clearly, we should never make mistakes. That God endowed us with a limited intelligence, and at the same time with free will, in virtue of which we can assent to what is imperfectly or inadequately known, does not make Him (*vid. supr.* 3) the positive cause of our mistakes. God Himself is of course infallible, because He has no inadequate ideas. We, however, if we would guard against error, must always inquire whether an idea is not made by ourselves, and made in such a way that, in forming it, we have omitted something, without which it cannot exist. For if we give our assent to such an imperfect idea, for example a mountain without a corresponding depression, we make a mistake. Of those ideas which are not produced by ourselves, but are adventitious, we may certainly affirm that there is something

external to us which corresponds to them as their *ideatum;* but that this has exactly the qualities which are reflected by our idea of it, cannot be affirmed until a distinction is drawn between *modus rerum* and *modus cogitandi,* what belongs to things and what to the sensible subject. Colour, for instance, like time, does not exist in the objects, but is a condition of the subject, a *modus cogitandi* (Letter to Vatier, of 17 Nov. 1643, ed. Elz. i., *Ep.* 116, ibid. *Ep.* 105). There is no fear of error in regard to innate ideas. They are so bound up with the nature of thought as to be inseparable from it, so that we may say they are the innate power of thought itself. The idea of God, or of ourselves, may accordingly be assented to, as being at once adequate, clear, distinctly known, and innate. Just as there is a difference between the infinite and the limited mind in regard to the understanding, the *intellectus,* which is not a *facultas electiva* (To Buitendijk, 1643, *Epp.* ed. Elz. ii. 10), so is there in regard to the exercise of the will. God has perfect freedom of will. He does not affirm a thing because it is so; on the contrary, it is so because He affirms it. Similarly a thing is good simply because He wills it. Everything, even the eternal verities, is dependent upon God's good pleasure, and therefore His will cannot be conditioned by His intelligence (*Object. sext.*, p. 160. To Mersenne, 20th May, 1630. *Epp.* ed. Elz. i. 111). It is otherwise with man. With him, to believe to be good, is identical with to will (Letter to a Jesuit, 1644, ed. Elz. i. Ep. 116). In regard to God, then, Descartes is a Scotist; in regard to man, he is a Thomist. He does not suffer him, however, to lose his *indifferentia arbitrii.* For we may recollect that we have known something to be good, and therefore desired it; and this recollection may become the motive of an act of will. Thus man, by accustoming himself to act in accordance with what was previously known to be right, may become able to oppose what appears to him at the moment as a good. Nor does this imply any loss of freedom, but rather the gain of a higher freedom than the *æquilibrium arbitrii* (*Resp. sext.*, pp. 160, 161). Descartes conceives of the Divine will as perfect freedom from necessity; but it must not therefore be supposed that he believes freedom from determination to be the highest quality of the human will. Rather, he expressly says (*Medit.* iv.) that indifference is the lowest stage of will, and that the man who

always knew clearly and plainly what was true and good, would never hesitate what to choose. Such a one would be perfectly free, but he would not be indifferent. The highest freedom, and the highest perfection altogether, he considers to be infallibility become habitual.

7. The Cartesian philosophy of mind is substantially enriched, but at the same time modified, by the transition to *Anthropology*, that is, the study of the connection which experience shows to exist between the finite mind and an organic body. However hard it is for Descartes to admit the existence of such a connection, since it was the nature of substances to be mutually exclusive, and thought and extension stand to each other much as fire to ice or black to white (To Mersenne, 8th Jan., 1641); however often he maintains that there is no proof of this connection in reason, but only in sense and experience,—he cannot deny that (in man) a thinking substance, a *mens* or *anima* (for with him the two are identical), exists in connection with a body, and that the two form a unity, though it be only a unity *compositionis* (*Respons. Sext.*, p. 156). The connection between a mind and a body, cannot have its reason in their nature, since this was one of opposition; it must therefore be a supernatural fact, willed by God (*Pcip.*, i. 61). Although in this connection the soul is united to the whole body, yet the union takes place through the medium of a definite organ. This is the *conarion*, the small cone (*gland pineal*) suspended at the point where the vital spirits meet and cross each others' paths. Apart altogether from its position, it is the most suitable organ to serve as the special seat of the soul, because it is not one of those which exist in pairs; and it is important that the soul should feel as a single sensation what is presented to it by the two eyes (*Les Passions*, i. 30). But in spite of this connection between them, the soul cannot really set the body in motion, inasmuch as the production of even the smallest additional quantity of motion would be inconsistent with the first law of nature. Through its influence on the *conarion*, however, it may give another direction to the vital spirits which are already in motion, may guide them (*Respons. quart.*, p. 126), so that its work may be compared to that of the rider, who directs what is really the movement of the horse. In like manner, the affection of the senses and other bodily organs does not really produce any new ideas in the soul; but the movements of the vital spirits,

and the traces which previous movements have left in the brain, like folds in paper, become for the soul occasion and opportunity for calling forth ideas which resemble them (*Notæ ad progr. quodd.*, p. 185). Moreover, as is proved by dreams, and by the fact that pain is sometimes felt in amputated limbs, this occasion is to be traced, not to the affection of the organ of sense, but simply to the movement of the vital spirits, which can also be produced in other ways (Letter to Fromond, Nov., 1637). Further, no ideas are called forth, save those which concern what is sensible. For neither images on the brain (sensations), nor traces of these (recollections), have anything to do with what is intellectual (*Notæ ad progr.*, p. 188). This connection with the body renders it possible, if the soul has an idea, for the vital spirits, by means of the pineal gland, to force their way to the heart through all the pores within the brain and the rest of the body; the oftener it happens, the easier those pores are opened. In this way the sensations are prolonged and strengthened. The result is the condition of affection or passion, in which the ideas are powerful, but are confused owing to the connection with the body—a connection which is not clear to the reason (*Les Passions*, i. 37, 28). Nothing, accordingly, is so destructive of clearness of mind as the passions. Just as ideas were naturally divided into theoretical and practical, perceptions and acts of will, so too the passions may be classified on a similar principle. Among the primary affections, which Descartes assumes to be six in number, a specially theoretical character belongs to wonder (*admiration*), in the case of which the movements of the vital spirits are supposed not to pass beyond the brain (*Les Passions*, ii. 96). In the case of the other five,—love, hate, desire, sorrow, and joy,—the movement forces its way to the heart, is felt there, and is accompanied by a tendency to motions; they are practical (*Les Passions*, ii. 88–101). All the rest, such as hope, fear, and the like, may be deduced from these. As the soul has the power of calling forth ideas, and of giving, by the help of these, a particular direction to the animal spirits, it is able indirectly to subdue the passions, to neutralize the fear of death by the hope of victory. This is a struggle, not between a higher and a lower soul, but between the soul and the vital spirits (*Ibid.*, i. 45, 47). By self-observation and patience, even the weakest soul may succeed in gaining a mastery over the passions, just as we can

tame the largest dog (*Ibid.*, 56). If this be done, the passions themselves become a means of pleasure, and instruments for the attainment of the ends we ought to desire; for the good which the reason recognises has a more powerful influence upon us, if it presents itself at the same time as beautiful, an effect that is produced through the medium of the senses (*Les Passions*, iii. 211. 12; ii. 85). In the mastery over the passions, and the consequent desire for what we know to be right, all moral action consists, a point which is brought out especially in his letters to the Princess Elizabeth and the Queen of Sweden. Its highest reward is the peace of conscience that results from the desire to live a virtuous life.

8. This account of the connection of body and mind, and the moral demands directed not merely to the latter but to the whole man, is very defective, and is further marked by such glaring contradictions, that an attempt to get rid of them was made ere long within the Cartesian school itself. The universal law of nature, that absolutely no fresh motion can arise in the physical world, was subverted even by the minimum of motion which Descartes admits, when he says that the soul sets the *conarion* in motion. And further, the secondary law, that a body continues moving in the same direction, proves that the soul, by giving a fresh direction to the vital spirits, introduces into the body a new and a stronger motion than that of the *spiritus animales* had been. The contradiction is so manifest that when a clear-sighted disciple attempted to get rid of it by a method which Descartes himself had indicated, all the prominent Cartesians readily accepted his views; indeed, we may even confidently assert that Descartes himself would have done so. People accordingly have been quite justified in always regarding Occasionalism as the true Cartesian doctrine. The man who first propounded it, was ARNOLD GEULINCX, or, as it is otherwise spelled, Geulincs, Geulinck, Geulinxc. He lived from 1625 to 1669; and the theory which has made his name immortal, was propounded in his lectures, probably at Louvain, certainly afterwards at Leyden. It is not found in his *Saturnalia seu quæstiones quodlibetales*, Leyden, 1660, nor in the *Logica fundamentis suis restituta*, Leyden, 1662, but it is developed in detail in his Γνῶθι σεαυτὸν, *sive Ethica*, Amst., 1665. I have never been able to get the original edition of this, and know only the one published after his death by Philaretus

(*i.e.* Bontekoe), which was supplemented from the author's MSS., and printed again in 1709 by Flender. I am thus unable to decide whether it is to Geulincx or to Bontekoe that we should ascribe the comparison made in a note, between the body and the soul and two clocks going together. This is usually regarded as an illustration invented by Leibnitz, but H. Ritter has already pointed out that Leibnitz has no right to the credit of having been the first to make it. None of the rest of the works of Geulincx were printed till after his death. Among these are the *Physica vera*, which appeared in 1680 at Leyden, as an appendix to Bontekoe's posthumous works, and the *Annotata præcurrentia* and *Annotata majora in principia Renati Descartes*, which were published at Dortrecht by his admirers in 1690 and 1691. These consist of notes dictated to his hearers; and to them are added by way of supplement a number of academical treatises, which were defended by his pupils under his presidency. Last of all, and also in 1691, there was published the *Metaphysica vera et ad mentem peripateticam*, Amst., 16mo, a work which, after a long search in places at a distance, I found quite close at hand in the library at Jena. He here contrasts the true metaphysic with that of the Peripatetic school.—According to Geulincx, the mutual interaction of body and soul is rendered impossible not merely by their nature as substances and the opposition of their attributes, but by the fact that nothing acts which does not know what it is doing; and one does not know how the movement of his hand comes to pass, nor does the sun know how the impression of light is produced. On the other hand, it cannot be denied that if I will to move my hand, it really does move, and that if the sun shines on my eye, I have an idea of light. In both cases we have to do with something which is inconceivable or even impossible, and which is yet actual, that is, with a marvel. This consists in the omnipotent God employing the opportunity or occasion to move my hand when I exercise my will, and to give me an idea of light when the sun shines. (It is the "occasion, or opportunity," of Descartes, applied, however, not to the soul but to God.) Accordingly, in the view of Geulincx, neither the will nor the impression made on the eye is properly a cause, but merely an occasion, an opportunity (*occasio, causa occasionalis*), a view which for this very reason has been called the system of occasional causes, or Occasionalism. In view of

this inability to produce any change whatever in the external world, it is quite natural that Geulincx should lay down the practical precept: Where I can do nothing, I should will nothing, but submit. The result of this is a system of ethics which, as might be expected in the case of a convert to Calvinism, is remarkable for the most decided contempt of works, and for complete resignation to the will of the Almighty. Humility, which combines the two,—consciousness of our own helplessness, and submission to the Higher Power,—is accordingly declared by Geulincx to be the highest virtue. This agrees well with a statement in the second part of the *Metaphysics*, to the effect that we are modes of the Divine Mind, and that if we imagine the modes removed, we have God. As has been already indicated, this very statement is found almost word for word in a letter of Descartes' (i. 103, ed. Elz.), and prevents us from drawing a hard and fast line between Occasionalism and Cartesianism. On the other hand, in the *Physics* of Geulincx there occurs a statement which, as it had been already denied by Descartes, must be regarded as an addition to his doctrines. As our Ego is properly not a *mens*, but merely *aliquid mentis*, that is, participates in God as the only *mens*, so there is properly only one *corpus*, extended matter; and the so-called bodies participate in it, each being properly merely *aliquid corporis*. Consequently there are not, as with Descartes, two kinds of substances, but really only two substances; his *mentes et corpora* are replaced here by *Mens* (*Deus*) *et corpus* (*materia*). If one takes the view that will be adopted in this work, and regards Spinoza as the logical outcome of Cartesianism, it is interesting to note how Descartes, Geulincx, and Malebranche respectively occupy the stages that lead to the position of Spinoza, and especially how Geulincx stands midway between the opposing attitudes of Descartes and Malebranche (*vid.* § 269, 3, 270). According to Descartes, God is infinite thought, in which minds participate, but not infinite extension, of which bodies are modes. Conversely, Malebranche makes bodies modifications of infinite (*i.e.* Divine) extension, while he regards minds as having a substantial existence, and not as merely participating. According to Geulincx, both minds and spirits are modifications; and he would have been in complete agreement with Spinoza, had not his dualism led him to believe in two substances, instead of in one.

§ 268.

Reception of Cartesianism.

1. The progressive mind must always be prepared for the criticism of those who lag behind; and accordingly Descartes had to be ready to meet a host of attacks. He and his school adopted the dictum of Bruno and Bacon (*vid.* § 249, 5), that it is really we who are the ancients, and looked down somewhat contemptuously on antiquity; nor did he estimate the Middle Ages more highly, for he talks of Scholasticism as merely an exercise for the youthful mind; where he mentions the method of Bacon, he regards it as a preliminary one, and Hobbes is treated by him as a man who was completely ignorant of physics, and whose knowledge of political science, if somewhat more extensive, was thoroughly unsound. This position of superiority was of necessity assumed by the thinker who began the series of efforts which, by assigning a true position to both the theology of mediæval thought and the naturalism of antiquity, have produced effects not merely differing from, but transcending the results of the two earlier periods. Foreseeing that there would be no lack of objections, he deliberately invited these before the issue of his principal work, in order that he might publish his replies at the same time. It is a remarkable coincidence, that in these seven sets of objections almost all the points of view are represented, which Descartes abandons as being inadequate. In the first place, as regards *Antiquity*, the most prominent contemporary of Descartes among the champions of ancient systems (*vid. supra* § 236–239) was Gassendi. The fifth set of objections are from him; and, as a matter of course, they exhibit a strong preference for the empirical point of view. In the account of the *Middle Ages*, a distinction was drawn between the patristic period, the scholastic period, and the period of transition; and Augustine was indicated as marking the zenith of the first of these (§ 144), Thomas Aquinas of the second (§ 203). The doctrines of all three periods were summoned into the field against Cartesianism. The philosophy of Augustine, to which Arnauld gives expression (in the third set of objections), protests, however, in the friendliest terms, for this too had shown some leaning towards pantheism, and Arnauld is almost persuaded to be a Cartesian. The protest of Thomism, on the contrary, is expressed much more bitterly. This makes itself heard in the seventh set of

objections, those of the Jesuit Bourdin, who, however, in his eagerness to crush the common foe, condescends to borrow weapons of attack even from Scotus, and thus appears as the representative of the whole scholastic period. Just as Descartes was here reproached with becoming a pagan, because he did not follow scholasticism closely enough, so exactly the opposite charge was made in the second and sixth sets of objections, which Mersenne had collected. Descartes is here regarded as an adherent of the ontological argument, that shibboleth of the scholastic mode of thought, and is treated from a point of view that has already been described (§ 267, 1) as a sceptically-tinged toleration towards all philosophical opinions. From the days of Montaigne this had been the attitude of mind adopted by educated Frenchmen. The philosophy of Hobbes (§ 256) has been represented as transcending this merely worldly wisdom, and as forming one of the culminating points of the period of transition, in contrast to mysticism which forms the other. Its author gives expression to his views in the third set of objections, where he of course finds fault with whatever runs counter to his naturalism. But Descartes was attacked also from the other culminating point, mysticism; not indeed in the objections which he himself collected and published, but in the letters which Henry More exchanged with him. Although this thinker, chiefly under the influence of Jacob Boehme, declared against Cartesianism, in doing so he expressed opinions which prove that he really occupied a more advanced position and belonged to the succeeding period (*vid. infra*, § 278, 2). Lastly, in the period of transition we mentioned those who, like Melanchthon for example, represented the Protestant spirit in the sphere of religion, although in philosophy they were thoroughly mediæval. This school of thinkers, too, sent its champion in the person of Voet. Most people know him only from his controversy with Descartes, and accordingly judge him as unfairly as any one would do who was ready to form an idea of the character of Luther and Melanchthon from their relation to Schwenckfeld, or conversely. More violent attacks, carried on with weapons other than those of science, were subsequently made upon Descartes, but not until his philosophy had found an echo in wider circles.

2. As may be imagined, it was in Holland that this first

came to pass. The University of Utrecht especially has earned the distinction of being the first place where, to quote Descartes' own phrase, "our philosophy" was taught. Its earliest advocate was Cyprian Renery, who had become acquainted with Descartes and with his doctrines in Deventer. As a professor at Utrecht, he helped to spread his master's views, and further was instrumental in bringing about the appointment of Henricus Regius (le Roi) as Professor of Medicine there. After the death of Renery, in 1639, the latter came to be regarded as the chief apostle of the new doctrine. His enthusiasm attracted the younger generation, but succeeded in calling forth the reaction of Voet, and through numerous paradoxes brought all sorts of annoyances on Descartes, who ultimately separated himself formally from his disciple. (This circumstance led me, in my work already referred to, into the error of ascribing to this Utrecht professor a book which at that time I did not know: *Cartesius verus Spinozismi architectus*, written by a different Regius.) What had happened at Utrecht, happened at Leyden. There Professors Heerebord and Raey were the first representatives of Cartesian doctrines. Their teaching gave rise to the reaction of Revius and others, and consequently to certain University regulations, concerning which Descartes believed himself bound to make complaint. But in spite of them Cartesianism continued to flourish in this University, as is proved by the names of Wittich, Heidanus, Geulincx, and Volder. In Amsterdam Cartesianism was represented by the physician, Ludwig Meyer, whose book: *Philosophia Sacræ Scripturæ interpres*, attracted great attention, and who has since become still more famous as the friend of Spinoza and the editor of his works (*vid.* § 272).* The new philosophy soon made its way into Gröningen through Meresius and Gousset, but especially through the German Tobias Andreæ (1604–1674). Franeker could boast of Alexander Roellius, and also of Ruard Andala (1665–1727), who in his: *Cartesius verus Spinozismi eversor*, Franeker, 1717, 4to, defended Cartesianism against more extreme developments. At the two latter Universities, Balthasar Bekker was educated. Born in 1634, he distinguished himself first by a defence of Cartesianism (*De philosophia Cartesiana admo-*

* It has recently been discovered that, not Meyer, but Schuller was the Editor of the *Opera Posthuma*, *v.* § 272, 1, *note*.—Ed.

nitio candida et sincera. Franek., 1668), then by his attacks on superstition in his work on comets, and in a very special degree in his *Betoverde Weereld* (*The World Bewitched*). In this work, which first appeared in Dutch in 1691, and was afterwards translated into many languages, he argues from the impossibility of mind exercising an influence on corporeal matter, to the absurdity of all belief in witchcraft and demons. The world is a world of nature, not of magic. He was a Doctor of Divinity and a clergyman at Amsterdam, and had to undergo much persecution on account of this work. Expelled from the Church, he joined the communion of French Reformers, and died in the year 1698. The number of works that this book called forth is very great. At Breda, Pollat and Schuler taught the philosophy of Descartes. In short, Cartesianism predominated more or less in the professorial teaching of all the Dutch Universities, and an immense number of writings were published in its defence. The Cartesians were opposed by the orthodox theologians, who were at the same timeengaged in controversy with the dissenting theologians (Arminians and Cocceians). This circumstance, as might have been expected, drew together the two parties who were attacked by a common enemy; and the result was, that eventually hardly any distinction was made between a Cartesian and an enemy of the Church. They had to submit to being called Jesuits or Cocceians, according to the term which seemed more opprobrious to their adversary for the time being; and even ecclesiastical councils, like that of Dort, sat in judgment on the new philosophy.

3. Descartes' doctrines did not establish themselves in his native country until somewhat later than in Holland; but when they did do so, they took a deeper hold. Only in this case it was not in the Universities, for these were closed against them, but in other institutions, that their fate was decided. The first movement was among the clerical Orders. There was none of these to which Descartes was so well disposed as to the Order of the Jesuits, and there was none whose good opinion he valued more highly. Although the provincial superior of the Order, Dinet, had been his friend since his days at La Flèche, and although Pères Vatet and Mesland were even his decided adherents, still the Order declared against him. The immediate occasion of this was a second explanation of transubstantiation, which has been already referred to;

the real reason was perhaps that the Jansenists, and especially their stronghold Port-Royal, decided for Cartesianism. (The *Port-Royal Logic* [*L'Art de Penser*], composed by Arnauld and Nicole in 1662, with the assistance of a work of Pascal, has been universally regarded as the Cartesian text-book.) The Cartesians were now reproached, as the Jansenists had been, with being Calvinists—a charge that stands in strange contrast with that of being Jesuits, preferred against them by the Dutch Calvinists. What happened on similar occasions, happened here. The foe of the foe was regarded and treated as a friend. Gassendi had opposed the teaching of Descartes, and he was accordingly taken into favour by the Jesuits. His doctrines were not put under a ban at the Universities, nor were his works placed on the *Index librorum prohibitorum.* Both of these indignities were inflicted on Cartesianism at the instigation of the Jesuits, who brought the Head of the Church into a position similar to that when Papal bulls were issued to protect Averroism against those who discovered its anti-Christian character (*vid. supra*, § 238). The patronage extended to the followers of Gassendi by the Jesuits, and further by the Universities, gave a new impulse to their teaching. Even the Parliament of Paris was almost misled by the Jesuits into committing itself to a position hostile to Descartes. His relation to some of the clerical Congregations existing at that time, was much more friendly than to the Order of the Jesuits. Especially was this the case in regard to the Congregation of the Oratory, whose founder, Cardinal Berulle, had been one of the earliest to regard Descartes with favour. His personal friends Gibieuf and La Barde belonged to it, and it was soon to produce Malebranche. Other Congregations followed this example. Added to this was the good-will which such prominent ecclesiastics as Cardinal Retz, Fénélon, and Bossuet showed to Cartesianism. Another circumstance that had an important influence in spreading the new ideas, was, that in some of the free academies, of which Paris had at that time a great number, academic prelections were held for the members, and public discourses for whoever cared to hear; and there the doctrines of Cartesianism were expounded. Among these, great attention was aroused by the lectures of Rohault, especially upon physics, and still more by those of his pupil and successor, Pierre Silvain Regis (1632–1707), who taught Cartesianism first in Toulouse and Montpellier, and afterwards in Paris,

and who was long looked upon as the first representative of the philosophy in its pure form. His *Cours entier de Philosophie* treats of logic in one book, of metaphysics in three, of physics in eight, and of ethics in three. As early as 1691 a second edition of it appeared (Amsterd., Huguetan, iii. vols. 4to). But what contributed more than anything else to the spread of the doctrine, was the interest which was taken in it by members of the most various classes of society. The advocate, Claude de Clerselier, who came to know Descartes shortly before his departure for Sweden, was so devoted to him that he afterwards appears as the principal translator of his Latin writings, and is also associated with the physician Louis de la Forge in the publication of the *Posthuma* of Descartes. Gentlemen of rank, like the Prince of Condé and the Duke of Luynes, would not let themselves be outdone by the scholars. The letters of Madame de Sévigné show the interest which intellectual women took in these doctrines; and the interest taken in them by those who were not intellectual appears from the comedies of Molière, who was a follower of Gassendi and therefore an opponent of the Cartesians. The *Egoists*, too, who appealed to Cartesian principles, are worthy of mention. This word, which up to the middle of last century had not the obnoxious moral meaning which is associated with it now, denotes here an adherent of the view that nothing exists save the Ego. The number of these "Solipsists" (as they were called later, although in the eighteenth century, with Baumgarten for example, "Solipsism" means exactly what is called egoism nowadays) seems to have been considerable. This we infer from Buffier, who attempted to refute their views. But, as early as the time of Reid (*vid.* § 292, 4), it was very difficult to get hold of any of their writings. The *Mémoires* of Trevoux (1713) mention a follower of Malebranche who held such opinions. It is perfectly evident that an extreme subjective idealism must take as its starting-point the certainty of one's own existence, as established by Descartes, and, on the other hand, that this starting-point may lead to such a result.

4. From Holland, Cartesianism spread to Germany. The Westphalian Johann Clauberg, born in 1622, and educated at Gröningen under Andreæ and at Leyden under Raey, was on most friendly terms with the Cartesians in France. He taught first in Herborn and afterwards in Duisburg, where he

died on Jan. 31st, 1665, after doing his best in his *Defensio Cartesiana* to defend his master against Revius at Leyden and Lentulus at Herborn. While in his logic he is a forerunner of the *Art de Penser* and in his physics of Occasionalism, he approaches very near Malebranche and Spinoza in his treatise on the knowledge of God. In his eulogy on the German language, again, he reminds one of Leibnitz, and in suggesting for metaphysics the names "*ontosophy*" or "ontology," he gave a hint of which Wolff (*vid.* § 290, 4) afterwards took advantage. Clauberg's collected works were published by Schalbruch, Amsterd., 1691, 4to. The Marburg statutes of 1653 contain a warning against Cartesianism, a proof that it had already found its way thither; in theology it was represented by Reinhold Pauli, in medicine by Waldschmied, and in philosophy by Horch. In 1673 Professor Kahler managed to introduce it into Giessen by means of a book, the title of which sounded like an attack against it. Cartesianism spread to Berlin through Chauvain (born 1640), who was actively engaged there as a preacher of the French Reformed Church, as professor at the French College, and lastly as editor of the *Nouveau Journal des Savans*. At Frankfort-on-the-Oder, Johann Placentius, a mathematician, wrote: *Renatus Cartesius triumphans*. At Bremen, Daniel Lipstorpius composed his: *Specimina philosophiæ Cartesianæ;* and there too Eberhard Schwebing refuted Huet's treatise against Descartes. In the Royal Institute at Halle Sperlette based his teaching upon writings of Cartesians; from Altorf, where the new views were represented by Petermann (1649-1703) and Sturm, they passed to Leipsic with the former. There they were afterwards advocated also by Michael Rhegenius and Gabriel Wagner. In 1677 T. Wagner says of Tübingen in his *Examen atheismi speculativi*, that no University suffers from a more dreadful visitation of Cartesianism. The records of Jena in 1697 contain a similar statement.

5. What Holland had done for Germany, France did for Switzerland, England, and Italy. Cartesianism was introduced into the first-named country by Rob. Chouet, who had been educated at Nîmes, and who was a professor at Saumur and afterwards at Geneva. But it did not flourish long there, for Geneva very early declared for the empiricism of Locke, which everywhere drove Descartes from the field. Descartes' doctrines were transferred to England, chiefly through Ant.

Legrand, a Franciscan born in the beginning of the seventeenth century. He devoted his *Institutiones philosophiæ*, a book that has been often reprinted, to the propagation of a doctrine which in his *Apology* (1679) he boldly defended against the theological zeal of Samuel Parker, bishop of Oxford. Samuel Clarke afterwards passed completely over to the other camp; but when he resolved to translate Rohault's *Physics*, he appears to have been more favourably inclined to Cartesianism than he was when he wrote the notes to it (*vid.* § 281, 2). Those English thinkers who afterwards adhered to Cartesianism instead of following Locke, adopted it rather as modified by Malebranche than in its original form. Among these was John Norris (1667-1711). Lastly, as regards Italy, Cartesianism found here too a footing in spite of papal censure. Especially was this the case in Naples, where it was represented by Thomaso Cornelio, born in 1614, Bornelli, born in 1608, Gregorio Caloprese, and Paolo Mattia Doria, who had come thither from Genoa. Its most characteristic advocate, however, was Michael Angelo Fardella (1650-1711), who was educated at Paris and wrought for the new philosophy in Modena, Venice, Padua, and lastly in Naples. In addition to being assailed here as everywhere else by the empiricism of the eighteenth century, Cartesianism in Naples had also to defend itself against the attacks of Giovanni Battista Vico, who was held in such honour there. The point which specially excited his hostility, was the contempt that the Cartesians affected for history and all positive knowledge. Huët had made a similar complaint, to the effect that the Cartesians wished to bring barbarism back again. One of the last and most zealous Cartesians of Italy was Cardinal Gerdil (1718-1802), who played the same *rôle* there that Fontenelle and Mairan played in France. The two latter, however, who occupied in succession the post of secretary of the French Academy, represent the development of Cartesianism,—Fontenelle following Leibnitz and Mairan Spinoza,—while Gerdil, adhering to Malebranche, held it more nearly in its original form.

§ 269.

Transition.

1. The starting-point of Cartesianism necessarily leads to an extreme dualism, in which any action of mind on body or

of body on mind is an impossibility. Necessarily; for if mind essentially consists in a negative relation to the external world (in mere Being-by-itself, in doubting, and so on), it naturally follows that its opposite is the negative of mind (hence, mere Being-outside-itself, extension). The introduction of the idea of God puts an end to this dualism. The original doubt is refuted. The external world reveals itself to the mind, and it becomes possible and certain that the mind by the direction of movements can make its way into the external world. The fact that Descartes makes the doubting Ego and the Deity the fundamental principles of his philosophy, agrees very well with what was indicated above (§ 259) as the peculiar characteristic of a system of modern philosophy. The former, the starting-point, is the *principium cognoscendi;* the latter, the terminus, is the *principium essendi.* Both really show, as was demanded in the § above referred to, the relation that subsists between the two sides that are to be reconciled. They do this in entirely opposite ways, inasmuch as the former declares that the two sides are mutually exclusive, while the latter maintains that it is not so. In spite of this, however, the latter conclusion necessarily follows from the former. The result of the doubt was, to show that the two sides were mutually exclusive. Now, since, according to Descartes, the nature of substance consists in this exclusiveness, it naturally follows that those two, as excluding each other, are thought of as substances. But if both are thought of as substances, they have, as Descartes himself says, this very element in common. The meeting-point lies in their existence as substances; and as soon as the notion of substance is strictly taken, their exclusiveness must give way to their community. But it is not strictly taken until the conception of the Deity is introduced; indeed, "properly speaking," He is the only substance. Before the Deity, then, the negative relation of the two sides vanishes; the external world opens up to the thinking Ego, and is no longer closed against the realization of its ends.

2. Another result, however, also follows. If it is the nature of substances to be mutually exclusive, things which are no longer mutually exclusive can no longer be thought of as substances. Starting from the position which assigned substantial existence to individual minds and bodies, we are bound to conclude that they have none at all. This contra-

diction between premises and conclusion is unavoidable if we adopt the Cartesian point of view. If it were fully and clearly realized, it would demand and find a solution. It was not until a later age that it became necessary to express this contradiction in the pointed form of the dilemma: "Either I am, and then God is not, or God is, and I am not." But before an individual philosopher (Schelling, *vid.* § 314, 2) could thus distinctly formulate the problem for solution, the spirit of philosophy must first have learned by experience that wholly antagonistic views of the world really existed. Spinoza, in the spirit of the seventeenth century, kept firm hold of the conclusion of Cartesianism, that is, of the second part of Schelling's dilemma; while, in accordance with the tendency of the eighteenth, the thinkers of the "Enlightenment" made the Ego the central point of their systems, and decided for the former of the two alternatives. As the "epoch-making" philosopher, Descartes combined both views, although he left the contradiction unsolved, just because he did not see it clearly. Spinozism, accordingly, appears as the natural development of Cartesianism; and yet it was to Descartes that its opponents in the eighteenth century, almost without exception, professed adherence. Similarly it would not be difficult to show that both the realism and the nominalism of the Middle Ages might justly claim descent from Erigena.

3. Although it is only a clear consciousness of this contradiction that can lead to its solution, a vague feeling of its presence may suggest a way of avoiding it. The difference between the two is, that in the former the claims of both the opposing sides are fully recognised, while in the latter only one of them is firmly maintained. This means of escape lay too near the position which Descartes had reached, not to be seized upon. To arrive at a conclusion which is opposed to the point from which one started, means, however, virtually to give the latter up. If this be done not merely virtually but actually, a position is reached which involves no contradiction. As soon as we take strictly the dictum that there is, properly speaking, only one substance, we deny a substantial existence both to thinking subjects and to extended objects. Descartes himself, in virtue of a feeling of this sort, is always on the point of taking the step to pantheism. What we are bound to censure him for, is the want of thoroughness which makes him retract deductions drawn from his theories, or

weaken them by distinctions, and the want of fairness he shows in treating one of the two opposite elements differently from the other. His school is characterized by the same faults. As regards the first, viz. his want of thoroughness, while admitting that, properly speaking, God alone is substance, he qualifies this by saying that there are things of which substance may be predicated, though not *univoce* with God. These are "created" substances, and inasmuch as what is created is re-created every moment, this means with him substances which do not subsist for a single moment. As regards his want of fairness, he makes a distinction between the world of mind and the world of matter, that is quite inconsistent with his dualism. For he says of the former: "If we imagine the limits removed, we have infinite thought, that is, God." (From this is deduced by simple conversion the proposition, also laid down by himself and by Geulincx: "If we impose limits on infinite thought, we have individual minds.") But yet he does not venture to assert, what is equally justifiable: "If we imagine the limits removed from the world of matter, we have infinite extension, that is, God." Nor can it be said that no conclusion is to be drawn from his silence on this point. He maintains that it is only of minds, not of bodies, that our knowledge can be clear, and independent of the help of the imagination. This shows that he cannot admit that our knowledge of matter stands in the same relation to our knowledge of what is most evident of all, God, as our knowledge of mind does, *i.e.*, that it is of such a kind that the knowledge of the finite can be deduced from the knowledge of the infinite. So, too, it was only from the existence of mind, that we could reason back to the existence of God. Thus it is minds alone that Descartes comes near to regarding as modes of infinite thought; he does not attribute this modal character to bodies. What he, a physicist, did not venture to maintain in regard to matter, one of his followers, who was a clergyman and a theologian, maintained, not of mind, but of matter.

SECOND DIVISION.

Malebranche.

§ 270.

1. NICOLAS MALEBRANCHE was born in Paris on August 6th, 1638. In 1660 he entered the congregation of the Oratory, founded by Cardinal Berulle, and was there converted to Cartesianism, which had already commended itself to the founder of the Congregation. His chief work: *De la Recherche de la Vérité*, appeared in 1674. It was in two volumes; later editions, of which six were published in his own life-time, are arranged in four. This was followed by: *Conversations Chrétiennes*, 1677, occasioned by theological attacks, and undertaken at the request of the Duke of Chevreuil. In a letter to Leibnitz, however, he disclaims the authorship of these, and ascribes them to the Abbé Catelan, and the *Méditations Métaphysiques* to the Abbé de Lanion. His differences with the Cartesian Quesnel, who otherwise had a very great respect for him, drew Arnauld into the controversy. With the latter, Malebranche fell out completely, as the result of the publication of his *Traité de la Nature et de la Grâce*, 1680. The *Méditations Chrétiennes et Métaphysiques*, 1683, roused much opposition, especially since in them the "Word," or universal reason, as mediator between the disputants, came forward to defend Malebranche's doctrines. The *Traité de Morale* appeared in 1684, the *Entretiens sur la Métaphysique et sur la Religion* in 1688, the *Traité de l'Amour de Dieu* in 1697, the *Entretiens d'un Philosophe Chrétien avec un Philosophe Chinois* in 1708, and the *Réflexions sur la Prémotion Physique* in 1715. As almost all his writings were exposed to a host of attacks, he also composed many controversial treatises. These are contained partly in the later editions of his works, partly in a four-volume collection which he prepared in 1709. In 1715 he fell ill in consequence, it is supposed, of a metaphysical discussion with Berkeley, and died on the 15th of October in that year. A collected edition of his works appeared at Paris: *Œuvres Complètes*, etc., xi. vols., 12mo, 1712.

2. In giving an account of Malebranche's philosophy, we shall be quite justified in confining ourselves to his chief work, the *Search for Truth*. The contents of his other

writings, with the exception of: *Entret. sur la Mét. et sur la Religion*, are almost exclusively of theological interest; and where he varies from his chief work he often appears to have become inconsistent, through dread of Jansenist and other heresies. Although many of these inconsistencies, such as his polemic against Quesnel and Arnauld, gained him the momentary applause of the Jesuits, still men who followed him closely, like the Benedictine Dom François Lami, saw that he was repudiating truths upon which his own doctrines rested. The end which Malebranche set before himself in his chief work, was first to discover the sources of all our errors (Books 1–5), and then to show how these can be avoided (Book 6). Like Descartes, he recognises an opposition between knowledge and will,—an opposition to which he finds a parallel in the capacity of extended things for being formed and for being moved,—and assigns to the latter the assent without which error would be impossible. Still following Descartes, he next distinguishes sense, imagination, and understanding in the theoretical part of conduct, and inclinations and passions in the practical part. Understanding and inclination he supposes to belong to mind as such, and the three others only to mind when united with a body. Keeping to the above order, and devoting a book to each, he now inquires in how far these five may become occasions of error.

3. The twenty chapters of the *first book*, which treat of the senses, start from the proposition that these have been given to us in order to help to preserve the body. It is in accordance with this purpose that they give us information, not so much in regard to the nature of things, as in regard to the relation of things to us. A distinction must be observed between three things which most people confuse:—the motion and configuration of the body that affects us, the concussion which the organ of sense, the nerves, and their vital spirits experience, and lastly the sensation, which does not lie in the object, nor in the body, but in our soul. If this be duly observed, it will be easy to make a proper use of the senses, for example when we feel a burn, to remove the burnt place from the fire, but to distrust them where they wish to mislead us into passing judgment on the nature of things. This nature of things is not revealed to us through the senses, but through thought, which tells us that the nature of things consists in extension, while most people believe it to consist

in the qualities warm, yellow, soft, and so on, which really exist only in our own soul. Those who understand by matter, as most do, merely the sum of these qualities, are fully justified in questioning whether any matter exists outside of ourselves. The *second book* treats of the imagination; its twenty-two chapters are divided into three parts (eight, eight, and six). The ideas (phantasms) of the imaginative faculty are, like sensations, merely conditions of the soul. They are distinguished from sensations, inasmuch as the concussions of the vital spirits which occasion them, are not called forth by the organs of sense being affected, but arise, voluntarily or involuntarily, in the central parts of the body. What Malebranche says further on this point, is in part extremely interesting, but is marked by nothing characteristic.

4. In this latter respect the *third book* forms a contrast to what precedes it. It is divided into fifteen chapters, of which four belong to the first and eleven to the second part, and treats of the understanding or pure spirit, as opposed to spirit in union with the body. The nature of spirit consists in thought, which is inseparable from spirit as extension is from body. It always thinks, and never thinks more in one instant than in another. Thought and consciousness here coincide so completely, that sometimes, instead of spirit or soul, he speaks of "this Ego" (*ce moi*). By the help of thought the spirit can get rid of everything else—of feeling and imagination, which are modifications of thought, and even of will, which is its accompaniment; only thought itself remains. The first object of thought is God, the Infinite Being or, what is the same thing, Being in general, Existence without any limitation, which for this very reason is not an individual being. This infinite being, which it would be an absurdity to think of as non-existent, is the first and absolute Intelligible. To form a correct conception of it, it will not do to regard one side of it only, as they do who call God a spirit. This is correct so far as He is not a body. But just as little is He a spirit in the sense in which man is. We must beware of making God in the image of man. In God are all perfections, including that in which bodies participate and of which they are modifications—extension, the infinity of which is a proof that it cannot be predicated of merely finite things. In its entirety and infinity it is called by Malebranche intelligible extension. God, as uniting in Himself all perfections, is His own object

and His own end; in the former respect, He manifests Himself as wisdom, in the latter as love to Himself. Both are inseparable from His nature; and accordingly God knows and loves Himself to all eternity, necessarily and unchangeably. Since everything which exists, exists solely through participation in being in general, everything is contained intelligibly (that is, as an idea) in the wisdom of God, or His knowledge of Himself; and the intelligible existence or idea of a thing is nothing else than a participation in, or modification of, one of the Divine perfections. The ideas of things, that is, the nature of things as God beholds it within Himself, exhibit accordingly a regular succession, in which, for example, the idea of body contains less perfection than that of spirit. Just as God sees within Himself the ideas or entities, so He sees all their relations to one another, that is, all truths. Both of these, as they unite to form the Divine wisdom, are of course as independent of God's good pleasure, as His own existence is; they are necessary and eternal. To do as Descartes did, and make them something quite arbitrary, means to declare that all science is impossible (cf. *Eclaircissem.* x.). The ideas of things are also an object of human thought, where it is real knowledge. People very often confuse ideas with impressions, or with mental images which have been called forth by these, and which do not in any way resemble the eternal prototypes of things. Or again, since it is by our own will that we make ideas present to ourselves, it is sometimes supposed that they are produced by us. The state of the case rather is, that our will is merely the occasion for their presence. Properly speaking, they do not exist in us, but we exist in that which the ideas unite to compose, the wisdom of God or Himself, which, or who, contains the spirits of men, just as space contains bodies. The ideas of things accordingly, are always present to us; we simply do not notice their presence, because we direct our attention to what passes away. If we turn away, and refuse to be distracted by the objects of sense, we again become conscious of the ideas. To know things means, then, to see their ideas, that is, themselves in God, who sees them eternally within Himself, and allows us to participate in this seeing of His, or enlightens us. Besides the infinite Being, of whom we have an idea that is, not perfect, indeed, but clear and distinct, the physical world is an object of our knowledge. If we do not confusedly

ascribe to bodies what belongs not to them but to ourselves, we cannot regard them as anything but various limitations of infinite extension. To look upon them in this light, means to know them in their ideas, or, what is the same thing, to see them in God, since all our ideas are only limitations of the idea of God. Accordingly, there is a scientific and purely rational knowledge of bodies; and Malebranche has no doubt that physics will one day rest upon the same evidence that geometry does. This is the most suitable place to insert the propositions in which Malebranche gives an account of his *Physics*. These are contained in the second part of the *sixth book*. In regard to what constitutes their nature, extension, bodies are of course all alike. They become different from one another through the interference of motion, in which alone consists even the distinction between the living and the dead. Since motion does not lie in the nature of matter, it is imparted to it by God, and lasts just so long as God continues to impart it, or wills it. But because God Himself is one and unchangeable, unchangeableness and simplicity are necessarily predicated of the laws of nature, *i.e.* of motion. That God everywhere employs the simplest means, is with Malebranche an established axiom, to which he continually returns; especially is this the case in his theories of evil and of providence. God could not have lessened the number of evils, except in a very complicated way. Herein consists Malebranche's optimism or faith in Divine justice, which explains his delight at Leibnitz's theological views (*vid.* § 288, 7), a delight which found expression in his letters to Leibnitz, published by Cousin. Similarly, he believes that providence must be limited to what is general, *i.e.*, to that for which the simplest methods suffice. Both theories drew down upon him many attacks. Since motion is imparted to bodies from without, he urges that one body does not communicate its motion to another, but that God takes it from the one and gives it to the other. This was also the reason why in his physical philosophy, which is quite as mechanical as that of Descartes, and in which he carries the theory of vortices still further by applying it to the particles of the first element, he differed in an essential point from his master. In a work written thirty years later than the *Recherche*, he attributes the errors in the laws of motion which Descartes laid down, and the untenability of his fundamental proposition, that the sum

of motion always remains the same, to the fact that he conceived of rest as a positive power, and not as a mere privation. This implies the censure, that a peculiar power is assigned to bodies, and the exclusive causality of God denied. The latter is emphasized by Malebranche, as it had been by Descartes, in the formula of Augustine, that preservation is continual creation. In the fact that he is in agreement both with the great father of the Church and with the epoch-making philosopher, he finds an ever-fresh proof of that agreement between philosophy and religion which he tries to establish in many of his writings. At the point where, as already indicated (*vid.* § 144, 4), Augustinism approaches pantheism, Malebranche feels it necessary, when he afterwards becomes acquainted with Spinoza, to state explicitly the difference between their doctrines. According to him, he says in the *Entretiens*, the *universum* is in God; according to Spinoza, God is *in universo.*

5. The result of the superior rank which Malebranche assigns to spirits as compared with bodies is, that his mental philosophy does not, like that of Descartes, form an exact parallel to his physics. God, he says, and perhaps we ourselves in a future life, can conceive of spirits in God or through ideas, that is, as modifications of infinite thought. Then we shall have a perfectly clear and distinct knowledge of them. At present this is not the case. We know of our own existence only through an inward, and a very confused feeling; so that the Cartesians maintain just the opposite of the truth, when they say that spirits are better known to us than bodies. It is not so with our own spirit, much less then with those of others, the existence and character of which we can only infer by conjecture. It was probably his consciousness of the worth of the redeemed Christian soul, that made him afterwards condemn Spinoza so utterly. For in the pantheism of the latter, spirits become modifications of infinite thought, exactly as with Malebranche bodies became limitations of extension. And yet, as Mairan points out to him in the interesting letters published by Cousin, Malebranche, not only in his "intelligible matter," but elsewhere too, approaches very near to what so roused his wrath in the writings of that "*misérable.*" Especially is this the case in the *fourth book.* Here he treats in thirteen chapters of the practical side of pure spirit, or its natural motions, the inclinations. Just as

our knowledge consists in our participation in the ideas or eternal truths, so too the exercise of our will consists in our being carried along by the love with which God loves. This love has only God Himself for its object, since God loves things only so far as He loves Himself; and so all our will is really love to God. There is no exercise of will at all, which would not involve love to the *bien en général*, to happiness. But as God is the good in general, just as He was existence in general, and as happiness lies in Him alone, even the most perverse exercise of will is always love to God, mistaken love though it may be. Whence these mistakes arise, how they can attach themselves to love for the good in general, to love for our own well-being, and lastly to love for others—all this is explained in great detail in this book. We do not need to enter particularly into the explanation; here too the injunction continually recurs, to approve only of what is quite clearly known.

6. The *fifth book* treats, in twelve chapters, of the passions. He passes on to this subject with the remark that the spirit, besides its connection with God, by which it participates in God's knowledge and in His love to Himself, stands to the body in a relation which is no less essential and necessary. We have not a clear and rational knowledge of this connection, as we have of that with God; we know of it only through an *instinct de sentiment*. Still it subsists; nor is it to be regarded as a consequence of the Fall, although it must be admitted that the inclination to submit entirely to the dominion of the senses, has become greater since then. It was God that united the spirit with the body, but the spirit is itself responsible for its state of subjection. God has not ordered this connection, as many suppose, in such a way that, in consequence of it, the body exerts influence on the soul and the soul on the body, for that would be an utter impossibility. He has rather so ordered it, that on the occasion of our exercising our will, He moves our arm. He has pledged Himself to do this, and He raises our arm, even if our will be contrary to His commands. *Semel jussit semper paret.* (Malebranche's arguments for Occasionalism are often almost word for word in agreement with those of Geulincx; because he contributed so much to the diffusion of this theory, he is still regarded in many quarters as the author of it.) We saw that through this connection with the body, a distinction arises between

pure ideas and those which are mingled with the products of sense and imagination. Corresponding to this, there is a distinction between the purely mental or spiritual inclinations, and the raising of these to passions through the movement of the vital spirits. Not merely in this definition, but also in the arrangement of the passions, Malebranche is in complete agreement with Descartes. Wonder, in which, according to both, the concussion of the vital spirits does not reach the outer parts of the body, is called by Malebranche an imperfect passion, the others are called real passions. All are traced back to love and aversion as the *passions mères*, in fact, properly speaking, to love alone, since aversion is inconceivable without love. With express reference to what had been said of the senses, the purpose of the passions is declared to be to serve the economy of the body. They free the soul from the care of the body, and give it time to occupy itself with higher things. In this, as in the former case, the soul falls into errors, through giving its assent without clear knowledge, and through making no distinction between what is familiar (*familier*) and what is thoroughly known (*clair*). Malebranche, accordingly, as little as Descartes, admits the existence of innocent error. But, as might be expected from the religious tendency of his teaching, he insists much more strongly upon the conclusion that freedom from error is identical with deliverance from sin, in other words, is enlightenment. There could be no difficulty in accepting such a conclusion, since God was "the place of all spirits."

7. In the *sixth book*, which falls into two parts of five and nine chapters respectively, he treats of the *method* of seeking for truth. Here he again insists that the only real cause is God, that we know only because He enlightens us, and feel only because He modifies our thought; he then goes on to point out that all depends upon one thing—we must give our assent only to that to which we cannot refuse it without being reproached by our reason. Inattention and narrowness of mind are therefore the greatest enemies of truth. Rules are given, how both ought to be met; and it is repeatedly pointed out how these have been followed by Descartes and neglected by Aristotle. In this book, too, the thought several times re-appears, that since there is only one end for God, namely Himself, our destiny can only be to know Him and to love Him. Knowledge of the truth, such as is attained in mathe-

matics and metaphysics, and the wish to act virtuously, are accordingly means to lead us to the highest end, to union with God. That this end may be reached by all, even by the spiritually gross and coarse, for whom the senses are the highest authority, God has condescended to make Himself comprehensible even to the senses. For fools, He has Himself become to some extent foolish, in order that He may make them wise (Book v. 5).

8. Although the views of Malebranche were not received with the same extraordinary enthusiasm as Occasionalism had been, yet a considerable number of Cartesians adopted them. The first that deserve mention are Thomassin (1619–95), Bern. Lami (1645–1715), and lastly Levassor, who translated some of his works into English. The last-named, however, by abjuring Catholicism, provided Malebranche's enemies with material for calumny. Along with these came the Benedictine Dom François Lami (1636–1711), and even a Jesuit, Père André (1675–1764). Both of these, however, declare against him at the point where he shows a semi-Pelagian tendency. Outside of France the English thinker, John Norris, deserves special mention. Nor was there any lack of opponents, even apart from those who disagreed with him on theological grounds. Those who had opposed Cartesianism in its earlier form, had now of course to argue against Malebranche also. Prominent among these was Foucher, canon of Dijon (1644–1696), whose scepticism reminds us of Montaigne. Less important is the Jesuit Detertre, whose sudden revolt from Malebranche is somewhat suspicious. Still less important is Faydit (died 1709), notorious as the "Zoilus" of Malebranche. But he was also attacked from the Cartesian point of view, especially by Regis, against whom he defended himself in a printed letter. Hardly was Malebranche dead, when the sensationalism that took its rise with Locke, began to be supreme in France. The struggle against it was kept up by Malebranche's disciples Lelevel, René Fédé, Lanion (who used the *nom de plume* of Wander), Claude Lefort de Morinière, and Miron. But it was the vain struggle of reaction against a new and a justifiable principle.

§ 271.

The system of Malebranche is supplementary to the whole

of Cartesianism, including Occasionalism. Descartes had hinted, and Geulincx had expressly declared, that minds were only modifications of God. Here we have the consistently developed doctrine of bodies as modifications of infinite (*i.e.* Divine) extension. The two former refuse to admit of matter what Malebranche refuses to admit of mind. This difference is explained by the fact that according to Descartes, it is only of spirits, according to Malebranche, only of bodies, that it is possible to have a perfectly evident, pure, and rational knowledge, free from the disturbing influence of sense and imagination. There was a subjective ground for this. To the mathematician and physicist, the material world appeared the most substantial; to the pious theologian, the world of spirits. Further, Malebranche was not enthralled so completely as Descartes by the dualism which the substantial existence of minds and of bodies demanded. He admits that one class is more than the other, and is thus not on the same level with it, but above it. Physical and mental philosophy are no longer co-ordinate parts of the whole system. Accordingly the one-sidedness with which he meets and supplements that of Descartes, is much more emphatic; he is much more one-sided than his master. But he is so only because he was more bold in deducing the pantheistic results consequent upon Descartes' adoption of Augustine's theory of perpetual creation, *i.e.* of God as the sole cause. The philosopher who forms the culminating point of this period, the thinker who brought Cartesianism to its fullest development, deduced these results in their completeness; and in doing so he avoided leaning to one side or the other after the manner of his predecessors. For this reason Malebranche had to be discussed before him, although the more advanced results were deduced, but not published, earlier.

THIRD DIVISION.

Spinoza.

§ 272.

Colerus: *La vie de B. de Spinoza.* The Hague, 1706. (A translation from the Dutch. The original appeared in 1705. Owing to a confusion with Fr. Holma's Dutch translation of the article in Bayle's Dictionary, Colerus' book has been assigned by many to the year 1698.) *La vie de Spinosa par un de ses disciples.* Amst., 1719. 2nd ed., Hamb., 1735. This is merely the rarer part of the work by the physician Lucas: *La vie*

et l'esprit de Mons. Benoît de Spinoza. The other portion has been published several times under various titles, as *Liber de tribus impostoribus*, as *Spinosa II.*, and so on.

1. BARUCH DE SPINOZA was born, according to the ordinary account, which Böhmer doubts, at Amsterdam on Nov. 24th, 1632. The signature DESPINOZA also occurs in his letters; and the name is sometimes written DE ESPINOZA, while in all three forms an *s* is frequently substituted for the *z*. He belonged to a well-to-do household of "Portuguese" Jews; for this term was applied even to Spanish Jews, like the Spinoza family. His gifts were early recognised, and he was accordingly entrusted to the care of the Rabbi Moses Morteira, a thinker who sought, in a way that reminds us of the Schoolmen, to bring about a reconciliation between philosophy and Judaism, and who in this semi-Rationalism was a follower of Maimonides. The pupil remained faithful to his master only in his anti-mystic (anti-cabalistic) tendencies. On other points he separated himself from him at an early period, because his rationalism was not sufficiently thorough-going. He was especially opposed to placing Aristotelian interpretations on the text of Scripture, and accordingly Ibn Ezra appeared to him a preferable authority to Maimonides. Spinoza got his first lessons in Latin from a German. Afterwards, in order to acquire classical culture, he entered a kind of school, presided over by the physician Franz van den Ende, notorious on account of his heterodoxy. At the same time he was instructed in the natural sciences by the physician Ludwig Meyer, and in this study he was perhaps assisted by Oldenburg. The circumstance that Meyer was a zealous Cartesian renders it probable that Spinoza now began to study the works of Descartes, and also the writings of the Cartesians. We know for certain that he read Heerebord's books. Apart from the fact that the natural bent of his mind made him less liable than Descartes to limit himself to physics, he must have been repelled by the way in which the theories of the latter were adapted to the doctrine of the Catholic Church. Added to this was the impression made upon him by the so-called (§ 190) Jewish Aristotelians. (Cf. Joël: *Zur Genesis der Lehre Spinoza's.* Bresl., 1871.) Lastly, the early acquaintance which Sigwart surmises, and Avenarius asserts, that he had with Giordano Bruno, is a fact that deserves to be noted. Still the impression that Cartesianism made on Spinoza was

very powerful. It considerably modified his views in other respects than mere form. The gradual estrangement from the synagogue which all this produced, finally led, in 1656, to his expulsion by an anathema of August 6, the Spanish text of which has been preserved. A protest against it, written in Spanish, contained, according to some, the outlines of the doctrine which Spinoza afterwards developed in his *Tractatus theologico-politicus*. It cannot have contained more than the outlines; for had Spinoza thus early placed Moses and Christ in the same relation as he does in the *Tract. theol. polit.*, he would hardly have protested against his exclusion. (Joël has shown how much besides in this work had been said before Spinoza's day by Maimonides and other Jewish scholars.) Neither at this time nor afterwards did he, so far as is known, formally become a convert to Christianity, although he often attended Christian sermons. He even took part in a petition concerning the appointment of a preacher, and he lies buried in a church. Baruch, or, as he now called himself, Benedictus, remained at first in or near Amsterdam. It is probable that as early as this there began the formation of that circle, chiefly of Jews, to whom Spinoza afterwards communicated his works in duplicate as they gradually progressed, and to whom he so often speaks of "our philosophy." To this circle belonged Ludwig Meyer, Simon de Vries, G. H. Schuller, and afterwards Tschirnhausen, in short, quite a number of prominent men. He had besides a great deal of intercourse with Arminians condemned by the Synod of Dort. One of them received him into his house. His relations with these "Collegiants," or "Rhynsburgers," date from an early period. Perhaps this contributed to his expulsion from the city in 1660 by the magistrate, at the instigation of the Reformed clergy, who joined hands with the synagogue. After this he himself lived for a long time in Rhynsburg, where he maintained himself by polishing lenses, but was chiefly occupied with his studies. A letter to Oldenburg shows what his opinion of Cartesianism was as early as 1661. His own views can be gathered from his *Tractatus brevis de Deo*, etc., written for his friends in Amsterdam. Van Vlooten has published this in a Dutch translation, and in an unfortunately not very successful re-translation into Latin, in his: *Ad Bened. de Spinoza Opera quæ supersunt omnia Supplementum.* Amst., 1862. The first part of the appendix to this *Tractatus*, and

still more the beginning of the *Ethics*, as far as the 9th proposition, agree substantially with the small treatise which Spinoza sent to Oldenburg in the above-mentioned year. (*Cf.* Ed. Böhmer: *B. de Spin. Tract. de Deo et homine*, etc. Hal. 1852, 4to, and particularly Chr. Sigwart: *Spinoza's neu entdeckter Tractat.*, etc., Gotha, 1866, and Trendelenburg in his: *Historische Beitr. zur Phil.*, iii., pp. 277–398.) In this *Tractatus*, he does not yet quite adopt the position afterwards taken up in his chief work. Thus, he still admits the existence of a real connection between soul and body—a connection which he afterwards denies, and is bound to deny, in accordance with his theory of the attributes of substance. It follows from this, that the latter theory must at first have been held in a different form. His doctrines were communicated only to those whom he believed to be discreet and strong-minded. Accordingly, when a young man, probably the one who lived at the time in the same house with him, Alb. Burgh, asked him to instruct him in philosophy, he dictated to him the chief points of the Cartesian philosophy. These jottings were amplified at the request of L. Meyer, and published by the latter in 1663 as: *Ren. des Cartes Principia philosophiæ more geometrico demonstrata per Benedictum de Spinoza, accesserunt ejusdem Cogitata metaphysica.* Even the latter did not contain Spinoza's own views. In order to prevent this work producing the impression that the suspected individual was a Cartesian, the real Cartesians began from this time to persecute him in every way. In 1664 he removed to Vorburg, always busied with the development of his system. In 1665 he was working at the third part of it, and was able to lay eighty propositions before one of the Amsterdam circle, J. B. (Bresser?). The copies which his friends took of what he sent them, were, of course, word for word; but Spinoza's correspondence shows that many misleading clerical errors had crept even into these. On the other hand, he himself, when he communicated in writing single propositions from his system, seems to have exercised great freedom in regard to individual expressions. Continual alterations were made in matters of detail. (Thus, as Vlooten's *Supplem.* now shows, the reference in Simon de Vries' letter of Feb. 24th, 1663, was originally to *Schol. tert. prop.* 8, which does not correspond to the *Ethics* in its present form, and not to *Schol. prop.* 10, *lib.* i., to which it was corrected before publication. Thus

it is no longer possible to argue, as was formerly done with apparent good reason, that the first book of the *Ethics*, and much less that the whole work, was completed in 1663.) These alterations explain why references to previous statements are so often inaccurate. But the plan of the whole had been decided upon, and perhaps the five parts of the *Ethics* finished, when he yielded to the entreaties of his friends, and in 1670 took up his abode at the Hague. Here he lived with the painter Van der Speyk, who drew his portrait, and who is also said to have instructed him successfully in his art. The change of residence occurred in the same year as the (anonymous) publication of his *Tractatus theologico-politicus*. It purports to be printed at Hamburg and published by Heinr. Künraht, this being a device to disguise Christoph Konrad, of Amsterdam. This frequently reprinted work caused a great outcry, especially among theologians. About the same time his patron De Witt, who had always urged him to print, met his death. These occurrences made Spinoza, who had a great regard for his own peace of mind, and also for the conscientious feelings of others, entirely give up his plan of publishing anything else. For the same reasons he also declined in 1672 the professorship at Heidelberg, which was offered him. Only once, in 1675, he seems to have made up his mind to publish the *Ethics*, manuscript copies of which were in the hands of not a few people. The talk which this announcement created, made him give up the idea. Consumptive symptoms showed themselves more and more decidedly, and he set about preparing for death. He arranged that the *Ethics* should be printed, but that merely his initials, and not his full name, should be prefixed to it; posterity has disregarded his wish that his system should not be called after him. Other writings he burned, including a translation of the Pentateuch. His life, which had been in every respect an exemplary one, came to a close on February 21st, 1677. (This date, like that given for his birth, is the usually accepted one.) In the same year there appeared in a quarto volume: *B.D.S. Opera posthuma, mdclxxvii.** This

* It has been newly discovered (*Vid.* Ludwig Stein: *Neue Aufschlüsse über d. Herausg. v. Op. posth. Spin.* in *Archiv für Gesch. d. Philos.* Bd. i., Heft 4) that not Meyer and Jeller, but Georg Hermann Schuller was the real editor of the *Opera posthuma*. Stein also contends that the *Præfatio* was *composed* by Meyer, not merely Latinized by him from Jeller's Dutch.—Ed.

contains the five books of *Ethica*, the unfinished *Tractatus politicus*, the likewise unfinished *De intellectus emendatione tractatus*, which was written before the *Ethics*, but after the *Tract. brev.*, *Epistolæ et Responsiones*, and the unfinished *Compendium grammatices linguæ hebrææ*. The first complete edition of Spinoza's works is that of Dr. Paulus: *Benedicti de Spinoza Opera quæ supersunt omnia*. 2 vols. Jena, 1802–3. Gfrörer's unfortunately unfinished collection: *Corpus philosophorum optimæ notæ*, Stuttgart, 1830, contains all his writings, including even the Hebrew Grammar. Lastly, in 1843, C. H. Bruder published a stereotyped edition in three small volumes (Leipz. Tauchnitz). Unfortunately it is not much more correct than that of Paulus. Uniform with this appeared the *Supplementum* mentioned above. Besides the *Tractatus brevis de Deo*, etc., it contains a short mathematical treatise on the rainbow, which was supposed by many to have been among the manuscripts destroyed. As a matter of fact it has been in existence in print since 1687, although this early edition is extremely rare. In addition to these, the *Supplementum* has some additional notices of his life from a Dutch MS., and also some *Letters* hitherto unprinted. Böhmer (Fichte's *Zeitschr.*, vol. 42) and Trendelenburg have shown how bad the Latin translation of the *Tractatus* is. The German one by Chr. Sigwart, Tübing., 1870, has its value much enhanced by the addition of explanations and parallel passages. Of translations of Spinoza's philosophical works, the French one by Saisset is far preferable to the German one by Auerbach. Of the innumerable monographs on Spinoza, F. H. Jacobi: *Ueber die Lehre des Spinoza in Briefen an Mendelssohn*, 1787, still deserves to be mentioned, as it laid the foundation of a thorough study of Spinoza in Germany. The literature of the subject is pretty exhaustively catalogued in Antonius van der Linde: *Spinoza*, Göttingen, 1862. To the list there given should be added the article by Böhmer already referred to, which was written later. It is called *Spinozana* ii., and is in the 42nd vol. of Fichte's *Zeitschrift*. This contains a very thorough explanation of one of the most difficult points, forming a sequel to *Spinozana* i., *Ibid.*, vol. 36, and being itself continued under the same title in vol. 57.

2. The fact that Spinoza employs the geometrical method both in his account of the principles of Cartesianism and in his own chief work, may be regarded as an acknowledge-

ment, that it was through Descartes that he was led to the thoroughly mathematical view of things, which is characteristic of him, and which must never be lost sight of, unless the difficulty of understanding his doctrines is to be much increased. Philosophical and mathematical certainty are with him synonymous (*Tract. theol. polit.*, c. 14, 36). For no other reason than because it is a necessary consequence of the mathematical way of looking at things, the geometrical form of proofs is of great significance, even where the proofs themselves are insipid and marred by inaccuracies. Every point of view not recognised in mathematics is expressly rejected by Spinoza as inadmissible. Foremost among these is the teleological. In order to preserve this, Aristotle had declared a mathematical view of physics to be inadequate (cf. § 88, 1). Spinoza, on the other hand, will not admit the conception of an end even in Ethics. He is never weary of scoffing at those who demand a God that works towards ends, who commit the ὕστερον πρότερον of explaining things by their ends, or who introduce the confused idea of obligation into human conduct. He expressly extols mathematics because *non circa fines versatur* (*Eth.* i., *Append.*), and recommends it as an example. Everything, even the various aspects of human activity, is to be regarded exactly as if it were a question of lines, planes, and solids (*Eth.* i., *pr.* 33. *Schol.* 2. iii., *præf.*). Just as mathematics knows nothing of the idea of an end, so the idea of causality is utterly foreign to it. There we hear nothing of the actual production of effects, which cannot be conceived of without transference, but merely of conditions. Instead of causes, mathematics has reasons; instead of effects, consequences. This is exactly Spinoza's attitude. The expression *causa*, and even *causa efficiens*, occurs in his writings (*Eth* i., *prop.* 16, *Coroll.*). But his often repeated polemic against the *causa* being conceived of as *transiens;* the explanatory remark, when *efficere* was predicated of anything, that it means *ex ejus definitione* (so *Eth.* i., *pr.* 16, *dem.*), or even *ex eo sequitur* (i., *prop.* 7, *dem.*, and elsewhere); the continually recurring reference to the illustration of the triangle, from the nature or definition of which this thing or the other follows—all these show clearly that he knows nothing of actual causal connection, but merely of being conditioned by a pre-existing or auxiliary conception. Accordingly he connects *causa* and *ratio* by *seu* (i., *pr.* 11,

dem. alit.). Just as space neither contemplates nor causes figures, but certainly conditions them, since figure cannot be conceived of without space, so Spinoza recognises no other conception of the conditioned than that it presupposes something else: *conceptum alterius rei involvit* (*Eth.* i., *ax.* 4). In accordance with this principle, wherever the conception of one thing presupposes (*præsupponit, involvit*) that of another, he forthwith defines the former as conditioned by the latter, as its *effectus* (cf. *Eth.* ii., *pr.* 5, *dem.*). Closely connected with this polemic against all *transitio*, is the similar one against all real succession, against time, which he looks upon as merely a confused idea. Averroës, whose opinions may have been familiar to Spinoza through his commentaries on the work of Maimonides, and through Gersonides, had made (*vid.* § 187, 2.) the philosopher take his stand in the heart of eternity, where before and after completely disappear, and where all that is possible is regarded as already actual. Spinoza follows him almost literally in demanding that the philosopher should view everything *sub specie æternitatis* (ii., *pr.* 44, *Cor.* 2), *i.e.* in perfect freedom from the limits of time (i., *def.* 8). This naturally implies, that he views everything *simul* (*de int. em.* xiv.), *i.e.*, without a real, and in merely a logical succession.

3. Accordingly, the starting-point of his philosophy is not the creator of the world, not even the fundamental cause of all things, but the logical presupposition of all that exists,—that in virtue of which alone everything else can become an object of thought, and which itself does not require for its conception the antecedent conception of anything else. This is the only meaning of his *causa sui* (i., *def.* 1). The phrase has no reference, as it had with Descartes, to an actual process of self-creation. In the *Tract. brev.*, Spinoza had scoffed at such an idea, and therefore at the *causa sui*; in the *Tract. de int. emend.* he is willing to accept this (*vulgo*) current expression, provided it be taken to mean simply what is *in se*, that is, not *in alio*. In this sense, and in this sense alone, it is adopted in the *Ethics*. The best translation of *causa sui* in Spinoza is: the unconditioned. This he finds in the one Substance wherein all things consist. This Substance alone exists, it combines in itself *omne esse;* and therefore it would be an absurdity to conceive it as non-existent (i., *def.* 3, *de int. emend.* ix.). Although he calls this Substance God, it must

not be forgotten that he expressly declares that he attaches a very different meaning to this word from that attached to it by his Christian contemporaries; further, that he uses *Deus* and *Natura* quite indifferently; and finally, that he joins by *hoc est* the sentences: "God is one," and: "The Substance wherein all things consist, is one" (*Ep.* 21, *Eth.* iv., *Praef.* i., *pr.* 14, *Coroll.* 1). (Those who attach a religious significance to the word God, ought accordingly, in reading Spinoza, always to substitute *Natura* for *Deus*.) The unity of Substance is not to be conceived of as numerical, for number presupposes a higher genus, but as absolute oneness (*Ep.* 50). Since there is no real existence, except Substance, and since anything defined, or limited, or determined, or finite (all four words mean just the same in Spinoza), only exists because it is limited by another thing of the same nature, *e.g.*, a figure by other figures (cf. *Eth.* i., *def.* 2), it follows that Substance is infinite. In regard to this word, Spinoza insists, as Descartes had done before him, that in spite of the negative prefix, infinity is a positive conception. For all determination is negation, inasmuch as it draws a line between the thing determined and everything else, *e.g.* a figure (*Ep.* 50). Further, it states a *non-esse*, a *defectus* (*Ep.* 41). Accordingly, that which, like Substance, is simply an affirmation of existence (*Eth.* i., *pr.* 8, *Schol.*), must naturally be conceived of without this negation, and therefore as infinite in the positive sense of the word (*ibid.*, i., *pr.* 8, *Schol.*). Since "without limitations" means the same thing as "infinite," we may also use "perfect" instead of either. It is so used in the *Tract. brev.* (p. 22), where *non esse* accordingly appears as *omnium imperfectionum maxima* (p. 56). That which is absolutely undetermined, is determined neither in regard to its existence nor in regard to its results. That is, where it produces an effect, it does so without being compelled. What he here opposes to compulsion, Spinoza calls necessity quite as often as freedom (*ibid.* i., def. 7), and says, in accordance with this principle, "God acts (*agit*) without compulsion, and He is a free cause" (*ibid.*, p. 17). If we reflect that Spinoza is never weary of denying that God acts with freedom of will, and that he uses *ex eo sequitur* for *agit* as frequently as we saw that he did for *efficit*, it becomes clear that *libere* here merely means "of Himself," or, "without compulsion," and *agere* about as much as "making" or "causing" does with us, when we say:

"The nature of the triangle makes or causes its angles to be, etc." On the whole, then, Spinoza always maintains that the same necessity which requires the existence of God, demands that everything should result from Him (iv., *præfat.*), *i.e.*, maintains that His being and His activity coincide.

4. The correlative to the absolutely unconditioned, or Substance, is the merely conditioned. To this, Spinoza often (*e.g. Ep.* 4) applies the Aristotelian name of *accidens*, but usually the Cartesian one of *modus*. He also calls it *modificatio*, or *affectio*. He explains mode to mean that which is in something else, so that it can only be conceived by the help of this something (i., *def.* 5), or requires this something as a preliminary or pre-existing conception (i., *pr.* 8, *Schol.*). Infinite space is the pre-existing condition of a definite figure, and can be thought of without the help of the figure; but the converse is not true. Similarly, thought cannot rid itself of Substance, but may rid itself of mode in which Substance *certo et determinato modo expressa est;* it is possible to conceive as non-existent what exists definitely, impossible to do so with existence itself (i., *pr.* 24, *Ep.* 28). For this reason eternity, *i.e.* existence as a result of the definition, belongs only to Substance, not to modes. Similarly, Substance is the unity that excludes all plurality, while there are many modes, etc. In short, the predicates attached to Substance and to modes are of such opposite kinds, that Spinoza himself compares the difference between the two to that between straight and crooked. They are diametrically opposed to each other, as correlatives must be. And further, as is also characteristic of correlatives, they suggest one another, a relation which Spinoza expresses by calling Substance the *causa* (not *transiens*, however, but *immanens*) of the modifications, of which it is said to be at once the cause and the sum-total. In spite of the fact that it has been criticized as childish, my comparison of this relation to that between the ocean and the ever-vanishing waves, seems to me quite as justifiable as the one made by Spinoza himself in the *Tract. brev.*, where it is likened to that between the understanding and the ideas of which the latter is the sum, or as the other in the *Ethics*, according to which Substance is related to the modes, in the same way that a line is related to the points which exist in it (as possible). Now, if Spinoza in many passages maintains that nothing really exists except Substance and its changing forms

or modifications, the question arises—What place is there in his system for individual things, the *res particulares*, of which he very often speaks? Spinoza himself associates the most various meanings with the word *res*. But if one understands, as we would do here, by individual objects or things, beings which exist and persist independently, then properly speaking Spinozism does not admit that there are things at all. We only come to things by giving independence to the modes which are essentially dependent, by disregarding what constitutes their nature—the fact that they are merely in something else. In this abstract way of looking at them, we alter them just as, in one of the similes employed, frost would change the waves into lumps of ice, or, in the other, a needle cutting the line would change it into points. Spinoza gives the name of imagination to this partial and fragmentary way of regarding things (*vid. infra, sub.* 11); and we must accordingly say that imagination alone makes (independent) things out of (dependent) modes. The mere sum-total of individual things is called the *world* (of sense) in ordinary phraseology, and by Kant too, who opposes it to Nature. If we adopt this view, Jacobi and Hegel are right in maintaining, especially in contrast with those who reproached Spinoza with having deified the world, that he had rather denied its existence altogether. If we accept with a slight modification the illustration which Spinoza himself employed, and liken Substance and its modes to a plane surface and the figures which can be drawn within it, the process characteristic of imagination may be compared with the division of the plane surface into an infinite number of minute squares, each of which would represent what we, in Spinoza's language, call a *res particularis* or even *individuum*. If it be asked what is the condition (*causa proxima*) of the existence of such a square, it is certainly not the infinitely extended plane in which it is, but the other squares which enclose it. This makes perfectly intelligible Spinoza's assertions that no finite thing results from God, or has Him for its (immediate) cause, but that each in turn is conditioned by finite things, and these again by finite things, so that the finite results only from the finite (i., *prop.* 28). And further, that every individual thing, inasmuch as it is conditioned by another, is under restraint, and is accordingly not free or necessary, that it contains an element of chance which cannot be deduced from its definition or *a priori*, but can only be

realized by the help of experience, *i.e.* imagination (ii., *pr.* 31, *Coroll. Ep.* 28). The illustration just employed makes it very easy for us to understand the position of Spinoza, when he defends himself so vigorously against the accusation that he makes Substance consist of a combination of things, and yet elsewhere calls things parts of nature (*Epp.* 40, 29, 15). To make Substance a combination of things would be to him just as absurd as (*i.e.*, not less so, but not more so, than) to say that the line is a combination of points. In our own illustration, every square can be called a part of the plane surface, and yet no one could say that the plane was formed by a combination of the squares. For, in the first place, they were not there prior to it; and further, in order to have the plane surface, we must remove in thought the sides of the squares, that is, the squares as such. Things as such, then, are products of a limited apprehension; things are in fact modifications which give definite expression to the true existence (God, Nature) (i., *pr.* 25, *Corol.*). But so soon as their true aspect is realized, they cease to exist independently, they are no longer things in the ordinary sense of the word. In their place appear limited participations in the one true existence. Each of these participations must naturally contain two important elements; and the fact that Spinoza sometimes lays stress on one of these and sometimes on the other, often makes it harder to understand him. In the first place, as an expression of the true existence, it belongs to the infinite multiplicity (*i.e.*, the totality) that results from God (i., *pr.* 16, 17, *Schol.*), or is contained in God (ii., *pr.* 8), in such a way that it cannot be conceived without Him. In other words, it belongs to that which is (immediately) caused (conditioned) by God (v., *pr.* 29, *Schol.*). This side of the individual thing is its essence or nature (*essentia sive natura*, iv., *def.* 8, *pr.* 56, *dem.*), often called by metonymy its idea (*definitio* i., *pr.* 16, *dem.*). This is eternal, just as being in general is eternal, *Cogit. met.* 1, 2, *Eth.* i., *pr.* 21. It is called an eternal truth (*Ep.* 28). Accordingly, with Spinoza "to view under the form of eternity," and "to apprehend anything from its essence," are synonymous (v., *pr.*, 29, 30). Since being or existence was the absolutely positive which excludes all negation, it is impossible that the essence of a thing should contain what involves its non-existence. Transitoriness would involve this, and accordingly the essence of everything be-

comes identical with the maintenance or assertion of its own existence (iii., *pr.* 4, *dem.*, *pr.* 6, 7). Besides this positive element which constitutes the true reality (*entitas sive realitas* iv., *præf.*) of things, there is in the second place that which completes the *essentia* by making it *actualis* or *præsens existentia*, or *actu existere* (v., *pr.* 29, *dem.* ii., *pr.* 9). This comes to it from other things, with which it is united to form a *communis ordo naturæ*, or *connexio causarum* (ii., *pr.* 30, *dem. pr.* 7, *Schol.*). This negative element,—which, just because it is negative, is not deduced from the being of the thing, but is accepted empirically as a fact,—makes what is (essentially) eternal into something temporal or enduring. Each thing has, accordingly, a double existence, and likewise a double position in the complex world of existence: on the one hand, that which is determined by its essence, on the other, that which is determined by its being conditioned by something else. In virtue of the former, it is necessary *per se*; in virtue of the latter, necessary *per aliud*. The latter Spinoza called *contingens* (i., *pr.* 33), and accordingly identified, as did his subsequent opponent Wolff (*vid.* § 290, 4), with the *hypothetice necessarium*. The two kinds of existence, the timeless and the temporal, would correspond in our illustration to the existence of each individual square as a plane, and as a four-sided figure. Spinoza compared them to the possibility of making, by the help of two intersecting chords within the circumference of a circle, an infinite number of right angles of the same size, and the actual existence of two such right angles made by drawing two chords (ii., *pr.* 8, *Schol.*). This comparison explains the position subsequently taken up by the school of Leibnitz and Wolff, in which existence was placed on the same level as possibility, and *existentia* was called *complementum possibilitatis* (*vid.* § 290, 4).

Cf. Theodor Camerer: *die Lehre Spinoza's*. Stuttg. 1877.

5. Midway between Substance as the *infinitum* and things as *finitis*, there stands the sum of all modes, which is reached last in the ascent from things, and first in the descent from the infinite. Spinoza's phrases: infinite modification, or infinite mode, and so on, characterize very aptly this intermediate position. In connection with it, however, we are not to think of anything like an actual development, but simply of a higher and a lower in a logical and mathematical sense.

Thus, if, to push our illustration further, we start from the most limited, the primitive square, this gives us what Spinoza calls *individuum primi ordinis;* if we imagine several of them combined into one, we have *individua secundi ordinis*, and so on until we reach that which embraces all of them. This remains the same amid all changes of its subordinate constituents, and is *tota natura* (ii., *Lemma* 7, *Schol.*). Instead of this expression, the phrase : *facies totius universi* is employed in a letter to Tschirnhausen; and Spinoza at the same time says, that it is this he means when he speaks of an infinite, eternal modification of God, which results directly from God. In the ascending process above described the simple square is recognised as resulting directly from those which surround it, and these in their turn from those which surround them. And so, when the question ultimately arises,—"What is the presupposition necessary for all the squares taken together, that from which they result directly as from their *causa proxima?*" we can hardly give any other reply, than that it is the plane surface undivided. Quite in accordance with this, Spinoza says in his *Tract. brev.*, that God is *causa proxima* only of infinite modification (*Supplem.*, p. 59). This latter he separates from individual things by an infinite number of intermediate stages; and he says repeatedly in the *Ethics*, that it alone results directly from God, that what it comprehends results from Him only indirectly. Inasmuch, however, as infinity can now be predicated both of the absolutely unconditioned and of this immediately conditioned, and further, since the word *natura* was employed to denote both, the necessity arises for avoiding misunderstandings by strict distinctions. Spinoza remains faithful to the conception he has once set up, according to which the infinite is the positive, which excludes all limit (as being negation). But he allows a distinction between that which absolutely excludes all limitation, and that which merely excludes numerical determination. The former is the *absolute infinitum*, Substance; the latter is what he means wherever he speaks of the infinite in the plural, and employs *infinita* as a synonym for *omnia* (*e.g.* i., *pr.* 16). Although he himself frequently says, that we should apply the term *infinitum* only to the absolutely infinite, and should call the innumerable, *indefinitum*, and although he contrasts the former as *infinitum rationis* with the latter as *infinitum imaginationis*, still he is not always consistent. Consequently, the distinction

is often lost sight of between the conceptions which we have so far been explaining, and which, to connect them with Spinoza's own words, form the descending stages: (1) All or infinite (*Omne, absolute infinitum*, in the *Tract. brev.*, also *Omne*); (2) Everything, or infinites, or infinitely many (*Omnia infinita*); and lastly, (3) Each, or individual thing (*Quodcumque, res particularis, finitum, singulare*). If this distinction be maintained, there is no contradiction involved in Spinoza's saying, that *no* finite thing results from God, and that *everything* results from God (i., *pr.* 16, *dem.*). Nor is it any more a contradiction to say, that *all* finite being is necessary, and that *every* finite thing is contingent. With the expression "nature," Spinoza deals more strictly than with "infinite" as a predicate. He accordingly adopts the distinction between *natura naturans* and *natura naturata*, a distinction which appears as early as the Commentaries of Averroës (*De cœlo*, 1, 1), and which was current among the Schoolmen. Consistently, however, with his point of view, the idea of creation which former thinkers had looked upon as the bond between the two (*e.g.*, Vincent of Beauvais: *Speculum majus*, 15, 4), is here supplanted by that of condition. Both in the *Tract. brev.* (*Supplem.*, p. 80) and in the *Ethics* (i., *pr.* 29, *Schol.*), he says that the *natura naturans* is that which is in itself and requires nothing else, *i.e.*, God. In regard to the *natura naturata*, on the other hand, the two accounts are quite at variance. According to the *Tract. brev.*, a distinction must be drawn between the *natura naturata generalis*, *i.e.*, the modes which follow immediately from God, and the *natura naturata particularis*, *i.e.*, the particular things conditioned by these modes. In the *Ethics* this distinction is no longer recognised. There, conditioned nature is defined as that *quod ex necessitate Dei naturæ sequitur, hoc est* OMNES *modos quatenus considerantur ut res quæ in Deo sunt et quæ sine Deo nec esse nec concipi possunt* (i., *pr.* 29, *Schol.*), that is, exactly as the *natura naturata generalis* was conceived of in the *Tract. brev.* If, then, we keep the expression, *world*, for the sum of things (the former *natura naturata particularis*), the *natura naturata* which stands midway between it and God, would correspond very much to what we might call the world *as a whole*, or *order* of the world. This is distinguished from the unconditioned, as the system of all conditions, within which every individual object would be a conditioned thing.

6. The distinction between nature, viewed either as all or

as everything, and individual things, may be called a quantitative one; and accordingly a geometrical figure sufficed to make it clear. Qualitative distinctions are introduced into the system by the help of a third fundamental conception. This is the conception of attribute, the definition of which Spinoza himself inserts between that of substance and that of mode—an order from which we have departed here. Where he is maintaining that nothing, except Substance and its modes, exists *realiter*, he repeatedly adds to this word *i.e. extra intellectum.** And yet, besides these, he speaks of attributes. The only explanation possible seems to be, that the attributes are *in intellectu*. That such is really the doctrine of Spinoza, many are disposed to deny; but they can only do so by utterly ignoring the chief passages in support of this view. These passages must accordingly be brought forward prominently here. Spinoza never forgot the statement he made in his *Cogitat. metaphys.* (i., 3), to the effect that Substance, as such, does not affect us at all, and that it therefore requires to be interpreted by an attribute, from which (as Descartes before him had taught) "*non nisi ratione distinguitur.*" Accordingly he always speaks of the attributes of Substance in such a way as to bring into prominence the idea of existence for the understanding that knows. This is the case even in the definition of attribute (i., *def.* 4). While Descartes had said that attribute constitutes (*constituit*) the essence of substance, Spinoza says that attribute "is that which intellect *perceives* concerning substance, as constituting the essence thereof." (That *constituens* is neuter here is proved beyond a doubt by ii., *pr.* 7, *Schol.*) In this, an indication of something which is not perceived, is recognised even by those who hold a different view from the one maintained in these pages. In the same direction point all the varieties of expression: that attribute *exprimit, explicat* the essence of Substance, or, that the essence *per attributum intelligitur, sub attributo con-*

* Kuno Fischer: *Gesch. d. n. Phil.* 2nd ed. i., 2, p. 275 and 317 asserts that I have no right to appeal upon this point to *Eth.* i. *pr.* 4, *dem.*, since there Spinoza adds to the word *Substantia—sive quod idem est attributa.* The quotation in my *Vermischte Aufsätze* did not refer to the end of the *dem.*, of which Fischer is thinking, but to the first sentence of it, where this addition is no more to be found than it is in *Ep.* 4, which I also brought forward as a proof. [Fischer replies to this in the 3rd ed., p. 359.—ED.]

sideratur, and so on, all of which involve the idea of revelation or phenomenon, *i.e.* of a relation to a perceiving subject. Most decisive of all is what Spinoza writes to Simon de Vries, or rather in his person to the whole circle, in whose name de Vries had questioned him. After defining Substance as he does in the *Ethics*, he continues : "By attribute I understand exactly the same thing, except that it is called attribute *respectu intellectus substantiæ certam talem naturam tribuentis.*" (Here then it is the perceiving intellect, with Descartes [cf. § 267, 4] it was nature, which is said to be that which *substantiæ naturam tribuit.*) He then goes on to meet the objection that two names are applied to one and the same thing, by pointing out that what we call *smooth*, may be called *white*, if it be looked at in a different aspect. The other example which he brings forward in the same place, that the third patriarch had two names, one of which denoted his relation to his brother, reminds us of what he had said in regard to the name of God in the *Tract. theol. polit.* xiii. 11, 12. Only the name Jehovah indicates *Dei absolutam essentiam sine relatione ad res creatas;* El Sadai, on the contrary, and all the others, *attributa sunt quæ Deo competunt quatenus cum relatione ad res creatas consideratur vel per ipsas manifestatur.* Accordingly, although (*Eth.* i. *pr.* 32, *dem.*) the *substantia absolute infinita* is expressly distinguished from Substance *quatenus attributum habet*, still we must surely ultimately conclude that the attributes do not introduce essential differences into Substance, but merely state what it is for the understanding that contemplates it, *i.e.*, the ways in which it appears, or,—what is the same thing differently expressed, —in which it is conceived of by the understanding that contemplates it. I have compared them to the coloured spectacles through which a white surface (*i.e.* one which contains all colours or no colours) is viewed, and I am least of all moved to abandon this illustration by the raillery of the critic who maintains that the understanding does not put the attributes there but merely distinguishes them. For this seems to me to be merely the substitution for the spectacles of a prism, which breaks up the white into blue and yellow, *i.e.*, the substitution of *bonnet blanc* for *blanc bonnet.* The view here advanced has been attacked with more serious weapons, but with even less success, by those who say that it makes Spinoza into a disciple of Kant. As if Kant had

invented the distinction between "in itself" and "for us," between essence and phenomenon! As if, since men began to think, it had not been made by every one who has attempted to get *behind* things or to investigate their *essence!* But not only has this distinction been made. It has been the subject of reflection ever since Democritus distinguished between what is ἐτεῇ, and what is νόμῳ, or Aristotle contrasted φύσει with πρὸς ἡμᾶς. The same question appears in the Middle Ages in all inquiries about *esse in re* and *esse in intellectu*, about *distinctio secundum rem* and *secundum rationem*, about *denominatio extrinseca* and *ens rationis*. Lastly, as regards Spinoza himself, one could never say that such a distinction was unknown to him and did not appear till the succeeding century, unless one were willing to forget all the passages where he contrasts *denominationes extrinsecas*, *relationes* and *circumstantias* with *essentia*, *modi cogitandi* with *modis rerum*, *distinctiones reales* with *distingui solo conceptu*. There is, however, a vast difference between Kant and Spinoza. The former never loses sight of this distinction, and has pushed his reflections upon it so far as to reach the result that all predicates which are attached to phenomena, must be denied of things in themselves. In Spinoza, the relation between the two is quite different. He touches upon the relation between things as actually existing and as objects of thought, only where he cannot avoid it, especially therefore where he has to reply to objections. That the two may stand in opposition to each other, never occurs to him. Like all before Kant, he looks upon it as a matter of course that *cogitari debet* and *est* are the same. And so too with *non esse* and *nequire cogitari*. The question: "Why are the two one?" he thrusts aside almost scornfully, as where he touches upon the criterion of truth, or again where the adequacy of the idea, though at first it does *not* denote its agreement with the *ideatum*, still involves the certainty of this agreement. For this very reason I can see no objection to my view in the fact that Spinoza says *substantia sive*,—or even *id est*,—*ejus attributa*. It is exactly parallel to *non est i.e. cogitari nequit*, or conversely. Spinoza's theory of the attributes of Substance would accordingly assume the following shape: The understanding can conceive of anything only by attaching predicates to it. If that which is conceived is something limited or finite, then the predicates to be attached to it may contain negations. Thus, *e.g.*, if

mind, because it cannot distinguish bodies strictly, *omnia corpora sub attributo entis, rei, etc. comprehendit* (ii., *pr.* 40. *Schol.* 1). It is otherwise with Substance, existence in itself, to which, as the absolutely affirmative, only such predicates may be attached as express something absolutely positive, that is, perfection or infinity. It is true that so soon as there are several of these, so soon as one is *not* what the other is, their infinity is not the infinity of Substance, which was absolutely free from negation, but a third kind, which now appears, the *infinitum in suo genere* (i., *def.* 6 *explic.*). By this is to be understood that which allows nothing of the same kind as itself to escape it. Thus extension, which includes all extended things, remains infinite (in its own kind), or *infinitam* CERTAM *essentiam exprimit* (i., *pr.* 10, *Schol.*), even although thought lies outside of it. Now all such perfectly positive predicates expressing this infinity must be attached to existence, which includes everything. An infinite understanding will therefore view it under innumerable attributes; for such an understanding, Substance consists of all, *i.e.* of innumerable attributes, each of which expresses eternal and infinite being (i., *def.* 6). It is otherwise with the human understanding. It too is unable to conceive of Substance without attributes, that is, without attributing to it predicates. Substance accordingly *sepositis affectionibus cogitari potest*, but not *sepositis attributis*; it consists therefore of attributes, and that, as we have just shown, for the human and for the infinite understanding alike. Thus, as soon as the understanding, whether finite or infinite, appears, what exists outside of the understanding as Substance, pure being, is changed into attributes, or consists of them (i., *pr.* 30, *dem.*). (I consider this passage one of the most important for confirming my view, although it has been brought forward very recently to refute it, in the excellent essay of Camerer, referred to above, § 272, 4.) But of what attributes? Just as Spinoza is serious in his scorn for those who consider that the *globulus* which we inhabit is the whole world (*Tr. br. de Deo*), so he is serious, when, in his letters to Tschirnhausen, he admits the possibility that another finite understanding may not know the attribute of extension, just as our understanding is unable to conceive of an infinite number of attributes of Substance, although it knows that there are such. He may at one time have cherished the hope that the human understanding would

succeed in discovering new attributes of God. But in his latter days he was convinced that, because man is a mode of thought and extension, he knows only the attribute of thought and that of extension, and can accordingly conceive of God only under these two attributes, but must conceive of Him under both. In spite of this limitation, he claims for the human understanding an adequate knowledge of God, since, as Descartes had already shown, it is possible to have a perfectly adequate knowledge of the triangle, even before one knows all the propositions which follow from the definition. It is not in Substance, then, but in the limitation of the human understanding, that we are to look for the reason why we must be content with regarding it as thinking and as extended. As a matter of fact, however, it does not really involve a great sacrifice to renounce all claim to a knowledge of the others. For thought, which Spinoza conceives of just as Descartes had done,—as the making objective or the representation of what exists *formaliter*,—mirrors in itself the content of all attributes. Thus it forms, to express it mechanically, the half of all that *all* the attributes together contain, or contains just as much as all *the others* put together; —an exceptional position which Spinoza recognises when he contrasts thought, as he frequently does, not with the "others," but with "the" attributes (ii., *pr.* 8, *Cor.*; *pr.* 6, *Coroll.*). Thought, which is thus correlative and equivalent to all the other attributes, is known to the human understanding and to every finite understanding, even to that which could not apprehend extension. But this is not all. It appears to have been the feeling that subject and object, Ego and non-Ego, were mutually opposed, which made Spinoza say so decidedly in his *Tract. brev.* p. 192, that even although it were not bodies that occasioned our ideas or mental affections, still what called them forth would be something quite different from the human mind. This "*omnino differre*" assigns to every object of thought a nature opposite to that of thought. Since, however, thought was something internal, being-by-itself, this is something external, being-outside-itself (*Vid.* p. 40, *supra*); so that every attribute which is opposed to thought threatens to become ultimately identical with extension. Perhaps Spinoza felt this when he gave up the search for other attributes. Perhaps too it was this feeling which, when Tschirnhausen drew his attention through Schuller to

the fact that thought will contain more than each of the other attributes, made Spinoza pass over the point in silence, and afterwards led him in the further course of his investigations to proceed as if it were impossible to regard existence otherwise than under these two attributes. We have now further to inquire how all, how everything, and how individual objects present themselves to the mind of the observer under these attributes.*

* It was through Hegel that I was first led to adopt the view stated here. In my: *Versuch einer wissensch. Darst. der Gesch. d. n. Philos.* i., 2 (Leipz., Riga and Dorpat, 1836), § 8, and more thoroughly in my: *Vermischte Aufsätze* (Leipz., 1846), I have expounded it as the only one which to my mind is consistent with maintaining the "monism," or pantheism, of Spinoza. My belief has been confirmed by the fact that a different view of the attributes, as is proved by the example of Thomas, and more recently of Böhmer, goes hand-in-hand with the idea that Spinoza is a "pluralist," or, if one will have it so, a polytheist. But my opponents are not drawn solely from those who hold such an opinion, but also from those who regard the oneness of Substance as part of Spinoza's teaching. In fact, my view has been attacked by almost all who mention it. Although these attacks have shown me that it has weak points, still I have met with no theory which I should be prepared to accept instead of it. To begin with what the most formidable opponent of what he calls the "formalist" view advances,—although Kuno Fischer's reproduction of the system of Spinoza is brilliant, and in many respects admirable, still I cannot agree with his assertion that the attributes are forces. For we join issue on the first point of all, inasmuch as I deny that the Substance of Spinoza is a *causa efficiens* (*vid. supra, sub* 2), while Fischer really founds his whole account upon the supposition that it is. [*Vid.* Fischer's reply, *op. cit*, 3rd ed., p. 369. Also: Note to p. 355.—ED.] Trendelenburg I can no longer reckon among my opponents. For if he calls the attributes "various definitions of one and the same thing," or various "expressions," I confess that I can discover no difference between those statements and my own. P. Schmidt, in his interesting essay on Schleiermacher, which will be referred to at the end of § 315, differs from both Fischer and Trendelenburg, but is a decided opponent of my view. According to him, thought and extension are the *summa genera* of existence. So far, I can quite agree with him. For by denying the determination (finitude, according to Spinoza) of the individual objects of perception, it is possible to rise from these until ultimately the two classes of thinking and extended existence are reached. Beyond these lies nothing but the *omne esse*, which embraces them, and which is identical with Spinoza's Substance, or Nature, or God. This, however, so far from anticipating one of the possible answers, does not even raise the question: "Whence comes that by which existence manifests itself as these two *genera*, or by which the two are distinguished, thinking existence being non-extended, and extended existence, non-thinking?" To this Hegel replies, and I follow him: "It cannot be deduced from Substance, and it must accordingly be introduced into it. This is the work of the understanding, which finds in itself not merely one, but two positive predicates (positive to correspond to *existence*), and no more than these

7. First, as regards Substance as such, the *natura naturans*, it is, according to its two attributes, of two kinds—extended Substance, and thinking Substance (*res extensa*, *res cogitans*, ii. *pr.* 1 and 2). In both cases, however, we must imagine every limitation removed. God is therefore neither body nor will, for the former is a limitation of extension, while the latter is a determined and limited form of thought. Infinite or substantial extension, infinite size, attributes (*i.e.*, properly, the other attributes) of God, *natura Dei*, or even simply *natura*, are the terms applied to the Infinite as extended. On the

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two." That Spinoza *reaches* his attributes in this way, is for me much the most important point. In the face of that it seems comparatively unimportant, how far he himself was conscious of the relation in which his two attributes really stood. Even if I could not bring forward a single quotation to prove that Spinoza was conscious of this, I should venture to say that the attributes are predicates, which the understanding must attach to Substance, not because the latter, but because the former, has this peculiar constitution. (I might say so, just as I may say that every person who tries to squint must alter the pupils of his eyes, although only a very few of those who squint know that this is the case.) I can, however, appeal to the letter to Simon de Vries, which I could not set aside so easily as K. Fischer does, even if it were written merely for the person to whom it is addressed, much less when it is seen to be an *epistola catholica* to Spinoza's school. If the members of the Amsterdam "Collegium," to which Spinoza was really writing, read his answer, it must have at once become plain to them, that in the theory of attributes, the point raised was what had been called for centuries, in philosophical phraseology, a *distinctio rationis*, as opposed to a *distinctio realis*. Descartes, too, employs this phraseology; and K. Fischer, in his translation of the First Book of the *Princ. Phil.*, has been less happy in his choice of the expression, "rational" distinction, than Picot, who says (*Œuvr. de Desc.* ed. Cousin, vol. iii., p. 104): *qui se fait par la pensée.* Descartes (*Princ. Phil.* i., 62), just after having said that the distinction between a substance and its attributes is a *distinctio rationis*, justifies the position that in certain circumstances this can be united with the *distinctio modalis*, on the ground that both form a contrast to the *distinctio realis*. Any one who bears this in mind in reading Spinoza's letter, as that circle of Spinozists at Amsterdam probably did, may,—if he shares the view I have set forth here, of Spinoza's theory of attributes,—regard this theory as almost directly suggested by Descartes. (Many, however, who do not agree with me, will perhaps think that Fischer should have called my view, not "formalist," but, "modalist," on the analogy of the Sabellian doctrine of the Trinity.). It appears to me still to be the one in which I can find the best explanation of the contrast between Spinoza's mutually opposed attributes of one Substance, and Descartes' two kinds of mutually opposed Substance. Nor am I shaken in my convictions by the statements of the *Tract. brev.*, which distinguishes these two predicates from all others. I see in those statements the bridge that connects Spinoza's original theory with Descartes and (the later) Spinozism.

other hand, infinite or substantial thought, infinite power of thinking, frequently too *idea Dei*, often simply *Deus*, are the names employed to denote the thinking Absolute. Consequently, while at first *Deus* and *natura* were connected by *sive*, it now runs: *quod formaliter est in natura, objective est in Deo*, but never conversely. The two words, taken in this narrower sense, stand in the same relation as *res* and *cognitio rei*, and the parallelism which Descartes had merely asserted to exist between formal and objective existence, here requires no further proof, because formality or actuality (what is now known as real existence) and objectivity (what is now called existence as idea) are both predicates of the same being. Since to become an object of thought, or to exist as an idea, means with Spinoza, just as with Descartes, to come into consciousness, unconscious thinking is of course a contradiction in terms, and God, because He thinks, knows that He thinks. Spinoza lays great stress on this point. He warns us against supposing that an idea is a "mute" (*i.e.* unperceived) copy, and demands that it should be regarded as a (conscious) act of thought (ii., *pr.* 43, *Schol.*). Accordingly the *idea tam ejus* (*sc. Dei*) *essentiæ quam omnium quæ ex ipsius essentia necessario sequuntur* (ii., *pr.* 3), which constitutes the Divine thought, is not an unconscious process; and those who understand by consciousness no more than consciousness of sensation, may say that Spinoza here teaches the doctrine of a conscious God. Those who demand more from (even human) consciousness, may question this. God, or Substance in general, was the condition (*causa prima*) of all that exists, and therefore His extension will be the condition of all corporeal existence,—this reminds one of Malebranche,—and similarly God, as a thinking being, will be the condition of all the various processes of thought. The circle has its ultimate ground in extension, just as the idea of the circle has its in thought. Accordingly, to attempt to deduce the existence of an extended thing, *e.g.* of the circle, from the fact that God had willed it, *i.e.* thought it, would—quite apart from the error of making one individual thing be conditioned by anything except another individual thing (*vid. supra, sub* 4, i., *pr.* 28)—involve the further mistake of trying to explain the mode of the one attribute by a limitation of the other. The two are entirely independent, each is to be conceived of *per se*, for otherwise they would be modes.

Everything, then, that follows *formaliter* (*i.e.* as something real) from the attributes of God, or from His nature (*i.e.* His extension), follows as an object of thought from His thought, or His idea (ii., *pr.* 6 and 7, and *Cor.*).

8. Leaving aside for the present, as we did before, the *natura naturata* (*generalis*), and turning to the world of individual things, we find that these are either *corpora*, *res corporeæ*, sometimes simply *res*, or are *ideæ*, according as they are regarded under one attribute or the other. As surely as the small squares we introduced maintain their position relatively to one another, whether they are looked at through a yellow or through a blue glass, so surely is *ordo rerum idem ac ordo idearum*, and a body and its idea or its *cognitio* are *una eademque res* (ii., *pr.* 7, and *Schol.*), which becomes at one time part of the Divine thought, at another, part of the Divine extension. The proposition brought forward above, to the effect that one individual thing results only from another individual thing, receives here a more exact determination. Anything of the nature of body can be conditioned (caused) only by something else of the nature of body, and a process of thought only by a process of thought (ii., *pr.* 9, *dem.*),—a separation of the two worlds which excludes all idealistic explanations in physical philosophy, all materialistic explanations in mental philosophy. Occasionalism could not go further than Spinoza in this separation. Not only does he scoff at those who imagine that their will moves their hands, but he makes both the rise of ideas in the human soul and their departure from it, *e.g.* at death, quite independent of the body, so that the mind dies from within (iii., *pr.* 11, *Schol.*). At the same time we must not overlook the fact, to which, following the example of the elder Sigwart, I drew attention in my *Vern. Aufs.*, p. 160, that he treats materialistic explanations of mental processes with more respect than their opposite. Indeed, sometimes (ii., *pr.* 19, *dem.*) it happens with him that the *ideata* are opposed to the ideas, not as *res* but as *causæ*, which contrasts strangely with what he writes to Schuller on 18th Nov. 1675. Although, on account of this separation, both body and mind are to be conceived of as *automata*, the latter as *automaton spirituale* (*De int. emend.* xi. 85), still on account of the parallelism, in fact on account of the unity of the two orders, the few propositions on the theory of body which Spinoza has interspersed in the Second Book as lemmas,

are also very important for the theory of mind. Accordingly they are just in their right place under the heading *De natura et origine mentis.* Since all bodies alike exist in extension, and further since extension does not vanish if we imagine an individual body removed, the essence of this body cannot consist in extension (*Cf.* ii., *def.* 2), but in that which modifies extension by being added to it. With Descartes this had been motion, which was added to extension by God. Spinoza puts this *Deus ex machina* aside, by making motion follow from extension. Further, by admitting an opposition within motion itself, an opposition which he designates by the words *motus et quies* (not to be regarded as absence of motion), he reaches in the *Tract. brev.* the position of making the essence of each body consist in a definite proportion of motion and rest. Such a proportion is found even in the *corpus simplicissimum,* by which we are merely to understand one of the above-mentioned *individua primi ordinis.* This is accordingly distinguished from others of the same kind only by swiftness and slowness, not, so far, by direction, etc. of motion. This same *individuum,* under the attribute of thought, or in the Divine thought, is a simple thought or process of thought, an *idea.* If we imagine an *individuum secundi ordinis,* this would, under the attribute of extension, be a *corpus compositum,* which might contain a number of different complicated movements, accelerated, curvilinear, etc. To this corresponds a complex of ideas, or an *anima,* so that there is no composite body which would not possess a soul. There are various degrees in which this is true, for the more complex and capable of the most various impressions it is, the more perfect is the body, and the richer in ideas or more perfect is its soul (ii., *pr.* 13, *Schol.*). Lastly, if the body is put together in the way in which the human body is, its soul is called a mind (*mens*). This mind is not something simple, but is made up of ideas, just as its body is made up of individual bodies (ii., *pr.* 15, *dem.*). Nor can we say of it that its essence consists in thought, but rather that it consists in the idea of this its body, or the knowledge of all the various bodily conditions (ii., *pr.* 13). We must not, however, forget that there is no other knowledge of the body and its existence than that which concerns its being moved and affected (ii., *pr.* 19). The so-called connection of body and soul, then, consists in its being one and the same thing, which is regarded at one time under the one

attribute, at another under the other (iii., *pr.* 2, *Schol.*). The fact that every individual object, and therefore man, must, as being a mode of Substance, be regarded under the same attributes as Substance itself, leads Tschirnhausen (*Ep.* 67) to bring forward one of the most forcible objections against the plurality of the attributes: If man is a mode of Substance which has an infinite number of attributes, how comes it that the human mind has the idea only of two of these? Spinoza attempts to answer this in a letter of which only a fragment has survived (*Ep.* 68). The answer he gives could only be satisfactory, if, instead of saying that the knowledge of these attributes falls into an infinite number of other *mentes*, he had said that it falls into other *intellectus infiniti* (*cf. infra, sub* 9); for it is absolutely impossible to understand how what constitutes *my* essence should be known by another *mens, i.e.* another part of the one *intellectus infinitus* of which I and that *mens* are parts. Mind, then, is simply the *idea* or *cognitio corporis*. But since an idea is only a product of the activity of thought, which was identical with consciousness, the *idea corporis* is a conscious act of thought of the mind. Accordingly the *idea corporis* is so closely connected with the knowledge of it, that as mind is *idea corporis*, so it is *idea* of this *idea*, and therefore *idea mentis*. (Kuno Fischer, whose correction of my former view I gratefully accept, has explained this point very clearly. The most important passages are *De int. emend.* vi. 34 ff. and *Eth.* ii., *pr.* 20–22.)

9. The ascent from individuals of the first to those of higher orders led, as we have seen (*sub* 5), to the *tota natura*, which, however, was not that which excludes all plurality, but the *natura naturata* which embraces everything that necessarily follows from Substance. This too must be conceived of under the two attributes. Under the one it will contain not a definite proportion of rest and motion, but all rest and all motion; and it will accordingly be *motus et quies* in general. Under the other, just as one mind embraced many *ideæ*, so it will embrace all *ideæ*, and therefore also all collections of ideas or *mentes* (v., *pr.* 40, *Schol.*). This sum of all ideas (and minds) is the *intellectus infinitus*, which, as we may quite easily see from the foregoing, belongs not to the *natura naturans*, but, just like *motus et quies*, to the *natura naturata* (i., *pr.* 31, *Ep.* 27). As the *natura naturata* was the last to be reached in

the ascent from the finite, and the first to be reached in the descent from the infinite, we can easily understand why the *intellectus infinitus* and *motus et quies*, which follow directly from God, were called at first not works but everlasting sons of God (*Tract. brev.*, p. 82),—expressions which do not occur in the *Ethics*. The *intellectus infinitus*, then, possesses or contains *objective*, the essence of all things (*ibid.*, *Append.* p. 246). It is the *idea* or *cognitio omnium*, just as our mind is the *cognitio* of all that goes to make up our body, and just as "substantial thought," or substance under the attribute of thought, was the *cognitio* of *omne esse*. Exactly as individual bodies participate in *motus et quies*, and are conditioned by them, so every *mens* is of course a part of the *intellectus infinitus*. The difference between this and the *cogitatio infinita* may be defined by saying that the former does and the latter does not consist of ideas (*Ep.* 26). What is contained in the latter is the idea only of the one existence. The *cogitatio infinita* is therefore not *idea omnium*, but certainly *idea Dei*. For the rest, Spinoza's *intellectus infinitus* reminds us strongly of the *intellectus universalis* of Averroës, *vid.* § 187, 2.

10. Since, according to Spinoza, man is a part of nature, *i.e.* a thing among things, *Anthropology* naturally forms a part of his physical philosophy, and is with him much more nearly akin to Zoology than it is with Descartes (*cf.* iii., *pr.* 57, *Schol.*). The third part of the *Ethics*, which treats of man apart from everything else, and purely as a natural being, begins by determining the conceptions of activity and of passivity. Activity means an adequate and sufficient, passivity on the contrary, merely a partial explanation of one's own condition (iii., *def.* 2). Man accordingly, whose bodily state is conditioned by the bodies which surround him, and who through sensation becomes conscious not merely of his own existence but also of the existence of other beings, is at once active and passive. In other words, he is checked, affected from without, in his activity; but he keeps striving to assert his existence in the face of this hindrance, for this is essentially involved in the nature of everything (iii., *pr.* 3, *Schol. pr.* 6, 7, 9). If the consciousness of being thus affected is called affection, the consciousness of the effort mentioned (*appetitus*) will be *cupiditas*, the first affection. With this are associated joy and sorrow, according as satisfaction or

hindrance gets the upper hand. Next come fear and hope, which are modifications of these fundamental affections. Since they all involve passivity, the absolute Being, as the absolute explanation, and therefore the absolutely Active, can know nothing of them. Like the being to which they belong, these passions (*passiones*) are both bodily and mental. Along with them the conceptions of good and evil are forthwith settled. These, since they denote merely satisfaction and its opposite, describe a relation to the individual that desires. The expression, "this is good for me," has therefore a perfectly rational sense; while the expression, "this is good (absolutely)," has no meaning whatever (iii., *pr.* 39, *Schol.*). By bringing into connection with joy or sorrow the idea of the object that causes them, we get love or hate (iii., *pr.* 13). Spinoza now shows how, from the combination of those hitherto mentioned, the most various passions result, partly of a depressing and partly of an elevating character. Since the depressed condition of mind is always laid down as the one that is to be avoided (iii., *pr.* 28), we get Spinoza's statics and mechanics of the passions; from which is deduced the result that every one acts as his nature demands, *i.e.*, seeks his own profit, and that the affections of men can only be overcome by stronger affections. These two propositions give us the premises of Spinoza's *Political Philosophy*, which is stated in outline in a scholium of the *Ethics*, and in more detail in the *Tractatus politicus*. Spinoza's aim is merely to give a physiological account of the State; from his point of view this becomes a mechanical and physical theory. He does not profess to give laws for a Utopia, but merely a description of how man is bound to pass from a state of nature to some form of political society. Since every being naturally tends to assert and to enlarge its own existence, or to seek its own advantage, it has a right to do this; and might and right generally coincide. Not merely has the pike a right to eat the small fish, but man has the right to live according to his nature, and therefore the fool has a right to live foolishly, the wise man to live rationally. Nothing, accordingly, would be unjust in the state of nature, except what no one wishes to do, and what no one can do. If men come into contact with one another,—as they are bound to do, since ultimately nothing can be so useful to man as his fellow-men,—those who are rational, *i.e.* those who go in pursuit only of knowledge, can never

come into conflict with one another. On the other hand, those who follow their affections are bound to get into entanglements about the end they have in view, and accordingly men are by nature enemies. In this mutual warfare all are powerless, and in an absurd position, since all assertion of their power or of their right brings with it the loss of these two things which they attempt to assert. They are bound to extricate themselves from this situation, and they do so by transferring to the community, which thereby becomes a State, the *summum imperium, i.e.*, the power of terrifying and persuading by hope and fear, and thus of bridling the weaker affections. In this way men become citizens in relation to the State, and subjects in relation to its laws. The union of men to form a State is conceived of as something purely external, for Spinoza entirely disregards the idea of nationality (God, he says on one occasion, creates not nations but individuals). Similarly, he never refers to the natural unity of the family. Where he uses the word, he understands it to mean artificial bonds of citizenship within the State. By entering into political union, one's own natural power is certainly lessened; but since it is a means of purchasing security, the profit is greater than the loss. Spinoza exalts his own political philosophy in contrast with that of Hobbes, because it allows of the continuance of natural rights. Men are still determined to action by fear, hope, and the like; only, in the State the object of fear and hope is the same for all. While in the state of nature nothing was unjust except what was impossible, in a political society injustice is simply what the State forbids, justice, what it allows. As with the individual, so with the State, right is limited by might. In regard to other States, treaties are binding only so long as it considers them advantageous, and so on. In regard to its own citizens, its power is limited by the absurdity of which it would be guilty, if it tried to give commands which it could not enforce, and thus made itself contemptible. This would be the case, for example, if it attempted to persecute people for their religious or scientific convictions. But convictions are quite different from the external signs which mark their presence. To determine the form of worship is, according to Spinoza, just as according to Hobbes, the business of the State. Since the attitude of the citizens to the State is a *noli me tangere*, he constructs his State without any regard to it. The political machine

should be organized in such a way that it will go just the same, whether the individuals have an affection for the community or not. Whether peoples flourish or go to ruin, depends simply upon the character of the arrangements. In his view, there is no other way for a people to fall into decline. Men were always and are everywhere the same; and therefore, if things go badly, the political arrangements alone can be responsible. Great importance is accordingly attached to the omnipotence of the State; and the Government is always conceived of as the State in the proper sense of the word. Although the governing body (or the ruler, for in a monarchy *rex est civitas*) can never really be wrong as against its subjects, still it should never forget that its power stops at the point where threats and promises cease to have any effect; and, above all, that the most dangerous enemies of every State are its own citizens. That State, therefore, is the safest, in which the government is conducted on the most rational principles, and in which the greatest amount of freedom is granted to the individual citizens. Of the three forms which government may take, Spinoza has treated only of monarchy and aristocracy; his account breaks off at democracy. He often states the principle that every attempt to overthrow the existing constitution must end in destruction. It would be strangely at variance with this, if he, who lived in a republic, had represented monarchy as the only constitution that afforded security and peace. On the other hand, those who are so anxious to make Spinoza a democrat, forget that in his *Politics* he does not retract the principle already laid down (*Eth.* iv., 54, *Schol.*)—*Terret vulgus nisi metuat*, but merely extends the conception *vulgus* to the great majority of mankind. At the very most, three, he believes, among the hundred chosen *optimi* would be under the guidance of reason. The *optimi* are the State in an aristocracy, as the king was in a monarchy. Spinoza admits that a monarchical constitution would offer sufficient freedom, where the prince aimed at the good of the mass of his subjects; and he further acknowledges it to be an intelligible fact that monarchy has developed out of aristocracy, and this out of democracy, which is the primitive form of the State. Still, he believes that he could count most surely on the durability of an aristocratic republic, consisting of several orders of citizens.

11. Spinoza's political philosophy gave an account of civil

freedom, *i.e.* of that extension of power of which the mass of mankind is capable. His Moral Philosophy, on the other hand, has for its purpose to show how the few who do not require the State and for whom accordingly civil liberty is insufficient, raise themselves to the highest form of liberty, spiritual freedom, which is a private virtue (*Tract. polit.* i., 6). A philosopher who denies the conception of an end, and therefore all notion of obligation, and who compares the freedom of the will to a stone that has been thrown and that imagines itself to be moving of its own accord, cannot, it is clear, establish an ethical system that would take the form of a positive command. Like everything else, the human will is treated on the analogy of mathematical physics. He begins with a warning not to accept the idea of a will (*voluntas*) as distinct from the various acts of will (*volitiones*); for a fiction of this sort has, he says, about as much value as the *lapideitas* which the Schoolmen distinguished from the *lapides* (ii., *pr.* 48. *Schol.*). He had learned from Descartes to identify will with assent; and this, combined with the fact that we *must* assent to what we clearly recognise (*e.g.* the three-sidedness of the triangle), leads him to the result that every clear idea is a *volitio*, and that therefore the sum-total of all such ideas and the sum-total of all *volitiones*, *i.e.*, *intellectus et voluntas, idem sunt* (ii., *pr.* 49. *Coroll. et Schol.*). Spinoza's nature was purely speculative to an extent that is probably unique; and therefore, just as he could not conceive of any one's being displeased because a sphere is round, so he could not see how one should refuse to give his assent to what he has come to understand, *i.e.*, recognise as necessary. Thus the relation that subsists between the individual who understands and the thing that is understood, is that between one who is free and something which he has himself approved of or willed. Increase of understanding, therefore, brings increase of (spiritual) freedom, for it adds to the amount of that of which I am master. On the other hand, the more I understand, the more am I bound to accept of what does not depend upon my approval, and, therefore, the more constrained I am. This contrast between constraint (*servitus*), treated of by Spinoza in the *Fourth Book* of his chief work, and spiritual strength and spiritual freedom, discussed in the *Fifth*, is the cardinal point of his *Ethics*, which thus becomes really a *Tractatus de intellectus emendatione*, to adopt the title of one

of his earlier writings. In order to explain the origin of this constraint, it is necessary to return to that fragmentary existence, the world of sense, and to the individuals of various orders. The figure we have already employed, of a plane surface divided into squares, will help us again. Hitherto we have been considering such combinations of more simple individual objects into more complex ones, as may be compared with divided surfaces that are bounded simply by straight lines and right angles. If, on the other hand, we imagine the divided surface to be curvilinear, a number of the squares would be mutilated, and would come only partly within the range of the figure; *i.e.*, it is possible that in the case of complex individuals many of the component elements are only partially and not entirely regulated by the whole. Now, if such an individual object be a body, *i.e.*, be regarded as extended, the motions of its component parts are not thoroughly controlled by its own. It is subject to perturbations. These, however, are peculiar to such bodies, for they of course occur neither in a *corpus simplicissimum* nor in the *individuum summi ordinis*, which contains all bodies and therefore all motions. What holds good of the complex body, naturally holds good also of the complex of ideas, or the mind, which expresses this body *objective*. A portion of the ideas of which it consists, will come completely under its control, and will therefore be deducible from its definition. With regard to these it will be active, according to the meaning of this term as already laid down. It will stand in quite a different relation to those ideas which do not come entirely within it, but exist partly in it and partly in other portions of the *intellectus infinitus* (*i.e.* in other *mentes*). (This is the case when two people apprehend one and the same object, each from a different side. Just the opposite happens in regard to what belongs to all and is true of each part as well as of the whole (ii., *pr.* 38). From this it follows, that only in the former case is a difference of views possible.) Those fragmentary (*mutilatæ*) ideas which we have merely *ex parte* (ii., *pr.* 10 *Cor.*), Spinoza calls inadequate, and contrasts with adequate ideas of which the mind has entire possession. Accordingly, just as in Descartes, these two expressions denote, not a relation to the *ideata*, but merely the relation of the ideas to the mind that has them. Further, adequacy and certainty (*certum esse*) are clearly identical. What I know

completely, I know certainly and without doubt; inadequate (half-known) ideas, on the other hand, are uncertain (ii., *pr.* 43, *Schol.*). Although the inadequate idea is only part of an adequate idea, still in another respect it contains more than that of which it is a part. For it is marred by its relation to the mind into which it enters; and it is accordingly not merely *mutilata*, but also *confusa* (ii., *pr.* 35). In contrast with the complete and pure ideas, the inadequate ideas may be called *imagines* of things (ii., *pr.* 17, *Schol.*). Every individual idea by itself is, of course, adequate; and similarly the *intellectus infinitus* contains all ideas in their entirety; in it they are therefore adequate. Only in a mind which stands midway between the two and is part of a larger mind, will there exist side by side with the ideas which fall completely within its control, of which it is therefore master, or in regard to which it is active, other ideas, which it possesses and controls only partially, in regard to which it is therefore passive or constrained. The sum-total of the former (the real *ideæ*) Spinoza calls *intellectus*, that of the latter (the *imagines*) he calls *imaginatio*. Nor is it difficult to see why there can be an *intellectus infinitus*, but not an *imaginatio infinita*. The understanding, or the better part of the human mind, as Spinoza often calls it, contains the ideas which are clear, definite, and so certain that no doubt at all can arise in regard to them, not even as to whether they correspond to their *idcatum*. In the case of an adequate idea, it is as unnecessary to seek for a test in regard to this latter point (which is accordingly a secondary quality of adequate ideas), as it would be to illuminate light (*De int. emend.* vii.). To have an adequate idea, means to know that it is true; and the knowledge of the understanding is therefore free from all taint of doubt. It is quite otherwise with inadequate ideas and with their sum-total, imagination. This contains half-knowledge, knowledge that is uncertain and doubtful. The motions in which the affections of our body consist, belong only partly to it and partly to the bodies by which it is affected. They are not to be explained by our body alone. Similarly, the mind, so far as it has the ideas of these affections, stands in a passive or suffering relation, since the idea of each of these always involves the idea of other existences. In our sense-perceptions we neither perceive our affections pure and simple, nor perceive in its entirety that which affects us.

These, therefore, and the experience which rests upon them, —and accordingly the knowledge of ourselves as particular individuals,—are inadequate, confused, constrained, *i.e.* the work of the imagination (ii., *pr.* 16, 26 *Coroll.*, *dem.* 28). The same is true of every passion; it is a confused act of thought, an idea of a perturbation of the body. It is characteristic of this constrained or first kind of knowledge (*De int. em.* iv., *Eth.* ii., 40, *Schol.* 2) that it breaks up everything into fragments (*Ep.* 29), and therefore regards everything separately (*seorsim*), that is, as something contingent, which may also exist in a different form (ii., *pr.* 44). Further, it looks at nothing from the point of view of eternity, but only from that of duration (ii., *pr.* 45, *Schol.*). To put it generally, it regards nothing as it is in itself, but everything (in its relation) to us. Hence arise both the confused notions of an end and the equally confused universal ideas, which unite to produce the meaningless expressions, good and evil, beautiful and ugly (ii. 10, *Schol.* 1. i. *Append.*). The majority of mankind exercise only this limited kind of apprehension; and every one finds it difficult to rid himself of it entirely. It is accordingly said to be that which regards things *ex communi naturæ ordine* (ii., *pr.* 29, *Coroll.*).

12. With the man who is thus constrained, Spinoza contrasts him who is spiritually free and strong. Nothing fills such a one with the slavish astonishment that accompanies ignorance or half-knowledge. He knows things, and therefore assents to them or wills them. In the higher knowledge which is characteristic of this freedom, Spinoza distinguishes two grades. He accordingly always calls it *cognitio secundi et tertii generis.* In the earlier *Tract. brev.* the names *fides* and *cognitio*, as opposed to *opinio*, occur for these; and all three are compared with the religious conceptions *peccatum*, *lex*, and *gratia* (*Suppl.* p. 180). The lower of these two stages knows by reasoning, the higher by direct intuition. The former, therefore, deals with what is conditioned and deduced, the latter with what is unconditioned. The three *genera cognitionis* correspond to the successive stages: *communis naturæ ordo*, *natura naturata*, *natura naturans.* Unlike imagination, the two latter kinds of knowledge,—which are distinguished from each other as *ratio* and *cognitio intuitiva*, but are often also included under the common name of *ratio*, —regard everything in its eternal and necessary connection.

For them, there is no possibility of a thing existing under a different form. They stand to everything in an attitude of assent, *i.e.*, of freedom. Nor have they to do with the individual and with individual distinctions. They are concerned with the universally valid,—which forms the *notiones communes*, or *fundamenta rationis* (ii., *pr.* 44, *Coroll.* 2, *dem.*) or *ratiocinii nostri* (ii., *pr.* 40, *Schol.*),—and therefore with regular connection. Accordingly, the dictum that nothing proceeds out of nothing, in virtue of which we may say that everything without exception is conditioned, is numbered among the *notiones communes* (*Ep.* 28). These are something quite different from the universals or general ideas above rejected. If we keep firm hold of the fact that to conceive is to approve, or to will for oneself, we can easily understand how Spinoza, in spite of his fatalism, can still assert that,—in fact can even show the way in which,—man may attain to ever greater freedom and rid himself of all passivity. So soon as he understands it, conceives it in its necessity, he ceases to wish for anything else; in fact, through the increase in his power of apprehension, his former passivity or suffering has become the occasion of an increase of power, that is, has become pleasure. (It is interesting to compare with this the way in which Jacob Böhme made the pardoned sinner find enjoyment even in his sins, *vid. supra*, § 234, 5.) The more our knowing, our clear knowledge, becomes desire, *i.e.*, feeling or affection, the more is it in a position to overcome the other affections in, accordance with the law already stated. The more it grows, the more do tranquillity (*acquiescentia*) and intellectual power (*fortitudo*, *virtus*) increase. Blessedness, the highest and enduring joy, does not come as the reward of this *virtus*, but consists in this *virtus* (v., *p.* 42). Now, since everything is known in its necessity only if it is known as a necessary consequence of the infinite, diviné being, this joy is impossible without the idea of God, and therefore (*cf. supra*, *sub* 10, the definition of love) this knowledge is necessarily love to God (v., *pr.* 32, *Coroll.*). That this *amor intellectualis* is nothing else than love of truth, is expressly stated in the *Tract. brev.* (*Suppl.* p. 116). Just as we do not love the truth that it may love us in return, so we do not love God for this object. Indeed, to wish Him to love us, would mean, since God can love no individual being, to wish that He was not God (v., *pr.* 19). God, then, does not love us, but we love Him, if we have knowledge.

But since together we form the *intellectus infinitus*, which knows God and therefore loves Him, it may be said that our love is a part of the love with which God loves Himself, that He loves men with the love with which He loves Himself, and lastly, that our devotion to God is His glory and honour (v., 36, c. *Cor. et Schol.*). The adequate ideas, as component parts of the *intellectus infinitus*, are eternal; only the fragments of them pass away. Accordingly the greater the number of adequate ideas which go to make up a man's mind,—which in turn will depend upon the perfection with which his body is organized,—the larger will be the part of him that is eternal, the less reason will he have to be afraid of death (v., 38, 39). (Those who find in these last sentences a personal God, personal immortality, and ever so much besides, must not forget that, according to Spinoza's express declaration, God has neither understanding nor will. According to him, a God who loved men in return for their love, would be no God. Further, he looks upon personality and duration as mere figments of the imagination, the existence of which he has certainly no wish to prolong for ever. Lastly, he makes religion and blessedness consist solely in the self-forgetful devotion by which man becomes a tool in the hands of God, that is thrown away and replaced by another when it has become useless. *Cf. Tract. brev.*, p. 178. In this other, the ideas which had gone to make up my mind, still continue to exist.)

13. It was only in Holland that Spinozism found an immediate response. From the circle of friends in Amsterdam, who have already been spoken of, the acquaintance with Spinoza's doctrines spread so quickly, through the circulation of the *Ethics* in manuscript, that many printed works which are usually regarded as precursors of the *Ethics*, really draw their inspiration from that book. This is the case, for instance, with the writings of Wilh. Deurhoff (1650–1717) of Amsterdam, whose collected works appeared in 1715. It is difficult to decide whether Bredenborg (*Enarratio tractatus theologico-politici, etc.*, 1675), and the Socinian Franz Kuper (*Arcana atheismi revelata, etc.*, 1676), concealed their agreement with Spinoza under the mask of attacks upon him. Some maintain that they did; and that devices of this sort were sometimes resorted to, especially after the appearance of Spinoza's *Opera posthuma*, is proved beyond a doubt by the testimony of a work by a decided adherent of Spinoza, which

has now become very rare. In 1684 there was published, professedly by Kühnhardt at Hamburg, but really in Holland, *Principia pantosophiæ* in three books. The third part is unfinished; but the first, which gives as an introduction an outline of logic, bears the title: *Specimen artis ratiocinandi naturalis et artificialis ad pantosophiæ principia manuducens;* and it has for a motto: *Quod volunt fata non tollunt vota.* The author does not give his name. Placcius (*Theat. anon.*, p. 324), however, says that the engraving accompanying the work (which is not in my copy) proves that the writer was ABRAHAM JOHANN KUFFELÆR, *Jur. utr. Doct.* at Utrecht. Bayle gives him the same name, and so does Baumgarten, in whose *Nachr. v. e. Hall. Bibl. Pt.* 1, a short summary of the contents of the book is given. In later times the author's name is usually written Cuffeler. Besides his enthusiasm for Spinoza, of which he makes no secret (*e.g.* i., p. 103), his book has another interesting feature. The theory of God has, he says, been fully discussed in that "*libro aureo*," Spinoza's *Ethics;* and he promises to treat the theory of nature in this work on similar principles, in order to lay the foundation of a complete theory of human nature. Only a small part of this promise is fulfilled. The whole of the second book is taken up with an outline of arithmetic and algebra for the benefit of the non-mathematical reader. The third, which treats of physical philosophy, breaks off after discussing the theory of falling and of floating bodies. The principle on which most stress is laid is, that the essential character of bodies consists in extension, but their real existence in motion. The sum-total of motions, therefore, which the Cartesians never determine more exactly, can very easily be strictly determined: it exactly amounts to the sum-total of real bodies. Equal motions in opposite directions are called rest. All motions, as for example the increased speed of falling bodies, are easily explained by the disturbance of equilibrium. In this, the chief part is played by the air which follows in their wake, especially the finer element of ether, which remains even in the so-called *vacuum* of the barometer (*baroscopium*). Still more influential than these laymen were some clergymen, who combined Spinozism with religious mysticism—not a very hard thing to do. Amongst these was Friedrich von Leenhof (1647–1712), whose *Heaven and Earth* appeared in 1703, and produced many writings in reply. Still more important was

Partiaan van Hattem (1641–1706), of Bergen op Zoom, whose followers formed the numerous sect of the Hattemists. It can easily be proved that he had read the *Ethics* of Spinoza, at first in manuscript copies. His theories gave rise to a vast amount of controversy. But the opponents of Spinoza were far more numerous than his adherents. Spinozism was attacked as the enemy of religion and as atheism, not merely from the theological side, but also with the weapons of philosophy. The names of Velthuysen (*Tractatus de cultu naturali et origine moralitatis*, 1680), Poiret (*De Deo, anima et malo*, 1685), Wittich (*Anti-Spinoza, etc.*, 1690), Dom. Fr. Lami (*Le nouvel Athéisme Renversé, etc.*, 1696), Jacquelot (*Dissertation sur l'Existence de Dieu, etc.*, Paris, 1696), Jens (*Examen philosophicum sextæ definit. Ethic. Bened. de Spinoza, etc.*, Dort, 1698), prove that opponents and adherents of Descartes and Malebranche combined to attack Spinozism. The appearance of a number of controversial writings shows that notice began to be taken of Spinoza in Germany also. The titles of these were collected by Jänichen in a work of his own, in the beginning of the eighteenth century. The circumstance that Spinoza became known in Germany chiefly through Leibnitz, who put forward a rival system, accounts for the fact that Spinozism did not flourish in this country. Those who were inclined to adopt his views, at least took pains to conceal it. This was what Friedrich Wilhelm Stosch did in his *Harmonia philosophiæ moralis et religionis christianæ*, 1792, which was printed professedly in Amsterdam, but really in Guben.

§ 273.

1. Just as Descartes had done (*vid.* § 269, 2), only in the opposite direction, Spinoza passed from the principle of his philosophy to something which abrogated it. Even in the sense of the word determined in § 259 as a unity of formal and objective existence, that principle was, that God is the only Substance. It is just this that forces Spinoza to give it up. In order to conceive of substance as the only true existence, every negation, and therefore every determination, must be excluded. But the result of this is, that what is excluded from it becomes something which does not exist in it, and which is therefore no longer *in alio*. Determined existence then must be *in se*, or of the nature of substance. It is not merely hard,

as Spinoza admits, but utterly impossible *not* to take the modifications for independently existing things. They themselves change for the mind that regards them, and therefore it changes them. Just as everywhere what is excluded takes its place by the side of that which excludes it, so here definite or determined existence places itself *beside* infinite existence. Similarly Parmenides had been compelled to allow the non-Being to stand side by side with the Being, from which it was excluded.

2. Spinoza tried, as Parmenides had done, to save his pantheism by making the view of existence as one and infinite the only correct and rational view, and representing the view that gave it many aspects as mere opinion (*cf.* § 36, 3) or imagination. But since he explains imagination from the fact that there are many minds and many fragmentary ideas, he is really moving constantly in a circle: imagination makes ideas fragmentary, and is itself the consequence of their being fragmentary. He cannot get rid of the plurality of independent existences; and in order to conceal the contradiction into which he thus falls, he separates his pantheism and individualism ("monism" and "pluralism") by the word *quatenus*, which Herbart has humorously called the charm that made everything possible with Spinoza.

3. As these two different ways of regarding existence are found side by side, those who make Spinoza a pattern of formal consistency, *i.e.* of perfect agreement, have no other resource than to regard only the one side as his real view, and to ignore the other, whether as an inconsistency or as a concession to those who differ from him in opinion. The latter course was adopted almost invariably with the anti-pantheistic propositions until a comparatively recent time. Some fifty or sixty years ago, Thomas attempted the opposite solution of the difficulty. He tried to make out and to maintain that Spinoza was really an atomist, and that his pantheism (that is, almost the whole of the first book of the *Ethics*) either was not seriously meant or was written only to please the pantheistic Cartesians. This paradoxical view has at all events had one good effect. It made men begin to examine more closely what was the real nature of Spinoza's consistency, which had been praised so highly since the days of Jacobi. The result has been to show that Spinoza was consistent, not in standing by what he had once said, but in deducing from this all possible conse-

quences, even such as were opposed to the point from which he started. Descartes' ultimate conclusion, that God alone was substance, provided a theme for Spinoza. Spinoza in turn, starting from this point, was driven to the view that individual existences were of the nature of substance; and thus he provided a theme for the thinkers of the succeeding period. And they treated Spinoza exactly as he had treated Descartes —they ignored everything but his ultimate conclusion.

SECOND
PERIOD OF MODERN PHILOSOPHY.

PHILOSOPHY OF THE EIGHTEENTH CENTURY: INDIVIDUALISM.

§ 274.

THE preceding period was the period of organization. Busied with this, men forgot that it was of the nature of mind always to pass from universality into the particular subjects, and to quicken itself and them by this mutual sustenance. Such neglect brought its own punishment with it. The other aspect of the whole was now brought into undue prominence, and in all spheres of intellectual life subjectivity and individualism raised their heads. The reverence for ecclesiastical dogma had to give way before the assertion of personal conviction, and of the no less personal need of salvation. And in this movement the men of the Enlightenment and the Pietists had more than one point in common, including an interest in heretics. In the State the example shown by the successors of the great queen and the still greater minister (§ 262) taught rulers and statesmen to be guided more by egoism than by a regard for the general well-being. This practical maxim, as might have been expected, spread downwards from above, until, simultaneously on the throne and among the dregs of the people, the cry arose, "After us the deluge." Lastly, the movement showed itself in the constitution of the Church. The individual congregations grew too strong for the national Church, and everywhere distrust was roused against the territorial system. Hand-in-hand with this went the leaning from the Lutheran to the Reformed communion. So strongly is this contrasted with the principle that guided the organization already described, that we may fairly call this period the period of *disorganization.*

§ 275.

Individualism was the only philosophical formula to which a representative man in such a period could give expression. This has now to develop the aspect of truth unwillingly admitted by Spinoza, and, in conscious opposition to pantheism, to defend to the uttermost the substantial existence of individual objects. Individual objects, however, with Descartes and Spinoza were of two kinds, which, having opposite predicates attached to them, were mutually exclusive. Individualism accordingly will develop itself in two diametrically opposite directions, which may be called realistic and idealistic, after the names that individual objects had last received (*res* and *ideæ*). By these must be understood here only individualist (anti-pantheistic) systems, which in their turn are mutually opposed. Considerations of convenience make it advisable to begin with the realistic series.

FIRST DIVISION.

Realistic Systems.

§ 276.

The tendency of realism is to bring into prominence individual beings as such, but also to exalt what is material in them at the expense of what is spiritual. In this movement a negative and a positive element may be distinguished. But the two are so completely separate, that at first the human spirit is brought to the humble acknowledgment of its own insufficiency, without those who produce this result always being conscious that the humiliation of what is intellectual can only lead to the triumph of what is corporeal. The SCEPTICS and MYSTICS of this period, even those in whom the superhuman interest appears most strongly, prepared the way for the thinkers who, while maintaining that the mind was unable to find the truth within itself, added that the external world, and not God, provided the means for supplying the deficiency. In fact, indications which point to this view are found in almost every writer of these two schools.

§ 277.

A.—THE SCEPTICS.

1. The self-sufficiency of the mind, which Descartes and Spinoza had acknowledged by saying that it created its own ideas like an "automaton," had been questioned by some even of the contemporaries of these two philosophers. The earliest of these was FRANÇOIS DE LA MOTHE LE VAYER (1588–1672), a man of education and knowledge of the world, as became one who had been tutor in a royal family. Among his numerous works (first collected 1654–56, 2 vols. fol.; last edition, Dresden, 1756–59, 14 vols. 8vo), he wrote some in which various peoples and various epochs were compared. Just as had been the case with Montaigne, these ethnological studies strengthened his sceptical tendencies. Nowhere does he give more decided expression to these than in the *Cinq Dialogues*, published in 1673, after his death, as the work of one Orosius Tubero. The untrustworthiness of the senses, and therefore still more so of the reason, which is entirely dependent on the senses, must lead, he here teaches, to a renunciation of all knowledge. This renunciation can only be helpful to religious faith. It is in the will, by which one subjects oneself to the mysteries of religion, that the merit of faith consists.

2. Although their nationality and calling in life were very different, still there are points of likeness between Le Vayer and the English writer JOSEPH GLANVIL (1636–1680). The sceptical ideas of the latter are developed in his works, *The Vanity of Dogmatizing* (London, 1661), and *Scepsis Scientifica* (London, 1665), where, among other things, the validity of the idea of cause is attacked. With this sceptical attitude he combines a supernatural theology, defended in his *Philosophia pia* (1671), and his *Essays on Several Subjects in Philosophy and Religion* (1676, 4to); and also a great preference for anti-scholastic, experimental natural science. The latter he shows especially in his *Plus ultra, Or the Progress and Advancement of Learning*, etc. (1668). As the title of this book indicates, he is a disciple of Bacon. He notices Descartes too, but not to express agreement with him. Against him, as well as against Hobbes, he calls in the aid of Montaigne and Charron.

3. The third who deserves mention, is a German contemporary of Glanvil, HIERONYMUS HIRNHAIM (1637–1679), abbot of the Remonstrant monastery at Prague. His book, *De typho generis humani*, etc., Prague, 1676, 4to, does not betray any acquaintance with Descartes. In contempt for knowledge he surpasses even Glanvil, and he takes particular delight in bringing into prominence the contradiction between the dogmas of belief and the axioms of reason, in order to point the moral that the mind, unable to find the truth within itself, should seek help in the Divine revelation. As a general rule, however, a passive attitude is recommended, since the mind can only conceive what it has previously felt, *i.e.* received. Hirnhaim also shares Glanvil's liking for natural science, but his physics are not modern, and belong rather to the latter period of the Middle Ages. His world-soul and the *ideæ seminales* which it contains, as well as the *Archäi* which work in things, remind us strongly of Paracelsus. Nor can this be wondered at, if we bear in mind that the Paracelsian physician and philosopher, J. Marcus Marci (1595–1665), exercised great influence over him. This thinker taught at the University of Prague, and his work, *Idearum operatricium idea*, had been published in Prague three years before Hirnhaim's birth.

Cf. Barach: *Hieronymus Hirnhaim*, etc., Vienna, 1864. G. E. Guhrauer: *Marcus Marci und seine philosophischen Schriften*, in Fichte's *Zeitschrift*, vol. xxi., 1852.

4. Of much more importance is the theologian DANIEL HUET (8 Feb., 1630, to 26 Jan., 1721), renowned for his vast learning. He was quite conscious of his antagonism to Descartes and Spinoza. For a while he was inclined towards Cartesianism, but he seems to have been turned away from it by the influence of Isaac Vossius. Just as the father (Gerhard Vossius) may have been the first to suggest the Biblical euhemerism that makes Huet in his *Demonstratio evangelica* see in the history of almost all the Greek gods and goddesses simply the story of Moses and his sister, so the son may have been the cause of Huet's subsequent hostility to Descartes. His chief philosophical works were: *Censura philosophiæ Cartesianæ* (Paris, 1689); *Quæstiones Alnetanæ de concordia rationis et fidei* (Caen, 1690); and *Traité philosophique de la Faiblesse de l'Esprit Humain* (Amst., 1723), written in 1690 in French, and

then translated by Huet himself into Latin, but not published till after his death. These show how his aversion to Descartes and Spinoza, which had grown into positive anger against them, is combined with a scepticism which brings a charge of untrustworthiness against the senses and still more against the reason, whose chief instrument,—the syllogism,—is said to rest simply upon evasions. He therefore goes on to demand that we should make ourselves subject to revelation, upon which even the credibility of the axioms of reason ultimately depends. Only because in the dogma of the Trinity, trinity and unity are ascribed to the same subject (Substance), does the principle of identity hold good; and not conversely. But in proportion as he emphasizes the insufficiency of reason, Huet approximates to sensationalist and even materialistic opinions. It is an established axiom with him, that nothing can be in the understanding that has not already been in the senses; and he is fond of repeating that it is the impressions on the brain that force the mind to form its ideas of things.

Cf. Chr. Bartholmèss: *Huet, évêque d'Avranches, ou le scepticisme théologique.* Paris, 1850.

5. Decidedly the foremost place among the Sceptics of this period belongs to PIERRE BAYLE (18 Nov., 1647, to 27 Nov., 1706). He was early familiar with the works of Montaigne and Le Vayer; and in Geneva, whither he had betaken himself when he found his security in France endangered by his apostasy (1670) from Catholicism, which he had embraced too hurriedly, he became acquainted with Cartesianism. This he expounded in his lectures, while he was a professor at Sedan. There are clear traces of scepticism in his *Letter on Comets* (*i.e.* the dread of comets), written while he was at Sedan, but not published till 1682, at Rotterdam; it is quite openly professed in his *Dictionnaire Historique et Critique* (first ed. 1695–97, 2 vols, fol.; second ed., greatly enlarged, 1702: the best edition is that of Des Maizeaux, 1740, 4 vols. fol.). Bayle's other writings are to be found in *Œuvres de P. Bayle*, etc., the Hague, 3 vols. fol. (3rd vol. in two parts). The most complete justification for our ranking Bayle among the individualist philosophers is the manner in which he treats Spinoza. The advocate of toleration is hardly recognisable in this part of his work, so strong a re-

semblance do his invectives bear to those of the fanatic Huet. Spinozism is called a most monstrous opinion, which surpasses all conceivable absurdities, and so on. Atomism, on the other hand, which he rightly recognises as the view most diametrically opposed to pantheism, enjoys a much more kindly treatment. The other differences between the views of atomists, *e.g.* between the followers of Descartes and those of Gassendi, seem to be of no importance so long as they unite in opposition to what he censures as the worst of Spinoza's blunders, *viz.* the idea that individual objects are merely modifications of a single substance. In spite of his hostility to pantheism, however, Bayle did not come back to the point from which Descartes had started, that is, to the unassailable certainty of one's own existence, and the positive knowledge resulting therefrom. Rather, his scepticism shows a decided tendency to question both. We are said to be far surer of the external world than we are of ourselves; in fact, since we are recreated at every instant, we do not know at all whether we are still (the same), and so on. Just as uncertain as the certainty of our own existence is the canon deduced from this, which the Cartesians held to be the criterion of truth. This it assuredly is not, for the dogmas of religious belief, which certainly contain truth, contradict the most evident axioms of reason; and heresies, Manichæism, for example, conform much more to the requirements of reason than Christianity does. This is no disadvantage to the latter, for since faith rests upon revelation, and demands the surrender of the reason, it becomes more meritorious the more difficult it is. Bayle rejects most decidedly the arrogance that would doubt the honesty of the man who asserts that he believes what is contrary to his reason. How should not such a contradiction be possible, when reason, like caustic remedies, is only successful in refuting errors, and is bound to inflict damage where it attempts to demonstrate religious truth, just as those remedies are when they touch healthy flesh? It is bound to do so, for it undertakes the task of representing as necessary whatever it demonstrates; and accordingly in considering the order of salvation it transforms God's free work into something necessary, just as Spinozism does. A man of such immense learning as Bayle could not but attach great value to experience, as that by which material is accumulated. His preference was rather for historical matter than for nature. Still,

he had a certain amount of interest in natural science. But he cared far more for ethics than for physics. As might be expected from the individualist point of view which he adopts, he makes individual conviction and individual conscience the real principle of moral action. When, however, he begins to determine more exactly what is meant by conscience, he is often led to give great prominence to the element of universality in it, so that his moral philosophy is a compromise between subjectivity and objectivity. The former comes to the front when he maintains that a false conviction, if it be innocent, forms as complete a justification of an action as a true one would do, and when he makes no distinction between the erring conscience and that whose demands are true. On the other hand, the latter makes its presence felt when he asserts that the conscience of all agrees in certain demands, and when he calls it universal reason, or compares moral philosophy with logic, the latter of which forbids all that is contrary to one's intellectual conscience. Only in one point is he absolutely consistent, that is, in the complete separation of moral philosophy from dogma, the doctrinal side of religion. Not only is he continually arguing against those who deny morality to the heathen, but he carries his opposition to a theological basis of ethics so far that he falls into self-contradiction. He declares it to be quite possible for a state to consist entirely of atheists, and he says that the worst Christian may be the best citizen. So far, this is quite consistent with the separation of moral philosophy from religious creed. But when he goes further, and hints that zealous Christians must necessarily disregard the well-being of their state, and when he shows that this well-being demands and pre-supposes all sorts of things that the Christian considers to be wrong, he clearly asserts that civic virtue is not consistent with every creed, inasmuch as it is inconsistent with Christianity. This anticipates the subsequent declaration of Mandeville (*vid.* § 284, 2). But Bayle blunts the point of it by the mischievous remark that we need not distress ourselves about states composed solely of Christians. The number of those who really live as the gospel directs will always be very small. Those who, in spite of their profession of Christianity, are ambitious, interested, and so on, will everywhere form the majority.

Cf. Ludw. Feuerbach: *Pierre Bayle nach seinen für die Geschichte der Philosophie und Menschheit interessantesten Momenten.* Augs., 1838.

§ 278.

B.—THE MYSTICS.

1. The Mysticism of this period leads to the same result as its Scepticism, a coincidence which will be better understood if we note the union of mystic and sceptical elements in a single individual, *e.g.* in Hirnhaim. The mystics reproached the mind with its poverty and helplessness, and in doing so they aimed, even more than did the sceptics, at furthering the interests of the supernatural. Then came the demand to accept truth from the Godhead that reveals it, and by-and-by the hint to accept it from the phenomenal world as well. As soon, however, as the mind has become accustomed to the humble *rôle* of a mendicant, complete subjection to its benefactor may be looked for. This is not possible so long as, owing to their contradictory predicates, those individual existences which are spiritual and those which are material are mutually exclusive, and therefore both equally justified. Some change must be made before any relation of superiority and inferiority is possible. This may be brought about either by attaching to minds a predicate which will bring them nearer to bodies, or by giving to bodies a predicate which will make them more like minds. The former alternative leads more directly to the purpose in view—the subjection of the ideal world to the real; the latter may also be perverted to serve an end directly at variance with its original one. Of the two contemporaries and friends who accomplished what we have just indicated, More, who conceives of spirits as being also extended beings, in a very special degree paved the way for Realism; while Cudworth, who makes the component parts of the physical world *quasi*-thinking beings, exercised an appreciable influence upon Leibnitz, *i.e.* upon the development of Idealism.

2. HENRY MORE (12th Oct., 1614, to 1st Sept., 1687) was at first led by somewhat unsystematic philosophical studies at Cambridge to a peculiar form of pantheism. From this he was emancipated by the study of the Neo-Platonists, of German theology, and of other mystic writings; and lastly, by Cartesianism. Cartesianism, however, he found perfectly satisfactory only for a short period. It became more and more apparent to him that, in the true philosophy, Cartesianism forms only one side and Platonism the other; and that the two

are mutually complementary, like body and soul. This true philosophy he believes to have been laid down in the original Jewish Cabalah, which stretches back far beyond Moses, and to have been transplanted by means of Moses (Moschos) to the Greeks,—Pythagoras, Plato, and others. He gives a full account of the fortunes and the contents of this true Cabalah in a number of writings (collected in *Henrici Mori Cantabrigiensis Opera omnia, tum quæ latine tum quæ anglice scripta sunt, nunc vero latinitate donata, instigatu et impensis generosissimi juvenis Joannis Cockshuti*, Lond., 1679, 3 vols. fol.). His most important proposition is, that all substances are extended, but extended in such a way that minds are under a fourth dimension, in virtue of which they are not, like bodies, confined within the limits of impenetrability. Accordingly those who maintain that mind is nowhere (Nullibilists), and those who teach that it exists altogether in every part (Holenmerians), are equally wrong. Rather, like a globe illuminated from within, mind admits of gradual distinctions. Its innermost and brightest portion is connected with one organ; the outer and darker region with others. When impressions are made from without, the parts of the soul on the circumference connected with the organs of sense, prompt the inner or central parts to the production of thoughts. (Only of God can it be said that He is everywhere and nowhere, that He is everywhere altogether and equally, that He is altogether centre, and so on.) As regards bodies, these cannot contract and expand, because the fourth dimension does not affect them. They are impenetrable. Therefore with them all influence is exerted merely on the surface, and Descartes is quite right when he treats the theory of bodies as mechanics. The point in which his physical philosophy requires to be corrected is, that not merely organic bodies but all bodies are interpenetrated by minds. In the lowest stages these are called germs (*formæ seminales*); in the higher, souls. Further, the universe too is interpenetrated by a quickening spirit of this kind, the spirit of nature or of the world. This, which is itself unconscious and unreflecting, serves as an instrument in the hands of God, and furnishes the key to the phenomena of sympathy and antipathy, of animal instincts, and so on.

3. Ralph Cudworth (1617 to 26th Jan., 1688) studied at the University of Cambridge from his fourteenth year, and taught there from his twenty-eighth. Besides some smaller writings

on theological subjects he published an *opus magnum: The True Intellectual System of the Universe. The first part, wherein all the reason and philosophy of Atheism is confuted, and its impossibility demonstrated.* London, printed for Richard Royston, 1678, fol. Mosheim, who translated this work into Latin (*Systema intellectuale*, Jen., 1733), included in his second edition Cudworth's posthumous work, *Discourse of Moral Good and Evil.* Materialistic doctrines, especially those of Hobbes, led Cudworth to investigate carefully the nature of Atheism, under which term he includes the opinions of all those who admit the existence only of what is material (corporealists). Of the four classes to which he reduces them all, the most important seem to him to be the Atomism of Democritus, which deduces everything from existences that are simply extended, and the Hylozoism of Strato, according to which the primitive particles are endowed with life. The latter view, which is a denial of mere Atomism, may very well be combined with theology. It is indeed really the only one that can save theologians from the fanatical opinion that God with His wonder-working power interferes directly everywhere. The modified Hylozoism which Cudworth adopts attributes to every component part of the physical world a plastic nature, what chemists call "Archäus," the essence of which may be called thought, provided that by this is understood nothing conscious. Similarly, every larger whole —a planet as well as the body of a man or an animal—has its own principle of life. Those who are afraid of admitting that the whole universe has a plastic nature of this kind cannot at least avoid allowing one to each planetary system We must not, however, think of these principles of life as something divine. In fact, it is a mistake to consider the life of planets, and so on, a very high one. It is rather the lowest form, and may be compared to our dreams or to the instinctive action of animals. According to Cudworth, there is a great deal of truth to be extracted from the positive assertions of Hylozoism, but this is counterbalanced by the weakness of its negative statements, especially its objections against the proofs of the existence of God. He himself undertakes the defence of all these proofs—of the teleological against Descartes' denial of final causes, and in a special degree of the ontological. In the latter he finds, just as the authors of the second set of objections against Descartes had done

(*vid.* 267, 2), only one defect. We must begin by proving that a being whose existence is necessary is possible, and then we may go on to deduce existence from the idea we have of such a being; that is, either God is impossible, or He really exists. Further, from the fact that there are eternal verities, it must be concluded, according to Cudworth, that there is an eternal understanding in which these are found, and in which the reason of individual human beings participates. All knowledge then is really a process of illumination by God, just as historically all philosophy originates in the divinely revealed Cabalah, which was transmitted from the Jews to the Greeks. Lastly, Cudworth disposes of those objections against the existence of God which are deduced from the presence of evil in the world. We could certainly imagine a world in which the individual would be better; but it is quite another question whether this would not be more than counterbalanced by the loss of perfection to the whole. In any case, however, want of perfection is not to be attributed to the will of God, but to the limitation which is inseparable from the nature of the finite.

4. As was the case among the Sceptics, so among the Mystics the foremost place belongs to a Frenchman. PIERRE POIRET (15th Aug., 1646, to 21st May, 1719) was at first an adherent of Descartes, but was afterwards alienated from him by the writings of Tauler, Thomas à Kempis, and particularly of Mdlle. Bourignon. Subsequently he became filled with aversion, especially towards Spinoza. To this feeling he gives expression in the second edition of his *Cogitationes rationales de Deo, anima et malo*, which originally (1677) had had quite a Cartesian tone. The *Œconomie Divine* (Amst., 1682, 7 vols. 12mo) is chiefly devoted to the exposition of his theological doctrines, which have long exercised great influence, particularly in Germany. For his philosophical opinions his most important work is: *De eruditione solida superficiaria et falsa*, etc. (Amst., 1692, 12mo). In his *Fides et ratio collata* (Amst., 1708, 12mo), he appears in the same relation to Locke as that in which Malebranche had stood to Spinoza,—roused to wrath by the logical results of his own views. Poiret, like More, compares the mind to a globe of light whose outer surface is the medium of external and lower knowledge, and whose centre is the medium of inner and higher knowledge. The former is the active understanding or reason, through

which we possess ideas and mathematics, the triumph of the reason. It has only to do with shadows of reality, and as soon as it attempts to exercise dominion in the sphere of the real, as in the mathematical physics of the Cartesians, it merely lays hold on the dead corpse of nature instead of on its living body, and finds only lifeless mechanism and fatalism instead of intelligible order and freedom. A much higher place belongs to the passive, purely receptive understanding. This, however, is itself subdivided into two : receptivity either for the influence of the world of sense, or for that of God. Even the former stands much higher than reason does, for by its instrumentality we are affected by something that is real, by it we come to a knowledge of existence, and not of shadows merely. Receptivity for the Divine revelation, of course, takes the highest place. Through this man rises to be a theologian, just as through the use of the reason he sinks into a philosopher. It was therefore a complete reversal of the truth to do as Descartes did, and make the evidence of reason the cardinal point of all knowledge. The most certain fact of all is God, and we must accordingly begin with Him. He is much more certain to us than our own existence is. Then follows the existence of material things. The erroneous method of the Cartesians made men doubt what was most certain of all, God, and also, as is proved by the example of Malebranche, the existence of bodies.

§ 279.

C.—EMPIRICISM.

Even where the Sceptics and Mystics did not, like Poiret, actually rank sense-perception above knowledge derived from the mind itself, even where they did not, like Le Vayer, More, and Huet, adopt the axiom, *Nihil est in intellectu quod non ante fuerit in sensu*,—they still paved the way for Empiricism. As soon as mind has been placed in a purely receptive relation towards one thing, the Godhead, it follows at once that it is not inconsistent with its nature to receive help from without. And, considering the anti-pantheistic tendency of these doctrines, it is not credible that the Godhead will long maintain this position of sole benefactor. Bayle was not the only one who saw where the real contrast to Pantheism lay. Sensationalism and blind subjection to faith had appeared side by

side in Huet and Poiret (as frequently in modern times). It only required the advent of religious enlightenment to make the former come forward in all its singleness, and announce to the mind that it must let the external world say what is true, and order what is just and good. The speculative aspect of this point of view is represented by LOCKE, its practical side by the ENGLISH SYSTEMS OF MORALS.

§ 280.

LOCKE.

Lord King: *The Life of John Locke, etc.* New edition, Lond., 1830. 2 vols. [H. R. Fox Bourne: *Life of John Locke.* Lond., 1876. 2 vols.—Tr.]

1. JOHN LOCKE was born on 29th Aug., 1632, at Wrington in Somersetshire. At Oxford, where however he was chiefly occupied with medical studies, he was first repelled from philosophy by the doctrines of the Schoolmen, and then brought back to it by the study of Descartes. For a while he was attached to the English embassy at Berlin, and afterwards he lived for a short time in France. Next, only however so long as his patron, Lord Shaftesbury, was in power, he was invested with a civil post of considerable importance. Subsequently he retired to Holland, the refuge of all religious or political malcontents. Here in 1685 he composed in Latin his "Letter on Toleration," which appeared anonymously along with two others in 1689, and which had been written in an English form as early as 1667 (*Epistola de Tolerantia*, etc. Gouda, 1689, 12mo). There too his chief work, of which the plan had been formed as early as 1670, and a scheme put in writing in 1671, was completed, and an extract from it published in Leclerc's *Bibliothèque Universelle.* It did not appear in its final shape until Locke had returned to England with William of Orange, when it was brought out as *An Essay concerning Human Understanding, in four books.* London, 1690. (The French translation prepared by Coste, Amsterd., 1700, is fuller than the first English editions, inasmuch as it contains additions from Locke's own hand. The later ones contain these additions, retranslated into English.) Besides this *opus magnum*, which has been translated into very many languages, Locke wrote on the most various subjects,—on the form of government, on raising the value of money, on education, on the reasonableness of Chris-

tianity, all of which treatises are found in his collected works. The London octavo edition of these in ten volumes has been very often reprinted. On Oct. 28th, 1704, Locke died in the house of Cudworth's son-in-law, Masham.

2. As Descartes had done before him, and as Kant was to do after him, Locke maintained that before a philosophical inquiry can be set on foot, it must first be made clear whether it falls within the compass of our understanding, and how far the power of our understanding extends. This inquiry he himself compares with the attempt to look at one's own eye; and he impresses upon us the fact that it does not concern the nature of mind, but contents itself with noting what takes place in the understanding, when knowledge is acquired. Locke agrees with Descartes in applying the word "idea" to everything which falls within our consciousness; and the task to which he chiefly applies himself, is to discover how the human mind in general attains to ideas. The *First Book* arrives at the negative result, that the view according to which ideas or their combinations, axioms, are innate, is untenable. If there were such innate ideas, they would be found in every one, and therefore in children and savage races. But the example of the former proves that the theoretical axioms, that are regarded as innate, the so-called laws of thought, are not universally valid. Besides, their abstract character shows that they are the product of an advanced stage of civilization. Similarly, the case of savages proves that there is no single practical axiom which is universally valid. The same is true of the component parts of axioms, individual ideas; there are none which are innate. All the *ideæ innatæ* of Descartes (§ 267, 6) are accordingly denied, and only the *ideæ adventitiæ* admitted. The understanding is, in its natural condition, like a blank sheet of paper.

3. This negative result is supplemented by the *Second Book*, which shows that this white paper is written upon by experience, *i.e.* by a perfectly passive reception of impressions. If what we perceive in this way is an object external to ourselves, we call this perception through the external sense or this external experience, sensation. But if we perceive by internal sense something that goes on within ourselves, we call this internal experience reflection, in regard to which it must not be forgotten that it is just as much a passive process as sensation is. Whether what is reflected in our under-

standing is something external or something internal, we ourselves in the process of reflection always perform the part of the smoothly polished glass in the *camera obscura*. (To-day Locke would have said, of Daguerre's silver plate.) There are therefore ideas of sensation and of reflection. The power of an object to call forth an idea in our understanding we call its quality. If the idea that is called forth resembles that condition of the object by which it was called forth, it is a primary quality. Thus extension and impenetrability are primary qualities, because our idea of extended existence has its counterpart in a real separation between the particles, and the resistance that we feel has its counterpart in an analogous configuration of the parts. On the other hand, in most cases in which we speak of the sensible qualities of things, it is quite otherwise. These qualities (agreeable, for example, or blue) really tell only of a certain relation to our organ of sense; the capacity of the object in virtue of which it produces in us the sensation of blue, is no more like this sensation than the capacity of the sun in virtue of which it softens wax, is like softness. Instead of merely speaking in this case, as would be perhaps more correct, of a power the body has to be viewed as blue, we ascribe to it the quality blue. This does not matter, provided we always bear in mind the distinction between these secondary qualities and the primary ones. The latter lie in things, the former lie in ourselves. (Descartes had made exactly the same distinction in separating *modi rerum* from *modi cogitandi*: vid. § 267, 6. Malebranche had gone still further: *vid. supra* § 270, 3.) The ideas of sensation are therefore a result of the qualities of things outside ourselves; the ideas of reflection are the results of the conditions in which we ourselves are. Of these two sorts of ideas, and of them alone, all our knowledge consists, and therefore the sphere of understanding is limited to them and their combinations. Exactly as it is impossible to make a picture visible to one who has been born blind, so even God Himself cannot reveal to us any knowledge that pre-supposes a sixth sense. Just as the innumerable multitude of words are combinations of only five and twenty letters, so the number of primitive or simple ideas, out of which all knowledge is ultimately combined, is not very large. In order to exhibit the complete alphabet of these, it is advisable first to enumerate those ideas for which we are indebted to a single sense (like colour,

sound, and so on), and then those which are introduced into us by the combination of several senses (extension, for example, which when measured is called space); further, those which are due to reflection pure and simple (thought, will, duration, which when measured is called time); and, lastly, those which arise from a combination of sensation and reflection (power, unity, and so on). Just as syllables and words are formed from letters, so from these simple ideas, which are the basis of all kinds of knowledge, are formed by combination complex ideas, which Locke reduces to the three classes—modes, substances, and relations. Since simple ideas result from processes independent of ourselves, there must always correspond to them something real; they are ectypes. On the other hand, complex ideas as images of our mind are archetypes (the Schoolmen said *entia rationis*); they have nothing real to correspond to them. To this latter class belong all universal conceptions, and therefore everything that can be denoted by words (not proper names) and made clear by definitions (not by being exhibited). Locke here adopts entirely the principles of mediæval Nominalism, *i.e.* he is an individualist. A vast number of errors are due to people forgetting that a word always denotes something general, not something actual. Accordingly he considers it necessary to insert the *Third Book*, which deals simply with language. Intelligibility is the end of language, the hearer always combining the same ideas in the same manner as the speaker does. Closely connected with the (anti-pantheistic) assertion that only individual objects have any real existence, is the zeal with which Locke always combats the doctrine of Descartes and Spinoza, that infinity is a positive and finitude a negative conception. In his view, just the opposite is the case.

4. One only of the complex ideas stands in a different relation from all the rest. This is the conception of substance. Whether it be because we are accustomed to find many qualities together, or whether there is some other cause at work, we are compelled to supply a support for the aggregation of these qualities. Although neither external nor internal experience gives us this conception, and although we have no distinct idea of it, still we are bound to say that it is something real. The idea of substance, therefore, although complex, is still an ectype or copy; not indeed

an adequate one, as the idea of extension is, for we do not know *what* it is that corresponds to our idea, we are only certain *that* there is something that does so correspond. For this reason we cannot divide substances according to their nature, but only according to their qualities, and thus they fall into cogitative and those which are not cogitative. The former class must not be called immaterial, as they were by the Cartesians; for it is possible, indeed their passivity makes it very probable, that they too are material. Equally incorrect is the other assertion of the Cartesians in regard to minds, that their essence consists in thought. Then of necessity minds would always think, a hypothesis which experience disproves. Thought as a separable quality may without logical contradiction belong to a corporeal existence.

5. Now if ideas are still further combined (as words into sentences), the idea of their agreement or disagreement produces knowledge. If the relation of the *ideata* corresponds to the relation of the ideas, the knowledge is real; otherwise it is verbal. (Exactly the distinction already made by Occam, *vid.* § 216, 5.) According as the agreement or disagreement is directly perceived, or comes into consciousness through the intervention of some medium, the knowledge is intuitive or demonstrative. Besides these two there is another kind, which, like them, is distinguished from belief and opinion. This is sensible knowledge, or the perception of what exists outside of ourselves. Our knowledge of things is of this sort, our knowledge of ourselves intuitive, and our knowledge of God demonstrative. For the conception of God is merely composed of ideas that represent qualities of minds, and that have been extended by the introduction of the idea of infinity. If the component parts of any piece of knowledge are universal conceptions, it is a universal principle. But it is too often forgotten that such a principle has always been preceded by a knowledge of particulars, from which it has been formed by abstraction: thus we know that this circle is this circle, before we know that everything resembles itself. The use of universal propositions should neither be exaggerated nor undervalued. An important distinction in regard to them must be noted. Some of them add nothing to our knowledge,—identical propositions, for example, where the subject and the predicate are the same, or propositions that predicate of the subject a part of what is contained in it (the

triangle is a triangle, the triangle is three-sided). Others, on the contrary, by drawing conclusions from the nature of the subject, and making these into predicates, do tell us something new (*e.g.* the exterior angle is greater than either of the two interior and opposite angles). (This distinction between "trifling" and "instructive" propositions afterwards plays an important part with Kant and his successors, as the distinction between identical, analytical, and synthetical judgments. *Vid. infra* § 296 ff.)

6. Finally, Locke gives a division of the whole of knowledge. Φυσική, or natural philosophy, has to do with things; πρακτική, or moral philosophy, has to do with the means by which the good and the useful are attained; lastly, σημειωτική treats of symbols, and has rightly been named λογική, since words occupy the first place in it. Locke has not elaborated all of these branches of knowledge equally, nor any one of them completely. His *Elements of Natural Philosophy* gives a description of the most important phenomena of the universe. Logic is discussed, not only in his chief work, but also in the treatise, *Of the Conduct of the Understanding*. In regard to moral philosophy, his friends were quite justified in asking him to formulate a system. For here, as in mathematics, it is the relations between conceptions we have ourselves formed that are treated of; and Locke had therefore frequently asserted that ethics might be made just as much a demonstrative science as mathematics is. But instead of giving us something of this kind, he was satisfied with quite casual remarks, from which we can see that he admits no will except such as proceeds from want, and is therefore identical with impulse. Perhaps it was the difficulty of combining this conception of will with the freedom (not of will, but) of man, for which Locke warmly contends, that prevented him from laying down a real principle of ethics. Suffice it to say, that he gives no decided opinion, not even in regard to the source of moral obligation; for he often appeals to Divine authority, and then again emphasises the fact that God never requires anything that is against our interests. The outward sign of the morality of an action he asserts to be the approval of disinterested onlookers. The life in moral associations, in the family, in the State, in the Church, is subjected to a more careful examination than personal morality was. In all cases, however, what he looks at is the form which this life had

assumed in his native country. In his *Thoughts on Education*, which he published in 1690 (*Works*, vol. ix.), he has always a cultivated English family in view. His two *Treatises on Government* (1689), really the beginning and end of a larger work which he intended to produce, are, as he himself admits, an examination of the State from the point of view of a Whig filled with enthusiasm for William the Third. Lastly, his *Letters on Toleration* (English version in the 6th volume of the London edition), as well as his treatise on *The Reasonableness of Christianity* (ibid., vol. vii.), state the opinions of a freethinking member of the Church of England. In spite of their national colouring, these writings, after this colouring had disappeared, exercised great influence, even outside of England, and they must accordingly be mentioned here. Especially characteristic of him is the strictness with which he would draw the line between these various spheres. He tries to secure the family against the interference of the Church as well as of the State. This explains his objection to education in public schools, which in England are institutions of the Church as well as of the State. Education should be directed by a tutor at home. The main thing, to be aimed at is practical capacity, and therefore less study of languages and more of facts is required. Modern languages are to be learned earlier than ancient ones, and both are to be taught by actual practice. The grammar of a language is not to be learned till one can speak it. The adaptation of method to the boy's character, the demand for gymnastic exercises, the transformation of work into play, and so on, are recommendations which, after Rousseau stripped them of their English dress (*vid.* § 292, 3), appeared to the world like a new gospel. Exactly in the same way he wishes to have the life of the State separate and distinct both from family life and from the Church. The whole of his first *Treatise* is a continuous polemic against Sir Robert Filmer (1604–1647), whose *Patriarcha*, not published till long after his death (1680), but extensively circulated in manuscript, was held in high estimation by the Tories. In Filmer's book the State was represented as an extension of the family, and monarchy as an institution consecrated by Divine sanction. In his second *Treatise*, Locke expounds such a constitution as had been created by William's ascent of the throne, and not republican theories, as Filmer's contemporaries, Milton (1608 to 8th Nov., 1674) and Algernon Sidney

(1622–1683) had done. In his view the State is a contract concluded for the security of property. The parties renounce their natural right of appropriating everything and of punishing him who lays hands on their property, and submit themselves to the community, which gives expression to its will by the majority. They do this, of course, only on the understanding that the general good will be kept in view in directing the life of the State. The most important point in this treatise, especially owing to the importance which was afterwards attached to it, is the theory of the powers of government. Locke distinguishes three,—the legislative, the executive (administrative and judicial), and the federative. The two latter, in which the State exercises its sovereignty at home and abroad, have, as might be expected, one and the same instrument. In the monarchy this is the prince, who also shares in the legislative function, but to such a limited extent that the centre of gravity lies in the representatives of the people, partly elected and partly hereditary. Where the manner of representation becomes absurd, owing to altered circumstances,—such as the decay of a town that is represented or the rise of one that is unrepresented,—Locke gives us to understand that the monarch may exercise his prerogative and alter the electoral law. For the rest, we can see from the whole of his account how his experiences, partly personal, under the last of the Stuarts, had made him distrustful of the exercise of the prerogative. He always comes back to the point that the legislative power is the supreme power in the State, and that in all cases of dispute the ultimate decision must rest with the people. Unlimited monarchy he does not regard as a form of constitution at all. Only those who are bound by laws form a State, and therefore the unlimited monarch is outside of the State. The "appeal to Heaven," *i.e.* the attempt to hazard the issue of war, is frequently introduced as the last resort under the arbitrary rule of a tyrant. Finally, as regards the Church; this is a free communion of those who seek the good of their souls in a common worship of God. Since the State has only to aim at bodily well-being, and has no power to affect men's dispositions, it ought to be tolerant towards all Churches. This obligation meets with a limitation only where the doctrines of a Church or the disposition of an individual endanger the well-being of the State. The State need not bear either with those who can perjure

themselves, or with atheists, who cannot take an oath at all. Religion itself can only suffer by the State's adopting an attitude of partiality to it. The truer it is, the less does it need the help of the State. Experience, too, teaches us that Christianity has always flourished best where the State tolerated the most various religions. It is true that it was at that time also most free from human elements, and stood closest to rational, biblical Christianity. In regard to the account of this, given in the work already mentioned (*Reasonableness*, etc.), it is very strange that Locke denies that he was acquainted with the *Leviathan* of Hobbes. The affinity between his doctrines and that book is not made less by this denial; it is only made more enigmatical. Like Hobbes, he does not wish the teaching of the Bible to be interpreted, but to be taken literally. The total result is, that by Adam's fall physical well-being and physical immortality, which is accidental to man, were lost; that the condition for the recovery of the latter is simply the belief that Jesus is the Messiah; but that the condition under which rewards will be distributed at the last day is obedience to His commands. The latter agree exactly with natural morality; but God's revelation of them has served a good purpose. Without such help it would have been very difficult, even for those with the highest intellectual gifts, and utterly impossible for those less gifted, to convince themselves of the truth of moral precepts. At the same time, as is proved by pagan ethical philosophy, which teaches that we should love virtue for its own sake, we should have lacked one of the strongest impulses to a moral life, the hope of reward and the fear of punishment, which the Christian religion employs in its service. For the rest, Locke does not deny that miracles have been performed to convince us of the truth of the Divine revelation; hence his protest against Toland's appeal to his authority (*vid.* § 285, 1). Before this even, at the very beginning of the work we have been discussing, he declared against those who see in Christ only a revival of natural religion. Our Lord did not indeed teach anything that was contrary to reason, but He certainly taught what the reason would never have discovered, had it been left to itself; *e.g.* that He is the Messiah, *i.e.* the whole amount of what we have to believe, just because we cannot find it for ourselves.

7. Locke's views on education appealed to a wider audience

when Rousseau appeared as their advocate; and similarly his political theories found an apostle in Charles de Sécondat, Baron de la Brède et de MONTESQUIEU (18th Jan., 1689, to 10th Feb., 1755). He had come forward as an author, while still a young man (1721); and his *Lettres Persanes* contain an able but bitter criticism of the civil and ecclesiastical condition of France. He next sketched the plan of his chief work, at which he laboured for twenty years. From the historical studies into which he was led, arose his *Considérations sur les causes de la grandeur et de la décadence des Romains* (1734). But, while he owes a good deal to his study of the ancients, of Machiavelli (*vid.* § 253), and of Bodin (*vid.* § 254, 2), he was still more influenced by a residence of several years in England, and by the study of the political writings of Locke as well as of some other English authors, who are to be named immediately. They, on the other hand, are indebted to him for the currency given to their ideas outside of their native country. The work appeared in 1748 under the title, *De l'Esprit des Lois*, and was reprinted some twenty times within a period of eighteen months. It contains his theory,—*i.e.* really Locke's theory modified,—in thirty-one books, the connection between which is not always very close. To meet the attacks made upon it, he subsequently wrote a *Défense de l'Esprit des Lois*. After his death there appeared a second edition, enlarged by additions which Montesquieu himself had composed, and in which he had worked up what professional friends communicated to him in letters as supplementary to his theories. In this form the work has passed into the collected editions of his writings. In the Zweibrücken edition (1784, 8 vols. 8vo), the chief work with its defence fills the first five volumes.—By the spirit of laws, which forms the subject of his inquiry, Montesquieu understands not so much the laws themselves as their connection with all the natural and historical characteristics of the people among whom they are observed. He attaches so much importance to this, that he will not admit any standard of the excellence of a law except that it should conform to the nature of the people. He regards it as a very rare occurrence if laws which are good among one people, maintain that character in different surroundings. In conscious opposition to Spinoza and Hobbes, he declares against the opinion that law and justice do not arise until after the State has been formed. He holds that laws of

justice and equity are prior to all formation of States. He sees the real origin of these in certain natural needs which compel men to seek peace and union. Owing to the varied character of the earth's surface, there are many such communities which have arisen naturally. Positive laws supplement natural laws, and put an end to war between them and within their borders. Thus arises a threefold right: the right of nations, which holds nations together; political right, which holds governors and governed together; and, lastly, civil right, which is the bond between the individual elements of the people. If the sovereign power is in the hands of the whole of the people or of a part of it, the form of government is republican (in the former case democratic, in the latter aristocratic). If it is exercised by one individual, but in such a way that it is regulated by laws, the State is monarchical; a despotism, on the contrary, is where a single individual bends all to his will, just as his humours or his good pleasure may prompt. In the democracy, the people are in one aspect sovereign, in another, subject; the principle by which it subsists is (civic) virtue (in the case of aristocracy, moderation). Without this no democracy can endure. In a monarchy, the real spring of action is honour; in a despotism, it is terror. Accordingly in a democracy and in a despotism every man is on an equality with his neighbour (in the former case equally important, in the latter equally unimportant). On the other hand, a monarchy without nobles and other divisions of rank is an impossibility; any attempt to get rid of these two leads to a despotism. Small states are naturally republics, very large states despotisms, and moderately sized ones monarchies. (A federative republic may also cover a wide area, and may consist of republics like the Netherlands or Switzerland, or of monarchies like the German empire.) Besides the size of a state, account must also be taken of the climate, the character of the soil, and so on. Much that would be an absurdity in Europe, is a necessity in Asia (cf. books xvii., xviii.). Although Montesquieu's point of view does not admit of his definitely expressing a preference for one form of constitution over the others, still he does not deny that he has an exclusive enthusiasm for the Romans among ancient nations, and for the English among modern ones. This latter feeling has brought him into substantial agreement with Locke on a great many points. More especially he has been led in

the famous eleventh book, which treats of political freedom in its relation to the constitution, to give to his description of the English constitution almost the form of an *a priori* construction (cap. vi., cf. book xix., cap. xxvii.). Consequently, those who for the last hundred years have drawn their constitutional theories from him, have all been accustomed to look upon England as the ideal of political freedom. After first defining political freedom as the power to do what one ought to desire, he lays down as its chief condition the right relation between the three powers of government. Here he at first completely adopts Locke's position. *La puissance législative, la puissance exécutrice des choses qui dépendent du droit des gens*, and *la puissance exécutrice de celles qui dépendent du droit civil* are just what legislative, federative, and executive power were with Locke. But while with Locke judicial activity constituted only one part of the executive power, which included administrative activity as well, the French lawyer, who saw in the judicial authorities of his native country the last bulwark against despotism, attaches much greater importance to the judicial function. He even goes so far as to say that henceforth he will understand by the executive power that which makes war and peace, and sends ambassadors (*i.e.* Locke's federative power), and will rank the judicial as a third variety side by side with this and the legislative. Everything is lost, in his view, if these three powers are combined in one person or in one collegiate body; for that is oriental despotism. Everything, on the other hand, is won, in his view, if the judges are entirely different persons from those who lay down or carry out the laws. Accordingly in a monarchy he is willing to allow the prince a large share in legislation; but the point to which he always returns is, that the judges must be completely independent both of the executive and of the legislative power. To be sure, he also limits the activity of the judges entirely to the question of fact, and then to the (purely mechanical) application of the written law. With him it is no question of *finding* a decision. The objection was raised, that the separation of these powers would lead to a crippling of all three, and therefore to a stoppage of the machine of the State. It is noteworthy that the only answer he can make, is the assurance that since the machine *must* go, the powers will ultimately act together. Except the conditions given in nature, and except the constitution, there

is hardly anything of such importance for the life of the State as religion. After the covert attacks on Christianity in the *Lettres Persanes*, it might perhaps be generally expected that, as in Machiavelli, the Christian religion would be compared unfavourably with others. This expectation would prove groundless. Whether it is that Montesquieu modified his views as he grew older, or whether it is that he was determined by the practical consideration that heathendom is a hing of the past, suffice it to say, that he gives the Christian eligion the preference above all others.

§ 281.

The English Systems of Morals.

Schleiermacher: *Grundlinien einer Kritik der bisherigen Sittenlehre.* Berlin, 1803. Fr. Vorländer: *Geschichte der philosophischen Moral, Rechts- und Staatslehre der Franzosen und Engländer.* Marburg, 1833.

1. In the first book of his *Essay*, Locke had placed speculative and practical principles on the same plane. In regard to the former, however, he had supplemented the negative result that they are not innate, by the positive statement that they are presented to us by the external world. Exactly the same process must be looked for in the case of the latter: the mind cannot draw the principles of action from within itself, they must come to it from without, and not, as mediæval philosophy had taught, through revelation, but from the external world. This positive addition to Locke's negative assertion was made by some thinkers who are connected with him, not merely by nationality, but also by the fact that they owe to him their first impulse towards philosophy. With one exception (Clarke), they have confined themselves entirely to the practical aspect of the question. But since the theoretical speculations of Clarke have exercised much less influence than his views upon ethics, and since his position in regard to the latter is very like the position of one of the others, his teaching may be discussed among the systems of moral philosophy, in spite of the objections that have been made against such a classification.

2. Samuel Clarke (11th Oct., 1675, to 17th May, 1727), while still an undergraduate, conceived a dislike to Cartesianism, which was prevalent in Cambridge. In his twenty-first year

he published a translation of Rohault's *Physics* (vid. § 268, 3), accompanied by notes in the spirit of Newton. (Subsequently he became so closely associated with the latter that, with the author's approval, he translated the *Optics* into Latin.) Theological treatises and sermons, which were favourably received, led to his being entrusted with the apologetic lectures of the Boyle foundation for the year 1704, and—quite an exceptional occurrence—for the following year as well. The two courses were printed and published under the title: *A Discourse concerning the Being and Attributes of God, the Obligation of Natural Religion, and the Truth and Certainty of the Christian Revelation*, etc. London, 2 vols., 1705–6. (Often reprinted and translated.) Besides this *opus magnum*, must be mentioned his correspondence with Dodwell on immortality, with a Cambridge scholar and Collins on freedom, and with Leibnitz on space, time, and other subjects. Except the letter to Dodwell, they are all translated into French in Des Maizeaux, *Recueil de diverses pièces*, etc., 2 vols.; Amst. (2nd ed., 1740). The originals will be found in the collected edition of his works, London, 4 vols. fol., 1732–42. —Clarke's hostility to Spinozism, characteristic of this whole period, is especially prominent in the *first* part of his principal work, where he indulges in a more violent polemic against Spinoza than against any atheist. The mistaken idea, which Clarke shares with Bayle, that Spinoza transformed the sum of all things into God, is not the only reason why, in spite of all the ability displayed on this very point, he succeeded only in raising a temporary sensation, and not in producing a lasting effect. This is rather to be explained by an inconsistency into which the author has been betrayed. He very often insists that everything must be arrived at by deduction, that philosophical and mathematical method coincide, that nothing is proved unless its opposite is self-contradictory, and so on. These precepts he follows so faithfully, that Zimmermann, in the essay to be referred to below, rightly makes him a follower of Spinoza, and declares that of the twelve propositions, in the establishment of which his work consists, the first seven might quite well have been endorsed by Spinoza. For they assert and prove deductively that from all eternity there exists a single Being, who is unchangeable, independent, necessary, and infinite. But then he suddenly passes from deduction to induction, and argues from the irrefragable fact

that each one of us is a spirit and is free, back to the spirituality and freedom of God. Further, he treats as valid the teleological method, although it is quite inconsistent with the mathematical one. In short, he appears first as an adherent of Empiricism, and then as an intellectual kinsman of Leibnitz, between whose views in regard to evil and his own there is practically a literal agreement. The fact that the two opponents of pantheism are at one in this respect, does not, however, prevent them from disputing on another point. The contrast to Leibnitz, the idealistic upholder of individualism, which was what justified us in ranking Clarke here (cf. § 275), comes out especially in the correspondence between the two. In this contest, too, a want of consistency has broken the point of Clarke's argument. At the very outset he concedes to Leibnitz, what he had already said in his chief work, that we dare not with Locke admit the possibility of the soul's being material. But since —and this was just what had led Locke to make that statement—matter alone can be passive, Clarke appears the less logical of the two when he strives to disprove the contention of Leibnitz that the soul itself is the author of all its ideas, even of sensations (*vid.* § 288, 5). Similarly in the struggle against pantheism he appears the less successful of the two, because he is not so thoroughgoing an individualist as Leibnitz, who denies that there are two *minima particula* exactly alike. In particular, however, a man who, against the assertion of Leibnitz, that space is not real, maintains the view of Newton that it stands in the same relation to God as the sensorium does to our soul, surely does not stray far from the doctrines that Malebranche and Spinoza taught in regard to extension, *i.e.* from pantheism. What Clarke says in the *second* volume of his *Discourse* is much more consistent, and has accordingly exercised a more enduring influence. This remark applies to the earlier portion, which discusses the obligations of natural religion; for, as the book proceeds, it becomes a theological defence of the dogmas of Christianity, and is in no way remarkable. As Spinoza had been the chief object of Clarke's attacks in his account of the being of God, so in his ethical philosophy it is Hobbes. The assertion of the latter, that the conceptions of good and evil arise through human ordinance, is represented as self-contradictory. At the same time the absolute independence of moral conceptions

(their *perseitas* in the phraseology of the Thomists) is maintained against those who, like the Scotists and Descartes, make it depend upon God's good pleasure that what is virtue is not vice, and conversely. So surely as God has created all things, so surely is He bound to admit certain relations between the things which He has created; just as the triangle we construct owes its existence to us, but compels us to admit the existence of its properties. Those relations that are inseparable from the nature of the thing, and therefore eternal, have validity in and for themselves. Any one who would deny *in praxi*, e.g. that we are dependent upon God or that all men are equal, would act just as irrationally as if he would deny *in thesi* that twice two is four. The only difference is, that impossibility stands in the way of the latter denial, while the freedom of the will makes it possible for us to refuse reverence to God and the justice of equal measure to our fellow men. The practical recognition of a real relation makes an action fit, its opposite makes it unfit; and in this fitness or unfitness the morality or immorality of the action consists. Both are therefore raised above all caprice, human and Divine; and while dogmas of belief may be made credible by miracles and doubtful by greater miracles, even the greatest miracle can never make it doubtful that we have to act in accordance with the natural relations of things.

Cf. R. Zimmermann: *Samuel Clarke's Leben und Lehre.* Vienna, 1870.

3. In a very similar sense, and often in exactly the same words, as Clarke, WILLIAM WOLLASTON (26th March, 1659, to 29th Oct., 1724), his older contemporary, expresses himself in his work, *The Religion of Nature* (Lond., 1 vol. 4to), which appeared (unfinished) only a short time before his death. The book has often been reprinted, and a French translation of it was published as early as 1724. By natural religion he understands, as Clarke had done, what we should call natural morality. With Locke he denies innate practical principles; what are called so are, for the most part, the result of education. Clarke had indicated, and Wollaston expressly states, that every action is a practical declaration, *i.e.* contains a principle. If this principle is untrue, as where I by using something that does not belong to me, claim it as my own, the action is morally bad; an action of the opposite character is morally good. Lastly, one, neither the completion nor the omission of

which denies a principle that is true, is morally indifferent. Of course, in judging of its character we are bound to consider, not merely one side or the other of the object of the action, but the whole of its relations; and therefore an action will only contain a true principle when it is quite in accordance with the whole nature of the object of the action. The moral law may accordingly be completely summed up in the formula: We should follow nature, or treat everything as that which it is. (It is instructive here to think of the time when Fichte will demand that we leave nothing as it is. *Vid.* § 313, 2.) Like Clarke, Wollaston urges the mind to act as things prescribe; and so, like Clarke, he requires an exact knowledge of the external world. He is not, however, content with this, but points also to the reward which such action is to have. This reward consists in happiness, the balance of pleasure over pain. And as a matter of fact, that, as a result of obedient submission to things, we should be affected by them in a way that does not partake of the character of opposition, appears quite as natural as that nature should bring forth food for the being that submits himself entirely to her, and thorns and thistles for him who exalts himself above her. It is only when Wollaston conceives of this following of nature as a following of one's own nature, and of this nature of one's own as reasonableness, that he finds the necessity arise of calling God to his aid, to win for him what has now become accidental, the favour of the external world.

4. In making this (idealistic) assertion, however, Wollaston has deserted the ground held by Locke, and has fallen into self-contradiction, just as Clarke did when he denied the possibility of the mind being material. Clarke, as we have seen above, demanded that mind should be passive, and at the same time denied to it what, as Locke had learned from the Aristotelians of the Middle Ages, is essential to all passivity. Here, again, we see that Wollaston makes the essence of mind lie in reason; and yet he requires from it that, instead of dictating laws, it should allow them to be dictated to itself, by that of which it knows, not through the reason but through the senses. To escape from this contradiction is all the more necessary, because both have adopted Locke's fundamental principle, that the first elements of all intellectual possession are won through the senses, *i.e.* that the mind obtains its contents simply by passive conduct. In this way, the begin-

ning and the end of their systems teach that the mind is passive, while the central part maintains that it is independently active. Clarke had defined freedom as pure activity, and he and Wollaston had contended for it most vigorously; so much so indeed, that their ethical philosophy admitted none save the imperative form of the doctrine of duty. But freedom is quite inconsistent with such a beginning and such an end. Natural determinations are bound to take the place of self-determination of the mind. This implies that ethics is bound to become a natural history of moral action, the theory of the virtues.

5. Hardly any one was better suited for taking the first step in this direction than Anthony Ashley Cooper, Earl of SHAFTESBURY (26th Feb., 1670, to 1713). The classical bent of his studies had given him an almost Hellenic sense of the beautiful, but at the same time also a pagan cast of mind, which found vent in many covert attacks, not so much against religion generally, as against Christianity. His youthful *Inquiry concerning Virtue and Merit* was published against his will by Toland, not, it is asserted, without being somewhat altered. There is no doubt that when Shaftesbury himself published it afterwards, it differed in many points from the first edition. This was followed by a treatise upon *Fanaticism*, occasioned by certain Government measures which it was proposed to adopt against some manifestations of religious fanaticism that had appeared among the emigrant French Huguenots. The tone of banter in this treatise, which was directed against such interference, had given offence, and in order to justify it, he next published his *Essay on the Freedom of Wit and Humour*. Here occurs the declaration, often repeated afterwards, that ridicule is the best criterion of truth. These essays, along with several others, notably the one entitled *The Moralists, a Philosophical Rhapsody*, were published in a collected form in three volumes as, *Characteristics of Men, Manners, Opinions, Times*, etc. As early as 1727 this work had passed through four editions, and it has been translated into many foreign languages. After his death there appeared, *Letters Written by a Nobleman to a Young Man at the University*, directed (1706–10) to a youth in whom he took a great interest (Ainsworth).—Shaftesbury's chief interest lay in religious and ethical questions, and he expressly defines philosophy as the study of happiness. His first strik-

ing characteristic is his strenuous endeavour to establish the independence and self-sufficiency of morality. He argues with equal fierceness against Hobbes, who makes what is right or wrong depend upon the State, and against the theologians, who make it depend upon the Divine will. If theology and morality are to be inseparably associated, it would perhaps be better to make theology rest upon morality, than conversely. While Locke had called it one of the advantages of the Christian religion that it employed the hope of reward and the fear of punishment as incentives to virtue, Shaftesbury sees in this the destruction at once of religion and of morality. Starting from the fact that joy and sorrow are the primary affections, he goes on to define what produces joy as good, and what produces sorrow as evil, while what produces neither is indifferent. The end of all action he declares to be happiness, the largest possible amount of satisfactions or goods. Actions that lead to happiness are good; bad actions are the opposite of these. In order to form a correct idea of what happiness is, we must make a more careful examination of human affections. Since every man is something by himself, but at the same time a part of a larger whole, his affections are, in the first place, towards his own well-being, or are self-interested, self-love, and, in the second place, they are towards the whole, or are social. To give undue prominence to one or other of these would be morally ugly or bad. Moral beauty, like all beauty, consists in a harmonious relation between the two opposite elements. In morality, as in everything else, we decide what is beautiful by the aid of an innate sense or instinct, which corresponds to a musical ear in music, and a sense of colour in painting. This moral sense says to us that a particular action is beautiful, exactly as the musical ear decides that something is not discord. But just as in the case of the arts the natural ear (and so on) is not sufficient, but requires to be supplemented by cultivation, from which musical taste is developed, so the "moral artist" requires a refined taste, which is gained by practice. This will be a safer guide than the natural moral sense, especially in complicated cases. This taste condemns the conduct of the egoist as emphatically as it does the bearing of those who are usually called "too good." Only when one or other set of affections becomes unduly prominent, can strife arise between them. Except in such an event, the good of the

whole implies also the good of the individual, and conversely. It is like the harmony which the whole world presents to us. There too, if we consider an individual apart, much that is evil meets our view; but if we look at the whole, this evil vanishes, indeed appears as a discord necessary to secure the beauty of the whole. (Both in this optimism and in his moral distinctions we can always recognise the language of the artistically minded æsthetician.)

Cf. Spicker: *Die Philosophie des Grafen von Shaftesbury.* Freiburg, i. Br. 1872. Georg von Gizycki: *Die Philosophie Shaftesbury's.* Leipzig and Heidelberg. 1876.

6. As a matter of fact, however, Shaftesbury only took the first steps towards fulfilling the demand of ethical empiricism, and representing moral philosophy as the natural history of moral action. Since the moral taste was acquired by practice, *i.e.* by self-exertion, the connoisseur of the virtues, as Shaftesbury pictures him, is still to far too large an extent his own creation. And, further, it was unavoidable that such a large element of self-determination should be left, since the two opposite kinds of affections were equally justifiable; that is, nature failed to decide between them. Where the acquired moral taste gives way to the natural moral sense, and the latter goes over completely and entirely to the side of one kind of affections, we are bound to admit that, in spite of the greater one-sidedness, an advance has been made from the position of Shaftesbury. This step was taken by FRANCIS HUTCHESON (8th Aug., 1694, to 8th Aug., 1746). Born in Ireland, but of Scottish parents, he lived in Glasgow, first as a student, and from 1729 onwards as a professor. With the exception of his *Compendium logices* and his *Synopsis metaphysicæ, ontologiam et pneumatologiam complectens* (Glasgow, 1714), all his works deal with æsthetical and ethical questions. Amongst these are his *Inquiry into the Original of our Ideas of Beauty and Virtue* (Lond., 1720); his *Essay on the Nature of Passions and Affections* (Lond., 1728); lastly, his *Philosophiæ moralis institutio compendiaria* (Rotterd., 1745), and the more detailed work, *A System of Moral Philosophy, in three books*, etc. (2 vols., 4to). The last mentioned was not published till after his death; it has been often reprinted. The main ideas are as follows: Since moral philosophy has for its function to show how man can attain by his natural powers to the highest happiness and perfection, it must rest

upon the observation of the capacities and affections that exist within us. What such observation shows to be the simplest elements may be called ideas of the internal senses. Senses is used in the plural, because the sense of honour is different from the sense of beauty, or the sense of the suffering of others. These ideas had been greatly neglected by Locke in favour of those of the external senses, *i.e.* the practical or moral ideas had been neglected in favour of the intellectual ones. In this inquiry we find, at the very outset, the great distinction between blind and passing impulses, on the one hand, and, on the other, those enduring and calm affections which rest upon ideas. Since happiness too is an enduring condition, the latter are much more important for it than the former. But within them, in turn, we find the great distinction, determined by their object, between selfish and benevolent affections. The two kinds are mutually exclusive, for disinterestedness is an essential characteristic of the latter. Now experience teaches us, that where we ourselves or others act in accordance with the disinterested affections, we cannot withhold our approval. This is due to the fact that an innate moral sense, whose voice may be drowned, but can never make a mistake, urges us to act in accordance with benevolence. The internal satisfaction, which such action secures, is the highest happiness, and this is not, as the advocates of egoism teach, the end, but the consequence of virtuous action. Our nature, accordingly, urges us to live, not for ourselves, but for others; and where we follow this voice of nature, we act virtuously. After treating of these general principles in the *First Book*, he goes on in the *Second* to discuss natural rights and duties without regard to civil government; and, lastly, in the *Third*, to take up those rights in the form they assume in a civic community.

7. By transplanting to Scotland the ideas that Locke and Shaftesbury had awakened in England, Hutcheson produced there a great movement both in theology and in philosophy. In the former the "Moderates" were his friends, and for the most part his scholars; while, as regards the latter, of the two men to be discussed in the next section, one was a sincere admirer, the other a former pupil. But it is not Hume and Adam Smith alone who owe him a great deal. Hutcheson is intimately connected with what is now called specially the "Scottish School," the tendency which received its first impulse,

not in Glasgow or Edinburgh, but in Aberdeen: George Turnbull, the teacher of Thomas Reid (*vid.* § 292, 4), not merely knew and esteemed him, but also borrowed from him very essential points, which were thus transmitted from him to Reid. In fact, if we go farther back, we must recognise Shaftesbury as their real author.

Cf. McCosh: *The Scottish Philosophy.* Lond., Macmillan & Co., 1875.

§ 282.

Hume and Adam Smith.

The Life of David Hume, written by himself; published by Adam Smith, with a Supplement. London, 1777. *An Account of the Life and Writings of the late Adam Smith*, by Dugald Stewart, in *Essays on Philosophical Subjects.* Lond., 1795. [J. H. Burton: *Life of Hume*, 2 vols., Edinb., 1846.—Ed.]

1. In one point the incompleteness of Locke's empiricism, by involving him in difficulties and contradictions, made itself so strongly felt, that an attempt to avoid them became inevitable. From the fact that the mind is passive in regard to simple ideas, he had quite correctly concluded that only these represent anything real; complex ideas, on the contrary, are mere creatures of thought. Of one complex idea he makes an exception; he says that the conception of substance has something real to correspond to it. This conception, as Locke himself points out, contains in germ the conception of causality, and a stricter logical inquiry may easily show that it really contains all the relations which we are accustomed to class together under the name of necessity. These then, according to Locke, are the work of our understanding. When, however, he says at the same time that reality belongs to them, *i.e.* that they regulate the external world, what he exhorts the understanding to do becomes self-contradictory. For he bids it make itself subject to a world regulated by laws which the understanding itself makes. This inconsistency was avoided by the scepticism of Hume, whose advance beyond Locke consists in his maintaining, without any inconsistent exception, the principle his predecessor laid down, that complex ideas are not copies of anything, and in his drawing from this the conclusion that there is therefore nothing of the nature of substance in the internal world, and no necessary connection in the external world. In that case, however, there can be no real knowledge of either.

2. DAVID HUME (Home) was born in Edinburgh on April 26th, 1711. He studied a short time at the University of his native town, and subsequently filled a situation in a Bristol office. After a four years' residence in France, he published what is by far his most important philosophical work: *A Treatise on Human Nature, being an Attempt to Introduce the Experimental Method of Reasoning into Moral Subjects*, Lond., 1738, 3 vols. (reprinted in two vols. in 1817, London, Allmann). In 1874 Messrs. Green and Grose republished this treatise in two vols. (London, Longmans, Green & Co.), along with an admirable introduction written by the former. The book attracted no attention, and even at this day there are professed philosophers in England itself who have never read it. On account of its want of success, Hume himself afterwards compared this account of his "system of philosophy," as he rightly calls it, to a still-born child. After he had gained the ear of his fellow countrymen by a series of less ambitious efforts, dealing partly with politics, partly with æsthetics, and partly with economic science (*Essays and Treatises on Various Subjects*, vol. i., Edin., 1741), he ventured, in the succeeding volumes of his *Essays* (Lond., 1748–52), again to lay before the world his still-born system. Scientifically this was much less satisfactory, but for that very reason met with greater success. The first volume of his early work (*On Understanding*) furnished the materials for the *Inquiry concerning Human Understanding*, where easy reasoning, spiced with anecdotes, takes the place of acute analysis, and where the important inquiries regarding the Ego, which helped to produce the later Scottish school (Reid, *vid.* § 292, 4–6), are entirely omitted. The whole of the second volume (*On Passions*) is compressed into the scanty abridgement, *A Dissertation on the Passions*, where he puts forward as assertions what he had demonstrated in his early work. Lastly, the third volume (*On Morals*) is now represented by *An Inquiry Concerning the Principles of Morals*, with its four appendices. Although Hume calls this his best work, still, if we apply a strictly scientific standard, it does not appear in a very favourable light as compared with the thorough-going researches of the *Treatise*. But he had formed a correct estimate of his audience when he undertook to recast his book. (The five volumes of *Essays and Treatises* were subsequently reprinted in four [London, 1760], and still later in two volumes, *e.g.* in

the edition of 1784, London, Cadell.) For his historical works, too, Hume had to win an audience. He wrote the history of England backwards, beginning with the Stuarts, and then taking up the Tudors, leaving the early history to the very end (1754–62). Hume's merits as a philosopher brought him more honour abroad than in his own country. During his life he was held in high repute in France, and after his death was particularly esteemed in Germany. His last work was his autobiography, in which he jests with death. After his decease, which occurred on Aug. 26th, 1776, there appeared his *Dialogues concerning Natural Religion*, Lond., 1779; and *Essay on Suicide*, Lond., 1783, the genuineness of which is questioned by many. His philosophical works were published under the title: *The Philosophical Works of David Hume, Esq., now first Collected.* Edin., 1829, 4 vols. 8vo.

3. Hume's individualism leads him not merely to employ as an indubitable axiom the nominalist principle that only the particular exists, but also to hail as one of the greatest discoveries Berkeley's assertion that even every universal idea is really only the idea of a particular thing (*vid.* § 291, 5). His antipathy to Spinoza is correspondingly strong. Bacon and Locke he regards as the greatest philosophers; especially the latter, since he showed that all sciences must be preceded by an inquiry into the functions of the human mind. Like Locke, Hume maintains that the first elements of all knowledge, simple perceptions, are received by us passively. But he draws a distinction between their rise and their echo or survival, and accordingly divides perceptions into impressions and ideas. The latter necessarily presuppose the former, but since the distinction is only one of degree, an idea may be transformed into an impression by being strengthened. To have impressions is to feel, to have ideas is to think. Thought, again, is distinguished into memory and imagination, the former of which contains those ideas which are more lively and which are involuntary, the latter those which are less lively and which are called up at pleasure. Further, Hume retains Locke's two sources of ideas. But he takes a short step beyond this, for he shows that since all activity perceived by reflection is called forth by impressions of the external world, the impressions and ideas of sensation, as the primary ones, must precede those of reflection, which are merely secondary. Taken strictly, the former are the objects

of the latter: I perceive myself when I perceive that I feel something. Similarly he agrees with Locke in holding that complex ideas are formed from simple ideas by the help of the understanding or, rather, of the imagination; but he goes more thoroughly into the relations and laws through which, and according to which, such connections are possible. Likeness, contiguity, and causal connection are with him the foundations of all associations of ideas. Lastly, Hume also agrees with Locke in distinguishing demonstrative or verbal truth from real truth. The former (*e.g.* mathematical truth) is concerned simply with the agreement between two ideas combined in an (affirmative) sentence. The latter, on the contrary, depends upon agreement with an impression; where our certainty in regard to anything real has not arisen through an impression, it is not to be relied upon. Judgments that express a verbal truth rest upon the principle of contradiction, since their predicate can be found by analysing the subject, and their opposite is inconceivable. (Kant's analytical judgments *a priori*. *Vid.* § 298, 1.) But in the case of judgments that express a real truth, it is otherwise than with these rational forms of knowledge; for something that is not contained in the subject is added to it as a predicate, and the opposite is conceivable. Unfortunately it proves, according to Hume, that the two sciences which profess to contain real truths rest upon a very slender foundation. For the science of nature and the science of mind, which are both built up upon experiences, work with images of the understanding, which have nothing real to correspond to them.

4. The attack upon psychology is only found in the earlier work. In the *Inquiry* it is entirely omitted. No one who has read only the latter can rightly understand Reid's subsequent polemic against Hume. Psychology deals with the ideas of reflection, *i.e.* the ideas of certain conditions of ourselves, of seeing, hearing, pleasure, pain, thought, will, and so on. But we do not stop here. We go on to add to these the idea of something which sustains these conditions, of a substance in which they inhere, and which we call self or Ego. Substance, however, and inherence are not impressions, such as pain is, for example; the idea only arises because there has been a repeated recurrence in us of several ideas in the same relation towards one another and at the same time. It does not arise when we first observe this association, but it does arise when we

observe it for the hundredth time. The distinction between the first and the hundredth time is, however, not a real distinction. It only consists in our being familiar with the latter, but not with the former. The whole idea of substance, accordingly, has its root merely in the subjective condition of habit, and has no real meaning. For this reason there is no sense in such questions as whether our thought is inherent in a material or in an immaterial substance. The whole idea of a substratum which we call self or Ego, is an illusion. What is given is a succession of impressions and ideas, which we, in spite of their plurality, bind together into a permanent unity by a fiction of the imagination, simply because the same series very frequently recurs. That a view which denies all substantial existence to the Ego, naturally results in the theories developed, in the *Essay on Suicide*, against personal immortality, is quite clear. It is therefore of little importance whether Hume was its author or not. It is certainly not impossible that he was.

5. Hume's attacks upon natural science have become much better known. Unlike those upon psychology, they occur in the later as well as in the earlier treatise. Just as we add to ideas of reflection the conception of substance, so we add to those that depend upon sensation, a second form of necessary connection, the conception of cause. This, too, is not given to us as an impression, but only arises when two ideas invariably and repeatedly succeed one another; that is, it depends upon customary succession. The conception of cause, then, is likewise the result of custom, and has its origin in the imagination, which, however, does not work here so freely as in the case of fictions. For where we have been accustomed to see one impression following another, we are compelled to regard that which comes first as a cause, and confidently to expect that the other will follow. Such a conviction, resting as it does, not upon real connection, but only upon individual custom, is called by Hume belief or sometimes moral certainty. Experience teaches us that animals also expect effects, and accordingly Hume has no hesitation in ascribing to them the capacity for belief. All our knowledge of facts, and especially of the connection between them, which forms the substance of natural science, is therefore no real knowledge, but belief. Every demonstration which is not concerned with figures or numbers, and which claims to im-

part real knowledge, is worthless sophistry. These assertions have been called sceptical, and Hume makes no objection; only he does not wish his doubt to be confused either with the Pyrrhonic or with the Cartesian. His is merely the modest attempt to limit the understanding to the sphere in which it can accomplish something. If we recollect that Hume never doubted, what was regarded beyond everything else as doubtful by the sceptics of antiquity, the existence of what we perceive, we shall acknowledge that Kant was right in citing his principles as principles of pure empiricism. As the inquiries into the conception of substance found their natural complement in the negative assertions of the *Essay on Suicide*, so the examination of the conception of cause is followed by the no less negative assertions made in regard to natural religion in his *Dialogues* on this subject. All the proofs of the existence of God depend upon the conception of cause. This takes away from natural religion the character of knowledge. Still more so does the circumstance that from an effect, which has a finite character, and which is, besides, never adequately known, it deduces the existence of an infinite cause.

6. Hume lays much more stress upon the inquiries in regard to practical activity, especially moral philosophy, than upon those that deal with what is speculative. After defining the will as the consciousness (or feeling) that we originate a movement, he first clears the ground by warning us not to confuse the voluntary with freedom. The process of willing and acting is perfectly regular and mechanical. Its laws can be laid down with as much exactness as those of motion and light. The advocates of freedom themselves really admit the existence of this determinism against which they make an outcry. They do so theoretically, when they allow that there are motives, *i.e.* causes of willing; practically, when they punish a criminal, which would be an act of folly if his action were not a necessary consequence of his nature. But although there is no freedom to will or not to will, moral judgment is not thereby excluded: what is ugly displeases, what is beautiful pleases, although neither can help it. In the first place, the mechanical process spoken of must be more closely examined. We must begin by denying the foolish notion that the reason can ever induce us to will anything. The reason, as a purely theoretical association of ideas, merely teaches whether something is

true or untrue, and such knowledge never moves any one to anything. The so-called experience, that reason yet often overcomes our passions, rests upon erroneous observations. The only motives of all exercise of will, the passions, are divided into two chief classes, violent and calm. If, as very often happens, a calm passion, *e.g.* the longing for a future good, subdues a violent one, we are accustomed to call the power of this voice reason. Hume, however, does not question the fact that reasoning can call the calm passion into play; only in that case we must admit that the passion alone exercises any direct influence. Accordingly our next task is to get a natural history of the passions, which may serve as the basis of moral philosophy. He does not say much about the division of the passions into calm and violent; a much more important part is played by that into direct and indirect. Both in his first work and in the subsequent abridged version, the direct passions are treated a little unfairly. In fact, in the former the indirect are, somewhat strangely, treated of before the direct. From the primary impressions, pleasure and pain, proceed as immediate effects the propense and averse motions of the mind; and from these again, through their relation to the cause of the impressions, according as it is present or absent, proceed joy and sorrow, hope and fear. These direct passions are the basis of the much more complex indirect passions, where, besides the cause that produces satisfaction, there always comes into play another object, to which that cause belongs. If this object is one's own self, joy and sorrow assume the form of pride and humiliation; if it is some other thinking being, they appear as love and hate. Although called forth by a similar cause, the two pairs form a contrast, so that it is really inaccurate to speak of self-love, for love is joy in some one else. In his principal work, Hume makes a very strict examination of these four passions, and shows how transitions which experience and experiment present to us, are to be explained by association of ideas, and further by, to some extent very complex, relations of ideas and impressions.

7. This rather physiological examination of the will is followed by the ethical one. Hume, who often contrasts the two as "natural" and "moral," dedicates to the latter, as was mentioned above, the third part of his chief work. Here, too, he begins with a polemic against those who, like Clarke and Wollaston, make reason sit in judgment on an action. Reason decides

in regard to (verbal and real) truth, but this has nothing to do with praiseworthiness; no one would think of praising or censuring the fact that twice two is four, or that heat follows sunshine. The confusion of those conceptions is also reflected in the statements of the workers in this field, for they pass quite suddenly from *is* to *ought*. Morals, like criticism, rests upon a moral feeling; and accordingly Shaftesbury and Hutcheson deserve credit, the former for comparing virtue with beauty, and the latter for deducing moral judgments from a moral sense. As a matter of fact, moral judgments rest only upon the feeling of pleasure or displeasure which an action excites in him who beholds it. Moral judgments are thus transferred from the actor to the spectator. This transference, at which Locke had only hinted, is the novel and characteristic feature that distinguishes Hume's ethical system from its predecessors, with which it has otherwise many points of connection. The possibility that the actions of others should fill us with pleasure, depends, according to Hume, upon that peculiar capacity for imparting and receiving which connects us with everything, especially with the human race, and which may be called sympathy, since we cannot see suffering, etc., without ourselves sharing in it. For, by the help of the imagination, we always transfer ourselves into the position of that which, and especially of him whom, we see, and call an action virtuous which would fill us with pride if it were our own. It is a condition of such a moral judgment that we regard the action, not as an independent process, but as a sign of a disposition or a character; the person who judges, adopts as his standard what, in the natural history of the passions, had proved to be good and evil. This may be summed up in the formula: The manifestation of a disposition that tends to the profit whether of individuals or of all men, merits approbation; not a disposition that tends to one's own profit, for to seek this fills no one with pride. *What* is useful, that is, the end of the action, is determined, as has been shown above, not by reason, but by passion. Reason, however, teaches what are the means for attaining ends; and thus it co-operates, though only indirectly, in the moral judgment, since that which leads to what is praiseworthy, is itself praiseworthy. Here, however, Hume is on common ground with Clarke and Wollaston, and so it may be said of him that he combines in himself all that

his predecessors had taught. Finally, we must mention his division of the virtues into natural and artificial. By the former he understands those that tend towards what is a good, or is useful, for man as an individual. Accordingly, he includes among them the feeling of sympathy, since this produces enjoyment; that which leads us to consider something praiseworthy, is itself praiseworthy. On the other hand, he excludes justice from the natural virtues; it only arises in society, and is therefore conventional, though not arbitrary. The selfish interest, since it would itself suffer without a process of division and of mutual support, leads to the community, towards which, besides, we are already urged by the natural inclination of the sexes. The experience that the community cannot exist on any other terms, brings about the rise of property, and of respect for present possession and for a promise, once it has been given. The view, therefore, that makes society rest upon a contract, is a complete misrepresentation of the true state of affairs. Society becomes a State through the formation of a government. It can quite well exist without this, and doubtless did exist without it, until danger from another society led to a dictatorship. The State, therefore, was in the first instance certainly monarchical. Since the State is an institution that exists for the purpose of protecting its members, there are relations where the government has no right to interfere. It is not correct to say, that the form the State assumes is a matter of indifference. A constitution that has a hereditary monarch, a nobility without dependants, and a people voting by representatives, is the best, not merely for England, but for every country.

Cf. Jodl: *Leben und Philosophie David Hume's.* Halle, 1872.

8. Hume's fellow countryman, ADAM SMITH, the renowned father of modern political economy, really occupies the same position as his predecessor. Born, a posthumous child, on Jan. 5th, 1723, he studied three years at the University of Glasgow and seven years at Oxford. Afterwards he delivered lectures on rhetoric in Edinburgh. In 1751 he was appointed a professor at Glasgow, and lectured first on logic and subsequently on moral philosophy. While holding this position he published his *Theory of Moral Sentiments* (1759). In 1763 he resigned his chair, and accompanied the young Duke of Buccleuch on his travels in France. The next ten years he spent in

retirement at Kirkcaldy, his native town (1766–76). From his seclusion he published his world-renowned work, *An Inquiry into the Nature and Causes of the Wealth of Nations*, 1776. He was then appointed to a post of considerable importance in the civil service. This brought him to London for some years, and finally to Edinburgh, where he died in July, 1790. After his death there appeared his *Essays on Philosophical Subjects* (Lond., 1795), the only manuscripts which he did not burn. What Hume had hinted at by his treatment of these subjects, Adam Smith expresses quite definitely. Moral judgment, in the first instance, is only concerned with the action of others, and the verdicts of conscience are only an echo of the judgments that others pass upon ourselves. Just as a perfectly solitary being would not know whether he was beautiful or not, so he would not know whether he was moral. Accordingly, Smith, like Hume, makes sympathy or fellow-feeling the basis of the whole of moral philosophy, so that without it there would be no moral judgment at all. As, however, he always maintains that this sympathy is mutual, he shows how through it there arises, not merely compassion for the sufferer, but also an effort on the part of the sufferer to put himself upon the same level as the onlooker, that is, to master his suffering. We saw that Hume, by accepting, in addition to actions praiseworthy in themselves, those which serve a praiseworthy end, had approached on this point the position of Clarke and Wollaston, of which he was in other respects a strenuous opponent. Adam Smith does the same thing with full consciousness, and to a much larger extent. For, in the actions which we find praiseworthy because we sympathise with them, he distinguishes between what he calls propriety and what he calls merit. The former is nearly related to Clarke's "fitness," for by it is to be understood a proper relation to motive or the cause of the action. Thus, violent grief at the loss of one's father is a proper (suitable) demeanour; on the contrary, to cry out when one feels insignificant bodily pain is improper. Just as the relation to the cause determines the propriety, so the relation to the end determines the merit. If the end of the action is benevolent, it appears to us worthy of reward; in the opposite case, deserving of punishment. The result of his very exact analysis of the conditions under which we approve of an action, may be reduced, according to him, to the following four points: We sympathise with the motives

of the person who acts; we sympathise with the gratitude of those who receive benefit from the action; we note an agreement of the action with the rules by which sympathy is generally regulated; and, lastly, the action appears to us as a part of a system of mutual promotion of happiness, and therefore as organic or beautiful. At the same time, very careful consideration is devoted to those casual circumstances which, as experience proves, go to modify the moral judgment, a successful result, for example, and so on. Many of his observations show a profound knowledge of human nature, while many are extremely paradoxical. The earliest traces of the thoughts that form the subject of his most famous work are also to be found in Hume. Still more important for the development of these was his acquaintance with Quesnay and Turgot, and with the teaching of other French economists, especially of Gournay. Nor must we omit to mention various English treatises which his own work has consigned to oblivion, such as those of Petty, J. Steuart, and others. His indebtedness to these thinkers, however, does not detract from the originality of his ideas, and still less from the consistency and the masterly style with which he has elaborated them.

9. Not a few have been puzzled by the fact that the *Inquiry* contains so little of the brotherly love or fellow-feeling of the *Theory*, that it became the Bible of the egoistic Manchester school of political economy. The solution is easier than has been imagined, if we keep in view the relation of the two treatises to their original source, the Glasgow lectures on moral philosophy. There Adam Smith had remained faithful to the tradition of the Schoolmen, which had been handed down from Aristotle, and according to which practical philosophy was divided into ethics, economics, and politics. He differs from Aristotle, however, in one respect: he discussed industry, not so much in its limitation to the household, as rather in its national significance. And he has thus been led to depart from the Aristotelian tradition, inasmuch as with him economics is not the bridge that leads to politics, but rather political philosophy is the mediator between ethics and economics. Accordingly, in his courses of lectures, he made his researches into the nature of justice (legal and political philosophy) immediately follow those into the praiseworthy in general (ethics), and concluded with what is demanded by

the well-being of individuals and of the whole (expediency). Each of these fundamental conceptions was sharply distinguished from the other two, in order that it might be apprehended with as much clearness as possible. The plan followed in the lectures was followed also in the works subsequently printed. Smith's original intention was to pass from ethics, his views of which were published in the *Theory*, to politics, where Montesquieu was to serve as his model. This idea was given up, and expediency was treated of before justice. In the fifth book of the economical *Inquiry*, however, he goes into some questions that belong to legal and political philosophy. With this exception, Adam Smith never laid before the reading public any of that part of his system which reconciles ethics and industry. This exception, however, is sufficient to defend him from the reproach of having dispensed with all moral considerations in political economy. Any one who maintains that he did, must hold—as Say, for example, actually does—that the Fifth Book, with what is said there in regard to military force and to education, is an excrescence. Buckle showed truer insight in saying, that Adam Smith gives a picture, not of the form which political economy ought to take, but only of that which it *would* take under the anything but impartial guidance of selfishness.

Cf. Aug. Oncken: *Adam Smith und Immanuel Kant.* First Part. Leipzig, 1877.

§ 283.

BROWN, CONDILLAC, BONNET.

1. A second point in regard to which Locke only went half way, requires correction as much as did the inconsistency involved in saying that necessary connection is determined by the mind, and yet controls the external world. Clearly the mind retained far too much activity for a blank sheet of paper, to which Locke is so fond of comparing it. Not merely is it the instrument by which the ideas we receive are combined, but of these ideas themselves a very large proportion, those of reflection, are simply counterparts of mental activity. It is true that the mind is a mere mirror, so far as it has the ideas, and in this respect, therefore, it is perfectly passive. But inasmuch as what it reflects are its own activities, it is not passive. This twofold inconsistency must be got rid of.

To effect this, we must say that complex ideas arise without the active interference of the mind, and must do away with the second source of simple ideas, which presupposes the activity of the mind itself. Hume evidently inclines to adopt both of these courses. The former, inasmuch as he lays such great stress upon the laws of association of ideas, by which the part played by the mind is reduced to compulsory obedience; the latter, when he draws attention to the dependence of ideas of reflection upon those of sensation, and therefore designates the former as secondary. While Hume never gets beyond mere tentative efforts, three men succeeded in ridding their philosophy of both inconsistencies. These were the Irishman Peter Brown, the Frenchman Condillac, and the Swiss Bonnet. The first of them, even before Hume's day, corrected the one error, that as to the double nature of the sources of all ideas; the second, shortly after Hume's death, went further, and made complex ideas arise according to laws independent of the mind; the third carried on the work of the other two.

2. PETER BROWN, who died as Bishop of Cork in 1735, had first made a reputation as an orthodox theologian by a treatise against Toland. Subsequently he came forward as an opponent of Locke in two anonymous works (*The Procedure, Extent, and Limits of Human Understanding*, 2nd ed., London, 1729; and *Things Divine and Supernatural conceived by Analogy*, etc., London, 1733). He showed that the principle, *Nihil est in intellectu quod non ante fuerit in sensu*, in itself perfectly correct, must necessarily lead to the view that impressions made upon the senses are the only elements of all knowledge. To suppose that there are primary ideas of reflection is a mistake, because the consciousness of our own conditions is always perfectly immediate, and is not reached through ideas; and further, because it always occurs only as accompanying the ideas of the external world, and therefore presupposes them. The mind is really a *tabula rasa*, which only attains to ideas through the influence of the external world, and cannot therefore determine anything at all *a priori* in regard to the external world. We must, accordingly, distinguish the following forms of knowledge: the first and most certain, through ideas, which is concerned with the external world; the second and next most certain, which consists in the immediate consciousness of our own conditions. The

two may be included under the title of intuitive knowledge. From this must be distinguished deduced or mediate knowledge, within which we may make four subdivisions: demonstrative certainty, moral certainty, certainty based upon sight, and certainty based upon evidence. Since all four ultimately rest upon sensible impressions, there is of course no knowledge of the supersensible. We have no clear idea of our own thought, much less then of the thought of an absolutely immaterial being, who has never been brought within the range of our experience. For this reason, when we speak of processes of thought we always employ expressions adopted from the material world. To remedy this defect, we transfer to the supersensible, by the help of analogy, relations of which we have knowledge through the things of sense, as when we call God father. This is not a metaphor, for we are certain that there really exists in God something analogous to fatherhood. We are certain of that, but this "Divine analogy" cannot be called knowledge.

3. The Catholic Abbé, ETIENNE BONNOT DE CONDILLAC, went much farther in the path which the Protestant bishop had begun. Born in 1715 at Grenoble, he made Frenchmen familiar with the doctrines of Locke by his *Essai sur l'Origine des Connaissances Humaines* (1746, 2 vols.), to which Voltaire drew the attention of his countrymen. Afterwards, in his *Traité des Systèmes* (1749, 2 vols.), he argued strongly against Spinoza, and found fault with Leibnitz for not making experience the source of all knowledge. Finally, in his *Traité des Sensations* (1754, 2 vols.), he laid before the world the points on which, partly through the study of Berkeley (§ 291, 4), he had come to dissent from Locke. The *Traité des Animaux*, too, contains some matter that is of importance for his philosophy. Some weeks before his death, which occurred on Aug. 3rd, 1780, his *Logique* appeared. After his death his works were collected (*Œuvres complètes de Condillac*, etc., Paris, *an* VI. [1798], 23 vols.). His posthumous and unfinished work, *La Langue des Calculs*, published in the same year, is said by Aug. Comte, who ranks him very high as a thinker, to be the best he ever wrote. The following are the chief points of his teaching:

4. Although before the Fall and after death the human soul was, and will be, independent of the body, still at present it is so bound up with it that it can neither possess nor accomplish

anything without its help. In order to show that there is nothing in the soul, except the ideas which it receives through the impressions of the external world upon the senses, Condillac starts from a fiction, which others subsequently claimed the merit of being the first to invent. He imagines a statue which is endowed with the five senses in succession, and in the first instance merely with the sense of smell. He tries to show that even this sense is sufficient to produce in man the most essential ideas from which all his knowledge is formed. He then goes on to show what would happen when the man, who has hitherto been all nose, receives the sense of taste, of hearing, and so on. How easily he manages everything, is clear from the fact that it is at once assumed as self-evident that the simultaneous existence of an impression and of the copy of an earlier impression (the perfume of roses actually felt and the perfume of lilies previously felt), is a comparison, and therefore a judgment. The most interesting point in these inquiries, which are rambling and full of repetitions, is the contrast in which he places the sense of touch to all the other senses. It is through it that we first reach, he says, the idea of objectivity; the four others give us nothing but the sense of being ourselves affected, or of our own condition. It is only by being compelled to place what we feel, the solid, outside of ourselves that we are led to regard colour and so on as belonging to the things. The fact that we so far excel the animals in our sense of touch, largely explains our superiority over them. The ideas "good" and "bad," too, he supposes to be quite easily deducible from sensations. It is a contradiction to have a sensation without a feeling of pleasure, or the reverse. Hence results at once what is longed for or good, and what is abhorred or evil.

5. Condillac always said that the second point in which the Lockian system required correction, was the theory of association of ideas. If two ideas have some common point in which they meet, whether it be time, or whether it be likeness, they are capable of association. If such a combination of ideas repeats itself frequently, it becomes so much of a custom with us, that we are compelled of necessity to associate the one with the other. This is the origin of complex ideas. We do not make them. They make themselves. Nothing, however, does so much to facilitate the repetition of combinations that have already taken place,

or to render possible the rise of new ones, as the use of signs to represent these combinations. This is true even of involuntary signs, like the outcry at a mishap, but to a much larger extent of voluntary ones, words, the use of which leads the hearer to connect the complex idea denoted by one word with that denoted by another, even when up to this time he has never perceived such a connection. If this process of connection be called comprehension, it becomes quite coincident with language. That the lower animals have practically no language, is for them just as much a defect in regard to the combinations of ideas as we saw that their imperfect sense of touch is in regard to the elements of these associations. On the other hand, with man it is chiefly language that is instrumental in handing down to coming generations every combination of ideas fixed by a word, and in preventing imitation, in which all learning consists, from being limited in human beings to such a narrow sphere as it is among the lower animals. But because, even in the most complicated of all complex ideas, the prime elements, as we have seen, are sensations, impressions, the sum and substance of Condillac's theory of knowledge may be expressed in the formula: *Penser est sentir.*

6. Quite independently of Condillac, CHARLES BONNET of Geneva (13th March, 1720, to 20th May, 1790) reached very similar results. Indeed, he even hit upon the idea of a statue which is gradually endowed with the senses, before he learned that five years earlier the same conception had occurred to Condillac. Then, however, he read his predecessor's book, and made some changes. He no longer worked, as he had previously done, with the sense of sight, but with the sense of smell. He had early gained a reputation in the learned world by minor works, and then by his *Traité d'Insectologie* (2 vols., Paris, 1745; *Œuvres, tom.* i.). The consequence was, that before he was thirty the French Academy (of which he was afterwards an honorary member), made him a correspondent. But his eyes were weakened by using the microscope, and he was compelled to devote himself to speculation on more general questions. This was the case in his *Recherches sur l'Usage des Feuilles* (Leyden, 1754, 4to; *Œuvres, tom.* iv.), and to a still greater extent in his *Essai de Psychologie*, published anonymously (London, 1755; *Œuvres, tom.* xvii.). These were followed by *Essai Analytique sur les Facultés de*

l'Âme (Copenh., 1760, 4to; *Œuvres, tom.* xiii., xiv.), to which the *Considérations sur les Corps Organisés* (2 vols., Amst., 1762; *Œuvres, tom.* v., vi.) form a physiological supplement. Then there appeared the two much admired works, *Contemplation de la Nature* (2 vols., Amst., 1764, 8vo; *Œuvres, tom.* vii.–ix.) and *Palingénésie Philosophique*, along with *Recherches Philosophiques sur les Preuves du Christianisme* (2 vols., Geneva, 1769; *Œuvres, tom.* xv., xvi.). All these writings have been often reprinted and translated into other languages. They are contained in the collected edition: *Collection complète des Œuvres de Charles Bonnet.* Neuchatel, 1779. 18 vols. 8vo. (I do not know the quarto edition.)

Cf. J. Trembley: *Mémoire pour servir à l'histoire de la vie et des ouvrages de M. Bonnet.* 1794. (German translation, Halle, 1795.)

7. In spite of his decided superiority to his predecessor, whom he justly censures for often slurring over difficulties, Bonnet was at first held in less repute among his contemporaries than was Condillac, and it was not till after some decades that the position of affairs was reversed. This is to be explained mainly by the greater one-sidedness of the latter, who draws his support solely from Locke, *i.e.* solely from realistic doctrines. Bonnet, on the other hand, in spite of his great admiration for Newton and Montesquieu, does not neglect the study of Leibnitz and Berkeley (*vid.* §§ 288, 291, 4–7). Even in his *Psychologie* we find him declaring that the one school materialized and the other spiritualized everything, and that it would be a wiser course to avoid these extremes,—a principle which those who read it first, regarded as not thorough-going enough, but which a later generation hailed gladly as its own confession of faith. Everything that Bonnet subsequently worked out in more detail, is contained in outline in the *Psychologie*, to which he refers in all his later writings, generally to express agreement with it, often to improve it, but always as if it were written by some one else. Its special aim is to represent determinism or the "system of necessity," of which he is a supporter, as the only position scientifically tenable, and as one quite free from danger to religion. A view, according to which virtue is not so much merit as undeserved good fortune, teaches that we can be nothing and can accomplish nothing except it be given us from above. Further, he holds that the doctrine that there is no *æquilibrium arbitrii*, but that the

will necessarily follows the stronger motive, is the only one that can supply the *data* for a philosophy of morals and a theory of education; it helps us to understand why the fear of punishment is the safeguard of states; and it is supported by the Christian religion, which leads men to virtue by promising them happiness, *i.e.* by the motive of self-love. Religion, he says, has nothing at all to fear from philosophy, but must be on its guard against theology, which ruins it. After discussing determinism, he goes on to work out in special detail the principle that man is not, as the Cartesians would have us believe, a soul pure and simple, but that he is an "*être mixte*," and consists of soul and body. It is not on religious grounds that materialism must be rejected, for since God could endow a material soul with immortality, the victory of materialism would in no way endanger religion; it is on scientific grounds, *i.e.* for reasons founded on experience; for there can be no doubt that there is no other knowledge than that which rests upon observation and experience. Now from experience we have the indubitable fact that the soul in the Ego has a consciousness of unity and simplicity that a composite existence like a body never can have. Similarly, experience teaches us that when my senses are affected from without, my soul has ideas, and that when I perform an act of will, my limbs move. We must therefore accept as a fact a union of body and soul. The nature of this union is, however, unknown to us, and we can therefore come to no decisive conclusion in regard to the three theories that Leibnitz enumerates (*vid.* § 288, 4). As regards the relation between these two experiences, it is the first mentioned that has the precedence: it is only in consequence of some influence from without that I can will to make a movement, and therefore *l'activité est soumise à la sensibilité.* This degrades the soul to some extent, but does not degrade man, for man is not soul (pure and simple). The connection between body and soul is not a chance one (brought about for example, as Condillac holds, by the Fall), but is essential and eternal; and the Christian doctrine of the resurrection is thoroughly rational.

8. The chief purpose of the *Essai Analytique* is to show how the soul, whose essence consists not so much in thought as in capacity for thinking (*cogitabilité*), reaches ideas and actual thought. Condillac's imaginary statue is called in to aid in the discussion of this subject, but the task is performed

in a far more thorough manner, and quite without perfunctoriness. When the organs of sense on the surface of the body are affected, the sensation is transferred to a certain part of the brain, whether by a nerve-principle analogous to the electric fluid or to the luminiferous medium, or by a modification of the molecular condition of nerve-substance or of its finest fibres, or, lastly, by both at once. In this part of the brain the most various nerve-fibres (of sight, hearing, and so on) lie so close together, that they can communicate their motions to one another by the help of connecting mediums (*chaînons*). This is the seat of the soul, which here is led by the oscillation of the nerve-fibres to form ideas or have perceptions, and similarly from here (in a way that we do not understand), when it wishes to effect anything, sets in motion the fibres of the brain, each of which is a highly complicated piece of mechanism. Since the senses are the only ways by which an impression can be conveyed to the brain, the soul is quite inactive and devoid of ideas until some sensation has been experienced; with every new sense that comes to it, the number of ideas is increased and their combinations multiplied. By the aid of the imaginary statue Bonnet represents a soul in which only a single idea (the perfume of roses) is produced by the sense of smell, and then by the help of facts given in experience he watches carefully what the most probable processes in the nervous system would be. One of the most important questions which at once presents itself is, How does it happen that, as experience teaches us, a recurring sensation is felt as such, and not as a novel one? Everything points to a permanent alteration in the molecular condition of the nerve; the result of which is, that the nerve already employed is distinguished from one that has never been used. This, however, also gives the first datum for the solution of one of the most important psychological problems, that of custom. Memory is only a particular variety of this, for experience leads us to regard it as a condition of the brain rather than of the soul. Further, it is a fact of experience that a fresh sensation is felt either as recurrent, or as identical with a previous one, or, as distinguished from it. This makes it probable that among the brain-fibres intended for similar sensations (*e.g.* of light) there are some susceptible only to certain modifications of this sensation, others to others (the different colours, in our example), and that these communicate with one another.

(Similarly there are special fibres for the different sounds.) Starting from this supposition, Bonnet goes on to inquire by a most careful process of analysis, to what ideas a soul will come that receives impressions through the sense of smell alone, and receives of these only two varieties. It has perceived, and perceives again, the perfume of roses and the perfume of violets. His inquiry into these primitive and simple sensations is immediately connected with his inquiry into the earliest acts of the soul, which are produced by sensations. He begins with attention, of which he frequently remarks that he is the first to give an accurate explanation. It is a psychical act, by which motion is communicated from within first to the central brain-fibres, and then to the whole nerve. Here, too, established facts compel us to assume as a law, that a nerve thus set in motion retains the tendency of this motion, and, further, that it can impart the motion it has received to other nerves. Now the laws so far discovered suffice to explain, or to reveal the mechanism of the associations of ideas, on which Bonnet lays as much stress as Condillac. This mechanism finds its counterpart in the domain of psychical activity in the mechanism of the passions, the first principle of which is this: Self-love is the first motive of all desire, and therefore the perception of the agreeable is a condition of desiring at all. The associations of ideas become much more complex when, in addition to increasing the number of the impressions, and therefore of the ideas, we represent these as springing from more than one single sense. · By the association of smells with sounds, the latter may be made to serve as signs for the former. This means the discovery of the most important form of associations of ideas, and of the principal means of increasing their number,—language, which has as much importance for Bonnet as for Condillac. Now for the first time, there is a possibility of ideas in the full sense of the term, *i.e.* of signs that stand for a number of similar things. The act of forming such ideas Bonnet calls reflection; and although he therefore often follows Locke in calling sensation and reflection the sources of knowledge, still there is no contradiction in his maintaining that our most abstract ideas (*les plus spiritualisées, si je puis employer ce mot*) are deducible from *idées sensibles*, as their natural source. He does not make an exception even of the idea of God, and he looks for the primary elements of this in sensations. Reflection and

language modify, not merely ideas, the sum of which now becomes intellect, but also desire, which now for the first time becomes actual, deliberate will. A very interesting feature in the inquiries into complex and abstract ideas is Bonnet's distinction between *essence réelle* and *nominelle*, the former of which also appears as *chose en soi*, and the latter as *ce que la chose paraît être*. We see here how the spirit of philosophy is gradually preparing to make this distinction the point on which the view taken of the world hinges. There remains, however, this great distinction between Bonnet's *essence réelle* and Kant's Thing-in-itself, that, while the former like the latter is unknowable, it is supposed to stand in such a relation to the phenomenal, that the two can never contradict one another. Accordingly, Bonnet can call the nature of the soul unknowable, and yet say decidedly that it cannot be material (manifold), since it appears as one in the Ego (cf. *Ess. Anal.*, ch. xv., § 242 ff). By the union of reflection with memory the physical (or quasi-) personality, which the lower animals too possess, inasmuch as they recollect their own conditions, becomes an Ego, *i.e.* an intellectual or real personality, such as belongs only to mankind. Since the associations of ideas are only possible owing to intercommunication between the brain-fibres, we may call the intermediate fibres intellectual, just as we speak of fibres of sight and of hearing. But, in any case, the exact mechanism of thinking and willing is so conditioned by the constitution of the brain, that Bonnet, while always maintaining that he is not a materialist, often insists that, if we transferred Montesquieu's soul to the brain of a Huron, we should have, not Montesquieu, but a Huron.

9. It is only incidentally that Bonnet's psychological works make mention of the thoughts, to the further development of which his *Physiology* (as he himself often calls his *Considérations*, etc.), and his *Palingenesy* are devoted. In the former he appears as a decided opponent both of spontaneous generation and of the theory of successive acts of creation. According to him, the only correct view is that the universe was completed at its first formation, whether this be conceived of as a process of envelopment or otherwise. The germs which the earth has contained since its last violent change develop themselves sooner or later, and none of them will be lost. Spallanzani's and Haller's investigations confirm the belief that there is no absolute beginning of things, but simply evolu-

tion. All existence forms a graduated scale, in which no step is passed over, and no step is missing. The *lex continui*, which Leibnitz rightly maintains, admits of no exception. Besides the intermediate existences that we know, there are certainly many that are unknown to us. Man forms the highest stage of which we have knowledge, but it would be unjustifiable arrogance to regard him as the absolutely highest. In fact, a great deal goes to indicate that men, like all other inhabitants of the earth, are not in the butterfly, but only in the chrysalis stage. We saw that the soul had assigned it as its abode, that part of the brain in which the finest ends of all the nerves of sensation come nearest to one another, and which contains the connecting links between them; and the fact is, that the soul does not dwell here in a state of nakedness, but is connected with a garment that covers it, an ethereal body, so that man remains an *être mixte*, even when his brain decays and he is not yet clad in a new body. This absolutely imperishable, ethereal body, which covers the souls of animals just as it covers the souls of men, serves to explain the fact that, although memory is, as we saw, simply a condition of the brain, yet man will have after death a recollection of his former state of existence. This would be inconceivable, if it were simply the naked soul that separated itself from the brain. Now, however, we see that it takes with it a body that, from constant intercourse with the finest fibres of the brain, has absorbed into itself traces of what passed in them. Imagine this soul, along with its ethereal covering, introduced anew into a coarser body, which, however, has more than five gates for the entrance of external impressions. That would be an advance in which man never attains to being spirit pure and simple,—a doubtful advantage at the best,—but always remains *être mixte;* and to assume its existence contradicts neither reason nor the doctrine of the resurrection. Naturally the law of continuity requires that we should make an exactly analogous admission in regard to the lower animals; so that the animals that now stand highest, like elephants and apes, will move into the place which we occupy at present. These views on a future life Bonnet follows up with his defence of Christianity, written with much warmth. It occupies more than a fourth part of the *Palingenesy*, and has besides been also published separately, and often translated; as, for example, by Lavater, who sent his translation to Mendelssohn.

with the demand, either to confute this defence, or to become a Christian. The most interesting part is the explanation of miracles and prophecies. These are referred, the former to unknown, the latter to known, natural laws, by means of which God carries out the intention of speaking to us. (Here, too, Bonnet declines to decide between idealism and its opposite. The idealist does not deny the fact that we refer our sensations to objects outside of ourselves. But this fact is sufficient to justify us in reasoning to an ultimate cause of our own and all existence.) The most essential points of natural theology, as well as the credibility of the Apostles, the authenticity of their writings, the antinomies (Bonnet introduces this word with an explanation) in their evidences, and so on, are discussed, after the fashion of apologists of that day and of this, without their being brought into connection with what is characteristic of Bonnet. On the other hand, the groundwork of this apology is in perfect harmony with the oft-repeated principle, that happiness is the highest end of created beings, and *in specie* of man. To happiness belongs the firm conviction of a future life. If this cannot be attained otherwise than by a direct revelation from God, reason can raise no objection against the reality of such a revelation. The certainty is therefore founded upon the impulse to happiness, and is accordingly moral certainty. It is interesting to compare with this Basedow's duty of belief (§ 293, 7), and Kant's moral faith (§ 300, 10).

10. Locke's realism soon spread into Italy, in the form it had received from Condillac and Bonnet. The doctrines of the English thinker had been put into circulation somewhat hesitatingly in the South by GENOVESI, and very decidedly in the North by Father SOAVE, when Condillac himself began to give currency to his own modifications of them. His stay in Parma (1758-68) made his philosophy supreme in the Collegio Alberoni at Piacenza, and in the University at Parma, which had been re-opened. From the former came the two most important Italian sensationalists, connected by friendship and by a community of birthplace. The younger, who however was the first to appear as an author, Melchior GIOJA (1767–1829), goes little beyond Condillac, and draws from his doctrines chiefly practical conclusions which deal with statistics, punishment, education of the young, and so on. The elder of the two friends, who has left a tribute to the memory of the

younger, is Giov. Domenico Romagnosi (1761–1835). He shows almost more affinity with Bonnet than with Condillac. Many of his writings treat of the problem of knowledge. (For example, *Che cosa è la mente sana?* 1827.—*Suprema economia del umano sapere*, 1828.— *Vedute fondamentale sull' arte logica*, 1832.) Others, as is natural in the case of a practical jurist, treat of penal and natural law, constitutional monarchy, and so on. Others, again, take up such subjects as instruction and civilization. He often betrays a tendency, particularly in his later writings, to reconcile the sensationalist point of view with the one diametrically opposed to it.—Not so important as Gioja and Romagnosi are the sensationalists Cicognara, Borelli, Costa, and Bufoloni, who are in their turn associated with still less important thinkers.

Cf. Louis Ferri: *Essai sur l'histoire de la philosophie en Italie au dix-neuvième siècle.* Paris, 2 vols. 1869.

§ 284.

Mandeville and Helvetius.

1. Locke had developed doctrines which (along with the inconsistency of which he had been guilty) were superseded by Hume and Condillac; and a similar process is now to take place in regard to the systems of philosophy that rest upon a Lockian basis, including those of Hume and Adam Smith. To say that this basis is one of realistic individualism, is no new assertion; these thinkers themselves admit that it is so. The effort to imagine man as he was before any historical influences (*e.g.* that of Christianity) had wrought upon him, the more and more decided endeavour to transform ethics into a natural history of the passions, an attempt the result of which is to make physical processes the primary motives of action, the unanimous assertion that enjoyment, sought also by the lower animals, is the end of action, and finally the fact that Hume regards as natural only those virtues which have something to correspond to them in the lower animals,—all this shows a disposition adverse to what is ideal and spiritual. Similarly, they all display a hatred of Spinozism; and the nominalist principle, that truth belongs only to the individual, is with them a firmly established axiom. On both of these points, however, all those whom we have hitherto discussed were frequently inconsistent. Not to mention the want of

thoroughness which, as we saw, was characteristic of Clarke and Wollaston, even Hutcheson and Hume fall into self-contradiction. For the former does not hesitate to combine the realistic conception of happiness with the purely ideal conception of perfection, while the latter makes the artificial virtue of justice, which has nothing to correspond to it among the lower animals, if not the basis, at all events the support of the State, an institution whose existence is necessary. To a still greater extent do they come into conflict with their individualist principles. That the individual, natural man is entirely self-seeking, is the doctrine not merely of the Christian religion, but of every one who, like Rochefoucauld for instance, keeps his eyes open; and Hume admits that it is so. But how does that agree with the sympathy of which he and Adam Smith speak? However we may try to avoid the difficulty, this sympathy remains a spirit of community, *i.e.* a power which, while it has not an individualistic character, exercises a commanding influence in all individuals, and is therefore real. The fact that British moral philosophy contains so many ideal and so many social elements, explains why it has a certain attraction even for those who take a diametrically opposite view. Nevertheless, the combination of doctrines that are quite heterogeneous, remains an inconsistency. However unpleasant a spectacle it may be, the point at which this combination is dissolved, will accordingly mark a forward stride in the development of Realism.

2. This step was taken by the physician, BERNARD DE MANDEVILLE, in his fable of *The Grumbling Hive, or Knaves Turned Honest.* He was born in Holland in 1670, and was educated there; but his family were of French origin, and he himself was early naturalized in England. His book was published as early as 1714, but it failed to attract attention till he republished it nine years later as *The Fable of the Bees*, accompanied by an elaborate commentary (Lond., 1723–28, 2 vols.). With express reference to Shaftesbury, who is twitted with holding the pagan principle that man is by nature good, the commentary goes on to work out in detail the view that the natural impulses of man are at variance with reason and Christianity, that man is by nature selfish, unsocial, and an enemy of his fellow-men, and knows nothing of the sympathy and self-sacrifice that reason and Christianity demand. Similarly, the *Fable* shows that it is an entirely false

and Utopian idea to suppose that the chief requirement for the well-being of the State is virtue and morality in individuals. On the contrary, where all were honest, disinterested, and so on, trade and manufactures would languish ; in fact, the State would go to ruin. Neither the pleasure of individuals nor the prosperity of society is promoted by reasonableness and Christian virtue. This, however, he concludes, proves nothing. Christian doctrine demands that we crucify the flesh ; and in the same way it does not wish us to be too prosperous in our earthly relations. The opponents of Mandeville were not prevented by this moral application, which reminds us in many respects of Bayle, from condemning his teaching as vicious. It had a different effect upon those who were not afraid of deducing all the logical consequences of the realism that Locke and Shaftesbury represented. The impossibility of combining the ideal struggle after perfection with the sensual enjoyment of the individual on the one side, and with the material well-being of the community on the other, had been vividly pictured by Mandeville ; and this suggested the thought that if the two latter could get rid of their common foe, the arrangement would be the best possible. Accordingly the attempt was actually made to find in natural pleasure, stripped of every ideal element, the end of all action, and to promise that such action would be followed by the material well-being of all. France,—the country in which the principle quoted in § 274 made itself heard simultaneously on the throne and far beneath,—welcomed the theory of selfishness warmly, and in so doing showed how true was the remark of the woman who said that this was the great secret of the world.

3. Claude Adrien Helvetius (Jan., 1715, to Dec., 1771) conceived an admiration for Locke's *Essay*, while still but a schoolboy ; Mandeville's writings too, according to Malesherbes, exercised a great influence upon him. Another fact of importance was his connection with Voltaire, who was twenty years his senior. Of the large income which the post of a farmer-general ensured him from his twenty-third year until he voluntarily resigned it, as well as of the fortune he accumulated during this period, he made the noblest use. In fact, a general characteristic of this apostle of egoism was a goodness of heart that amounted to weakness. He wrote a didactic poem, *Le Bonheur*, in four cantos, which is very

stilted, although it has been highly praised by Voltaire. Besides this, he published a work, *De l'Esprit* (Paris, 4to, 1754), which, in spite of, or perhaps just on account of, the combined attacks of Jesuits and Jansenists, aroused intense interest, appeared in many editions, was often translated, and was eagerly read throughout Europe, especially at the courts. The treatise *De l'Homme* forms a sequel to this. It applies the principles of the earlier work especially to education, and did not appear till after the death of the author. In the Zweibrücken edition of the collected works of Helvetius (1774, 7 vols. 12mo), it occupies the last three volumes.

4. Helvetius declines to answer the question whether the soul has a material existence, because it is beside the purpose of his inquiry. This is only to deal with what we call intellect (*esprit*), when we say of an individual that he has intellect or is intellectual. What is this? Simply the sum-total of ideas, which, if they are novel or of public importance, make us say "genius" instead of "intellect." Since all ideas, as being copies of impressions, come to us from without, and since people are almost equally susceptible to them, the undeniable intellectual difference between individuals depends simply upon external circumstances, *i.e.* upon chance. About the most important element in this is education. But since circumstances do more to educate us than our instructors do, education and chance are very often employed by Helvetius as almost synonymous. It is therefore very important for the development of the intellect to begin education as early as possible. One of the most weighty among the external circumstances that go to mould the intellect, is civil life. Where intellectual and political oppression is the rule, as in the France of his own day, the intellect is bound to suffer. The more and more the deplorable distinctions of privilege and fortune are done away with, the rarer will men of outstanding genius become, but the larger will be the number of men who are happy.

5. By happiness Helvetius understands the largest possible amount of physical pleasure. Since there is no other universality than the sum-total of the individuals, one's own satisfaction contributes to the general satisfaction, inasmuch as it forms a part of it. Egoism is therefore the rule of all action. We are impelled to this by nature, for the motive of action is self-love, which reigns in the world of mind, as weight reigns in the world of matter. In fact, it is the fundamental element

in all that the intellect does, for the intellect only attains to knowledge through attention, and we turn our attention to a thing simply to get rid of *ennui*. All learning accordingly rests merely on self-love. In practical life this truth is, of course, even more evident. If our moralists were not fools who write for a Utopia, or hypocrites who do not say what they really think, they would long ago have given up their edifying homilies, and have shown that in promoting the advantage of others we do what is advantageous for ourselves. None but a blind man or a liar will refuse to admit that the grandfather loves his grandson, only because he sees in him the foe of his own foe (the son who is waiting for the inheritance). The State shows those moralists the right path to follow; for instead of exhortations it holds out threats of punishment and hopes of reward. Nor does it show merely the motive, it shows also the end of all action. This end is what conduces to the well-being of all. Accordingly, there are no virtues save those which are political. All others, religious virtues for example, are only virtues of prejudice.

6. It does not require a great deal of trouble to show that in the works of Helvetius there is hardly a noteworthy idea that has not been borrowed from some one else. Hume had taught that the mind consists merely of impressions and of copies of these impressions; Montesquieu, that differences of character are determined by circumstances, and especially by the laws of the State. That the spring of all action is self-love, had been the doctrine of Maupertuis (*vid.* § 294, 3) in his *Essai de Philosophie Morale*, Dresden, 1752. The very same view was held by St. Lambert (16th Dec., 1717, to 9th Feb., 1803), who occupies a position almost identical with that of Helvetius, and whose *Catéchisme Universel*, though it was not published till 1798, was written at the same time as Helvetius' treatise, *De l'Esprit*; and lastly, it was expressed by all Helvetius' friends in the social circles in which they moved. Accordingly Hume, in a letter to Adam Smith, praises the book simply on account of the excellence of its style. And still there is nothing unfair in Helvetius' book having become an object of hatred or of admiration to a larger extent than the books of the others we have mentioned. Its merit lies just in what makes its point of view so distasteful to us. Here the individualist interest is not ennobled by the introduction of religious interests, as in Maupertuis, nor of

social interests, as in St. Lambert. By the perfect frankness with which he makes the satisfaction of the sensible subject the principle of his philosophy, he places himself in the same attitude to the defenders of egoism, "rightly understood," as Mandeville did to the English and Scottish moralists. He goes further than they did, though this was not difficult after what they had done. A very similar position is adopted by Count Chassebœuf, who has become better known under the assumed name of VOLNEY, and has treated his master's doctrines poetically in the once highly-admired *Ruines* (1791).

D.—THE SENSATIONALIST ENLIGHTENMENT.

§ 285.

F. C. Schlosser: *Geschichte des achtzehnten Jahrhunderts*, etc. Vol. i., 2nd Part; Vol. ii., 2nd Part. H. Hettner: *Literaturgeschichte des achtzehnten Jahrhunderts*. Brunswick, 1856. Vol. i. and Vol. ii.

1. Before the most extreme consequences of realism could be deduced, and at the same time recognised as the long-felt secret of all cultured men, it was necessary that there should be cleared away a vast number of ideas which were fostered by the system of education then in vogue, and which prevailing custom made it hard to get rid of. Where reverence for the Church, even though it be merely outward, is regarded as a mark of respectability, where the word non-Christian is dreaded as a term of reproach, where it is acknowledged that the power that controls all phenomena is a spiritual power, and that the individual spirit is not subject to bondage nor fated to pass away, it is impossible to give successful expression to the demand which realistic individualism seeks to fulfil—to see truth only in the world of material things. The unsettling first of specifically Christian beliefs and then of religious convictions in general, especially of the ideas of God, freedom, and immortality, is the function performed by the Sensationalist Enlightenment of the eighteenth century. This movement began in England, and can be shown to be intimately connected with Locke and the ethical systems already discussed. Deism, which Herbert of Cherbury had brought into existence some time before, received quite a new impulse from JOHN TOLAND (1670–1722). He was one of the first to call himself a freethinker. He had expounded his political radicalism in his *Life of Milton* and in his

Amyntor, a defence of this biography; his advanced religious opinions are seen in his anonymous treatise, *Christianity not Mysterious*, Lond., 1696, which, in spite of Locke's protests, appealed to the teaching of that thinker. The latter book was followed by a number of works in which he explains his views. These had a materialistic tendency, and he proposes for them the name of "pantheism," a word which he was the first to bring into use. Among these writings were his *Letters to Serena*, London, 1704, intended for the Queen of Prussia; his *Adæsidæmon*, The Hague, 1709; and lastly his *Pantheisticon*, Cosmopoli, 1710. (Cf. Gerh. Berthold: *John Toland und der Monismus der Gegenwart*, Heidelb., 1876.)—Closely related to him is ANTHONY COLLINS (1676–1727), whose opinions were entirely moulded by Locke. In 1707 he had written *An Essay concerning the Use of the Reason*. The controversies raised by Sacheverell provoked from Collins his *Priestcraft in Perfection*, 1709. This was followed by his *Discourse of Free Thinking*, etc., London, 1713, which, in spite of the replies by Ibbot, Whiston, Bentley, and others, was very favourably received, although it did not go so far as did William Lyons, in his *Infallibility of Human Judgment*, London, 1713. After eleven years of silence, the discussions raised by Whiston in regard to the allegorical interpretation of Scripture, led him to publish: *Discourse of the Grounds and Reasons of the Christian Religion*, London, 1724, which found a sequel in: *The Scheme of Literal Prophecy*, etc., London, 1726. —THOMAS WOOLSTON (1669–1729) contributed to these controversies a large number of treatises. Amongst these the greatest attention was attracted by the *Discourses on the Miracles of Our Saviour* (1727–30), which he himself calls invectives against the letter, but glorifications of its ideal meaning. The most famous among the many replies was that of Sherlock. In turn, this reply called into the field a new champion of deism, PETER ANNET (died 1768), who, however, is not nearly so important as MATTHEW TINDAL (1656 to 16th Aug., 1733). The latter, who had gone over to Catholicism in 1685, and renounced it two years later, published anonymously his *Christianity as Old as the Creation*, etc., London, 1730, the book which has been called the Deist's Bible. In this, all positive religions are represented as distortions, Christianity as a restoration, of natural religion, and natural religion itself as simply the practice of morality, *i.e.* the fulfil-

ment of the duties that lead to happiness. Happiness is health of body and pleasure of sense. By our struggle after our own happiness we do honour to God, who is self-sufficing, and whom superstition dishonours by representing Him as if He needed our service.—Tindal's work was carried on and supplemented by the writings of that remarkable, self-taught man, THOMAS CHUBB (29th Sept., 1679, to 1747), first introduced to the world by Whiston, who published Chubb's essay: *The Supremacy of the Father Asserted*, London, 1715. This was succeeded by: *A Collection of Tracts on Various Subjects*, London, 1730. His most remarkable work, however, was: *The True Gospel of Jesus Christ*, London, 1738. After his death there appeared: *The Posthumous Works of Mr Thomas Chubb*, London, 1748, 2 vols.—Chubb shows us the form that deism assumed in the artisan class. His contemporary, HENRY SAINT JOHN, Viscount BOLINGBROKE (1st Oct., 1698, to 15th Dec., 1751), stood at the opposite extreme. A strict Puritan education had inspired him with a hatred of positive religion, similar to that which the leaders of the Enlightenment in France, to be treated of immediately, had imbibed in the Jesuit colleges. Even from his writings on the study of history, published during his life-time, and still more from the essays that appeared after his death (*The Philosophical Works of the Right Honourable Henry St. John, Lord Viscount Bolingbroke, etc.*, published by David Mallet, Esq., London, 1754. 5 vols.), it is abundantly clear that he wishes to maintain religion as a means to political ends, especially among the lower classes, and therefore censures the deists, but that, on the other hand, he regards all dogmas as simply the products of a vain philosophy and a cunning priesthood. With him, the place of religion was taken by a sensationalist theory of happiness, such as continued to be the religion of many men of the world after him. The influence of deism continued to extend through its becoming practically the religion of the Freemason lodges. The opposition between the Masonic fraternity and the order of the Jesuits was due, as many of themselves were aware, to the fact that both were equally anxious to lead the world to what each considered "the light," and that to some extent they employed the same means to do so.

Cf. Lechler: *Geschichte des englischen Deismus*. Stuttg. and Tübingen, 1841. [Leslie. Stephen: *History of English Thought in the 18th Century*. 2 vols. 1876.—Tr.]

2. It was in France that this view of life found its proper soil, and there therefore that it bore its richest fruits. A number of circumstances, not the least important among which was that association of immorality with formal attachment to the Church, which characterized the latter years of the reign of Louis XIV., and which soon afterwards made it possible for a Dubois to attain the dignity of cardinal, help us to understand why deism, when transplanted to France, is more hostile to Christianity than to any other form of positive religion. (One only needs to recall the outbreaks even of Montesquieu in his *Lettres Persanes.*) We must further take account of the circumstance already referred to, that the best schools of the time were in the hands of the Jesuits, and that the demand, uttered in the name of Christianity, to give no heed to doubts, was bound to exercise upon many of those educated there an influence similar to that exercised on Bolingbroke by his Puritan training.—It is no exaggeration of the importance of VOLTAIRE, that in France up to the present day any one who adopts the point of view of anti-Christian enlightenment, is called a Voltairian. He is really the incarnation of this view of life. Born in Paris on 21st Nov., 1694, François Marie AROUET received his early education in a Jesuit college, where, however, he was taught on lines admirably adapted to produce an ideal of frivolity. When quite a young man, he shone in the most brilliant circles of Paris; but, through a number of bitter experiences, he contracted a hatred of the Government, the Church, and the aristocracy of his native land. In this frame of mind he betook himself to England, where (1726–29) he moved entirely in the society of the deists who have just been discussed. (Before this period he had added to his own name that of VOLTAIRE, formed by an anagram from "Arouet *l. j.*" The *de* that connected the two appeared afterwards as a mark of nobility, when the name Arouet disappeared.) After his return, he published his *Philosophical Letters*, which had become well known in England in manuscript form, and were, in fact, first printed in English. There he draws the attention of his countrymen to the empiricism of Locke as opposed to the innate ideas of the Cartesians, to the enlightened deism of Bolingbroke as opposed to Catholicism and Jesuitism, and to the constitution of England as opposed to the absolute monarchy of France. The *Letters* were burned by the public executioner; but this did not make him shrink from the struggle

against limitations and prejudices. He continued it till the day of his death, and it has made his assumed name the most famous of the eighteenth century, one before which crowned heads trembled and bowed in homage. (Only the French court refused to receive him, much to his vexation.) At first he lived with the learned Marchioness du Châtelet at Cirey, in Lorraine, then he spent some time in Berlin, at the court of Frederick the Great, and finally retired to his country seat of Ferney, near Geneva, where he gathered a sort of court about himself. On May 30th, 1778, he died in Paris, "suffocated" by his triumphs. Down to the present day he is regarded by some as a god, by others as a devil. His works have been republished innumerable times. The Geneva quarto edition (1768) occupies thirty volumes, and there are fifteen volumes of correspondence besides. The edition in forty volumes that appeared at Kehl and Basle, was corrected by himself. The seventy volume Kehl edition (1785–89), which was edited by Beaumarchais and Condorcet, contains a biography of Voltaire, written by the latter. One of the best editions is Beuchot's (Paris, 1829–34, 72 vols.). Besides the *Philosophical Letters*, the most important of his writings from a philosophical point of view are: *Examen important de Mylord Bolingbroke*, 1736,: *Elemens de Philosophie de Newton*, 1738,: *Dictionnaire Philosophique*, 1764,: *Le Philosophe Ignorant*, 1767. Voltaire's hatred of Christianity, amounting ultimately to positive fanaticism, has led many to regard him as an atheist, and to deny that he had any religion at all. This is quite an untenable view; he is a deist in the sense of the English freethinkers; he is perfectly serious when he opposes more advanced and purely atheistical efforts as strenuously as he does the doctrines of the Christian faith; and he did not betray his principles when, to the horror of his admirers, he declared against the *Système de la Nature*. It is impossible to say that he is driven to take up this position by his heart, for one often feels that it is with great reluctance that Voltaire admits the existence of God. But his intellect compels him to adopt this view. He indeed denies the *consensus gentium* in regard to this doctrine; but he holds that the existence of God can be proved cosmologically, since we ourselves, and all matter in motion, must have a cause; teleologically too, for nature everywhere exhibits order adapted to an end, is art through and through, and is accordingly incapable of being understood

by those who deny final causes. Nor did Voltaire afterwards renounce his belief in the adaptation of the world to an end, even when he threw over his own optimism, and taunted Shaftesbury and Leibnitz on account of theirs. These two proofs are strengthened by the most striking one of all, the moral proof. For, without God, no hope and fear, no remorse of conscience is possible, and therefore no morality. Bayle is wrong in holding that a State of atheists could exist; if there were no God, we should be compelled to invent one. This, however, is not necessary, for all nature proclaims that a God exists. The stress laid upon the moral proof confirms Voltaire's often-repeated assertion, that his metaphysics has its root entirely in his moral philosophy; and the same thing is apparent from the fact that his ethics throws light upon what remains obscure from the purely speculative point of view. The nature of God and of the human soul, Voltaire holds to be unknowable, and yet he does not hesitate to invariably predicate justice of God, because there is a practical necessity that He should be just; similarly, he maintains the freedom of the human spirit so strongly, that this always prevents him from asserting that it is material. Here, however, just as in the case of optimism, advancing years produced a change. When the consciousness of youthful strength departed, the energetic assertion of freedom departed too. On the other hand, he held firmly and unchangingly to the opinion that in all men there are certain irrefragable ideas of right and justice, even although this clearly led him towards the doctrine of innate ideas. It is these, too, that always force upon him again the conviction of immortality, although theoretical principles, and often his own wishes as well, declare against it. That all inquiries into these subjects lead ultimately to scepticism, he often declared, and for this very reason he was fond of calling himself *philosophe ignorant*. He denied nothing, but undermined everything.

Cf. Bungener: *Voltaire et son temps*, 2 vols. Paris, 1852. Dav. Fr. Strauss: *Voltaire*. Leipzig, 1817.

3. The men who are usually called ENCYCLOPÆDISTS, went much further than he did, but always along the way that he as their "patriarch" had prepared for them. They received their name from the fact that they addressed the public through the medium of the world-renowned *Encyclopédie*, or *Diction-*

naire Raisonné, etc. (1751–1766 in 17 volumes, which were supplemented by other 11 volumes of plates with descriptions by Diderot, 1766–1772). As the moving spirit of this undertaking has afterwards to be discussed more particularly (*vid.* § 286), we must here make mention of the second editor, Jean le Rond D'ALEMBERT (16th Nov., 1717, to 29th Oct., 1783), a man whose want of courage simply enhances the excellence of his character and makes him a genuine representative of the scepticism that went somewhat beyond Voltaire, so far as that scepticism ventured to express itself in the *Encyclopædia*. The *Discours Préliminaire*, which he wrote as an introduction to the book, is really founded upon Bacon's survey of the sciences (*vid.* § 249), but is at the same time an independent work, a great part of which, as a matter of fact, is Diderot's. What is characteristic of d'Alembert appears much more strongly in his *Essai sur les Elémens de Philosophie*, a work which was undertaken at the request of Frederick the Great, and which contains an encyclopædic review of all the sciences. As regards moral philosophy, he came forward as a champion of selfishness, but sought to prove that this found its chief account in furthering the general good. When Diderot became more and more inclined to materialism, and the attacks upon the *Encyclopædia* multiplied, d'Alembert retired from the work, as Rousseau had already done (*vid.* § 292), and followed his profession as Secretary of the *Académie Française*, a post which he held from 1772. The sceptical *Que sais-je?* became more and more his maxim. His works first appeared in 18 vols in Paris, 1805, and were afterwards published by Didot, Paris, 1821, in sixteen parts, distributed in five volumes. These editions, however, do not contain his writings on mathematical subjects, which had been brought out previously in eight quarto volumes (Paris, 1761–80). Others who assisted in the production of the *Encyclopædia* were Daubenton, Marmontel, Leblond, Lemonnier, Duclos, Jaucourt, and so on. Many of them went far beyond the scepticism of d'Alembert, but did not venture to express this openly in the *Encyclopædia*. Such was the case especially with Diderot. In the article "*Encyclopédie*," he has described the artifices one had to employ in order to say the boldest things with security; and he does so in much the same words as Chaumeix had used in reproaching the Encyclopædists with want of honesty. The effect of the *Encyclopædia*, of which thirty thousand copies were printed in the first instance, and of

which there were four foreign translations as early as 1774, was immense. With high and low it became a text-book and an adviser, and served on the one hand to spread among all, knowledge that had hitherto been the exclusive property of certain professional circles, but, on the other hand, to undermine the already severely shaken reverence for established institutions. The effect of the former process was to produce that outward similarity of opinions and points of view which is called widely diffused culture; the result of the latter was, that in a short time everywhere, from the court down to the grocery stores, what had hitherto been looked upon as sacred and unassailable, was regarded as antiquated prejudice.

4. Two years before the appearance of the first volume of the *Encyclopædia*, Georges Louis Leclerc, Monsieur (afterwards Comte) de BUFFON (17th Sept., 1707, to 16th April, 1788) had begun to publish his gigantic work: *Histoire Naturelle Générale et Particulière.* The thirty-sixth volume of this appeared in the last year of his life, and seven other supplementary volumes were afterwards issued (1789). The circle of readers of this work was identical with that in which the *Encyclopædia* was so popular; for not merely was he brought into relations with its editors through his friend and colleague Daubenton, but it was an open secret that his ideas were pretty much the same as theirs, and that it was only as a precautionary measure that, especially since his dispute with the Sorbonne, he said "creator" where he would have much preferred to say "power of nature." (This anti-religious tendency is one of the many contrasts between him and Linnæus—between the greatest foe of system and the greatest system-maker among students of nature.) Buffon's theory of organic molecules, which allowed the reader, as it were, to observe nature in her silent process of creation, gave to many whom the reading of the *Encyclopædia* had deprived of what their hearts clung to, a sort of support by the worship of nature to which it invited them. Besides, the author of the *Natural History* was acknowledged to have a better style than any writer of his time, and his book was read, just as Bossuet's *Universal History* had been, as providing a pattern of the most elegant French. It is, therefore, easy to understand that a tendency to extreme naturalism always kept extending the sphere of its influence. A very important element in this movement was the salons of Paris, which became for the

Enlightenment in France very much what the lodges of Freemasons had become for English deism. Their influence was not limited to Paris, nor even to France. For the courts of Europe were kept informed, often by agents of their own, of what was said and done in the salon of Mme. Tencin, the unnatural mother who had caused her illegitimate son d'Alembert to be exposed, of Mme. Géoffrin, of du Deffand, of Mlle. l'Espinasse, of Mme. d'Epinay, of Mlle. Quinauld, of Messieurs de Holbach and Helvetius, and of others. Further, manuscript works hostile to religion, to the State, and to morality, which had been read aloud in these salons, were circulated in copies at the courts. In short, we can see how right C. F. Schlosser was in laying so much stress upon the significance of these salons for the history of thought, an example which has been followed by all who since his day have written upon the eighteenth century.

5. Among the works described here, that of J. B. Robinet (1735, to 24th Jan., 1820), *De la Nature*, occupies quite a peculiar position. The first four parts, which go to make up the first volume, appeared at Amsterdam in 1761, and were not merely several times reprinted in France, but were so much sought after that a second edition was necessary as early as 1763. This was enlarged by a second volume, containing the fifth part, which exceeds the first four in bulk and contains a criticism of the idea of God. (I am not aware whether the sixth part, which Robinet announces, ever appeared.) The *First Part* is an attack on optimism and pessimism alike, inasmuch as it makes the law of compensation, in virtue of which the rise and fall in the oscillation of a pendulum are equal to each other, a universal law of the world. In the whole, as in the individual, good is always counterbalanced by an equivalent amount of evil, death corresponds to birth, slow decay to slow growth. Unless, which would be impossible, God willed to commit an absurdity, He could not have made a world with a less amount of evil in it. In this balance of truth and error, etc., consists the beauty and harmony of the world. But it is quite easy to combine with it a graduated series of existences. The more perfect is that in which both factors show themselves in a higher degree. At the same time, emphasis is always laid upon the point that in nature the really permanent element is not the individuals but the classes. In the *Second Part*, he goes on to speak of the *génération uniforme*

des êtres, and there a great affinity to Buffon's organic molecules is traceable. In the spermatozoa discovered by Leuwenhoeck he sees combinations of the primitive germs, the animated atoms, which are themselves endowed with the nature of the beings they go to compose. The means by which these are brought together, is the distinction of sexes, which is manifest even in the simple germ. Not merely animals and plants, but metals also, are begotten, just as the stars too are begotten, grow, and decay. Here the inquiry breaks off somewhat abruptly, and passes on in the *Third Part* to the moral instinct. Hutcheson is praised as the thinker who first made a sense the basis of morality, Hume as the one who determined more exactly what corresponds to this sense. Both, however, had forgotten that every sense must have an organ, and that we must therefore assume special brain fibres for moral beauty and repulsiveness, just as for colours and sounds. These are probably more intimately connected with the higher senses, since only what we see and hear, not what we smell and taste, raises moral approval or disapproval. As the higher senses are refined and ennobled by the arts, so is the moral sense by society. The *Fourth Part*, which treats of the *physique des esprits*, states the laws according to which, in the germ as well as in the higher development, internal and external processes go hand-in-hand; and teaches that the nature of the soul must not be made to consist in thought, but in that principle from which, on development, thought is produced. Whether this is a material principle or not, is unknown to us. The *Fifth Part*, which was written later, supplements and corrects the idea of God held by Locke, whose philosophy, he declares, stands in the same relation to that of Descartes and Malebranche as history does to a romance. As we have no idea of the infinite, all attributes predicated of God are instances of anthropomorphism. If we would be rid of this, we must refuse to predicate of God, not merely finitude, but also goodness, wisdom, thought, and so on, since all of these are merely human, and cannot be conceived of without a body. The only resource left is to assign to God purely negative attributes, *i.e.* to acknowledge that we do not understand Him. Even the term "spirit" we can apply to God only in the sense that He is not corporeal; it is quite illegitimate to do as Locke did, and draw all kinds of positive conclusions in regard to God, from the constitution of our own

spirit or mind. The first cause, whose existence we are bound to take for granted, is absolutely unknown to us. Thus, although he pushes the theory that all mental phenomena are physically conditioned, so far as to assume that there are moral fibres of the brain, that is, farther than almost any one else did, Robinet does not do away with the unknown cause of the universe. Compared with what we shall have to consider immediately, this has been called half-heartedness. The explanation is, that he observed organic processes, as well as physical phenomena, much more carefully than most of his contemporaries did, and therefore often saw a great gap where they hardly noticed any difference. Robinet is more thorough and more serious than most of those to whom he was intellectually allied; but because with him "*esprit*" falls into the background before the solidity of his investigations, he has been forgotten as a pedant or a coward. And yet, after Condillac and Diderot, this thinker, who stood midway between the two, was possibly the shrewdest intellect that France produced at this time.

E.—MATERIALISM.

§ 286.

DIDEROT, LAMETTRIE, HOLBACH.

1. DENIS DIDEROT (5th Oct., 1713 to 30th July, 1784), when a boy, had a great wish to enter the Church; he was trained to be a lawyer; and he ultimately found that his true profession was that of an independent author. We have nothing to do with what he achieved as a dramatist and as a novelist. His philosophical training he owes to the reading of English philosophers; among his countrymen, Bayle exercised the greatest influence upon him. At first he maintained himself by translations from the English. The transition to original work is marked by his free rendering of Shaftesbury's *Virtue and Merit*, which appeared in 1745. At this time he was a sincere theist, and did not doubt the possibility of a revelation. He occupied a different position two years later, when he wrote his *Promenade d'un Sceptique*. This was confiscated before it was printed, and was published for the first time after his death in the fourth volume of the *Mémoires, Correspondance, et Ouvrages inédits de Diderot* (Paris, 1830, 4 vols.).

With him, however, doubt appears only as the point from which he passes first to what he himself calls deism, in contrast to theism, and finally to downright atheism and materialism. The *Pensées Philosophiques*, which appeared in 1748, and were burned by order of the Parliament, the *Lettre sur les Aveugles*, 1749, that *Sur les Sourds et Muets*, 1751, and lastly the *Interprétation de la Nature*, 1753, show how quickly these three stages succeeded one another. The articles in the *Encyclopædia*, of which he was sole editor from the seventh volume onwards, continued to be written from the deistic point of view, although their author had passed beyond it. They are all the less reliable as indications of Diderot's own opinions, from the fact that the printer, through fear of prosecution, made alterations in the manuscript on his own responsibility. Diderot's atheism comes out most openly in the *Interprétation de la Nature* and in the *Conversation with d'Alembert*, which first became known in the *Mémoires* referred to above, and its sequel, *d'Alembert's Dream*. Here he develops his theory (Buffon's) of living molecules, the union and separation of which produce the material transformation or life of the universe; here is found his reduction of all psychology to physiology of the nerves; here, too, his arguments against freedom and immortality, if by the latter is understood anything more than survival in the memory of others and in reputation; and here his gibes against those who assume the existence of a personal God, and do not believe that the great musical instrument we call the world, plays itself. Naturally Diderot's change of opinions in speculative philosophy was accompanied by an analogous change in regard to practical philosophy. The connection between morality and religion, which is maintained in his first work, is soon broken; and the spring of action is found to lie simply in human nature, especially as manifested in the passions, without which nothing great is accomplished. These, however, he believes to have the character of unselfishness and to make, not for their own, but for the general good. Ultimately, as his materialism becomes more advanced and consistent, all determinations of merit become more lax, virtues and vices are transformed into fortunate and unfortunate predispositions, and so on. It must, however, be admitted that it is just at this point that Diderot holds most closely by his original opinions, and does not proceed to the most extreme deductions. For instance, he

speaks strongly against Helvetius and angrily against Lamettrie. In fact, as Rosenkranz well puts it in his admirable monograph, he never escapes from the contradiction that he is a realist in metaphysics and an idealist in ethics. Diderot wrote nothing original on legal and political philosophy, for the socialistic *Code de la Nature*, which is usually found in editions of his collected works, is not by him, but by the Abbé Morelly. But scattered expressions show us what his opinions on despotism were, and how he classed priests and princes together.—An edition (very incomplete) of Diderot's works appeared in London as early as 1783. Afterwards his friend and pupil Naigeon prepared a much more complete one (Paris, 1798; 15 vols.), in which, however, the editor has taken some liberties with the text. Still more complete, and more faithful and better arranged besides, is the Paris edition of 1821 (22 vols.). But this also requires to be supplemented by the *Correspondance Philosophique et Critique de Grimm et Diderot* (Paris, 1829; 15 vols.), and the four volumes of *Mémoires* already referred to.

Cf. Karl Rosenkranz: *Diderot's Leben und Werke.* 2 vols. Leipzig, 1868.

2. It was, according to his own statement, through Diderot that the physician JULIEN OFFRAY DE LAMETTRIE (25th Dec., 1709, to 11th Nov., 1751) was first encouraged to become an author. His *Histoire Naturelle de l'Ame*, 1745, (certainly his most solid work), along with a satirical piece of writing against his colleagues, brought about his expulsion from France, as his *L'Homme Machine* (Leyden, 1748) did from Holland. He was then summoned to Berlin by Frederick the Great; and there, in the capacity of reader to the king, and,—as Voltaire wittily said,—court-atheist, he composed a large number of works (*Traité de la Vie Heureuse*, 1748; *L'Homme Plante*, 1748; *Reflexions sur l'Origine des Animaux*, 1750; *L'Art de Jouir*, 1751, and others). After his death, which resulted from mistaken treatment (by himself) of an attack of indigestion, these were partly reprinted in his *Œuvres Philosophiques*, London (*i.e.* Berlin), 1751, 4to, and subsequently, to mention only one other edition, Berlin, 1775, 3 vols. In all of these he teaches the most thorough-going atheism and materialism, and calls religion the disturber of the peace, which keeps individuals from enjoyment and society from unity. A State of atheists pure and simple would not merely be possible, as

Bayle surmised; it would be the happiest of all. What is called mind, is a part of the body, namely the brain, which, on account of its finer muscles, gives birth to finer products than the extremities. When it ceases to be active, "*la farce est jouée!*" and the fact that it is destined to pass away, is an exhortation to us to take our pleasure while we can. Wisdom and science were probably invented only because we failed to understand the ends of our organization. The boldness with which Lamettrie proclaims that sensual enjoyment is the only motive of action, repels us strongly, inasmuch as with him it amounted to a justification of his own conduct. This, and the superficial character of his works, did not however prevent his books from being very favourably received, for they were in harmony with the feeling of the time. Frederick the Great even composed a eulogy upon him, which was read before the Academy at Berlin.

3. Nothing but the circumstance that Diderot's *Conversation with d'Alembert* was in circulation only in manuscript, can account for the sensation created by the appearance of the *Système de la Nature*, London, 1770. Every one knew that it was not really written by Mirabaud, whose name appeared on the title-page, and who had died ten years previously as secretary to the *Académie Française*. Since the publication of Grimm's literary correspondence, no doubt has existed that the author of the book was Baron von Holbach. At the same time, Diderot's posthumous works show that a great deal was borrowed word for word from him. And since Holbach may have borrowed just as much from Lagrange, Naigeon, etc., it is impossible to decide how far he was merely editor, or how far these men were merely his co-adjutors in the work. PAUL HEINRICH DIETRICH, BARON VON HOLBACH was born at Heidesheim in the Pfalz in 1721 (or 1723); he was educated in Paris, and died there 21st Feb., 1789. That he was a remarkable man, is plain from the fact that Diderot, Grimm, and the Encyclopædists entertained such a respect for him, and that their antagonist, Rousseau, took him for the model of his Herr von Wolmar. His other works are forgotten. The chief ideas elaborated in the one just mentioned are as follows: Nothing exists except matter and motion, which is inseparable from the nature of matter, and is therefore not something communicated to it. The sum of all things or of all that exists is called nature, and forms a whole, since every-

thing receives and communicates notion, or stands in causal connection. In nature there is neither purpose, nor order, nor anything of the kind, but simply necessity. Accordingly we never have to ask "To what end?" but merely "Why?" and "How?" Motion is transmitted through the tendency of things to remain in the state in which they are, as well as by the powers of attraction and of repulsion which certain things possess. These three conditions of motion are usually called by physicists resistance, attraction, and repulsion; by moralists, self-love, love, and hate. The two are exactly the same, and the difference between moral and physical arises only because the difference between visible motions of a larger sum of molecules and invisible molecular motion (*e.g.* in fermentation), is conceived of as qualitative, and the internal motion of the molecules of the brain is thus taken for something specifically different from our other motions. In this way men come to double themselves, to look upon themselves as a unity of two substances, one of which—the soul—really shows at once its utter nullity, inasmuch as it admits of nothing but negative predicates. As a matter of fact, what we call the soul is only a part of the body; it is the brain, the molecular motion of which produces what we call thought and will, combinations, that is, of the sensations produced by external impressions. It is impossible to decide whether the susceptibility to sensation is a property of all matter, so that every material particle would feel if the obstacle to this were removed (as takes place, *e.g.*, through animalization), or whether the susceptibility to sensation is bound up with the union and mixture of certain kinds of matter. Suffice it to say, that all so-called psychical processes, like the passions, which are the only motives to action, are simply a consequence of temperament, of the mixture of fluid and solid parts. As all the passions are modifications of love and hate, they are no more mental than the phenomena of falling and of contact; but they are supposed to be so, because in the one case the corporeal movements are not so visible as in the other.—As a matter of course, when man had once begun to look upon himself as a being of a twofold nature, he was bound to extend the same idea to the whole of which he is a part. He was led to this particularly by the sense of a new evil and the dread of anything of the kind. Thus arose the idea of a God distinct from the world, an idea which explains

nothing, consoles no one, makes every one anxious, and whose utter nullity is also proclaimed by the fact that it consists of pure negations. There is nothing more self-contradictory than theology, which attributes to God metaphysical qualities that remove Him as far as possible from man, and moral qualities that bring Him down to the level of a human being. True knowledge, which is the property of but a few, substitutes the force of motion for the Godhead, and the laws of nature for Divine qualities and Providence. Nor is it to be supposed that the idea of God is an innocent mistake, or perhaps even one that is necessary to keep the uneducated under control. To foster mistakes in order to keep any one under control, means simply to administer poison in order to prevent a man from misusing his strength. Deism, *i.e.* superstition, is therefore anything but harmless, for it brings with it other foolish notions, some of which are theoretically untenable, others practically pernicious. Of the former class is the dogma of freedom. This was invented because God had been invested with moral qualities, and it was necessary to justify Him in face of the existence of evil. It forgets that a world into which a new movement was introduced, would be a new world; and that therefore any one who could really do anything would be the creator of such a world, and accordingly almighty. Of the latter class is the dogma of a life beyond the grave. By drawing men away from their life here, it makes them incapable of living for the world to which they belong. Materialism has the merit of consistency, which must also be allowed to Berkeley's theory (*vid.* § 291, 5, 6), its exact opposite; and it has the further advantage of according with sound common sense and of exercising immediate beneficial effects. It frees the individual from the torturing fear of a God, and from the no less torturing reproaches of conscience and longings, both of which are entirely foreign to him who knows that everything that happens is necessary. It teaches him to enjoy present happiness, for it does not sacrifice pleasure to a chimæra. Further, there result from it the most important conclusions for the relations between individuals, and for the regulation of these: Man is to be improved, not by moral homilies, but by being made more healthy; the physician takes the place of the pastor of souls. It further teaches that interest is the sole motive to action, and shows the way in which men are to be guided—only prove to them that

it is for their advantage to do what they are asked. As it is clearly for the advantage of every one to be at peace (religion teaches men to live at enmity with one another), society will be in the best possible condition, and punishments will always become rarer where every one seeks his own advantage. These latter are inflicted, not because the criminal is free and responsible, but for the same reason that we dam up rivers, although they are neither the one nor the other.

4. The physician PIERRE JEAN GEORGE CABANIS (1758 to 5th May, 1808) occupies almost the same position with respect to the *Système de la Nature* as Buffon took up towards the Encyclopædists. His *Rapports du Physique et du Moral de l'Homme* appeared first in the *Mémoires des Instituts*, and afterwards, in 1812, as an independent work. They have been often reprinted. The chief difference between him and Holbach, apart from the great superiority that his thorough knowledge of natural science gives him, consists in his substituting not so much mechanical as chemical and organic processes for psychical ones. The brain, like the stomach, performs functions of digestion and secretion, but the nourishment it takes is impressions, and its excrements are thoughts. His maxim is, "*Les nerfs—voilà tout l'homme.*" (From a letter published after his death, we can see that at a later period he himself did not find this theory satisfactory.) Views similar to those of Cabanis were elaborated by Antoine Louis Claude, Comte Destutt de Tracy (20th July, 1754, to 10th March, 1836), especially in his *Elémens d'Idéologie* (1801–1815; 5 vols.).

5. By reducing all mental processes to refinements of bodily ones, realism had reached a point where it (*vid.* § 259) was on the verge of ceasing to be philosophy. As a matter of fact, the works which were published with a view to outbidding the *Système de la Nature*, such as *Le Bon Sens, ou Idées Naturelles opposées aux Idées Surnaturelles*, 1772 (by Holbach himself), *Le Militaire Philosophe*, *La Théologie Portative* (by Naigeon), and so on, works in which this "philosophical" age abounded, do not deserve to be called philosophical. Even an enthusiastic admirer of Holbach, like Grimm, said of the first of these that it was an exposition of atheism for chambermaids and barbers. In short, the time had arrived when men were no longer content to repeat the phrase that Diderot had had on his lips when he died, "The first step to philosophy is unbelief"; they had come to think that this was the whole of philosophy.

The development of this line of thought, however, had shown how the opposite of pantheism, when consistently carried through, was bound ultimately to become a denial of that to which alone pantheism had allowed validity, in other words, to become atheism. The development of the idealistic systems of this period will show a similar result.

SECOND DIVISION.

Idealistic Systems.

Ed. Zeller: *Geschichte der deutschen Philosophie seit Leibnitz.* Munich, 1873.

§ 287.

JUST as the realism of the eighteenth century culminated in the materialistic enlightenment of France, so the series of idealistic systems culminates in the rationalistic enlightenment of Germany. These movements cannot but present points of resemblance, since both of them look at the world from an individualist point of view; but this must not blind us to the fact that they spring from diametrically opposite systems. Nor ought we to allow the opposition between them to mislead us into expecting to find everywhere perfect correlation and entire correspondence between the two sides. On the very face of it, there is a wide and obvious difference in their development. For realism at first manifested itself only in timid attempts; such systems as were propounded were merely tentative and of no real importance; it was not until comparatively late that the names of pioneers like Locke, Hume, and Condillac came into prominence. Idealism, on the other hand, made its appearance quite suddenly, in the system of a man who developed his theory in conscious opposition, not merely to the sceptics and mystics, but also to Locke and the English moralists, and who therefore may be said to have wrought along a line that covers the work of the whole of these thinkers. In fact, he carried his idealism to a point corresponding to that stage in the development of realism which is occupied by Condillac. There is another and more important difference. In the materialistic French enlightenment we see nothing more than the development of the germs that are traceable in Locke; it takes no notice at all, or at

best only an unfriendly notice, of opposing theories (Leibnitz's, Berkeley's). It is quite otherwise with the rationalism of the German enlightenment. However much this owes to Leibnitz, he is not its only parent; few of its representatives are to be regarded as merely continuing to work out what he had suggested. The great majority of them drew their inspiration from Englishmen and Frenchmen, almost as much as from Leibnitz and Wolff. Their theories have accordingly a more eclectic and a less consistent appearance. On the other hand, they have the advantage of greater variety, and are freer from all limitations, including that of nationality. The French enlightenment never had the cosmopolitan character of the German one. This second difference in the development of the two lines of thought is not, like the first, a work of chance, the result of external circumstances. It follows from the essential nature of realism and idealism. In the former, individualism and the absolute supremacy of what is corporeal lead to the common end that all knowledge consists ultimately in impressions and perceptions (an individual thing is only apprehended by perception)—that is, to empiricism. In the latter, the deification of what is mental leads to mind being conceived of as the only source of all knowledge, that is, to rationalism or *a priori* philosophy. On the other hand, as the only reality (the mental) is here regarded as something which is individual, but which is discovered empirically, and not through thought, there is room for a possibility which has no parallel in realism. It becomes possible for an empirical idealism (Berkeley) to arise alongside of rational idealism (Leibnitz); it becomes possible for Wolff to treat psychology as *both* rational *and* empirical, and for his successors to take up towards Locke an attitude analogous at once to that adopted by Leibnitz and to that adopted by Berkeley.

A.—LEIBNITZ.

C. E. Guhrauer: *Gottfried Wilhelm Freiherr von Leibnitz.* Breslau, 1842. 2 vols.

§ 288.

1. Gottfried Wilhelm Leibnitz (or Leibniz) was born in Leipsic on June 21st (July 3rd), 1646. In 1661 he entered the University of his native town, as a student of law. Although he was at that time very young, his early passion

for reading had given him an intimate knowledge of the classics, a thorough grounding in logic, and a considerable familiarity with Scholasticism. Seldom, if ever, did such a well-read student come up to the University; and no great philosopher ever continued to be so eager for reading and so dependent upon it as did Leibnitz. Descartes, before reading a book, always thought out what its title suggested, and that in such a thorough manner that, before beginning it, he had come to a decided opinion on the subject of which it treated. Spinoza read very little, and always got his ideas from himself, without any suggestion from without. Leibnitz differed from both. Even if he had not told us, we should have known that his best ideas came to him when he was reading. Any one who is fond of discovering plagiarisms would have an easy task with Leibnitz. Sherzer increased his affection for the philosophy of the Schoolmen; J. Thomasius interested him in the history of philosophy, and his bachelor's dissertation: *De principio individui*, of the date 30th March, 1663, shows him to be a well-schooled adherent of nominalism. This was followed, especially after he had studied at Jena under Erhardt Weigel, by a period in which Bacon and Hobbes in a special degree, as well as Keppler, Galilei, Gassendi, and (though to a less extent than the others) Descartes won him over to the mathematico-mechanical view of nature, and made him an adherent of the atomic theory and a foe of final causes. The study of Taurellus, too, must belong to a very early period, and was probably resumed afterwards at Altorf. Of the dissertations that he wrote in order to obtain the Academic degree, one appeared in an enlarged form as: *De arte combinatoria*, 1660, 4to. It shows that he had been a diligent student of Lully. He was driven by a clique from his native town, and at the same time from the academic career he had previously intended to follow. A brilliant dissertation (*De casibus perplexis*) secured him the degree of Doctor of Laws at Altorf. Under the patronage of Boineburg, he now entered the service of the Elector of Mainz, where his activity, even in the sphere of literature, was chiefly directed to legal reforms and problems of civil law. He also opened up correspondence with scientific celebrities like Hobbes, Spinoza, and others. A letter to Arnauld, with reference to the *Philosophia eucharistica* (*vid. supra* § 267, 5), seems intended to prepare a friendly reception for the writer. For immediately afterwards he undertook

the journey to Paris, which was to prove such an important point in his career. He did not, indeed, succeed in his intention of distracting the mind of Louis XIV. from German affairs by getting him to undertake an expedition to Egypt, and his subsequent idea of interesting the King in his plans for a system of universal symbols also failed. But he remained in Paris for some years; and it was there, according to his own statement, that he first learned mathematics. It was there, too, that he first made a thorough study of Descartes—so thorough that he copied out some of his unprinted treatises. He turned his attention to Spinoza as well as to Descartes; and to more than his printed works, for Tschirnhausen asked permission from Spinoza to communicate to him the manuscript of the *Ethics*. For a short time these theories took such a hold upon him that his essay, *De vita beata*, assumed the form of a mosaic of Cartesian statements, and he was able to say in after life, that he had for a moment been inclined towards Spinozism. It was only for a short time; for the extracts from Plato, made at the same time, were possibly made just that he might always have the countervailing influence ready to hand. This latter purpose would be equally well served by his recollections of the Scholastic forms, which he had for some time thrown aside. It has been suggested that we ought to regard the essay, *De vita beata*, as an extract of exactly similiar character. But I should only accept this view if it were proved to me that Leibnitz was in the habit of rendering such extracts into German, French, and Latin, (as was the case with the essay in question), and of making several clean copies of them. To convince me of that, will be no easy matter. During this period, Leibnitz spent some months in England. With that exception, he remained in Paris in spite of invitations from Denmark and Hanover; and there, in 1676, he made his discovery of the differential calculus. At length he yielded to the pressure from Hanover, and entered the Hanoverian service as librarian, privy councillor, and member of the Treasury. He combined literary labours with practical work. His *Cæsarinus Furstnerus de jure suprematus*, 1677, is connected with the work he had to undertake in civil law; and the superintendence of the mines, which was part of his duty, led to his writing his *Protogæa*. Under the Catholic Duke, Johann Friedrich, as well as afterwards under his Lutheran successor, Ernst

August, Leibnitz displayed great activity in endeavouring to reconcile the various Christian confessions. To further these conciliatory efforts, he wrote the essay which, when found among his papers, was afterwards published as *Systema theologicum*, to prove that he was a Catholic (1820). His letters to Bossuet and others were directed to the same end. It was also the first occasion of his *Correspondence with Arnauld* of the years 1686–90, though philosophy afterwards came to be the chief subject of discussion. These letters to Arnauld were long supposed to be lost, but they were published in 1846 by Grotefend. It is very easy to trace in them the gradual growth of Leibnitz's theory. The first papers that announced it to a wider circle of readers, are to be found in the *Journal des Savans*. There, in particular, appeared in 1695 the *Système nouveau* (my edition, No. 35, pp. 124 *seq.*), and the explanations that followed it. In 1684 Leibnitz's connection with Berlin and his journeys thither begin, for in that year his pupil, the Princess of Hanover, married the Elector of Brandenburg, afterwards King of Prussia. A more important journey was the one which he undertook to Italy, in order to make some searches in the records. This kept him away from Hanover for three years, and resulted in the formation of close connections with Vienna, Florence, Rome, Venice, etc. In 1691 Leibnitz was also appointed librarian to the (Catholic) Duke Anton Ulrich at Wolfenbüttel. This encyclopædia of all knowledge found it possible to get through an unparalleled amount of business. After the death of the Elector Ernst August (1698) his connection with Berlin became much closer. He was at once a sort of diplomatic agent at Berlin, and president of the newly-founded Academy there. He also again entered into relations with the Imperial court. When the war of the Spanish succession began, he aided Austria with his pen, just as he wrote on behalf of Prussia, when it was elevated into a kingdom, and again when the dispute arose about inheriting the principality of Orange, and lastly when Frederick laid claim to Neuchatel. Further, it was at this time that his most important works were written. In 1704 he composed his *Nouveaux essais*, *i.e.* new essays on the subject of the human understanding. These he did not publish, because in the interval Locke, against whom they were directed, had died. To the same year belong the discourses written for the Queen

of Prussia, which were subsequently combined into the *Theodicée* (1710). The death of the Queen loosened the bond with Berlin. His journeys thither became rarer and rarer, and in 1711 ceased altogether. Henceforward, however, Vienna had a great attraction for him. Peter the Great appointed him a Russian privy councillor of justice, and, immediately afterwards, in 1712, he obtained the long-coveted post of an imperial privy councillorship. It was probably not till this time that he was made a Baron (cf. Bergmann, *Sitzungsbericht der Wiener Akademie*, 20th Jan. 1858). Till the end of September, 1714, he lived at Vienna. There his *Monadologie* was written, in 1714, for the great Prince Eugen, and probably also the *Principes de la Nature et de la Grâce*. At the same time he was busy trying to found an Academy. During his stay at Vienna his oldest patroness died, the widow of Ernst August and the mother of the deceased Queen of Prussia. Her death was followed by that of Anne of England, so that on his return he found that the Elector had left Hanover. His own wish, and that of many patriotic Englishmen, was that he should follow the new King to England; but this idea met with a reception which left no doubt of his altered position at court. At the end, his life was embittered by controversies with Clarke and other followers of Newton; and when it came to a close, on Nov. 14th, 1716, not a single one of the court dignitaries who were invited to his funeral put in an appearance. Hitherto unprinted matter by Leibnitz was published by Feller in his *Otium Hannoveranum*, etc., Leipsic, 1718; by Kortholt in *Viri illustr. G. G. Leibnitii Epistolæ ad diversos*, etc., Leipsic, 1734 and following years, 4 vols.; and by Raspe, in *Œuvres philosophiques de feu M. Leibnitz*, etc., Amst. and Leipsic, 1765, 4to. Afterwards, what had been already printed, and had appeared chiefly in sundry periodicals, was collected by the Frenchman Lud. Dutens, in *Goth. Guil. Leibnitii Opera omnia*, Genev., 1768, 6 vols. 4to, from which, however, the posthumous works just mentioned were excluded. In 1805, Feder published his *Commercii epistolici Leibnitiani specimina*, Hanover, 1805, which contain much that is of interest. Next Guhrauer brought out: *Leibnitz's deutsche Schriften*. Berlin, 1838, 2 vols. Such articles in these collections as seemed to have a philosophical interest, as well as twenty-three hitherto unprinted essays, are contained in my chronologically arranged edition of Leibnitz's (philosophical) works: *G. G.*

Leibnitii Opera philosophica, etc. Berlin, 1840, 2 vols., 4to. It is from this edition that I quote here. Unfortunately it was not until after I had published it that Sextro discovered the copies of Leibnitz's letters to Arnauld, which went astray in Paris, and which were published by Grotefend in 1846. These are included in the collected edition prepared by G. H. Pertz, which began to appear in 1845 : *Leibnitz's gesammelte Werke, herausgegeben von Pertz.* (The first series contains the historical works [4 vols.], the second the philosophical [1 vol.], the third the mathematical [7 vols.].) In 1859 Count A. Foucher de Careil, who had previously published : *Lettres et opuscules inédits de Leibniz*, Paris, 1854–57, 2 vols., began to bring out : *Œuvres de Leibniz*, etc., Paris, Didot. The sixth volume appeared in 1864. But the work is not likely to go further. The most correct edition promised to be that which was begun under the guidance of Onno Klopp (*G. W. Leibniz's Werke*, First series, 1, 2, 3, 4, Hanover, 1865 ; 5, 1866). It then came to a stand-still until 1872, when the publishers again began to print. In that year vol. 6 appeared, and in the next 7, 8, 9, containing the correspondence with the Princess Sophie. Even if it should continue to be issued, it is apparently not to go beyond the first series (historico-political). In 1875 there appeared : *Die philosophischen Schriften von Gottfr. Wilh. Leibniz, herausgegeben von C. J. Gerhardt.* First volume, Berlin, 1875. It is to be hoped that no misfortune may overtake this promising edition. [Six volumes in all of this edition have appeared up to date.—Ed.]

2. Leibnitz's often-repeated assertion that Cartesianism is only the ante-room of true philosophy, implies that it is necessary to go beyond it. Not less frequently does he describe Spinozism as a development of Cartesianism, and at the same time as a justly disparaged theory. Thus the question arises, Where must we leave Descartes, if we are not to approach too near Spinoza ? Leibnitz finds this point in the Cartesian way of conceiving the idea of substance, the logical conclusion of which is that there is only *one* substance (*Exam. de Malebr.*, p. 691) ; and accordingly he declares that a correct idea of substance is the key to philosophy. His own view is, that the nature of substance consists in self-active power, in virtue of which it contains within itself the reason of all its changes, or is "pregnant with its own future," and in individuality, which presupposes infinite plurality. It is no wonder that he is

astonished at being accused of holding the same opinions as Spinoza, whose Substance excluded all plurality, and was besides an inactive universality (*à Bourguet*, pp. 722, 720). He is never tired of commending the substantiality, *i.e.* self-activity, of individual things as the only remedy against every form of pantheism—that of Averroes, the Mystics, Spinoza, etc. These infinitely numerous simple substances, unities, powers, etc., which from 1697 he calls "monads," a name possibly borrowed from Giordano Bruno, do not come into being and do not decay (*Syst. Nouv.*, p. 125). They can only be created or destroyed, and besides them nothing exists. Leibnitz himself was for some time favourably inclined towards the atomism of Democritus, Epicurus, and Gassendi, and it was therefore all the more necessary that he should make clear to himself and his readers the difference between his monads and the atoms of these philosophers. When he boasts that his theory contains more than atomism, which is, so to speak, a beginning or introduction to it (*Lettres*, p. 699), he does so because he does not deny the teaching of the atomists, but partly accepts it, and partly goes beyond and supplements it. Like them, he maintains that the ultimate individual things are impenetrable; his "windowless" monads correspond to their "hard" atoms; both theories say that each individual substance is separated from every other, nothing can enter into it, and nothing can come out of it (*Monadol.*, p. 705); its activity, therefore, as "immanent," is contrasted with all "transition." Leibnitz is as emphatic as the atomists in maintaining the indivisibility of his monads; but while the atoms, as being extended, remain divisible at least in thought, the monads, like mathematical points, are actually indivisible, and they are distinguished from the latter by being not merely modalities, but something real. They are, therefore, metaphysical points (*Syst. Nouv.*, p. 126. *Monadol.*, p. 705). But Leibnitz goes on to attribute to the monads predicates so far removed from the atoms, that he is able to say his theory has succeeded in combining the materialism of the atomists with the idealism of Plato (*à Bayle*, p. 156). The monads have the property, not only of reality (*acte*), but of self-realization (*activité*): just as an elastic body when compressed contains its expansion in the form of impulse, so the monad contains its own future state. This activity is inseparable from its nature, and accordingly the monad is always active (*D. prim.*

phil. emend., p. 122; *Syst. Nouv.*, p. 125; *Princ. de la Nat.*, p. 714; *De ipsa nat.*, p. 157). Further, while the atoms were limited portions of existence, each monad contains, like Spinoza's substance which was *omne esse*, the whole infinity of existence within itself, is a concentrated universe, and would accordingly lose nothing if all the other monads perished, and gain nothing if they could exercise influence upon it (*à Bourguet*, p. 720; *à Bayle*, p. 187). As an absolutely separated, self-sufficient microcosm, the monad produces automatically within itself all that concerns it; and an all-seeing eye could read in its present condition its whole past and future, *i.e.*, could read in it all existence (*Monadol*, p. 706). The process by which all existence is contained in the single monad, Leibnitz has described in very different ways, and in very different words. It is especially in his correspondence with Arnauld that he tries to explain it. Just as the centre of a circle is the meeting-place of all the *radii*, and therefore contains all the central angles, so the monad contains everything or expresses (*exprime*) everything. He puts the matter in the same way against Bayle (p. 187). Instead of speaking of it as a process in virtue of which all existence is contained (not really, but ideally, to use Hegel's language) in the monad,—a process which is often described by saying that the monad is potentially everything,—Leibnitz sometimes employs the expression "mirror" (Hegel says, "appear"), and says therefore that the monads mirror everything. It must not, however, be forgotten that everything exists in each monad as the immanent activity of the monad itself, and the monad is therefore a living mirror of all existence (*Princ. d. l. Nat.*, p. 714). The commonest expression, which will be the more familiar owing to the fact that of all monads our own soul is the one we know best, is the expression "represent" (*Vorstellen*). This, however, as he repeatedly explains, does not mean "represent to oneself," for *apperceptio* is a higher stage than *perceptio*, which latter word he often interchanges with *représenter* or, as above, with *exprimer*. Since "to represent" means merely to contain *idealiter* or *potentia*, we may say in Leibnitz's phraseology that the acorn *represents* the oak; and we need not be surprised if with him percipient activity, and development or creative power mean the same thing, or, if he calls life a *principium perceptivum* (*ad Wagn.*, p. 466). Our soul, when it slumbers, has a *perception* of the world, but not an *apperception* of it (*Princ. d. l. Nat.*,

p. 715). If we call everything that manifests a percipient activity a "soul," we may call the monads by this name. But it is better to say they are soul-like beings, or still better, forms, meaning individual forms, so that we may contrast them as formal atoms with the material atoms of Democritus (*Syst. Nouv.*, p. 124). This much is certain—the monads have not nearly so much analogy with the atoms of Democritus as they have with souls, in fact with spirits, and even with God Himself. From God, however, the monads are distinguished by their activity being limited and therefore constrained; and that not by anything outside of them, but by their own nature, for everything, even when it depends for its existence on something else, is limited, so far as it is limited, by its own nature. While, therefore, the monad expresses or represents everything, or the infinite, it does so in a finite way (*ad Des Bosses*, p. 740; *à Bayle*, p. 187). God, as Leibnitz writes to Bayle on Dec. 5th, 1702, contains the universe *eminenter*, the monads, on the other hand, do so *virtualiter*. While God represents or mirrors the infinite in an infinite way, *i.e.* completely and adequately, because He is pure activity (*actus purus*), a twofold element is distinguishable in the monad,—activity and its limitation, *i.e.* passivity or constraint. It was this that suggested the comparison with an elastic body. These two elements are described in different ways, according to the various philosophical schools to which those belong whom Leibnitz is addressing. Borrowing from Descartes and Spinoza, he says that the passive element in the monad lies in its confused perceptions (*Monadol*, p. 709). Since it strives to pass from these to more distinct perceptions, it is part of its nature to have *perception et appétit* (*e.g. à Bourguet*, p. 720). For the benefit of readers trained in the philosophy of the Schoolmen, it is notable that in the course of his letters to Des Bosses, the translator of his *Théodicée*, the two elements of activity and passivity are called *forma substantialis* or *entelechia*, and *materia* (*prima*). From the latter, God Himself has not the power to free the monads. They may therefore be called material souls, an expression which corresponds to the name formal atoms, already applied to them (*Syst. Nouv.*, p. 125). Leibnitz did not require to state expressly that *materia prima* was exactly the same as *perceptions confuses* (*e.g. à Montmort*, p. 725), and that God was *actus purus*. There could have been no doubt upon the point, since God has no confused per-

ceptions, and is neither material nor passive. Since it is thus possible to distinguish two elements in the monad, Leibnitz often says that the atomic theory is insufficient. We must go back to the much-abused substantial forms, and combine these, as a supplement, with the atoms. He calls this a supplementing of the physics of the atomists by a metaphysical principle, possibly because he remembers that Bacon (*vid.* § 249, 3) had assigned the material principle to physics and the forms to metaphysics. If final causes also be regarded as belonging to metaphysics, it is easy to understand Leibnitz's writing in his correspondence with Arnauld (*Disc. de Metaph.*, p. 22, ed. Grotef.), that his theory combined that of efficient causes with teleology. In each monad the infinity of existence manifests itself in a definite, finite way, and therefore activity and passivity appear united in a definite way. Accordingly, no one monad is exactly like another. There are no two things absolutely similar (*indiscernibilia*). Each monad mirrors existence in its own particular way and from its own peculiar point of view (*Syst. Nouv.*, p. 127). This variety cannot be admitted by the atomists, inasmuch as they assign to the atoms nothing but the property of being material. Nor would it exist at all, if the monad were pure activity. It is therefore caused simply by the limitation of the activity of the monad, and individual difference and peculiarity have their root in confused perceptions. Since the monads are in this way mutually exclusive, the *materia prima* is naturally the *vis passiva resistendi* (*De ipsa nat.*, p. 157). But this is not all. Every monad mirrors or concentrates in itself the infinity of existence, *i.e.* the same thing; each, however, does so in a different way. Thus, in spite of the variety, there exists an agreement which Leibnitz calls "*accord*," "*concomitance*," and at a later period always "*harmony*." Accordingly, although there can be neither influence nor mutual interaction between the monads, the sharp-seeing eye, already referred to, could not merely read in each monad (backwards and forwards) what was in it, but also (sideways) what is, was, and will be in all monads. Just as mirrors placed round a market-place never contradict one another, although the reflection in each is different, so it is with the living mirrors of the world. This harmony, variety in unity, has thus its condition in the limitations of the monads, their confused perceptions, or their *materia* (*prima*). This forms the connection between them. Without it, the monads would

indeed be gods, but would be isolated, would stand outside the universe, as if they had deserted it (*Monad.*, p. 709, *Théod.* p. 537, *Princ. de Vie*, p. 432). Harmony, as being unity in difference, is a manifestation of the great law of nature, which likewise results from the idea of the monad, that *lex continui* which Leibnitz laments to see too much neglected in the sciences. The law may be expressed as follows: "There are no absolute differences, but merely relative and gradual ones." It follows from this, that the first principles (*differentiæ*) of things are themselves separated only by gradual distinctions, and mirror the universe more or less clearly. This law of continuity, which often makes Leibnitz declare that things are everywhere as they are with us, excludes as an absurdity every abrupt transition (*saltus*), as well as every gap (*hiatus, vacuum*), and substitutes development for change. It does so in the case of the individual. No motion can arise except as a consequence of a motion that has gone before, no idea except as a result of a preceding idea. It does so also in the case of the whole. Here it requires us to conceive of all oppositions as relative, of rest as infinitesimal motion, of the parabola and the circle as ellipses with an infinitely great or an infinitely small space between the foci, of what is coherent as fluid, of what is fluid as coherent, of birth as evolution, of death as involution. Further, we must assume that there is nowhere a *vacuum formarum*, and we must believe that there are beings intermediate between animals and plants, genii that belong to a higher order than men, and so on (*à Bayle*, pp. 104, 105; *Nouv. Syst.*, p. 125; *Nouv. Ess.*, p. 392; *Princ. de Vie*, p. 432; *To Wagner*, p. 467). The monads, therefore, form a continuous and quite gradually ascending series, from the lowest, which stands nearest to nothing, to the highest, so that no two occur which occupy exactly the same place. What Thomas Aquinas had said of pure intelligences (§ 203, 5), is extended by Leibnitz to every monad; it is unique of its kind, and the number of grades in the series is infinite (*Princ. d. l. Nat.*, p. 715). In spite of this, Leibnitz lays down certain main divisions, depending upon the principal varieties of representative activity which we can distinguish by introspection. We are justified in drawing conclusions with regard to the other monads from this introspection, because the lower is always contained in the higher, and there is no condition beneath the human which would not fall

within human experience, and therefore be capable of being recognised by men. There are within us, in the first place, perceptions which are so obscure that we cannot distinguish them either from one another or from ourselves, as, for example, those which occur in deep sleep or in unconsciousness produced by turning rapidly round and round; in the second place, those which are clear compared with the foregoing, as, for example, the sensation of green, but which are still indistinct or confused because we cannot describe them to one who has been born blind, and because we do not even know that the green we see is a mixture of blue and yellow; in the last place, those which are distinct, and which we can communicate to others by defining them. (These distinctions occur in Descartes, and in the *Art de Penser.*) Similarly, we can distinguish, in the first place, monads that never get beyond the lowest grade of perceptions, and these may be called sleeping or bare monads; in the second place, those which attain to clear perceptions, and these would be souls; in the last place, those which, besides obscure and clear (but confused) perceptions, have also distinct ones, and these we call spirits (*Medit. de cogn.*, p. 75; *Monad.*, p. 706). Of course, within these main divisions there are an infinite number of grades. Leibnitz, for example, never doubts of the existence of superhuman genii, into which men are perhaps transformed after death (*Princ. de Vie*, p. 431; *To Wagner*, p. 466). If we pass up from stage to stage, all grades of monads ultimately point to one, in which all that is material, *i.e.*, all that is confused, disappears, because it perceives everything with perfect clearness, and is present directly in everything alike (*Princ. d. l. Nat.*, p. 717). This primitive, highest monad is God (*à Montmort*, p. 725; *ad Bierling*, p. 678). As we have said that He is free from what was previously recognised as the bond between the monads, He must, of course, be described as without, beside, and above the world (*De rer. orig.*, p. 147; *To Clarke*, p. 749); and He must certainly not be conceived of as an (immanent) soul of the world, or as a world-Ego. With Him must be contrasted, not, as has been supposed, matter, but nothingness. Matter is something between the two; indeed, Leibnitz (thinking perhaps of Campanella, perhaps, too, as is more likely, of Descartes) calls it a product of both (*Sur l'Espr. Univ.*, p. 182). God is the cause and creator of the monads, and, since harmony resulted from their essential

nature, the cause why this harmony exists: In its relation to God, harmony becomes something predetermined by God, and the expression *Système de l'Harmonie* PRÉÉTABLIE has been since 1696 the recognised name for the system of Leibnitz.

3. It is only of the existence of the monads and of their harmony that God (generally at least) is said to be the cause. Their essence (*essentia*) and even their possibility (conceivability) is an eternal verity which, like all eternal verities, has its abode in the Divine wisdom as the *regio idearum*, but is no more dependent upon the Divine will than this abode itself is. Even if nothing at all existed, the monads would still be possible. According to the familiar Aristotelian principle, they can be brought into existence only by a being that already exists. Further, this must not be one whose existence like theirs is an extension of possibility, but God, whose existence is due to His own possibility. The transition from the possibility of the monads to their actual existence may be called, with reference to Leibnitz's own terminology, a transition from his *metaphysics* to his *physics*. His essay of 1697, *De rerum originatione radicali* (pp. 147 *seq.*), is particularly important on this point. Here, as elsewhere, Leibnitz makes use of what he calls sometimes *principium rationis sufficientis*, sometimes *principium melioris*. In this case he expresses it as follows: "All that is possible has a claim to existence in proportion to its perfection." In other places he puts it more shortly: "Nothing happens without a cause (*i.e.*, an end)." All the infinite number of conceivable monads and combinations of monads press forward to come into existence; and absolutely no change takes place in their essential nature when they are brought from the *regio idearum* into actual existence (*à Clarke*, p. 763). Now comes to pass what happens in the analogous case where motive powers are at work on a single body in different directions. The result in this latter instance is the direction in which the maximum of motion is exercised; in the other process, which is at once metaphysical and mechanical, it is the greatest possible sum of reality or of perfection. (This comparison of perfection with reality warns us against taking Leibnitz's theory in a more ethical sense than it was intended to have. If, as late as 1714, he writes to Wolff, who had asked him for a definition of perfection: *Perfectio est gradus realitatis positivæ, vel quod eodem redit in-*

tclligibilitatis affirmativæ, and if he subsequently puts perfection on the same level as universality and regularity, because an exception is something negative, and only a rule is really an *observabile*, it is quite clear that Leibnitz approaches very near the purely logical conception of perfection entertained by Descartes and Spinoza [cf. § 272, 3].) Since that mechanical process goes forward within the knowledge of God, this comes to the same thing as saying that God compares the possible combinations and chooses the most perfect one. In this it may, indeed must, happen that less perfect things are chosen, instead of one thing which, taken by itself, would be perfect, but whose existence can only be purchased by a multitude of imperfections. In the same way, perfectly similar things are conceivable; but they never actually exist. For, if both were made actual, there would be no reason why one should be in one place and the other in another; and if only one of them were made actual, there would be no reason why that one should be chosen; and therefore God makes neither of them actual, and there never exist two things absolutely alike (*Ibid.*, pp. 755, 756). Not everything which is conceivable (*possible*), is for that reason compatible with everything else (*compossible*) (*à Bourguet*, pp. 718, 719). It was through confusing these two ideas that Averroës and Spinoza reached the erroneous principle that all that is possible becomes actual. This is true only of what is *compossible*. The sum of all that is *compossible*, and therefore exists, we call the world. That it must be unique is obvious (*Théod*, p. 506). Equally obvious is it that it is the best. It is not the best because God has chosen it, but God has chosen it because it is the best. That the sum of all existing monads, each of which is pregnant with its own future, also contains within itself all its future conditions; that there can be no omission or gap in the sum, the real world, any more than in the ideal world; that, for this very reason, everything happens from (not metaphysical, but moral) necessity, since its opposite is conceivable, but incompatible, *i.e.* impossible, —all of this goes without saying. If we pass now from the general idea of the world to that of its elements, the first question that arises is, How does Leibnitz conceive of corporeal things? Of course, as there is nothing real except the monads, body must consist of them. A body, therefore, or even the whole mass of bodies (*materia secunda*), is an aggregate of substances. It is, then, no more substance than is

the *materia prima*, but for the opposite reason. The latter was only one side of substance, *i.e.* something imperfect. The former, again, is composed of many substances. It is not *substantia*, but *substantiæ*, and, though it is regarded as a substance, it is only a *substantiatum* (*ad Des Bosses*, p. 440; *à Montmort*, p. 736). Such a combination of non-extended simple substances becomes extended through our perception of it, which is confused. We see the milky way or a cloud of dust as *continua*, because our eye is not sharp enough to distinguish clearly the individual stars or particles of dust. Similarly, through our confused perception of a number of simple things, there arise within us, in the first place, those *entia mentalia*, space, extension, which are no more real than time is, but are mere *ordines coexistendi* (*à Bayle*, p. 159; *à Clarke*, *passim*), and in the second place, extended bodies, which must be called *entia semimentalia*, *phænomena bene fundata*, because, like the rainbow, they have a real cause, though they only assume the form in which they appear to us, through our confused perception of them. (Particularly the letters to Des Bosses.) Just as the presence of another eye increases the number of the rainbows without a drop of water being added, so, in order to make the number of bodies larger, God only requires to raise some monads to the level of souls with a power of apperception. Bodies, therefore, are combinations of monads viewed as extended. They are phenomenal. Like them, motion too, or successive change of position, is a phenomenon, an appearance (*De phæn. real.*, p. 444; *à Bayle*, p. 159). The phenomena of bodies in motion, which are distinguished from our dreams by their conformity to laws, are therefore most assuredly not real in the aspect in which we view them; and what we ought to say is, that the phenomenon of a collision of bodies is always followed by the phenomenon of a combined motion. Instead of this, Leibnitz uses the language of those who see in motion a reality, saying that the modification of the motion is the result of the collision; and he puts forward as an excuse the fact that even a Copernican speaks of sunrise (*ad Des Bosses*, p. 435). But further, just as the phenomenon of greater or less extension has its ultimate ground in the real distinction between a larger or smaller number of monads simultaneously perceived, so too more or less motion will manifest itself according as the phenomenon is occasioned by more or less of motive power and its effect. It must not, however, be forgotten, that exactly

as two bullets, when melted into one, produce certainly a larger surface, but not one equal to the sum of the two previous surfaces, so the motion is not to be regarded as the measure of the motive power, or as at all equivalent to it. This is the great mistake of Descartes, whose fundamental law, that the sum of motions always remains the same, is very easily disproved by experiment. For, if it were true, a *perpetuum mobile* would present no difficulty. What remains always constant is only the sum of the motive power, further, as readily results from this, the activity of that power, the *action motrice*, and lastly, what Descartes seems to deny when he attributes to the soul the power of directing the body (§ 267, 7), the sum of the directions in which the power works (*ad Bernoull.*, p. 108; *Théod.*, p. 520). Since all conditions of bodies proceed from the activity of the motive power, it is perfectly justifiable to treat all corporeal processes, even such as are organic, from a mechanical point of view. Only it must not be forgotten that the ultimate ground of those fundamental mechanical laws lies in their being adapted to an end, so that they themselves can only be proved teleologically. The only true point in the polemic against all teleology is, that, in considering individual phenomena, one must not be too ready to pass over the (intermediate) causes that bring about the effect mechanically. On the other hand, to confine oneself absolutely to efficient causes, means to render impossible the understanding, not merely of what these depend upon, but also of many particular phenomena.

4. There may be an aggregate of monads in which one mirrors all the others in various degrees, but much more clearly than each of these represents its own condition and that of its neighbours. If so, there is in this aggregate a repetition to some extent of the relation between the two elements constituting substance. All the rest taken together are called *materia* (*secunda*, to distinguish them from the remaining monad), or body; the monad that perceives more clearly is called the entelechy of the body, which is itself said to be a living thing and, if its entelechy be a soul capable of sensation, an animal (*Monadol.*, p. 710). This connection, however, does not alter the fact that it is impossible for the one monad to exert anything but a purely ideal influence upon the others (*Monadol.*, p. 709). Further, the relation of soul and body can only be a harmony between the two, in which the motions pro-

duced by the automatically working body correspond exactly to the ideas that the spiritual automaton calls forth from within itself (*Monadol.*, p. 711). Nor is it necessary to have recourse to the desperate expedient of a continual miracle, which the Occasionalists adopt (*Théod.*, p. 521). We can, however, speak of a controlling and many controlled monads, of an active and many passive monads, if by the former we understand that one in which the cause of all the changes of the whole may be read more clearly than in any of the others, and by passivity, on the other hand (like Descartes and Spinoza), simply obscure and confused perception. Leibnitz is never tired of contrasting his own view with the common doctrine that the body exercises an *influxus* upon the soul, and conversely, as well as with that of the Occasionalists, which assumes that a continual miracle is being performed. His own theory is, that body and soul stand to one another in the relation of two clocks that keep good time. Their dials always indicate the same thing, although there is no real connection between them and no interference from without. Here, too, he goes on to emphasize the fact that this harmony is determined by God; and thus it happens that where Leibnitz speaks of pre-established harmony, he only means, as a general rule, that between body and soul, not that of the universe. Like every other, the animated body is never at rest. Rather, new monads are continually passing into it, others passing out of it. It presents a constant picture of change, like a river or a waterfall, or the ship of Theseus, that was always kept in repair (*Nouv. Ess.*, p. 278). And this change is mirrored in the soul that controls it. But a real metempsychosis, a sudden separation from one heap of monads and association with another, is a breach of continuity and therefore impossible (*Monadol.*, p. 711). Nor is a complete separation of body from soul any more possible (*Princ. de Vie*, p. 432). Rather, as birth is an unfolding of the already animated germ, so death may be a folding up into a condition analogous to the germ. But Leibnitz will not hear of the soul being connected with any definite part of the body (*Nouv. Ess.*, p. 278). It appears as if, even in their very earliest state, the monads from which human souls are developed, differ from all others, although it cannot be said that it is inconceivable that promotion to this higher rank takes place (*Théod.*, p. 527). The fact of their being under the control of one monad shows

clearly, since the harmony existing between the others has become in it something felt or even known, that the union is more intimate than that between the water-drops of a rainbow. A living body, therefore, evidently approximates more to a *unum per se* than does a dead one, which is a mere *unum per accidens*. Leibnitz cannot help admitting this. It is chiefly in his correspondence with Arnauld and with Père Des Bosses that such expressions occur as, that living things are more than mere phenomena; that there is here an additional element that transforms them into something real, a *realizans*, which, in the letters to Des Bosses, is called a *vinculum substantiale;* that on this account, while every mere body is *substantiæ*, or a *substantiatum*, a living body is also a *substantia* (*composita*). The occurrence of these and many similar expressions in those two sets of letters, in which the question of the Eucharist is always put in the foreground, have led many to the too hasty conclusion that this whole theory is nothing but a concession to the Catholic dogma. It is forgotten, that with Leibnitz the real presence of the body of Christ in the Sacrament was a matter of deep personal interest, and, what is still more important, that, quite apart from this question, he speaks elsewhere of the controlling monad being *centre d'une substance composée* and *principe de son unicité* (*Princ. de la Nat.*, p. 714); and on July 9th, 1711, writes to Wolff: "There are as many substances (*i.e.* composite substances) as there are organic bodies; inorganic bodies, on the other hand, as well as the fragments of an organism, are merely aggregates, merely phenomena." It was probably to a very large extent the firm hold he kept of the law of continuity and analogy, that led him to see in the relation between the two elements that constitute (simple) substance, the differential coefficient, so to say, of the relation between body and soul; in fact, that often makes him treat *materia prima* as the differential of the body, and *entelechia prima* as that of the soul, when he says that the former is the unity of the one, the latter of the other side, of all the elements of the living thing (p. 680). If, however, this analogy between the individual monad and the living thing be maintained, not merely does the latter become something that is really of the nature of substance, but conversely, we shall now be able to look in every individual monad for the germ of what is peculiar to the living thing. This (retrogressive) analogy, which leads to the posi-

tion that monads are corporeal, is all the more readily suggested because *materia prima* and *materia secunda* both depend upon the confusion of perceptions—the former upon that which belongs to the monads themselves, the latter upon that which belongs to him who observes them. If this distinction be forgotten, even Leibnitz himself may speak frequently, *e.g.* against Cudworth, exactly as if not merely *materia prima* but also a corporeal nature belonged to the individual monad. Leibnitz's theory certainly appears more comprehensive and more consistent if we leave out of account all the statements that affirm the substantial nature of a composite body or the possibility of a *substantia corporea*, *i.e.* of a *substance composée*, if bodies are conceived of as phenomena simply (as he always maintains that those beneath the animal stage are), and if nothing is said of the monads being corporeal, but always only of their being material. But no exposition of any system has a right to make it more consistent than it really is, although those who expound Leibnitz have taken this liberty. Most of them do so in the manner indicated, and omit, or at best pass lightly over, everything that does not accord with the view that bodies are merely phenomenal. To such an extent is this customary, that many regard it as obviously correct, and have not noticed the difference between these partial expositions of Leibnitz's theory and the one given by Kuno Fischer. He starts from a point diametrically opposite, and begins by asserting that every monad is an animated body. Reasoning from this, he says of every animated body, whether plant or animal, that Leibnitz sees in it a monad. In spite of the ability with which this is elaborated, it is only made possible by sacrificing, to an unwarranted extent, the letter of Leibnitz to the spirit. In treating of *substance composée*, *vinculum substantiale*, and pre-established harmony (2nd ed., p. 389), Fischer expressly states that the question merely relates to the elements in each single monad, not to the mutual relations between the monads. In saying so, he overlooked the fact that Leibnitz *never* introduces those conceptions except when he is dealing with the relation of a controlling monad to an aggregate of lower monads. Fischer's way of looking at the matter is wrong. But his error is like one of Bentley's. There is more to be learned from it than from ten expositions that are more nearly correct.

5. Closely connected with the biological theories we have

been considering, are those on mental philosophy, which nowadays are comprised under the name psychology, but which Leibnitz called *Pneumatics*. This subject is discussed principally in the four posthumous books of *Nouveaux Essais*, etc. (pp. 194–418), which criticize Locke's *Essay* chapter by chapter. (In what follows, exact references will be given only in the case of statements made elsewhere than in this work.) The human soul, too, is a monad, but it is distinguished from the soul of the lower animals by the very fact that the body it controls is a much more delicately organized machine than the bodies of the lower animals. A more important difference, however, is that its perceptions are clear. It can distinguish them from each other and from itself; and in this way it becomes conscious, is for itself what the other monads were for the eye that observed them, or, reflects its own activity (*Princ. de la Nat.*, p. 715). By means of this reflexive activity the mere individual is transformed into a person, the self into an Ego; the creature of nature becomes an integral part of the moral world, in short, the soul becomes a spirit. In this latter stage, perception is changed into thought and knowledge, effort into will. Confining ourselves for the present to the former of these, the speculative aspect of mind, we see that in spite of this advance we are not to assume any breach of continuity or any *vacuum formarum* between animal perception and human perception. For the former, by the help of memory, can rise to a power of association, in virtue of which it appears to us intelligent. Now, the human mind, wherever it is under the guidance of mere experience, that is, during a great part of its existence, is on exactly the same level. Only, the mind contains the groundwork of a knowledge based upon principles, which is not the case with the lower animals. These principles, therefore, are innate in the mind as a groundwork; and Locke's figure of a *tabula rasa* is misleading, besides being inconsistent with the ideas drawn from reflection, which he himself postulates. His Peripatetic aphorism: *Nihil est in intellectu*, etc., must be supplemented by the additional clause: *excipe nisi ipse intellectus*. Nor is Descartes' doctrine of innate ideas correct. According to his view, nothing exists in the mind except that of which it is clearly conscious, while as a matter of fact those principles are contained in the mind *virtualiter*, and do not come into consciousness until they develop themselves automatically from this groundwork. If

we alter Descartes' expression in this sense, we must say that, as nothing can enter into the soul (inasmuch as it is monad), all ideas are innate in it, that is, drawn from the innate groundwork and activity of the soul. This is true even of sensations; and Locke's theory of secondary qualities is a virtual acknowledgment that sensations are really thoughts. (It is interesting to recall the way in which Condillac subsequently reverses this statement, *vid.* § 283, 4.) The unconscious, infinitely small, or obscure perceptions from which consciousness first proceeds, are, according to Leibnitz, quite as important for "pneumatics" as the small corpuscules are for physics; and even less attention is paid to them than to the latter. This statement he justifies by his claim to have explained through them the harmony between the material and the moral world, the kingdom of nature and of grace. By the monads being conceived of as percipient powers, the elements of the material world were raised into close proximity with things spiritual. Similarly, by means of its obscure, unconscious perceptions, the mind stretches down into the material world, and the continuity of the two worlds is assured. Just as the individual constitution of the bare monads lay in the element of limitation, the *materia prima*, so here too the ultimate ground of individuality is made to consist in these unconscious perceptions, *i.e.* the obscure side of the life of the soul. Genius, disposition, feeling, are the words employed by a later generation to describe what Leibnitz calls the *je ne sais quoi*, through which each one is by nature moulded to some special form. It is only by adopting this view of infinitely small perceptions, that we can understand how we have thoughts at the moment of our wakening; we always continued to have thoughts, but we had none which stamped themselves on our memory and remained in our consciousness. Without them we cannot explain a single idea that occurs to us, nor that condition of partial slumber which we call bewilderment. Any one who possesses this key to psychology, must consider the assertion that there are intervals in which the mind ceases to think, as false as the one that any body is at absolute rest. Midway between these obscure perceptions and the distinct cognition that develops itself out of them, come those which are confused. Even the human mind contains perceptions of this sort. They appear particularly in the act of sensation, and here accordingly the mind

manifests itself in its function as mere soul. Hence the similarity which it exhibits in this case to the lower animals, while, when under the influence of obscure perceptions, as in sleep, it approximates to the vital principle of plants. Just as to see green was to see yellow and blue mixed up indistinguishably, so to hear the roaring of the ocean is a confused perception of an infinite number of noises. If under Leibnitz's guidance we pass through the confused perceptions of sensation away from the obscure perceptions that constitute the utterly dull consciousness of ourselves, that is, if we pass away from the whole of the obscure life of the soul, and enter the bright daylight of distinct perceptions, we reach the domain of real cognition or knowledge, which, as it is based upon certain principles, exactly coincides with what Leibnitz calls reason. Through this, man becomes able to participate in truth, while his confused thought only allows of his perceiving what is phenomenal. But in the human mind there are two principles of reason, corresponding to the two elements of which all that is real is composed. These are the principle of identity or non-contradiction, which determines the limit of conceivability, of logical possibility, and therefore the rational and eternal verities; and secondly, the principle of sufficient reason or of conformity (*pr. rationis sufficientis, pr. de convenance*, etc.), which determines all truths of fact. Logic and mathematics depend upon the former, physics upon the latter. What is inconsistent with the former is absolutely (or logically) impossible; what is inconsistent with the latter is physically impossible. The opposite of the first of these is the possible, of the second the real (*compossible*). The sum of truths goes to form the content of the reason, and accordingly Leibnitz usually defines reason as *enchaînement des vérités* (*e.g. Théod., Discours de la Conf.*, etc., p. 479). The science of method shows us how to advance by the use of these two principles to ever fresh items of knowledge. Evidently inspired by what Descartes had said in regard to philosophic method, Leibnitz throughout his whole life never lost sight of the idea of a universal theory of science, which he often calls, like Descartes, *Mathesis universalis*. Only fragments on this subject were found in his posthumous papers, and some of these have been included in my edition (No. xi.–xxii., lii.–liv.). Like Descartes, and like Locke, he demands that we should start from what is most simple. He does not, how-

ever, like the latter, see this in sensations, for these are confused and therefore complex. Rather, the point of departure ought to be something of which we have an intuitive knowledge. From the point of view of rational knowledge, what is free from contradiction is of this nature. We must, then, begin with the proof that something is free from contradiction, conceivable, and therefore with identical propositions, *i.e.* with definitions (not, however, merely verbal ones). (It was not through Spinoza, as I at one time supposed, but through Lully that Leibnitz was led to call these primitive conceptions, on one occasion, attributes of God.) A reduction of these to as small a number as possible would produce an alphabet of human thoughts. (The definitions that he himself mentions as fundamental definitions of this kind, show that he has in his mind a table of qualities or categories in which agreement, similarity, cause, effect, and so on, would be defined.) In these definitions, which must be reduced to as small a number as possible, we should have the first data from which the development of the truths of reason would have to begin. Next, as regards truths of fact, these also would rest upon certain fundamental facts—what Goethe afterwards called original phenomena—which may always be reduced in number by the comparison of a number of given facts. Leibnitz, therefore, like Bacon, urges that facts should be collected, and thinks there can never be enough of repositories and academies, the use of which he himself compares to that of tables of logarithms. Once these data are procured, we must set to work with them, a process which he is very fond of calling a kind of reckoning, *calculus ratiocinator*, etc. The word, however, must be understood in such a wide sense that ordinary reckoning, as well as the ordinary syllogistic process, forms only a small part of what it includes. Like all reckoning, this higher calculus has two parts,—association and separation, synthesis and analysis. The method of Combinations is an essential part of the synthetic process; by it we can, for example, calculate the possible total of all pieces of music, in fact, can find out these pieces themselves. The synthetic process tells us whether and how problems can be combined. The process of analysis, on the other hand, deals with the individual problem, breaks it up into easier ones, and, if it does not solve it, at least brings us nearer a solution. The theory of Probabilities forms an essential element here,

as the method of Combinations did in the former case. The example of Descartes and his own experience must have shown Leibnitz, what was in any case very obvious, that about the most important point for every system of calculus is the happy choice of symbols. Further, there is no doubt that he was familiar with the labours of Athanasius Kircher and Joh. Joachim Becher, and especially with a remarkable book by George Dalgarno, a man born in Aberdeen, whose works were reprinted in Edinburgh, in 1834. This was: *Ars signorum, vulgo Character universalis et lingua philosophica*, printed in London in 1661, with the motto *Hoc ultra*, which doubtless suggested to Leibnitz the heading *Plus ultra* (*Opp. phil.*, No. xv.). Taking all this into consideration, we need not be surprised that, his whole life through, Leibnitz was thinking of a system of symbols, by the help of which every primary idea could be fixed in a single character, and every combination of these in a single formula. For him, what these men had looked upon as the most important thing was merely a subsidiary advantage; namely, that in this way a universal system would be created which, as is the case nowadays in mathematics, would enable a German to read in his own language every book written by a Frenchman. The main point with him was, that a system of symbols would be chosen, the effect of which would be that every faulty combination of thoughts would necessarily lead to an impossible or self-contradictory formula, every hiatus in reasoning necessarily show itself in a want of connection between the characters, and so on. These results, however, would only be attained if such signs were selected for the ideas as would be analogous to the nature of the thing signified, like the *lingua Adamica* or *signatura rerum* of which the Mystics dreamed. Neither the symbols for the metals and planets, nor the hieroglyphics of the Chinese seem to offer this advantage; and accordingly he confines himself to mathematical symbols, experimenting sometimes with lines, sometimes with figures, sometimes with letters. That he did not succeed in achieving the desired results is well known and not at all surprising.— If the principles hitherto explained show us *how*, in Leibnitz's view, the mind rises from the dull consciousness of life to rational knowledge, we have still to see *what* forms the proper object of this knowledge, or wherein consists the truth at which it should aim. When the principle of non-contradiction

is employed, the object is considered merely as it is in itself, in simple relation to itself; on the other hand, when the question as to its reality (*compossibilité*) is raised, it is regarded as an integral part of a whole. Thus, if we employ both principles, we are naturally brought to a plurality in unity, *i.e.* to a harmonious relation; and the harmony of the universe is, therefore, the end towards which rational knowledge strives. The nearer it gets to this, the more does it become true philosophy or knowledge of the *world*, because the mind manifests itself as the conscious mirror of the universe. In other words, perfect truth is harmonious agreement distinctly recognised. But, since there was no gap between distinct and confused perception, there must also be an indistinct perception of harmonious agreement, even if it be within narrower limits. This, Leibnitz as a matter of fact admits in the enjoyment of the beautiful. The pleasure in musical harmony, and in harmonious relations generally, is an unconscious process of counting and comparison (*Princ. d. l. Nat.*, p. 718). Beauty, accordingly, would be the same thing as truth, the only difference being, that in the former case it would be confusedly apprehended, in the latter distinctly recognised. Both are marked by adaptation to an end and therefore by perfection.

6. The unconscious or infinitely small perceptions were the key to Leibnitz's theory of knowledge. They are equally important in his *doctrine of the will*, and the *ethical system* that depends upon it. As all the perceptions of the monads manifest themselves in the form of effort, we must distinguish in the human soul three kinds of effort, corresponding to the three grades of perceptions already distinguished. With the lowest, the impulse to development, man stretches down into the vegetable kingdom; with the second, instinct, into the animal kingdom; with the third, will, he rises above both. Again, therefore, he appears as a link between the realm of physical necessity and that of ends. Since these three grades stand in continuous connection, acts of will are originally formed in the obscure natural impulse, the natural groundwork. This of itself would show that they cannot be otherwise than determined; but there is even stronger proof in the fact that every effort ultimately depends upon a perception. Leibnitz rejects as an absurdity the perfect independence of will that would consist in its being independent of myself, whether I

will at all or not; we do not will to will, but we will something, *i.e.* the object of the act of volition. But even in regard to our willing this particular object, and not something else, we are not independent. We are always determined in our choice. The fiction of Buridan's ass is an impossibility; for the blow that was to sever the world into two absolutely similar halves, would also divide the ass in two, and the organs left on the one side would be different from those left on the other. There is always a preponderance on one side (*Théod.*, p. 517). In spite, however, of his decided determinism, Leibnitz refuses to be ranked with Spinoza. And rightly so. For the former places the process of determination outside of the individual, and compares him to a stone thrown by some one; Leibnitz, on the other hand, represents the will as determined by our own perceptions, and compares the view of the opponents of determinism to the delusion of the magnetic needle, which thinks that it points to the north out of its own good pleasure. The mistake arises because we are very often not conscious of this inward impulse that determines our will. We do not know why we will anything, although the act of will has a definite cause. This is the case, not merely where our perceptions are obscure and confused because they have not yet risen to be distinct, but also where they are so through degeneration. A case in point is habit, where we act through instinct or quite unconsciously, because we are urged by a natural impulse, the second of its kind that has come into play. Accordingly, if we go back to the very first movements of will, we shall find these in the feeling of discomfort and unrest, when we do not know what we wish. This may be called the obscure exercise of will, because it corresponds exactly to obscure perceptions. When several movements combine, there arises the tendency towards a definite perception. When this leads to complete satisfaction, it is pleasure or pain; when it falls short of this, it is longing or fear. If there be further added memory and play of the imagination, the result is a preference which decides what we are to will, and which can only be met by calling forth other determinations. In this second stage of will, which may be called the sensual exercise of will, and which corresponds to sensations in the more purely intellectual part of our nature, anything that produces pleasure or delight is a good that is willed, anything that results in pain is an evil. In this, as well as in

the rational exercise of will to be discussed immediately, the object is perfection, for pleasure is a heightening of activity; but since pleasure is only a feeling (*sentiment*) of this, it may be called a confused inclination towards it. Above these two stages there rises the rational exercise of will, determined by distinct perceptions. Here the axioms of our intellectual nature have their counterpart in those maxims which are innate in the mind in exactly the same sense, and which are gradually revealed to our mental consciousness. Where the will is determined by reason, it is free; the more rational it is, the greater freedom it has (*De libert.*, p. 669). The pleasure that follows the sensual exercise of will, is only a momentary heightening of activity, and therefore a transitory good; reason teaches us to seek the condition of abiding pleasure or blessedness. Nothing is better calculated to bring this about than the illumination of the understanding, and the constant exercise of the will in such actions as the understanding prescribes (*On Blessedness*, 672). In fact, it consists simply in the advance of wisdom and virtue, and is therefore permanent increase of strength, *i.e.* perfection. Parallel with this extension (one might say, in length) there runs another (which might be said to be, in breadth). Reason teaches us to find joy, not merely in our own satisfaction, but in the happiness of others. That is, it teaches us to love them, for love is simply pleasure in the blessedness of others. From this, however, the whole of natural law may be deduced; its requirements in its three stages,—*jus strictum*, *æquitas*, *pietas*,—are contained in the well-known formulæ *Neminem lœde*, *suum cuique tribue*, *honeste vive* (*De notion. jur.*, pp. 118, 119). Since the greatest increase of activity, and therefore the greatest happiness and the perfection of men, consists in their attaining to ever clearer knowledge, what the rational will prescribes is, not merely to make ourselves always more happy and more perfect by adding to our own enlightenment, but to exercise the highest of all virtues, philanthropy, in such a way as to contribute to the happiness and the enlightenment of all men. In fulfilling this purpose, we attain not merely to *a* good, but to the highest good, *i.e.* *the* good, which therefore forms the content of the will, as the true does of cognition. The resultant harmony that appears in all parts of Leibnitz's philosophy, is seen also in his ethics. It is interesting to note how, in spite of the verbal agreement between them on so many points, the diametrical opposition

between him and Spinoza comes out in the contrast between the self-abnegating *amor intellectualis Dei*, which is a private virtue, and the self-asserting, enlightening virtue of philanthropy. The sensuous perception of harmony, the artistic feeling, stood midway between sensation, the perception of the phenomenal and scientific knowledge, which embraced truth, *i.e.* consciously mirrored the harmony of all things. Similarly, to correspond to this, there must stand midway between the sensual pursuit of pleasure and the rational will for the good, a kind of will that does not directly lay hold of the highest end (philanthropy), but rather points towards it, as we saw that the beautiful does towards the good. As a matter of fact, this position, with Leibnitz, is occupied by human art—that form of activity in which we are like God, inasmuch as we create, and like nature, inasmuch as we produce machines (*Princ. d. l. Nat.*, p. 127; *Monadol.*, p. 712). This very statement, however, shows that what is meant here by art, is not the daughter of heaven, who is an end unto herself. In speaking of *échantillons architectoniques*, Leibnitz is clearly thinking of machines that are of practical utility; and therefore, where he uses the word *art*, we should prefer to say inventive rather than artistic and creative power. This explains why the whole of the subsequent view of the world, formed under the influence of Leibnitz, never got beyond the point of assigning to a work of art a moral end, lying above and outside of art itself.

7. Leibnitz's metaphysical theories conflict particularly with Cartesianism and with Spinozism. In his physics, by his idealistic view of extended substance, he proves himself an antagonist of More, who represents even spirits as extended, and of Cudworth, who holds that extended substance has a living force. In his psychology and moral philosophy he appears as the opponent of Locke and the English moralists, for he makes the mind the sole source of its own promptings and instructions. Similarly, in his *theology*, he comes out as the opponent of those who had played into the hands of realism by representing that faith and reason were opposed to each other (*vid.* §§ 276–278). His *Théodicée* (pp. 468–665) is a reply to Bayle. From this work all the following statements are taken, except in cases where a special reference is given. His opposition to Bayle makes Leibnitz begin with a discussion upon the agreement between faith and reason (pp. 479–503). He first puts faith and experience side by side, and then

goes on to show that neither is inconsistent with reason. For reason admits not merely those truths that are logically necessary because their contrary implies a contradiction, but also truths of fact, which depend upon the principle of conformity, and which have to do merely with what is physically necessary, or natural law. Even although a variation from this, *e.g.* a miracle, is incomprehensible to us who cannot survey the sum-total of all ends, it is not on that account irrational. If it were so, it would be absolutely impossible. On the other hand, there can certainly be things that transcend reason. (This distinction, very common among the Schoolmen since the time of Hugo of St. Victor, Leibnitz is able to adopt all the more readily because man is not the only rational being; in fact, he often says in so many words that this or that may transcend our present reason.) But this is not all. For even in what does not admit of an *a priori* proof, and therefore belongs to the mysteries of faith, there is much which, once it has become part of our belief, may be explained, *i.e.* defended against objections, so that we attain to a moral certainty in regard to it. Even the very dogmas that rouse most opposition, such as the Trinity, eternal punishment, the presence of the body of Christ in the Sacrament, and so on, are anything but irrational. That term should rather be applied to the views held by their opponents. (*Lessing's Werke*, ed. by Lachmann, vol. ix., pp. 269 and 154.) Such certainty is attainable to a much greater extent with regard to the essential content of religion, that which all religions must contain. As it lies in all men at least in germ, it may be called the natural element in religion, or natural religion. Christianity does not deny it. Christ is rather to be regarded as the true restorer of natural religion, since He preached its doctrines as positive ordinances. This natural religion, like science, lies in man *virtualiter* as an obscure impulse. By the process of development and enlightenment it is transformed into a natural theology which is rational faith, since its main tenets, the God who is without and above the world, and the immortality of the soul, are doctrines that reason preaches in its own name. Accordingly, the first points to be taken up are the proofs in reason of the existence of God. Leibnitz's distinction between the proof *a posteriori* and that *a priori*, corresponds exactly to the distinction between the two kinds of knowledge and truth. The latter

proof, which reasons from the idea of a Being who is necessary, to His existence, requires, according to Leibnitz, who on this point is in literal agreement with Cudworth, to be supplemented by the demonstration that that idea is possible, *i.e.* that it is not self-contradictory, like the idea of an absolutely swiftest motion, for example. Thus amplified, it is convincing, and may be expressed as follows: If God is possible, He exists, for His existence is a necessary consequence of His possibility. If He did not exist, He would not be possible, nor would anything outside of Him be possible (e.g. *De la démonstr. Cartés.*, p. 177). Nowadays this proof is called the ontological one. With Leibnitz it deserves this name in a special degree because it is closely connected with his ontology, which distinguished in the monad the two elements of possibility and reality. This distinction will be most apparent in the lowest form of monad, and will cease to exist in the highest form. The so-called *a posteriori* proof, which is connected with the *principium rationis sufficientis*, stands in the same relation to Leibnitz's cosmology, and may be called the cosmological proof, as that name is applied to it universally nowadays. Since everything that happens must have a cause, the existence of the monads, the harmony that subsists without their exercising any influence,—a harmony which must therefore have its reason outside of them,—and finally the connection between everything contingent, lead us to conclude that, outside of this connection, there is a necessary Being who is the source and origin of these things (*Monadol.*, p. 708; *Princ. de Vie*, p. 430; *De rer. orig.*, p. 147). But this principle involved the idea of an end as well as the idea of cause. If the latter was the basis of the cosmological argument, the former produces the teleological one, in virtue of which the idea of God appears as the culmination of moral philosophy, just as in the two former cases it was the crowning point of metaphysics and of physics: All orderly connection, and similarly all human action, is ultimately directed to an absolute end, and this is God, since everything in the measure of its perfection furthers His honour and His blessedness (*Defin. eth.*, p. 670). Especially is this the case with our philanthropy, since that is also the main element in the Divine nature. Leibnitz's metaphysics and physics (ontology and cosmology), as well as the second part of his "pneumatics," had each yielded a proof of the existence of God; and it almost looks as if he were

unwilling that the first part, the theory of knowledge, should appear at a disadvantage as compared with the others. In short, he adds a fourth proof to those already given : Since these are eternal truths, there must necessarily be an abode for them, an eternal understanding or a Divine wisdom that embraces them all (e.g. *Monadol.*, p. 708). Thus the first main element of natural religion, the existence of one God, which the Jewish was the first among positive religions to teach, is a postulate of reason; and the same is the case with the second, the immortality of the human soul, which Christ preached. Imperishableness is characteristic of it as a monad, corporeal eternity as a soul, and finally personality, moral responsibility, as a mind.

8. There are thus convincing proofs of the existence of God. It is a matter not of certainty merely, but of knowledge. With regard, however, to the Divine nature, it is impossible for us to know this adequately, because complete knowledge is possible only to a superior being as containing the inferior within itself. We have to content ourselves with a knowledge based upon analogy and rising from us, as the mirror and image of God, *via eminentiæ* to Him as the original. Just as the limited power that forms the essence of every monad, manifested itself in perception and effort that were no less limited, so the power that is free from all limitations, will be omnipotence, and will manifest itself in infinite knowledge and will, *i.e.* in wisdom and goodness. Just as, in each monad, effort was conditioned by perception, so too the absolute will of God, or His goodness, is conditioned by His wisdom, a state of things which we call His justice. In virtue of this, God can will only what His wisdom has recognised as the best; and He does not act arbitrarily, but through necessity. This necessity is a moral one, because the opposite of what is chosen involves no contradiction and is therefore conceivable, possible, although not in accordance with the end, *i.e.* not real (*compossible*). This moral necessity compels him to select from among the possible worlds, brought before Him by His reason, that which is the most perfect, as containing the greatest possible amount of reality, and therefore also the most blessed. This blessedness, not of man alone, but of the whole, coincides with the honour and the blessedness of God; and the world is therefore not merely a cunningly constructed machine, but a happy State; God is not merely its

architect, but its king. The two realms, that of nature and that of grace, between which man forms a link, are in perfect harmony, because they form a graduated line of perfection. One of Bayle's chief objections, the opposition between reason and faith, was repelled by the distinction between what transcends reason and what is contrary to reason, and by the proofs for the existence of God. Optimism supplies the weapons to dispose of the other, the reasonableness of Manichæism (*vid.* § 277, 5). The question how evil and wickedness are consistent with the best possible world, is such an important feature in Leibnitz's rational faith, that it has supplied the title for his work on this subject. A main point in this, is the reduction of moral and physical to metaphysical evil, *i.e.* the limitation in virtue of which even wickedness does not rest upon a positive cause (as Manichæism would make out), but upon a want, a *causa deficiens.* That the individual elements in the world are limited and finite, *i.e.* that they are not everything or are not gods, depends upon their nature; and, as their nature has its ultimate ground in themselves, and not in God's good pleasure, God is not responsible for this. It is true that the existence of anything at all is a result of the Divine will; and the question next arises: How is it conceivable that God did not leave the evil or even the bad in the region of mere possibility? God has only permitted it to exist as a means of advancing the perfection and blessedness of the whole. He is not like the foolish general, who sacrifices a province to save a couple of human lives, but like the artist, who employs discoloured shades or discordant sounds to heighten the colouring or the harmony of the work of art, so that it gains in beauty through what is itself hideous. God therefore does not really will the bad, He permits it; not for its own sake, not even as a means, but He endures it merely as a *conditio sine quâ non* in a world which, without it, would not possess magnanimity and a number of other virtues. If, therefore, we regard, not the individual, but the world as a whole, its aspect fills us not, as it did Spinoza, with resignation, but with serene calmness, with joyful confidence; and the ever-increasing joy in God goes hand in hand with a constant advance of blessedness and perfection, which the supreme architect and monarch maintains in the fairest harmony (*Monadol.*, §§ 87–89, p. 712).

Cf. A. Pichler: *Die Theologie des Leibnitz*, etc. 1st part, Munich, 1869. 2nd, *ibid.*, 1869.

B.—THE FORERUNNERS OF WOLFF.

§ 289.

1. Leibnitz's idealistic philosophy of harmony requires, in the first instance, to be *supplemented* in regard to those points where he has been satisfied with suggestions and aspirations. Some of those who supply this want, stand in no real relation to the system of Leibnitz; not a few of them, for example, are unacquainted with it. In that case it is only from our point of view that they can be regarded as following in his footsteps. On the other hand, such as explicitly profess themselves his adherents, may be looked upon as deliberately carrying on his work, consciously developing his doctrines. A position midway between these two is occupied by a man whose personal connection with Leibnitz led the latter to say, that much in his work was his (Leibnitz's) property, although this agreement is explained by the fact that they had both received similar inspiration and had drawn from the same sources. This man made an actual attempt to state what Leibnitz throughout his whole life had been looking for in vain, namely, principles of a philosophic method by the help of which we should be able, not merely to arrange what we already know, but also to make fresh discoveries. So long as there is no exact method, there can be no separation between the individual branches of study. This explains why, in Leibnitz's metaphysics, there were anticipations of physical theories; and why, on the other hand, in his physics,—which, taken strictly, could only be a science of phenomena,—we found him trying to reach back to what was real and of the nature of substance, and thus doing away with the distinction between ontology and phenomenology (§ 288, 4). Before it could appear in an adequate form, philosophy required something more than articles in journals and casual essays; detailed expositions of the various branches of study in their connection were necessary. To have shown the way in which this can be accomplished, is the great merit, though it is only a merit of form, of the first among those countrymen of Leibnitz who are to be discussed here.

2. Walther Ehrenfried, Graf von Tschirnhausen, Herr von Kisslingswalde and Stolzenberg, was born on April 10th, 1651, at his father's castle of Kisslingswalde in the Oberlausitz. He studied at Leyden, where he devoted his attention chiefly to mathematics. Subsequently, he served as a

volunteer in Holland. During this time he formed a close friendship with Huygens, and became familiar with the Cartesian philosophy. Afterwards he joined the circle of Spinoza's admirers, mentioned in § 271, and thus made the acquaintance of Spinoza himself. The most acute objections (*Epp.* 63, 67, 69, 71) in that philosopher's correspondence, though formerly ascribed to L. Meyer, are really by Tschirnhausen. When he subsequently came to know Leibnitz in Paris, he asked permission for him to be allowed to read the manuscript of the *Ethics*. Spinoza hesitated at first; and this hesitation looks almost like a presentiment of the dangerous adversary, who afterwards takes credit to himself for being instrumental in making Tschirnhausen less of a Cartesian than he had been before. Journeys to England, to Italy, to Vienna, and for the second time to France, where he became a member of the Academy, prevented Tschirnhausen from publishing so soon as he had intended, the work of which his letters speak as a *Tractatus de ratione excolenda*, or *de emendatione intellectus* (*to Huygens*, 11th September, 1682), and which appeared in 1687 as *Medicina mentis, s. artis inveniendi præcepta generalia*, under which title it was reprinted at Leipsic in 1695. The *Medicina corporis*, which forms a sequel to this work, is of no importance. Henceforward Tschirnhausen lived at his castle, occupied in grinding lenses and making chemical experiments which gave him almost as strong a claim as the notorious Boettger to the discovery of Meissen porcelain. In 1708 he died, regretted as a faithful friend by Leibnitz. The *Medicina mentis* frequently agrees almost word for word with Spinoza's *Tract. de emend. int.*, and yet never expressly refers to it; in fact, Spinoza is often tacitly censured. It would be an injustice to see in this nothing more than a fear of being put into the same category as the man who was in such evil repute. The decided conviction that pantheism was a mistake —a conviction which Leibnitz possibly strengthened—may explain this, and may also help us to understand why Tschirnhausen, on many points, approximates to the position taken up by Descartes before he had become a pantheist. For example, in laying down the first foundation of all philosophy, he makes this consist in the unalterable and indubitable conviction of one's own conscious existence, or existence as a thinking being. Starting from this fundamental fact of consciousness in general, a fact of which our inward experience makes us

certain, he goes on to deduce some others, which every fair-minded man must admit as readily as the one first mentioned, and which furnish the elementary axioms on which the particular parts of philosophy rest. On the fact that we are conscious of agreeable and disagreeable affections, depend the conceptions of good and evil, and therefore moral philosophy; the fact that there are some things which we can apprehend, others which we cannot, is the basis of the distinction between the true and the false, and therefore of logic in the proper sense, or *philosophia prima;* finally, the consciousness that we stand in a passive relation to certain ideas, or in other words receive impressions, is the foundation of all empirical knowledge (*Præfat.*). The *Medicina mentis* professes to treat only of the true logic, or *philosophia prima*, which Tschirnhausen, like Descartes and Leibnitz, often calls *ars inveniendi;* and it begins by laying down what is to be understood by conceiving (*concipere*). In Spinoza's language, he warns us against calling the mere image of a thing within ourselves a conception. In other words, we must not confuse mere perception, which is a work of the imagination, with conception, the work of the understanding, which contains an affirmation or a denial, *i.e.* with the judgment which expresses the nature of the thing conceived (pp. 41, 42, 37, ed. 1695). Now everything that can be conceived of in this way, is possible; everything that cannot, is impossible or false. Accordingly, we carry the criterion of truth and falsehood within ourselves; and the *philosophia prima* has only to test our conceptions so far as to see whether they are consistent. Their relation to the things outside of ourselves is a question that belongs to quite another part of philosophy (p. 52). If philosophy is to proceed methodically, it must begin by determining the simplest combinations (conceptions) of all. This is done in the definitions (p. 69). Since a definition is a judgment, *i.e.* a combination produced by the activity of the mind, it must state the originating cause. This was the idea present to those who wished to include the *causa efficiens* in the definition. Any one therefore who had the correct definition of laughter would be able to produce laughter (pp. 71, 67, 68). Further, it can easily be shown from the nature of definition, that of the two elements combined in it, one must have the character of something fixed, the other of something movable (p. 86). A circle, for example, is seen from the definition to be produced

by the motion of a straight line round a fixed point (p. 90). The analysis of the definition results in axioms (p. 61), its synthesis in theorems (p. 124). If we always begin with what is most simple, and proceed without a break to what is more complex, we need not be afraid of making mistakes. In spite of the similar methods pursued in the various parts of philosophy, there is still a great difference in respect of their subjects. What is apprehended by the senses is not so much conceived as merely perceived; it is therefore merely something that can be imagined, a phenomenon, a phantasm (p. 75). The most simple elements to which, or to combinations of which, everything of this kind may be reduced, are solid and fluid (p. 89). Within the limits of what is apprehended by the understanding, a distinction must be drawn between those of its products which may arise in various ways, and which may, therefore, be defined,—the *rationalia*, i.e. mathematical conceptions whose simplest elements are the point and the (straight and curved) line,—and those conceptions which can only be formed in one way. The latter are the *realia* or *physica*, the elements of which are extension and motion (in the two forms called rest and motion) (pp. 75, 76). They occupy the highest place, and so, therefore, does physics, the science which deals with them. While this science is not possible without mathematics, it also requires to be confirmed by experiment (p. 280), the nature of which the followers of Bacon have misunderstood. It may be called the science which is truly divine (p. 284), and also that which embraces everything, since the knowledge of our own selves forms a part of it (pp. 284, 84). At the conclusion of his work Tschirnhausen states that medicine, mechanics, and ethics are the practical applications of science, the last-mentioned being the doctrine of the soul's health. As mechanics is undoubtedly applied mathematics, while medicine professes to be based entirely upon perceived phenomena (*Imaginabilia*), it follows that the theoretical groundwork of ethics must lie in physics, as the knowledge of the *realia*.

3. Tschirnhausen is superior to Leibnitz in regard both to the method and to the subdivision of his system; for, instead of aspirations and suggestions, he gives definite directions and statements. And yet in another point he is even more deficient than his master. This is practical philosophy, ethics. He is content with merely assigning a place to it; while

in Leibnitz, the principle of action had been expressed in a definite formula. The work of both of these thinkers is supplemented by yet a third native of Saxony, somewhat older than either of them. The story of SAMUEL PUFENDORF'S life reminds one, in many respects, of that of Leibnitz. Born on Jan. 8th, 1632, he first studied law at Leipsic, and then went to Jena, where he became a pupil of Erhard Weigel, who by his application of the principles of Euclid to logical subjects, and particularly by his lectures, delivered in German, upon ethical relations, convinced him that a strictly demonstrative process was not limited to mathematics, but might be extended, especially to natural law. As tutor to the Swedish ambassador, Pufendorf acquired at Copenhagen, as Leibnitz had done at Mainz, a knowledge of important political affairs. During an imprisonment of eight months, he occupied himself with a thorough study of the writings of Grotius and Hobbes, his exceptional obligations to both of whom he always acknowledged. (Besides these, he afterwards mentions with approval the work of Richard Cumberland [1632–1718]: *De legibus naturæ*, published in 1672. Of Spinoza, on the other hand, he never speaks without bitterness.) In 1660, Pufendorf made his first appearance as an author, when he brought out: *Elementa juris universalis*, The Hague (often reprinted afterwards in other places). The twenty-one divisions that go to form the first book, he calls *Definitiones;* and rightly so, for as a matter of fact they simply contain, expressed in a very definite form, determinations of the most important elementary legal conceptions. The second book, which is much shorter, contains the *Principia*, seven propositions that sum up the whole of natural law. Of these the first two, which attribute to man responsibility and the capacity for coming under obligations, are called *axiomata*, because they are drawn exclusively from the reason; the remaining five are called *observationes*, because in them account is taken of experience as well. In the latter, power of judgment and free-will, and also self-love and the social instinct, are attributed to man; and from the combination of the two, the formula is deduced that every one must strive to preserve himself, but must do so in such a way that society is not thereby endangered. After stating all the precepts which are contained *implicite* in this formula, he concludes by saying that in every State natural law requires to be supplemented by positive

legislation. There is hardly a statement made in this treatise which would not be found in Grotius or Hobbes. For, even Pufendorf's denial of the existence of international law distinct from the natural right of the individual,—which is usually referred to as original,—is not an idea of his own. What he says here, had been already said by Hobbes (§ 256, 6). And yet the work merits the applause with which it was greeted. The novel feature of it was that he combined the doctrines of his two predecessors, giving free play not only to the selfishness of Hobbes, but also to the social instinct of Grotius. In consequence of this treatise, a chair (the first) of natural and international law was created at Heidelberg, and offered to Pufendorf. To the seven years of this professorship belongs his connection with Boineburg, whom he considers one of the greatest of statesmen. Nor does he assign a much lower position to his sovereign, the Elector Karl Ludwig of the Palatinate, who is believed to have furnished many data for the work which Pufendorf published in 1667, under an assumed Italian name: *Severini de Monzambano Veronensis de statu imperii germanici epistola* (published in the first instance at The Hague, very often republished, *e.g.* 1695, at Halle, by Thomasius, who delivered lectures upon it). This anticipation of Montesquieu's *Lettres Persanes* (§ 280, 7) contains a sharp criticism of the condition of Germany. It was at first ascribed to Boineburg, to Pufendorf's elder brother, and to many others. After giving an account of the present state of affairs, and of how it arose, it goes on to argue against the misconception that the German Empire was a continuation of the Roman, and that it had conferred great benefits upon the German nation. It then proceeds to combat the views of those who regard the German Imperial constitution as one of the Aristotelian pure or mixed forms of government. Rather it is an irregular form of government, and, looked at from the Aristotelian standpoint, a monstrosity. Finally, it passes on to a statement of the means that might remedy the evils which unquestionably existed. Although not blind to the injuries that Germany had experienced at the hands of Austria, he rejects the view of Hippolytus a Lapide (B. P. Chemnitz), who held that Germany would never be a united State till Austria had been excluded. He would prefer to see a confederation of German States with a standing authority at its head, a proposal in regard to which he apprehends great

opposition from the side of Austria. After the publication of this work, his position in Heidelberg became less pleasant, and, accordingly, in 1670, he accepted a professorship at Lund, in Sweden, during his tenure of which he published his elaborate work : *De jure naturæ et gentium libri octo*, 1672. (Some of the many subsequent editions include a Latin translation of the notes that Barbeyrac had inserted in his translation of the work into French. This is the case, for example, with the Frankfort edition, 1744, 2 vols. 4to.) Contemporaneously there appeared his treatise : *De habitu religionis ad vitam civilem.* Here the Church is treated as a union resting upon voluntary agreement, towards which the State stands in the same relation as it does towards all corporations, although it lies under certain obligations with regard to its maintenance and security. In 1671, he had published an abstract from his principal work under the title of : *De officio hominis et civis*, which has been often printed since (*e.g.*, Utrecht, 1723, 7th ed.). Even before this he had been very violently attacked by two envious colleagues, who, however, had to pay a heavy penalty for their enmity to a man held in such very high esteem at Stockholm. But they were joined by many in Germany, particularly theologians, including among others Alberti of Leipsic. Pufendorf was moved to compose several controversial pamphlets, which were afterwards collected in the *Eris Scandica.* From Lund he went to Stockholm, where, in the capacity of historiographer for Sweden, he wrote, in 1676, *De rebus Suecicis* [Utrecht, 1686.—Ed.], and *De rebus a Carolo Gustavo gestis* (Norimb., 1696, 2 vols.). In 1686 he received an appointment in Berlin, similar to that which he had held at Stockholm ; some time previously he had been made a baron [not till 1694.—Ed.]. There he wrote *De rebus gestis Friderici Wilhelmi Magni* (Berlin, 1695), and *De rebus gestis Friderici tertii* (Berlin, 1695). He did not live to see them published, for death carried him off on Oct. 26th, 1694.

4. The point of view that Pufendorf adopts in his later writings became the object of attacks from entirely opposite quarters. This was due to the fact that, in spite of his differences from both, he continued an adherent at once of Grotius and of Hobbes. He held that natural law and the natural rules of morality originate solely in the good pleasure of God, rejecting the Thomist view, that the good has an independent and absolute existence, and adopting the Scotist formula : A

thing is good because God has commanded it, and not conversely. This led him to censure Grotius, who declares that the moral law would be valid even if there were no God. Nor was he staggered by the objection that God might at any moment declare murder, adultery, and so on, to be a duty. If God of His good pleasure has once appointed to man a social and peaceful life, everything that runs counter to this must necessarily be forbidden; but it is a necessity which is conditioned by that exercise of His good pleasure, and which is therefore not absolute, but hypothetical. This assertion he expressed in classical language, by saying that the *entia moralia* ultimately depended upon the Divine *impositio*. It appeared to be a declaration of war against the Thomists, who maintained the "*perseitas*" of these *entia*, as well as against Leibnitz, who was a Thomist on this point; and it seemed further to allow more to the Godhead than science had any right to do. On the other hand, very different objections were called forth by Pufendorf's teaching as to the *principium cognoscendi* of natural law. The source, not of law, but of our knowledge of law, is simply the reason; the means to this end is just the study of human nature. Natural law, which is to be as binding upon Jews and Turks as upon Christians, cannot, therefore, allow itself either to be connected with the Decalogue—as Seckendorf, for example, in his *Christian State* would have it—or to fall back upon the paradisiacal point of view. It can only fulfil its end if it employs strictly demonstrative methods, and draws all its conclusions, if not directly, at least mediately, from axiomatic first principles which we must begin by establishing. First principles of this sort are, according to Pufendorf, that man, like all other beings, has selfish instincts; but that insufficiency, capacity for doing harm and for doing good, individual differences, and so on, all of which are present in him in a much greater degree than in the lower animals, impel him much more strongly than them towards society. The conditions of social life are determined by the laws of nature, which may be summed up in the formula that man must above all things advance the interests of society, and must therefore regard as forbidden whatever runs counter to them,—as obligatory whatever furthers them. From this formula may be deduced all human duties. These are to be classified according to their objects, and are thus naturally divided into duties to-

wards oneself, and duties towards one's neighbour. The abridged version puts duties towards God before both of these; but in the larger work they are so combined with the two others that the latter appear as the (only ?) ways of fulfilling the former. In the deduction of these various sorts of duties, the main point of view is, that unless we performed them (even those towards ourselves), society would go to pieces. Just as in what he says of the duties of the individual, or our general duties, or duties as men (*Jus nat. et gent.*, i.–v.; *De off. hom. et civ.*, *Lib.* i.), Pufendorf constantly reminds us of Grotius, so again his inquiries into man as a member of society, *i.e.*, our special duties, or duties as citizens (*Jus nat.*, vi.–viii.; *De off.*, *Lib.* ii.), naturally suggest a comparison with Hobbes. This is the case at the very outset with what he says of the state of nature. By this he understands the state of affairs in which there is absolutely no subordination, and therefore no law. Accordingly, as in his view our earliest ancestors lived in wedlock, and dwelt together as a family, he cannot assume the existence of a *status naturalis*, until the human race has grown so much and has become so scattered that the tradition of those associations has been lost, so that men live in perfect liberty. He refuses to postulate at this stage a state of universal war; he holds that peace is produced by our social nature. But as soon as he begins to describe this peace in detail, he runs the risk of conceiving of it as the end of a war that has hitherto prevailed, *i.e.*, of doing exactly as Hobbes did, except that, in spite of this tendency, something more than mere egoism is the motive that leads to the conclusion of peace. While the social instinct furnishes an adequate explanation in the case of small communities, regard for security is always put in the foreground in accounting for the origin of the State. This is supposed to move the individual families to give up a part of their liberty, and found the State, which rests upon two contracts and a resolution :— the contract which the individuals make with each other, the resolution that establishes the constitution, and finally, the contract between the sovereign and his subjects. Although the State originates in a contract, it may be called an order (indirectly) instituted by God; it is so because it is the means towards peace, an end willed by God. In the conclusions he draws from this theory, Pufendorf differs from Hobbes, inasmuch as he holds that the sovereign may be guilty of injustice

towards his subjects, by violating their rights as citizens or as men. Otherwise, his political philosophy contains almost nothing that Grotius and Hobbes had not said already. His agreement with the former is specially marked in his theory of punishment.

5. CHRISTIAN THOMAS, who, like his father Jacob, is much better known under the Latinized name of THOMASIUS, was born on Jan. 1st, 1655, not merely in the same district as the three thinkers we have last discussed, but in the same town as Leibnitz. He received from his father a sound education, and was also exercised by him in discussion, not, however, without being warned against any tendency to advanced speculation. As a student at Leipsic, he devoted himself chiefly to philosophy and the history of philosophy, with such success that he became a *Magister* as early as 1671. He then threw himself into the study of law, just as the quarrel broke out between Pufendorf and the theologians, some of whom belonged to Leipsic. At Frankfort, to which he had been attracted by Samuel Stryck, this youth of twenty defended in his lectures as *Privat docent* the theological basis of law. He was converted from this view by the pamphlets that Pufendorf published in his own defence; and consequently when, after a short period of travel and of practice as an advocate in his native town, he came forward there with lectures on Grotius, he brought a nest of inquisitors about his ears. To justify his position, he published his lectures as *Institutiones jurisprudentiæ divinæ*, where he appeared as a most determined opponent of Scholasticism, and as an independent adherent of Pufendorf, who, in contrast to the *perseitas* of good and evil, made the *jus positivum universale* the basis of positive law. The outcry produced by this work, as well as by the publication, in 1685, of the treatise *De crimine bigamiæ*, in which he represents polygamy as prohibited merely by positive and not by natural law, was small compared with the sensation caused by the step he took in 1687. It marks an epoch in history. For in that year he announced a lecture in German upon (the Spaniard) "*Gratian; or, The Basis of a Reasonable, Prudent, and Polite Life*," and issued a prospectus in German, in which the French were held up as models for imitation, because they had got rid of all pedantry, including the use of the Latin language. He followed this up, in 1688, by giving notice of his lectures in German upon Christian morality and

on the *Jus publicum*, in a similar prospectus directed against the Aristotelian ethics. What Leibnitz had only dared to hope for, Thomasius had accomplished; he had ventured to employ the language which Leibnitz had declared best suited for philosophical inquiries, and that not merely in a strictly private discourse, as Erhard Weigel had done, but in public lectures. The *Introductio ad philosophiam aulicam, s. lineæ primæ libri de prudentia cogitandi et ratiocinandi*, published at Leipsic in 1688, received its title partly on account of the Abbé Gérard's *Philosophie des gens de cour*, but partly also because Thomasius regarded courts as the highest class in the school of life; and thus the name really promised a philosophy of life. The German prospectus announcing lectures on this book extols German at the expense of Roman law. The defects of the latter are pointed out; and the neglect of natural law at the Universities is particularly censured. In 1688 Thomasius also began the issue of his (the first) learned periodical in the German language,—the "*Teutsche Monate*," as he generally calls it afterwards, instead of using its prolix title, which was often changed. It was to be modelled upon the French periodicals of Basnage, Bayle, and Le Clerc. In this monthly he reviewed, soon after it appeared, Tschirnhausen's *Medicina mentis*. The tone of the article gave great offence to the author, although Thomasius believed that he had paid him a high compliment by saying that he had prepared the way for his own advance, and that without him he himself would not have reached his present position. This periodical involved him in more and more quarrels; and when he came forward to protest against the oppression of the Pietists by the University of Leipsic, and finally was bold enough to defend a mixed marriage in the princely house, the combined efforts of the theologians of Leipsic and Wittenberg were successful in procuring, in 1690, a decree putting a check upon his academic and literary activity. Thereupon he took refuge in Berlin, where, as early as April, 1690, he was nominated a privy councillor of the Elector, and received permission to deliver lectures at Halle, a salary being granted him at the same time. The commencement of these lectures was the real beginning of the University of Halle; for the result of his success was, that other teachers were invited thither, and ultimately the formal foundation took place. To wage war against all prejudices, to assent only to what he

himself understood, to battle against all pedantic learning which has no practical use,—such became his watchword, and continued to be so throughout his whole life. It was quite characteristic of him; for, though not a man of new and original ideas, he was well able to adopt these from others, to put them in popular form, and to enhance their value for the end in view. If we were to allow that the German Enlightenment had only one father, Thomasius' claim to the title would certainly be a just one. In addition to his many-sided academic activity, he busied himself with literary work. In 1691 appeared the *Introduction to Rational Philosophy*, written before he left Leipsic. This was followed in the same year by the *Application of Rational Philosophy*. Similarly, the *Introduction to Moral Philosophy* (1692) found a sequel in *Medicine against Irrational Love*, or *Application of Moral Philosophy*, begun in 1693, but not finished until 1696. In all these works he appears as the man who puts the highest value upon *philosophia eclectica*, who "as a free *philosophus* attaches himself to no sect," and whose only aim is to drive out prejudices, to "clear" the understanding and "set it in order." When the University of Halle was formally opened, Thomasius was appointed second professor in the faculty of law. Among the contributors to two quarterly publications which he issued in succession under the same title, the *History of Wisdom and Folly* and the *Historia sapientiæ et stultitiæ*, appears the name of Leibnitz. These show that at this time his connection with the Pietists was very intimate. The same thing is proved by his edition of Poiret's work, *De erud. solid.* (§ 278, 4), and by his *Essay on the Nature of Mind*, published in 1699, where his theory of a universal mind betrays a decided tendency to mysticism. The stress he lays upon the teaching of the Bible, as contrasted with mere creeds, and his detestation of priestcraft made the orthodox always rank him with Spener. The latter, however, became suspicious much sooner than the theologians of Halle. As early as 1695, when Thomasius printed the dissertation of Brenneysen, *De jure principum circa adiaphora*, along with a defence against Carpzow, and still more after his work, *De jure principum contra hæreticos*, Spener took offence, especially at its light and often frivolous tone, and warned his friends at Halle against Thomasius. Talebearing,—which could hardly have been avoided, since Francke was in the habit of getting information in regard to the lectures

of other professors from their hearers,—hastened the breach, which was complete by 1702, and which Thomasius proclaimed to the world along with his views on hypocrisy, in the prefaces to some works published by him in 1704 and 1707. In 1700 he again began, in conjunction with Buddeus and others, a periodical, the *Observationes selectæ Halenses*, to which however he contributed but few articles. From this period date his attacks upon the prosecution of witches, in regard to which he had himself formerly held very narrow views, until he was converted by his teacher and colleague, Stryck. In 1701 there appeared for the first time the *Minor German Writings* often reprinted afterwards. The chief feature in these is his earliest prospectuses. In 1705 he published the *Fundamenta juris naturæ et gentium ex sensu communi deducta*, in which he subjects to criticism the theories of Grotius and Pufendorf, as well as his own early views. In 1709 he enjoyed the triumph of being invited to return to Leipsic. He declined the invitation, and was rewarded by the title of privy councillor, and in the following year, on the death of Stryck, by the first professorship of law and the office of Director of the University. While holding this post, he published the *Cautelæ circa præcognita jurisprudentiæ* (1710), and *Cautelæ circa præc. jurispr. ecclesiasticæ* (1712). Henceforth he only produced strictly legal treatises, or arranged collections of articles he had formerly written. The "*Serious but lively and rational Meditations and Reminiscences of Thomasius on Diverse Matters*" appeared in 1720–21, in four quarto volumes, and were continued (1723–25) in a work of three octavo volumes, bearing a similar title. On Sept. 23rd, 1728, Thomasius died in the midst of his relatives. H. Luden's monograph (*Christian Thomasius*, Berlin, 1805) ends with these appropriate words: "He looked cheerfully into the future; his relatives wept, his friends mourned, and Germany felt his loss." Some time after his death a collection was made of all the prospectuses he had written. An excellent estimate is given of him by Tholuck in Herzog's *Theolog. Real-Encyclopädie.*

6. The merit and the enduring influence of Thomasius do not lie in any particular theories with which he enriched philosophy, but in the purpose which he sets before it, and the method which he requires it to pursue. With regard to the latter point, his hatred of all pedantry leads him to despise the syllogistic method; his ignorance of mathematics makes him

indifferent towards the constructive method. There remains, therefore, nothing but the form of reasoning, of searching for points of view, in short, of superficial clever play with subjects, such as the conversation of cultured men of the world usually presents. This explains his contempt for all real learning, a contempt which makes him hint that unprejudiced soldiers and women run much less risk of mistaking what is right than bookworms do. It explains his insistence on the point that philosophical discussions should proceed in a cheerful and lively way, after the manner of Erasmus. And it explains his censure of Grotius and Pufendorf for disfiguring their inquiries by references, as well as his constant demand that philosophy should speak in the mother tongue and employ no pedantic terminology, since absolute intelligibility for every one is the only test of truth, which is really simple and easy to find. In short, he wishes to substitute culture for learning, plausibility for strict proof, the healthy human understanding for speculation, views which Leibnitz was constrained to call philosophy run wild. Again, as regards the function of the philosopher, he emphasizes in anti-scholastic fashion the absolute separation between philosophy and theology, and limits the former entirely to the things of this world. From his time we find in vogue the name *Weltweisheit* (wisdom of the world), as opposed to *Gottesgelahrtheit* (knowledge of God). He is, however, too ignorant of the laws that govern the world of sense, and takes too little interest in them, for us to expect from him a system of physics. All the more does he devote his attention to the moral world and its prime element, man. A characteristic of his individualistic tendencies that strikes us at once, is that he lays so much stress on individual differences that he comes very near to making each particular thing a species by itself. Hence the great significance he attaches to strict introspection and to knowledge of human character. He boasts to the Elector Frederick III., that he has found infallible principles on which to base the latter art. Neither of these, however, is an ultimate end. Just as in his view it is not understanding that determines will, but rather the reverse, so all knowledge, and therefore knowledge of oneself and of human nature, is to serve practical ends. The highest practical end is happiness, and therefore he defines *Philosophia practica* as "the science that teaches man how he is to live happily." But he makes a point of

assigning to philosophy only our happiness in this life; happiness after death belongs to theology. As the highest and most enduring happiness consists in quietness of mind as well as in inward and outward peace, the question arises: How are these attained? In the speculative sphere, by uprooting prejudices, by admitting only what we ourselves understand,—a process the result of which is to produce a perfect knowledge of the world, equally removed from atheism and from the much worse evil of superstition. In the practical sphere, the enemy of quietness of mind and of peace lies in the fact that our will or, what is the same thing, our love is irrational. To substitute rational love for irrational love, or the affections, is the highest teaching of his *Moral Philosophy*. He reduces all affections to three fundamental forms, and shows how the want of control over these begets the three cardinal sins of sensuality, ambition, and avarice, which sway irrational men, though in proportions varying according to temperament, age, condition, and so on. The contrast between the fools or irrational men and the wise or rational men is exhibited in tabular form. Thomasius follows up these general inquiries into the content of practical philosophy by others that deal with its subdivision. The *Fundamenta jur. nat. et gent.* reproaches Grotius and Pufendorf with not having made a sufficient distinction between the *Justum*, or the *obligatio externa*, to be treated of in natural law; the *Honestum*, or the *obligatio interna*, to be treated of in the *doctrina ethica;* and finally the *Decorum*, or what is ordained by respect for others (*pudor*), to be treated of in the *Politica*, which is based entirely upon knowledge of human nature. In the *Institutiones* he had himself taught that the principles of all three ultimately depend, as *leges positivæ universales*, upon the Divine good pleasure. He now gives up this view, and maintains that they are to be deduced from the fundamental truth, given in reason and experience, that every man aims at happiness, *i.e.*, at a long life accompanied by pleasure. Such a life is not possible without inward and outward peace; and therefore when men are thrown together in society, certain obligations appear which form the principles of those three parts of practical philosophy. The principle of justice is contained in the precept: Do not do to others what you would not like done to yourself, *i.e.*, *Neminem læde*, a precept which sums up all compulsory or perfect obligations; the principle

of decorum is given in: Do to others as you would that others should do to you; finally, the principle of morality runs as follows: Do to yourself as you would that others should do to themselves. The obligations that result from the two latter, are inward or imperfect. With regard to the content of these three parts, it should be noted that the *Moral Philosophy* follows Pufendorf in distinguishing between duties towards God, towards oneself, and towards others; but that it is much more decided than he was in assigning to philosophy only those duties towards God which manifest themselves in the fulfilment of the other two kinds. All the rest belong to theology as the science of the supernatural. Thus outward religious observances are not prescribed by the natural law of morality; nor are they forbidden by it. On this depends the duty of toleration. There were some who looked upon the rule of the Church as merely a subordinate part of the worldly system of government. In opposition to these, Thomasius develops his territorial system, according to which the State exercises the *jus circa sacra* only in order to preserve outward peace between the various religious communities. Nowhere did Thomasius gain more respect and renown than in his theory of the *Justum*, or natural law. Although he borrows a great deal here from his predecessors, so often referred to, yet he differs from them markedly owing to his much more decidedly non-theological position. Another distinguishing feature is, that he pays much less attention to the historical element, of which he is, to tell the truth, much more ignorant than they. Wherever the positive laws of a country are insufficient, there he brings in natural law to supplément them; and thus, more than any one else, he prepared the way for the tendency to *a priori* codification, that appeared soon after his day. Almost all who subsequently gave way to it were men who had been educated at Halle, which, through the influence of Thomasius, became the school of a rational and, in many instances, rationalistic philosophy of law. In his own case, the want of reverence for the past, that showed itself in his dislike of Roman law, was so far counterbalanced by a preference for German and provincial law that he shrank from over hastily throwing aside what had become historical. He goes so far as to utter a warning against the too speedy abolition of the torture, which he had himself stigmatized as immoral. Even his separation of law from

morality does not carry him nearly so far as it carried his successors, towards seeing in law nothing but a negative regulation applicable to external relations and capable of being enforced by compulsion, so that ultimately the whole legal and civil order becomes simply a gigantic system of compulsion.

C.—WOLFF. HIS SCHOOL. HIS OPPONENTS.

§ 290.

1. The grounds which justified us in ranking along with Leibnitz the three thinkers just named, were, in the first place, their individualistic tendency and the antagonism they manifested to Spinoza; and, in the second place, the fact that, unlike the empiricists, who share with them that tendency and that antagonism, they tried to deduce the laws of the physical and the moral world, not from experience, but from reason. In other respects, their teaching stands in no direct relation to that of their great countrymen. For Tschirnhausen is an adherent of Descartes and Spinoza, Pufendorf of Grotius and Hobbes, Thomasius of both, but none of the three of Leibnitz. Now, however, we have to deal with a man who, although he himself admits that he has learned something from all three, yet adopts Leibnitz's doctrines so completely that many have come to regard him as merely a commentator upon them. He is more than this. He has so transformed the philosophy of Leibnitz; that in point of method it comes up to the standards established by Tschirnhausen,—that natural law as developed by Pufendorf becomes an essential part of it, and, lastly, that it exhibits a more intelligible form and a more German dress than Thomasius was able to give to his reasoning. Under these circumstances we can hardly wonder that he protests against being called a mere follower of Leibnitz. It is difficult to strike a mean between the statement that he is an eclectic, a statement which would do him an injustice since his philosophy is really all cast in one mould, and the assertion that he stands in much the same relation to Leibnitz and the three thinkers just named, as Empedocles did to his predecessors (*vid.* § 44). The latter view flatters him too highly, for his merit is limited rather to what is merely matter of form.

2. CHRISTIAN WOLFF was born at Breslau on Jan. 24th, 1679. While still at school, his discussions with Catholics made him familiar with their scholastic doctrines, as well as with those

of the orthodox Protestants. At the University of Jena he hardly devoted so much attention to theology, to which faculty he nominally belonged, as to mathematics, physics, and philosophy. The latter he studied simultaneously under Hebenstreit, a follower of the Schoolmen, and Treuner, whose tendencies were anti-scholastic and Cartesian. A more important influence than either of these was his acquaintance with the work of Tschirnhausen and afterwards with the author himself, as well as the diligent study of Grotius and Pufendorf. In 1703 he took his degree in Leipsic, after presenting his dissertation: *De philosophia practica universali*, which first drew the attention of Leibnitz to him. There he delivered mathematical and philosophical lectures and wrought diligently at the *Acta eruditorum* until 1706, when he accepted the professorship of mathematics at Halle. After some years he began to lecture on physics as well as on mathematics, and in 1711 he took up philosophy also. These duties he continued to discharge with great success, until in 1723 the notorious clique drove him out of Halle. Only in one point does he appear as a disciple of Thomasius, whose method of philosophy had no other interest for him,—he delivered his lectures in German, and in much purer German than that thinker had done. From 1723 to 1741 he was a professor at Marburg, and, as such, a subject of the King of Sweden. In 1735 he had been invited to return to Halle, but declined. In 1741 he was again urged to do so, and this time he complied with the request. He lived there, finding more satisfaction in his literary than in his academic success, until 9th April, 1754, when he died as Chancellor of the University and Privy Councillor of Prussia, Vice-president of the Academy of St. Petersburg, and Baron of the Holy Roman Empire. The following may be named, in chronological order, as the most important of his writings:—To the period of his life in Halle belong: *Aërometriæ elementa* (1709); *Foundations of the entire Mathematical Sciences* (1710); and in a Latin dress: *Elementa mathes. universæ* (2 vols., 1713–15); *Reasonable Thoughts on the Powers of the Human Understanding*, etc. (Logic), (Halle, 1712, 8th ed., 1736); *Ratio prælectionum Wolfianarum*, etc. (an encyclopædic review of his system), (Halle, 1718); *Reasonable Thoughts upon God, the World, and the Soul* (Metaphysics), (Halle, 1719, 5th ed., 1732); *Reasonable Thoughts on the Conduct of Man* (Moral Philosophy), (Halle, 1720); *Reason-*

able Thoughts on the Social Life of Man (Political Philosophy), (Halle, 1721); *Various Essays towards the Knowledge of Nature and Art* (Experimental Physics), (3 vols., Halle, 1721–23); *Reasonable Thoughts on the Workings of Nature* (Theoretical Physics), (Halle, 1723).—To the period of his life in Marburg belong: *Notes to the Reasonable Thoughts upon God, the World, and the Soul* (Frankf., 1724); *Reasonable Thoughts on the Purposes of Natural Things* (Teleology), (Frankf., 1724); *Reasonable Thoughts on the Parts of Man, Animals, and Plants* (Physiology), (Frankf., 1725); *Full Accounts of his German Writings* (Frankf., 1726); *Philosophia rationalis, s. Logica* (Frankf., 1728, 4to); *Horæ subsecivæ Marburgenses* (12 parts, 1729); *Philosophia prima, s. Ontologia* (Frankf., 1729, 4to); *Cosmologia generalis* (Frankf., 1731, 4to); *Psychologia empirica* (Frankf., 1732, 4to); *Psychologia rationalis* (Frankf., 1734, 4to); *Theologia naturalis* (Frankf., 1736–37, 2 vols., 4to); *Philosophia practica universalis* (Frankf., 1738–39). Lastly, after his return to Halle, there appeared the remaining seven volumes of the *Jus naturæ methodo scientifica pertractatum*, the first volume of which had been printed in 1740, at Frankfort-on-the-Oder. Together they form eight vols. 4to; and the *Jus gentium* (Halle, 1749, 4to) is really a ninth in the same series. Last of all came *Philosophia moralis* (1750–53, 4 vols., 4to). Besides these there are extant six volumes containing collections of his minor works (1736–40, 8vo).

Cf. C. G. Ludovici: *Entwurf einer vollständigen Historie der Wolff'schen Philosophie*, Leipz., 1738. (Gottsched): *Historische Lobschrift auf den weiland*, etc. Halle, 1755, 4to.

3. The fact that there is in our soul both a *facultas cognoscitiva* and a *facultas appetitiva* makes Wolff distinguish *Philosophia practica* from what he calls *Metaphysica* instead of *Philosophia theoretica*, as we should have expected. He takes up *Logic* before either of these, rather upon pedagogic than upon more solid grounds. The detailed Latin exposition of this discusses historical, mathematical, and philosophical knowledge in the *Discursus præliminaris*, and then goes on to repeat the definition of philosophy, which had been already given in the *Elementa aërometriæ* in 1709. It is the science of the possible, so far as it can be realized. Although in his German writings Wolff always employs the word *Weltweisheit*

(*sapientia secularis*), yet this definition excludes the limitation to the finite, which Thomasius had imposed. He brings everything within the sphere of the science, and expressly mentions natural theology, philosophy of law, of art, of medicine, and so on, as parts of the system. Further, as Wolff always regards possibility as freedom from contradiction, this definition makes the law of identity the highest formal principle, and thus proclaims reasonableness as the chief characteristic of philosophy, and intelligibility as its chief merit. We can almost imagine it is Thomasius who is speaking, when, in the Preface to his *Logic*, he says that the principal defects of the philosophy of the time are the want of evidence, which rests upon definite conceptions, and the little regard paid to practical utility. Again, in altering the formula of Tschirnhausen (§ 289, 2) so as to assert that only those sentences are true, the subject of which requires or determines the predicate, he at least comes very near to limiting philosophy entirely to analytical judgments, *i.e.*, to applications of nothing but the law of identity. This also explains why with Wolff the philosophical and the (elementary) mathematical method coincide. Next, as regards logic itself, in his anxiety to get rid of all the rubbish of the Schoolmen, he accepts the views expressed by Ramus in his efforts at reform (§ 239, 3), and by the *Port-Royal Logic* (§ 268, 3); but it is chiefly the lead of Leibnitz and Tschirnhausen that he follows. He develops the opinions of the former where, in his theory of the concept, he adopts and completes the distinction between obscure and clear, confused and distinct conceptions; what he says in the same place as to its being characteristic of definitions to explain the origin of the thing defined, is directly borrowed from Tschirnhausen. On the other hand, it was Leibnitz who rescued him from the contempt for the syllogism with which Tschirnhausen had inspired him. Up to the last, however, he regards only the conclusions of the First Figure as perfect; and accordingly, in his short German outline of logic, he discusses them alone, although in his more elaborate Latin work he shows how the two other Figures can be reduced to the First. The first, or theoretical, part of logic is not nearly so elaborately treated of as the second, or practical, part, which gives a detailed account of the criterion of truth, the degrees of certainty, opinion, belief, and knowledge, the distinction between *a posteriori* and *a priori* knowledge—words which,

as for the first time in Leibnitz and Tschirnhausen, mean much the same as what is discovered by observation and what is discovered by reason,—and finally the usefulness of logic for all possible circumstances in life.

4. The speculative part of philosophy, *Metaphysics*, is divided, upon the basis of the three chief objects of human knowledge, into cosmology, psychology, and theology, the two latter of which he also classes together and designates by Leibnitz's name of "pneumatics." Clearly, however, the theories of physical and intellectual existences must be preceded by a theory of existence in general. For this *metaphysica de ente* there was current in Wolff's day not merely the name of Ontosophy applied to it by Clauberg, but also that of *Ontology*, which was favoured by others. He selected the latter of these two, and he assigned to it the position of *philosophia prima*, or "fundamental science," because what it discovers of the *ens* as such, naturally holds good of all *entia*. That these inquiries must exhibit a great number of points of resemblance to what the Schoolmen, following on the track of Aristotle, had said in regard to predicables and categories, is for Wolff a matter neither for surprise nor for reproach. He begins by setting up as formal principles the Law of Identity and the Law of Sufficient Reason, making the latter appear simply as a deduction from the former. After insisting upon the rule of method, that we ought to begin by stating the thought upon which any consequence depends, he commences the inquiry with the most indefinite and most general categories, *Nihilum* and *Aliquid*, between which there is nothing intermediate; so that he denies all Becoming, and maintains as an irrefragable principle the maxim *ex nihilo nihil fit*. By the help of the conceptions of the impossible and the possible, of the indefinite and the definite, he reaches the anti-Spinozistic proposition, which must be regarded as the most important in his whole ontology—that only what is completely determined (*omnimode determinatum*) is real, but that what is of this nature is an individual thing. Perfect determination is therefore the famous *principium individuitatis*, and is at the same time the *complementum possibilitatis*, by the aid of which the possible becomes the actual. If the *determinans*, and therefore the *ratio sufficiens*, of a thing lies within itself, that thing is *a se* and therefore (absolutely) necessary; if it lies in something else, the thing is *ab alio* or *contingens*, or necessary

hypothetice. In his detailed investigations into quantity and measure, he gives the outlines of a philosophy of mathematics (especially arithmetic), and he then proceeds to take up quality. Finally, he explains the conceptions of order, truth, and perfection, keeping in view the Scholastic maxims—*omne ens est unum verum et bonum;* and perfection is made to consist in the unity of the manifold, agreement in difference. The second part deals with the various kinds of existences. These are either simple or complex. To the latter, with the consideration of which Wolff begins, must be attributed extension, time, space, motion, form, origin from something else, transition into something else, and so on. But none of these can be applied to simple existences, which are really all that is of the nature of substance, since the whole of those predicates properly denote only what is accidental. Wolff is quite at one with Leibnitz in holding that these simple existences are really unities or monads, that they are metaphysical points, since they are not divisible even in thought, that they neither come into existence nor perish, that there are not two of them exactly alike, and so on. He further agrees with Leibnitz in maintaining that their essential nature is power and limited power. There is, however, one important difference. At first he left the matter doubtful, but subsequently he denied emphatically that this power is a power of perception. Accordingly, while Leibnitz is so fond of calling his monads souls, or at least beings of the nature of souls, Wolff prefers to apply to them the expression *atomi naturæ.*

5. Ontology, according to Wolff, should be followed by general (or transcendental) *Cosmology*, the basis of physics. This ought to begin by examining the origin and the qualities of all the elements of the world. By a world is to be understood a connection or association of finite things, and by this (or the visible) world the association of finite things actually in existence. Since in this all changes in the things are effected by means of motion, the world is a machine, and may aptly be compared to the works of a clock in which, granted its present construction, everything is (hypothetically) necessary. Thus the slightest alteration in the established connection would substitute a new world in place of the old one. (Hence too every miracle requires a second miracle, the *miraculum restitutionis*, by which the hand of the clock, which has been moved forward, is put back again to its place.) The

order of nature, or the laws of the physical world, accordingly coincide exactly with the laws of motion, which no one has formulated better than Huygens did. The component parts of the visible world, which are already associated together, are called bodies. Only the elements of these, the absolutely simple sorts of existence, are substances; the aggregates present to us the appearance of substances, only because we cannot distinguish between the large number of substances that go to compose them. The latter are therefore *phænomena substantiata*, to which our confused perception attributes the character of substance. Of course among these aggregates of substances also it is impossible to find two exactly alike. As their extension is a phenomenon, and therefore the work of the imagination, so also their *vis motrix, i.e.*, the sum of the primitive (elementary) forces, as it appears in our confused way of looking at them, is likewise a phenomenon, not entirely but about half the work of the imagination. If we analyse bodies in thought, we ultimately reach, long after passing the limits of perception, certain primitive *corpuscula*, which are composed of the incorporeal *atomi naturæ*, and which in turn form the elements of the derived *corpuscula*. The atomic philosophy, which explains everything from the association of small bodies, is therefore fully justified. Only it must not imagine that it is the true cosmology, for this must go further back. On the other hand, the purpose of *Physics*, or the special theory of bodies, really coincides with that which the atomic philosophers have set before themselves. In order to establish a physical philosophy of this kind, it is, according to Wolff, necessary in the first place to make a careful collection of what we have learned from the experience presented to us, and from the experiments we have deliberately made. His *Useful Essays* are meant to be contributions towards such a "History of Nature"; only after this has appeared, is the "Science of Nature" to follow, and the latter is to treat from a "dogmatic" point of view what in the former was the subject of "experimental" investigation. When fully elaborated, (dogmatic) physics would deduce everything from the connection and motion of the primitive corpuscules, which form the ultimate ground of explanation in this science, just as simple substances do in cosmology. Our physics, however, is far from having reached this point of perfection. Even where it approaches it, in so far as it explains everything mechanically,

i.e., from connection and motion, it never gets beyond *corpuscula* of a higher order, and never penetrates to the primitive atoms. In general, however, it is still unable to give a mechanical explanation at all, and has to be content with "physical" explanations that take as their starting-point certain masses (like water, air, fire, heat, and so on), our confused apprehension of which is proved by the fact that we think of them as completely homogeneous, whereas they are without doubt composed of a great variety of *corpuscula*. Finally, in the third place, besides mechanical and physical explanations, there are teleological explanations. These are not, as physical explanations were, a mere make-shift. Everything, at least if it is to be completely explained, must be considered, on the one hand, according to the causes that actually produce it; on the other, according to the end it serves. This point of view Leibnitz had already indicated, and it was elaborated by Wolff particularly in his *Reasonable Thoughts on the Purposes*, etc. The two ways of looking at a thing are not really contradictory, for if God has foreseen that this or that follows from the nature of things, and has yet created them, those consequences are just God's purposes. The teleological point of view is specially prominent in his examination of what is organic, in the definition of which ontology had already included the idea of an end. This may account for the fact that *telcology* is often ranked along with cosmology and physics as a third division of natural science. In the treatise, *On the Use of the Parts*, etc., Wolff does not take a single step without inquiring what the purpose of a thing is. The answer generally points to the use it has for man. Even the brilliancy of the stars he believes to be given them that they may serve as a light for mankind in the night time.

6. The name *Psychology*, which Wolff applies to the third part of his metaphysical system, occurs as early as Goclenius and his pupil Cosmann; but to such an extent had it fallen out of use that it almost looks as if he considered himself the inventor of the term. As in natural science, so here too he has put the empirical treatment of the subject before the dogmatic ("rational"); but the parallelism between the titles is not the only thing to show that the two should be taken together in any account given of the system. Wolff did not, like Leibnitz, conceive of all simple substances as perceptive, and therefore he had to combine for himself the

two characteristics of substantiality and perception. Starting from the fact of consciousness, he begins by deducing from this, as Descartes had done, the existence of the soul. He then goes on to reason that we are bound to conclude from the connection between perception and apperception, which makes the soul a thinking being, that it is incorporeal and simple, *i.e.*, that it is likewise a primitive substance. It too must therefore possess the power of continually altering itself. To deduce from the alterations of its *vis representativa* all the capacities of the soul as modifications of this *vis*, is the purpose of the *Psychologia rationalis*, which receives as material from the *Psychologia empirica* the facts that are to be explained. Wolff begins with the *faculties of knowledge*, which, following Leibnitz's classification of perceptions as obscure and confused, clear and distinct, he divides into an inferior and a superior part. To the former of these belong sensation, imagination, fancy (*facultas fingendi*), and memory, while the stages in the latter are attention, understanding, and reason. Under the question of sensation, he discusses the connection between body and soul, and asserts that the only tenable view is the theory of pre-established harmony, an expression which with him denotes simply this relation and never the harmony of the universe. In this connection he remarks that, as the soul begets its sensations entirely from within itself, although in exact correspondence with what goes on outside of itself, an idealistic system of physics—and long before Descartes there were thinkers who "admitted the existence of nothing but souls and spirits"—would assume exactly the same form as his own had done (*German Metaph.* §§ 777, 787). It is in no wise inconsistent with this, rather it is a necessary consequence of it, that he goes so far as to reproduce, word for word, the teachings of materialism, when he is arguing against those who assert that the soul exercises an influence upon the body. His view is, that the processes of soul and of body are independent of each other, that there is a correspondence between them, given in experience, but that there is no perpetual miracle, such as the Occasionalists assume, nothing in fact except a rational and intelligible connection. If this can be reached without pre-established harmony, he has no objections, he is not slavishly bound to the word; as he says, he has been led to use it quite involuntarily. In connection with imagination, it is important that he devotes so much

attention to the association of ideas, and makes an effort to reduce this to a small number of definite laws. With regard to the *practical* relation, the *vis appetitiva*, the most important point is the complete dependence of will upon knowledge, a dependence that possibly required to be emphasized all the more strongly since Thomasius had given currency to the opposite view. He holds as firmly as did Leibnitz, that what is seen to be a good must necessarily be desired; but by a good we are to understand what makes our condition more perfect, by an evil the contrary. The form of will that is determined by the lower faculty of knowledge, *i.e.*, by obscure and confused perceptions, is the lower or sensual will, which, when it rises to a certain pitch, produces passion; that which follows the higher faculty, is will properly so called. Thus, although there is no *æquilibrium arbitrii*, yet man is free, for he chooses what pleases himself. What Wolff says further in his *Psychology* in regard to the immortality of the soul, as distinguished from mere imperishableness, in regard to the previous existence of the individual in the spermatozoa, and so on, is all taken from Leibnitz.

7. In the last part of his Metaphysics, the *Natural Theology*,—so called to distinguish it from positive theology, which rests upon supernatural revelation,—Wolff appears as merely a commentator, and often a slavish commentator, on what Leibnitz had said in the *Théodicée*. The proofs of the existence of God, which in both instances are first discussed, are reduced to the *a posteriori*, and the *a priori* argument. The former reasons from the contingent character of our own (and the world's) existence to a really independent being, *i.e.*, one which exists *a se*. As the nerve of the argument lies in the fact that contingency, as *ab alio esse*, points to something beyond itself, Wolff is willing to admit the validity of the teleological argument, only on condition that we reason from the *contingent* order of the world to One who has so ordered it. That to which we are led by reasoning *a contingentia mundi*, must contain *eminenter* everything that what we started with contains in actual reality, but not what is the work of the imagination, or phenomenal. Thus it is free from all limits and from finitude, and is absolutely perfect. This argument, which begins with existence and ends with the Being of perfect nature, is treated of in the first part of his *Natural Theology*. The second part presents us with an argument *a priori*, which pursues a parallel

course in an opposite direction,—it starts from the most perfect Being, and ends by proving (His) existence. By reality must be understood, that which is a real predicate of anything that exists, so that it contrasts in the first place with its negative, absence; and in the second place with what is simply phenomenal and dependent upon our confused perception, what is mere appearance. God is therefore defined as the sum of all realities that are actual (*compossible*). This last clause secures that the conception should be possible, and its possibility was what Leibnitz was anxious to prove. And further, the maintenance of reality, as he shows, breaks the force of all the objections that are drawn from the idea of a greenest island, a swiftest motion, and so on, for green, motion, etc., are merely phenomenal, not real. The most perfect being is the sum of all realities because, if we could imagine a single one added to it, it would have been so far defective. As existence belongs neither to what is negative nor to what is phenomenal, we cannot but attribute it to the most perfect being. This Being therefore exists. The rest of Wolff's *Natural Theology* is taken up with showing that God, as the Supreme Being, has an absolutely distinct knowledge of everything, and therefore of all possible worlds, and chooses the best; that all the arguments which are made against His wisdom and goodness from the existence of wickedness, prove nothing, and so on,—discussions which are all found in Leibnitz. The elaborate refutation of Spinoza is, however, entirely Wolff's work. Next to the existence of God, the point in which Wolff takes most particular interest, is the immortality of the soul, the continuity of which, as opposed to its mere imperishableness, he endeavours to prove. In a letter to Herr von Manteuffel, he says frankly that these two doctrines comprise rational theology, and he censures all attempts, such as Leibnitz had made, to explain the mysteries of faith. He declares himself decidedly opposed to one of the dogmas, the reasonableness of which Leibnitz had tried to show,—eternal punishment. As regards miracles, he does not indeed deny their possibility, but he often comes very near to doing so, to such an extent does he limit the sphere of all that is supernatural, including of course revelation, not merely by the *miraculum restitutionis*, already referred to, which he demands in the case of every miracle, but by laying down a large number of conditions under which alone the miracle is admissible. Compared with

Leibnitz, Wolff approaches much nearer to the consistent rationalism of later times. In regard to mere outward ritual, on the other hand, Leibnitz appears as much the more heterodox.

8. Wolff shows himself much more independent of Leibnitz in that branch of the subject with which he was occupied before he made the latter's acquaintance, namely *Practical Philosophy*. This is developed in outline in his German writings on moral and political philosophy; but he goes into it much more fully in his Latin works on *Philos. pract. universalis*, *Jus naturæ*, *Jus gentium*, *Philos. moralis*. From these we see that just as Leibnitz's views had corresponded on the idealistic side to the materialistic teachings of the Sceptics (§ 277), the Mystics (§ 278), Locke (§ 280), and indeed almost of Condillac (§ 283, 3, 4), so Wolff is the direct antagonist of the English ethical systems (§ 281), of Mandeville, and to a certain extent of Helvetius (§ 284). Wolff, as opposed to these thinkers, makes the reason alone the *principium cognoscendi* in the case of all rules for the direction of our will—rules which he is fond of comparing with the logical ones that regulate our thought. So far does he carry this rationalism, that, in contrast to Pufendorf, he adopts the formula of Grotius, to the effect that these rules would be valid, even if there were no God. The good is good, not through the will of God, but "by and in itself"; and therefore it is binding even upon atheists, as is proved by the example of the Chinese. Again, he does not represent as the end of action a happiness that is more or less tinged with sensuality. He lays down as the supreme law: "Seek ever to advance towards greater perfection"; and he defines the perfection of an action, in a purely logical fashion, as conformity, not merely with the nature of the person who acts, but also in a very special degree with the consequences to which it leads. (Extravagance, which results in impoverishment, drunkenness, whose end is discomfort, and so on, are instances of imperfection.) Where he speaks of happiness, he regards it more as a supplement of perfection, and makes it consist in the approval of conscience, *i.e.*, of reason. Accordingly, he makes the *beatitudo philosophica*, or the chief good, consist in steady progress towards greater perfection. For this very reason he has no objection to others finding the basis of all duties in the happiness to which their fulfilment leads, provided only that they do not forget that this is not the ultimate basis. (This exactly corresponds to his atti-

tude towards the atomic philosophy, already described.) Like the source from which he draws the moral law, like the end which he sets before those who fulfil it, so too the form of this ethical philosophy is essentially different from that of the English thinkers; instead of a theory of the virtues, we have here a theory of the goods, often too echoes of an imperative theory of duties, in which virtue becomes promptitude in the fulfilment of duty. Only in one respect does he agree with them, and it is necessary that he should do so if he is to be called their antagonist—individualism is the characteristic feature of the practical philosophy of both. Although he follows Aristotle in dividing practical philosophy into ethics, economics, and politics, he does not go so far as to join him in making the whole more important that the parts (§ 89, 2). Rather, he continues to look upon all moral associations as contracts which men made in order to develop their powers to the full by combination. In this respect he hardly makes an exception even of the parental relation. We must begin by pointing out as one merit of Wolff, that in his practical as in his theoretical philosophy, he has given us an encyclopædic review of its individual parts, and of their mutual connection. His *Philosophica practica universalis* stands in the same relation to the three parts we have mentioned as his ontology does to his cosmology, psychology, and theology. It is the common basis of all three; and the two volumes that are devoted to its discussion aim at establishing the principles upon which a distinction is made between good and bad actions, and which render obligations and rights possible; and further, at deducing all moral action from human nature, a process in the course of which the general ideas of freedom, imputation, moral value of an action, conscience, conflict of duties, are treated of in detail. While there can be no doubt as to the fact of this part's being put in the forefront, or as to the explanation of that fact, it is very difficult to decide what position really belongs to the *Jus naturæ*, the elaborate discussion of which in eight volumes shows the importance that Wolff attached to it. In the first of these volumes, which professes to examine innate obligations and rights, Wolff follows the classification he found already in existence, and treats of the various duties as duties towards oneself, towards one's fellow-men, and towards God. The volume thus contains partly repetitions of what had been taught in the *Philos. pract. univers.*, partly anti-

cipations of what is discussed in the *Philosophia moralis*. Nor does Wolff assign a more decided position to the *Jus naturæ* in the casual remarks he makes as to its relation to other parts of his doctrine. For example, he says that the *Philos. pract. universalis* contains the principles of the *Jus naturæ;* and again, that the *Philosophia moralis* presupposes the *Jus naturæ*, exactly as the latter presupposes the *Philos. pract. univers.* From this we should conclude that the *Jus naturæ* contains the general principles of the *Philosophia moralis*. But it is quite at variance with any such relation between them, that in the second part of the *Jus naturæ*, which treats of property and its acquisition; in the third, which treats of the transference of property; in the fourth and fifth, which treat of contracts; in short, in his whole theory of acquired rights, a large number of entirely distinct inquiries occur, of which no use at all is made in the subsequent treatise on moral philosophy. The explanation of this inconsistency lies in the fact that Wolff, while he lays great stress on the distinction between *obligatio externa* and *interna*, hand in hand with which goes the classification of *obligationes et jura* as either *perfecta* or *imperfecta*, *i.e.*, as capable or not capable of being enforced, does not keep the two even so far apart as Thomasius did, not to speak of his drawing such a line between morality and legality as was drawn at a later period by Kant. Exactly as the *justum* and *honestum* are confused, so the *decorum*, which Thomasius distinguished from them, is often confused with both. This accounts for purely moral motives, and even æsthetical considerations, being mixed up with strictly legal inquiries, a form of confusion which, with its converse, is very frequent in Wolff, and which naturally renders unavoidable the many repetitions that add so much to the bulk of his writings on practical philosophy. Where elaborate inquiries are set on foot to discover whether it is contrary to the *jus naturæ* to make a loud smacking noise while eating, we must be prepared for thick quarto volumes. And again, as duties towards oneself include the right use of the reason, and therefore correct definition, judgment, and reasoning, the whole of logic is included in moral philosophy, a proceeding which of course vastly enlarges the compass of the latter. His treatment of the subject would have been shorter, and at the same time clearer, if he had confined himself to the rules for the guidance of the will, maintaining strictly, as he is always endeavouring to do, the

distinction between those which are perfect and those which are imperfect,—legal duties and duties of affection. This is true, at least, of the part where he treats of man as an individual. For moral associations, as was seen afterwards in the case of Kant, are by such a separation subjected to an abstract and lifeless examination; and it is just the confusion between the legal and the moral which saves Wolff, when he is dealing with the question of the succession of children to the property of those who have died intestate, from taking refuge, with Grotius and so many others, in the fiction of a quasi-testament, and which puts him in a position to maintain the only correct view. Here, too, however, there are signs of uncertainty manifested.—As regards the duties of the individual, man is justified and bound to care for his own perfection. It is only by appealing to experience that Wolff succeeds in showing that this is inseparably bound up with the perfection of others. Perhaps it is just the consciousness of the weakness of his argument at this point that makes him hurry so much in this part of his system; he even runs the risk of omitting some of the necessary intermediate steps in passing from one stage to another. By thus bringing the two together, he makes in ethics the transition from duties towards oneself to duties towards others, and in natural law that from the examination of the individual to the examination of communities. The latter are either simple forms of society, the elements of which are individuals, or complex forms, which themselves consist of smaller communities. To the former class belong the associations between husband and wife, between parent and child, between master and servant. These three combine to make up the first complex form of society, the household, the rights and duties of which are the subject-matter of *Economics*. In this portion of his work his homely morality, free alike from excess and from laxity, comes cheerfully to the surface. If we compare Wolff's discussion on monogamy with the expressions of Thomasius, or even of Leibnitz, in regard to polygamy, or if we put Wolff's treatment of marriage side by side with the uncivilized fashion in which it is afterwards treated by Kant, no one can help being filled with respect for the stern, honest father of the household, in spite of the pedantic formality which mars his detailed discussion of the subject. Individual households, just like the individual man, cannot subsist without the community. Through the contract which they make

for mutual support and security, there arises the "commonwealth," or the State, the well-being, peace, and security of which are the highest end which those who live in it can pursue. *Political philosophy* teaches us how these are to be maintained. By the well-being of the whole is to be understood the sum-total of the perfection of the individual citizens; as this was seen to be identical with happiness, the perfection of a community increases with the happiness of its members. Wolff thus stands in an antagonism to Pufendorf, of which he himself is fully conscious. For Pufendorf deduces even duties towards oneself from the social principle, while here a diametrically opposite course is pursued. The ultimate ground of the social contract is, that without it the individual cannot attain to the highest perfection (*cf. Jus nat.* vii., p. 143). As by this contract, which concedes to the whole the right of exercising compulsion upon individuals, the aggregate of individuals (the people) makes itself into a State, the supreme power originally rests with the people; according as it retains this in its own hands, or surrenders it to definite instruments, there arise the three pure, as well as the mixed Aristotelian forms of government; and these varieties are further increased owing to the fact that the sovereign power may be limited or unlimited, and that it may be surrendered temporarily or in perpetuity. Everywhere the well-being of the State continues to be the supreme law. On the one side, it forms the sole check upon the power of the sovereign; upon the other, it rises above all the fundamental laws of a State. (That is, where there are such laws.) Before the well-being of the whole, individual rights too must retire into the background; and where Wolff goes into detail, the bureaucratic character of his system of government becomes at once very apparent. The sovereign power has to see that the various callings in life stand in a fitting numerical relation to each other; and it has the superintendence of schools, churches, and places of public amusement, which are classed together as means of attaining moral perfection. It controls penal jurisdiction, a point in regard to which Wolff has the credit of having drawn attention to the difference between chastisement, which tends to improvement, and punishment, which is merely deterrent. (In regard to the torture, which he never quite rejected, his later writings propose many more limitations than his earlier ones. Capital punishment he looks upon as

necessary for the self-defence of the State, and therefore he regards it as permissible only in cases where the individual is entitled to draw the sword. The indisputable right of the State to treat with ignominy the corpse of the suicide, ought not to be extended to atheists. Where they propagate their doctrines, he considers it quite justifiable to send them into exile.) Detailed inquiries into the relation between natural and civil law, into sovereign rights, and into the duties of rulers and subjects, occupy the rest of his treatise on political philosophy, to which his *Law of Nations* forms a sequel. Like Pufendorf, Wolff sees in international law simply an extended form of natural law, an extension which is rendered possible by the fact that the community too is a person, and that therefore States can enter into the same relations as private individuals. Here Wolff, like Grotius, distinguishes a necessary or natural law of nations, to which all peoples are subject as members of the one great republic of States, from the positive law of nations, which rests upon the presumption of contracts, actual or tacit, between individual States. It will be readily understood that in the first chapter, where the duties of nations towards themselves are discussed, a good deal is said which really belongs to internal constitutional law. On the other hand, the inquiries of the second chapter, which have to do with the duties of nations to one another, deal with international law, properly so called. The third chapter, which treats of the property of nations, discusses questions of a miscellaneous character, inasmuch as the property of the individual citizens, its protection, prescriptive rights, and so on, come under consideration, almost as much as does the property of the State. The fourth chapter deals with contracts, the fifth with the settlement of disputes, the sixth with the right to make war, the seventh with the laws of war. Here a strict distinction is made between just and unjust war, as well as between natural and positive law. According to the former, for example, poisoned arrows, assassins, and so on, are allowable in war; according to the latter they are forbidden. The eighth chapter discusses peace and the conclusion of peace, the last the rights of ambassadors.

9. A system that commended itself by completeness, a fixed terminology, and an easily-handled method, was bound to attract a large number of adherents. In the WOLFFIAN SCHOOL, mention must be made of one of Wolff's oldest scholars, and his

companion in suffering when he was driven from Halle, LUDWIG PHILIPP THÜMMIG (1697–1728), whose chief work, *Institutiones Philosophiæ Wolfianæ* (Frankf. and Leips., 1725–26, 2 vols.), has been frequently reprinted. By the conciseness of its form it contributed at least as much as did the writings of the master to the spread of Wolff's philosophy in Germany, all the more so that the latter used to appeal to it as a perfectly accurate account of his theories, while its effect abroad was increased by the excellence of its Latinity. In addition to this, Thümmig wrote a great number of small treatises, one of which, *Demonstratio immortalitatis animæ ex intima ejus natura deducta* (Halle, 1721), made a sort of sensation, although it failed to accomplish Thümmig's immediate purpose of establishing the distinction between immortality and mere imperishableness, as well as of representing the soul as incorporeal,—an idea at variance with the views of Leibnitz. This, with many other similar essays, is included in *Meletemata varii et rarioris argumenti* (Brunsw. and Leips., 1727), which Thümmig published shortly before his death.—GEORG BERNHARD BILFINGER (Jan. 23rd, 1693, to Feb. 18th, 1750) was another man of whom Wolff declared that he had thoroughly comprehended the meaning of his system, although the name of "Leibnitzo-Wolffian" philosophy, which he introduced, was not satisfactory. Among the very miscellaneous writings which he published in Latin, partly at Tübingen, partly at St. Petersburg, and partly also at Tübingen, must be mentioned: *De harmonia animæ et corporis humani maxime præstabilita ex mente illustris Leibnitii commentatio hypothetica* (Frankf., 1723); *De origine et permissione mali* (1724); but especially, *Dilucidationes philosophicæ de Deo, anima humana, mundo et generalibus rerum affectionibus* (Tübing., 1725, 4to) (very often reprinted afterwards). The last-mentioned was regarded for a long time in Germany and abroad as the best text-book of Wolffian metaphysics. The friendly reception it met with was due in some measure to the circumstance that the author was honestly pious, and was familiar with scholastic theology, so that he was able skilfully to face the misgivings suggested by theology, and to set them at rest. Where he differs from Wolff, it is to come into closer agreement with Leibnitz. A case in point is the name "monad." Here, however, he does not go so far as to make all monads percipient beings, a position he had taken up in his first work. On the other hand, he proposes to

attribute to all of them power of motion, an idea that brings him nearer than Wolff to the atomic theory. The object which Thümmig and Bilfinger had had in view was to represent in small compass and for wider circles of readers, in the one case the whole Wolffian system, in the other only the speculative part of it. Others attempted to work out the separate portions of the system in greater detail. As Wolff had really excluded nothing from the sphere of philosophy, this meant much the same thing as to treat philosophical and all other scientific subjects according to the principles of his philosophy. Of course the vast number of such treatises included a great many that were hasty and superficial; and we can readily understand that Wolff's opponents brought against him the same charge made before his time against Lully, and after him against Kant and Hegel. It was said that his teaching led men to construct everything *a priori*, and to decide everything before they have even got so far as to know it. Logic was developed by Jacob Friedrich Müller, Hansch, Baumeister, Schilling, and others, who adhered more or less closely to Wolff; in the same field must be mentioned Reusch, Hollmann, Engelhard, Gottsched, and Büttner, who, however, combined logic more with the introduction to philosophy, and partly also with metaphysics. Köhler, Rübel, and Walcher took up practical philosophy, particularly natural law. In theology the following came forward as more or less decided Wolffians: Reinbeck, Ribov, Ringier, Canz, Carpov, Carpzov, etc.; while among jurists there were Erath, Cramer, Ickstadt, Heineccius, Jariges, Nettelbladt. Even medicine supplies the names of Burggrav, Schreiber, Grosse, Thebesius.

10. The importance of ALEXANDER GOTTLIEB BAUMGARTEN compels us to accord to him a separate treatment. He was born at Berlin, on July 17th, 1714, and died on May 27th, 1762, at Frankfort, where, after lecturing at Halle from 1735 to 1740, he had been appointed to the chair of philosophy. While still a schoolboy at Berlin, he occupied himself with attempts to write poetry; afterwards he went to the Orphanage at Halle, where A. H. Francke took him to his table. This, combined with his intercourse with Breithaupt and Lange, naturally prejudiced him strongly against Wolff. But he studied him for himself, and gradually became a devoted adherent of the much-abused system. He appears as its decided advocate in his dissertation: *Meditationes philosophicæ de non-*

nullis ad poëma pertinentibus (Halle, 1735, 4to). He lectured on all parts of philosophy, at first following Wolff and Bilfinger and afterwards his own notes, which were the groundwork of his *Metaphysica* (Halle, 1739). His other writings, too, were notes for his academic lectures. Amongst these are *Ethica philosophica* (Halle, 1740); *Æsthetica* (*Frankf.-on-the-Oder*, 1750 and 1758, 2 vols.); *Acroasis logica in Christianum Wolf. dictabat A. G. B.* (Halle, 1761); *Initia philosophiæ practicæ primæ* (1760). Of the same character are the following, published after his death, *Sciagraphia encyclopædiæ philosophicæ* (Halle, 1769); *Philosophia generalis* (Halle, 1769); *Dictata juris naturæ*, etc. Baumgarten completed the work that Wolff had done so much to accomplish, for his encyclopædic review of the sciences goes into much greater detail than Wolff's did. He actually makes ceremony and expression the subject-matter of two sciences,—*Prcpologia* and *Emphaseologia*,—and includes practically everything within the sphere of his observations. Further, he follows up the track which Wolff had begun to lay down, by adhering even more firmly than the latter did to an exact terminology. As in doing so he often modifies the phraseology of the Schoolmen, and as Kant, who for a long time lectured from his *compendia*, adopted these improvements and transmitted them to us, it has come to pass that many changes in the earlier terminology (for example, the current signification of "subjective" and "objective," which is exactly the opposite of the meaning they had in the Middle Ages) are attributed to Kant, although Baumgarten either first adopted them or first made them stereotyped. (An instance is the usage which Leibnitz and Wolff attempted to introduce,—the latter with success,—according to which, "to have *a priori* knowledge of," means, not as it used to do, "to derive from its cause," but "to derive from the reason.") For the introduction and naturalization of German terms, too, Baumgarten is chiefly responsible, in spite of the fact that his *compendia* are in Latin. For as his notes, some of them on their very first appearance, others when they were republished, gave under the separate paragraphs a German rendering of the technical expressions employed in the text, he perpetuated such of Wolff's translations as he adopted; in points where they differed, Baumgarten succeeded in supplanting Wolff's expression, even when it was as good as his own, and therefore much more so when he had finer linguistic acumen and

taste upon his side. (As an example of the former case, take the fact that, in Baumgarten, Wolff's "*Vor und an sich*" is first changed to "*An und vor sich*," and ultimately to "*An und für sich.*") But Baumgarten's supplementary work is not confined to adding fresh demands to those Wolff had already made; he also carried out some things that Wolff had only demanded. In this he is helped by following suggestions and indications given by Leibnitz, which seem almost to have escaped Wolff's notice. The most important of these amplifications is this. He agrees with Wolff in distinguishing philosophy from theology; but at the same time he contrasts it strongly with mathematics, which deals with the quantitative, and in this way he reaches the definition he always maintained, that philosophy is *scientia qualitatum in rebus sine fide cognoscendarum.* Like Wolff, he makes the theory of knowledge precede both speculative and practical philosophy, the former of which embraces metaphysics, although, just as Wolff did, he often hesitates whether this theory ought not to be combined with psychology. He applies to it the name "*gnoscology.*" According to Leibnitz and Wolff, knowledge is partly of a lower (sensible), and partly of a higher (intellectual) kind; but Wolff, in his *Logic*, has dealt only with the latter. Baumgarten, therefore, begins with *Æsthetics*, or the theory of the lower form of knowledge, as the first part of "gnoseology," and then goes on to treat of *Logic* as the second part, applying to it the same name as his master had done. Now Leibnitz had shown that sense-perception, or confused perception of what is perfect, gives rise to the enjoyment of the beautiful (§ 288, 5); and further, that the corresponding instinctive production of what is perfect ma'-es a man an artist (*ibid.*, 6); accordingly, it is not so strange abmany nowadays suppose that in Baumgarten—exactly as in Kant—æsthetics means the theory of the lower form of knowledge, and at the same time the theory of the beautiful. The *scientia cognitionis sensitivæ* is identical with the *ars pulchre cogitandi*, for sensible perfection is beauty; the theory of the beautiful, therefore, deals with the *perfectio cognitionis sensitivæ qua talis.* This theory, which he also calls *philosophia poetica*, was now made the subject of detailed investigation for the first time since Aristotle and the Neoplatonists. It was intended to include in its general or *theoretical part* the science of discovery, the science of method, and the science of interpretation. The first of these was to

show how beautiful thoughts were to be discovered, the second how they were to be arranged, and the third how they were to be communicated to others. This division agrees exactly with that given in the *Meditationes*. Baumgarten has only discussed the first of these three. The other two, as well as the whole of the special or *practical part*, remained untouched. Even in his dissertation, which contains the outlines of his æsthetics, just as in his other writings, he shows that our critical faculty (*facultas dijudicandi*) puts us in a position to perceive perfection, *i.e.*, agreement in difference. If we do so with perfect distinctness, our judgment is intellectual; but if it rests upon a perception that is (though clear) confused, it is a judgment of taste. The former decides whether a thing is good or true, the latter whether a thing is *beautiful*. Thus, what appears perfect is beautiful, beauty is *perfectio phænomenon* (*Met.*, § 662). As the purpose of the science of discovery is to give an account of the origin of the beautiful, it naturally begins with an enumeration of the subjective conditions under which a beautiful work of art comes into existence. Accordingly, he here explains the conceptions of innate genius, practice, inspiration, etc., and attempts to give what he himself conceives of as a logic of the creative power of imagination. In divisions and subdivisions, which are made for the most part on the principle of dichotomy, and in the course of which six different alphabets are exhausted, the conceptions of æsthetical philosophy are discussed in a fashion which, as he is always either quoting the precepts of older teachers, Cicero, Horace, Quintilian, Longinus, etc., or citing passages from the ancient poets, early brought upon him the reproach of having allowed his interest in poetry to make him forget all the other arts. (This is not so much the case in his dissertation. Many of those marks of the poetical, which he speaks of there, are expressly said to apply also to works of formative art.) Of the three points which he mentions as indispensable to the beautiful—completeness, grandeur, truth—the second gives him an occasion for going very fully into a discussion of the sublime. At the same time, he takes up the dignified in representation, which, as personal or subjective grandeur, contrasts with and corresponds to material or objective grandeur. These are followed by his inquiries into internal (poetic) truth, and then comes (in the second volume) his examination of lucidity. Here a good deal is introduced that

really belongs to the science of interpretation. As regards the second part of the theory of knowledge—*Logic*, which deals not merely, as æsthetics does, with the *rationis analogon* but with the *ratio* itself, his *Acroasis logica* had its origin in notes to Wolff's philosophy of the reason: more independence is shown in the account of logic given in the *Philosophia generalis*, published by Förster after Baumgarten's death. The latter resembles the former in being minutely subdivided; but, except the reappearance of the Fourth Figure of the syllogism, it contains no noteworthy variations either from Wolff or from the *Acroasis logica*.—In *Metaphysics* he follows Wolff closely, but in doing so he includes again many statements which Leibnitz had made, and which Wolff had refused to accept; and further, he supplements the work of both where symmetry requires it. An illustration of the former is, that he once more applies the name monads to simple substances, and attributes to them percipient power, although he does not deduce universal harmony from this, but conversely deduces this from universal harmony. The most important instance of the latter is that he amplifies Leibnitz's law of thought, that everything has a reason, by the *principium rationati* that everything has a consequence, and then combines the two into the *principium utrinque connexorum*. Similarly he supplements Leibnitz's assertion that there are no two monads, or even things exactly alike, by the further statement that no more are there two entirely different, a result which might have been deduced from Leibnitz's *lex continui*. Just like Wolff, Baumgarten makes his psychology follow his ontology and cosmology. He begins with the empirical part of it. Here his treatment differs from Wolff's in being much shorter, and also in introducing a large number of laws, drawn from experience, in regard to the origin, lapse, and association of ideas. In his rational psychology, he defines the soul as *vis repræsentativa universi pro positu corporis humani in eodem*, and concludes from this, that it is not, like the body, a *phænomenon substantiatum*, but that for that reason it is imperishable. He then goes on to criticise the various views as to the origin of the soul, and its connection with the body. Naturally he declares in favour of pre-established harmony, and against the theory that after death the soul is absolutely incorporeal. Like Leibnitz, he accepts transformation in contrast to transmutation and metempsychosis. Finally, as regards natural

theology, from the conception of the all-perfect being he concludes that it can contain no negation, and that therefore its realities never form a contradiction, so that the most real being of all is possible; it follows that it excludes non-existence, as a negation, and therefore is God actually. After pointing out that no predicate belongs *univoce* to God and to finite things, he proceeds to speak of the essential attributes of God, and to examine His understanding, His will, creation, providence, and, lastly, revelation. In all this he does not differ in any essential points from Leibnitz and Wolff. Baumgarten holds that *Physics* should come after metaphysics, and after all the parts of this, not as with Wolff—at least, in fact—after cosmology, since teleology, which forms an essential part of physics, presupposes natural theology. He has not given us any works dealing with physical subjects. On the other hand, the attention he devoted to *Practical Philosophy* is shown by his treatise on *General Practical Philosophy*, already referred to, and by that upon *Ethics*, which forms the sequel to it. Between the two he inserted in his lectures a discussion of natural law. In the *Ethics*, he treats of our duties towards God, towards ourselves, and towards everything else. The last vague phrase is chosen because we have duties also towards beings above us and beneath us. He insists upon the necessity for philanthropy, and its expression, the spread of knowledge, that through this illumination (*illuminatio*) the state of darkness may give place to that of light.

11. One of Baumgarten's oldest pupils was his subsequent biographer, GEORG FRIEDRICH MEIER (29th March, 1718, to 21st June, 1777), who was a professor at Halle and a very prolific writer. Of his more elaborate works we shall here mention only: *Proof of Pre-established Harmony*, 1743; *Thoughts on the State of the Soul after Death*, 1746; *Defence of the same*, 1748; *Proof that the Human Soul lives for ever*, 1751; *Defence of this Proof*, 1753; *Second defence of the same*, 1753; *First Principles of all the Fine Arts and Sciences*, 3 pts., 1748 (reproduces the teaching of Baumgarten in his lectures at Halle); *Philosophical Ethics*, 5 pts., 1753–61; *Doctrine of Reason*, 1752; *Extract from the same*, 1752; *Metaphysics*, 4 vols., 1755–59; *Theoretical Doctrine of the Emotions*, 1759; *Philosophical Considerations on the Christian Religion*, 5 pts., 1761–67; *Investigation of various Matters in Philosophy*, 4 pts., 1768–71; *Doctrine of the Natural Social Rights and Duties of Man*,

2 pts., 1770–73. Besides these, we must mention his polemics against Gottsched. The latter show him as an adherent of the Swiss school, the first who publicly praised Klopstock's *Messias*, etc. Although Meier has written handbooks dealing with almost all parts of philosophy, and distinguished by accuracy and clearness, still these, and even his elaborate works on practical philosophy and natural theology, have done less to make him famous than his labours in the field of æsthetics. It was he who induced Baumgarten to publish his *Æsthetics*; and by often-repeated lectures, as well as by printed works, he became the most zealous apostle of the new science. Although he was not nearly so well read in the classics as Baumgarten, and was besides, as he himself confesses, quite without experience in music and painting, yet he made Halle the place specially frequented by those who wished to study the "fine arts." A determined opponent of the principle of imitation as applied by Batteux,—a principle which generally had the conception of the beautiful surreptitiously introduced to support it,—Meier agrees with Baumgarten in holding that by beauty we must understand indistinctly (*i.e.*, sensuously) perceived perfection (*i.e.*, correspondence with an end), and accordingly lays down as the supreme law of æsthetics, applicable to all the fine arts alike, that we should strive after the greatest beauty in sensuous knowledge. He always insists, however, that we are not to suppose that the clear knowledge of perfection is necessary to artistic creation, or that æsthetics will endow a man with the spirit of beauty. Baumgarten had distinguished the two as *æstheticologus* and *æstheticus*. This is the point in which Meier and the Halle school of poetry,—largely composed of his admirers,—specially opposed the tendency of Gottsched and approximated to the views of the Swiss school. It accords quite well with the fact that, convinced as he was of the harmony between philosophy and theology,—the former of which develops in a scientific manner the natural, the latter the supernatural revelation of God,—convinced, indeed, that the latter depended upon the former, he still protested so energetically against the philosophical homilies of his time, in which Christ was addressed as "adorable monad." In general, his writings,—his treatise upon prejudices, for example,—exhibit a clear and intelligent apprehension, that frowns upon all exaggeration. A sensation was created by his views in regard to the souls of animals, among which he assumes very various

stages, the highest, and even the lowest, showing degrees of reason, and being perhaps the germs of future human souls. Still more opposition was roused by his openly admitting that, while it was perhaps possible to prove from the principles of philosophy the imperishableness of the human soul, no such proof was possible with regard to personal immortality. He pointed out indeed that it was still more impossible to prove the negative of this; but that concession did not satisfy his readers, and a host of attacks compelled him to modify the view he had expressed. There are two things which Meier especially aims at in all his inquiries—that his teachings should be intelligible, and that they should be practically useful. In his *Ontology*, which otherwise contains but little that is remarkable, he even attempts to avoid as unpractical the question whether the elements of all things are monads. (Perhaps he was himself permanently influenced by the lectures which, at the request of Frederick the Great, he delivered upon Locke's *Essay*.) This explains too his attitude in his *Cosmology*. There, after defining the world as the sum of all finite things,—which is itself finite and therefore limited by space and time, and in which strict connection and therefore hypothetical necessity, but not fatalism, is supreme,—he refuses positively to decide between the materialist who makes everything consist of things of complex nature, and the follower of Leibnitz. "Neither natural, nor practical, nor economical, nor political philosophy suffers by one's being a materialist in cosmology." Without coming to any decision on this point, it is always possible to distinguish dormant substances from those which can perceive sensations, and these again from conscious spirits. In the world, spirits form the kingdom of grace, or the moral world, in which *one* must be assumed as supreme. Whether that one is to be found among men, we do not know. Theologians perhaps see it in Christ, as others have seen it in an ἀρχαῖος of the earth or soul of the world. Just as, to confute the materialists, it must be proved that there are simple substances, so, in order to combat the idealist, it must be shown that besides spirits there are also dormant substances. Leibnitz attempts to do this; and for that very reason he cannot be called an idealist. For the rest, it is not necessary to come to any decision at all in regard to the idealists; for, as they themselves admit that there are phenomena which are called bodies, physical philosophy is no way affected by

this disputed question. The idealist is at a disadvantage only in one respect. His world, consisting merely of spirits, shows much less variety (*i.e.*, perfection) than that of the dualist. In matters of detail, Meier's physical philosophy is just like Wolff's, a mechanical atomic theory; the conception of the current of nature, *i.e.*, of the laws of motion, of the supernatural, of *miracula restaurationis*, etc., assume exactly the same form as in Wolff and Baumgarten. His *Psychology* has exerted a permanent influence, particularly upon the terminology of the subject, owing to the fact that Kant during his early period followed him almost as closely as he did Baumgarten. The first point that strikes one as characteristic, is the much greater importance attached to empirical than to rational ("*vernünftige*") psychology. When he is speaking of those who have deserted the path of experience and devised a psychical theory which is simply a philosophical romance, or when he is praising the modern philosophers who have recognised that the surest road to a knowledge of finite spirits is the path of experience, we can almost fancy that it is the language of a follower of Locke. With Leibnitz and Wolff, he draws a distinction between the faculty of knowledge and the faculty of desire, and then in both contrasts the higher or rational faculty of knowledge and desire with that which is lower or sensuous (*i.e.*, rests upon indistinct perceptions). The lower faculty of knowledge, or the faculty of having obscure and confused perceptions, is called sensuous, not because it has to do with what is corporeal, but because the nature and kind of knowledge is peculiar and conditioned by the connection with the body. The primary elements of this knowledge are sensations, *i.e.*, perceptions of our present state. These are also called phenomena or appearances, because things appear to us to be what sensation tells us they are. Sensations, as well as the faculty of sensation, sense, have reference to the state either of the soul or of the body, and accordingly we must distinguish inward sense and inward sensations from outward sense and outward sensations. To the former class belongs the sensation "sad," to the latter the sensation "blue." (The theory of the right use of the senses may be called empirical æsthetics.) From sensations as the most primitive sort of perceptions others are deduced by the aid of attention and abstraction. The first of these are the ideas or perceptions of past states, which, when they are recognised again, form the content of

the memory. He then discusses the faculty of composition, foresight, and foreknowledge, and finally the faculty of judgment, the latter of which enables us to decide what is perfect, whether it be unaccompanied by distinct knowledge (judgment of taste), or accompanied by it (judgment of reason). Passing now to the higher faculties of knowledge, he says that through the union of several clear perceptions there arises a distinct perception, which is the object of the understanding, so that the activity of the latter is to be regarded as conceiving. If its concepts are absolutely free from indistinctness, it is pure understanding, *i.e.*, understanding cleared of all that is sensuous. Understanding, however, is inferior to reason, the faculty of recognising the connection of perceptions and things perceived. This naturally employs the form of the syllogism, as the understanding does that of the concept. The particular proportion of the various faculties of knowledge gives the particular cast of a man's mind, or what we are accustomed to call his head, just as the proportion of the various forms of the faculty of desire produce a man's disposition or his heart. To proceed, the faculty of desire is determined by perceptions, although we are not always conscious of these. If the determining perceptions are indistinct, we have the lower or sensuous form of willing; if they are distinct, we have the rational form, or will properly so called. This would be pure, if the desire and the repugnance were absolutely free from sensuous motives. It is not caprice alone that makes the will free, but the fact that through caprice it allows itself to be determined by rational motives. The rational form of willing makes for perfection, and the end of all action is therefore bliss or the pleasure in perfection attained. The end of sensuous desire is well-being. If the two are united, the result is the highest good, happiness (*Glückseligkeit*), in which well-being (*Glück*) and bliss (*Seligkeit*) are combined. In psychology, too, Meier declines to come to any decision as to whether the soul has a complex nature, whether it exercises an influence on the body or is merely in harmony with it, and so on. This is said to be of no practical interest, because it has no bearing upon human happiness. The immortality of a complex nature is not inconceivable, that of a simple one is not necessary. *Natural theology*, as the last part of metaphysics, begins by examining the idea of God, and then takes up His dealings with men. Both the

proofs of the existence of God are given exactly as in Baumgarten, except that here *realitas* reappears by the side of perfection, and from the fact that non-existence is an imperfection, it is reasoned that the absolutely perfect being exists. These are followed up by studies of the Divine qualities, in which the perfections that belong to God as a being, are first dealt with, and then those which belong to Him as a spirit. Creation and Providence, Divine Government, and the Best-world are the subjects which are last discussed. The greater part of Meier's teaching on these points is a repetition of what his predecessors had said. But there is also much that is peculiar to him; for example, the distinction between the inner (essential) perfections of God, which are absolutely unchangeable, and the outer,—his relations to the world,—which are not so. In his twenty-two *Philosophical Considerations*, which deal with the most important dogmas of Christianity in a fashion that reminds us of Leibnitz, and to a still greater extent anticipates the teaching of Lessing in his *Education of the Human Race*, he repeatedly makes use of this distinction.—In his practical philosophy, too, Meier closely follows Baumgarten, as he himself declares in the preface to his five volumes on *Moral Philosophy*. He distinguishes moral philosophy, first, from Christian morality, which rests upon a supernatural revelation; secondly, from the part of practical philosophy which treats of social duties; and thirdly and lastly, from natural law, which deals with outward or obligatory duties, while moral philosophy has to do merely with the inward (or conscientious) duties of man as man (not as a member of society). In his system of duties towards God, towards oneself, and towards other things, the principle of perfection is taken up and applied, first generally (vols. i.–iv.) and then particularly (vol. v.). No attention, however, is devoted to moral associations; only the distinctions between learned and unlearned, rich and poor, old and young, etc., are discussed.

12. Although the great majority of those who were entitled to give an opinion declared themselves in favour of the philosophy of Wolff, still it did not remain unassailed. Its *opponents* in Germany ranged themselves under the banner of *eclecticism*, a banner which Thomasius had already raised; but they combined with his doctrines those of the Schoolmen, to which he had been more bitterly opposed than were Wolff and his school. The famous theologian, JOH. FRANZ. BUDDEUS (25th June, 1667, to 19th Nov., 1729), before he went to Jena, laboured

as a colleague of Thomasius, and while in this position he published his *Elementa philosophiæ practicæ* (Halle, 1697), and his *Institutiones philosophiæ eclecticæ* (Halle, 1705). Subsequently he drifted more completely over to the camp of Wolff's opponents than he himself wished to do. He exercised an important influence on the history of philosophy, inasmuch as J. Jac. Brucker received from him the first impulse towards the composition of his learned work (*vid.* § 13, Note 3).— Much more important than Buddeus from a philosophical point of view was ANDREAS RÜDIGER, who was born in 1673 at Rochlitz, and who, at Halle, came specially under the influence of Thomasius. After studying theology, jurisprudence, and medicine, he worked alternately at Halle and at Leipsic, as a physician and a professor of philosophy, till his death in 1731. His *Disputatio de eo quod omnes idcæ oriantur a sensione* (Lips., 1704) was followed by his *Philosophica synthetica*, etc. (Lips., 1707), (afterwards published as: *Institutiones eruditionis*, Lips., 1711), then by his *Physica divina*, etc. (Frankfort-on-the-Main, 1716, 4to), and lastly by *Philosophia pragmatica* (Lips., 1723). It is only in the last-mentioned work and in his treatise: *Chr. Wolff's Views*, etc., which appeared in 1727, that his polemic is directed against Wolff himself; in his earlier writings it is rather the elements out of which Wolff formed his system, his predecessors, that Rüdiger attacks. Thus he denounces the mathematical method, which had become supreme in philosophy since Descartes and Tschirnhausen. As mathematics has to do with the possible, philosophy with the actual, we should leave the analytical method to the former; philosophy should proceed synthetically and be grounded upon experience. For this reason we must always begin with the teachings of sense, both the outward sense by which we perceive bodily affections and the inward sense by which we perceive psychical activities. From thence we must proceed to definitions, axioms, and proofs. Philosophy is not something supernatural, nor something spontaneous; it must be pursued by a regular path. It is a knowledge of truth in matters of fact; and as nature is a fact of this kind, and further, as the Author of nature has, as a matter of fact, given us certain inviolable laws as well as certain pieces of advice, philosophy falls into three parts, which treat respectively of *Sapientia*, of *Justitia*, and of *Prudentia*. By *Sapientia* must be understood a knowledge

of nature,—(the nature of God can only be known by supernatural revelation),—and this forms the first part of the system. It is divided into logic and physics, according as nature is considered as a microcosm or as a macrocosm. In both of these there is great room for improvement. In the former the theory of probability in particular requires to be subjected to revision, as well as that of the syllogism, because in this case a large number of traditional rules, *e.g.*, that there cannot be four terms, that from particulars no conclusion can be drawn, etc., are not true. In physics there is much more to be done. The extreme of a purely mechanical atomic theory, as put forward by Descartes and Gassendi, and the extreme of an exaggerated "vitalism," such as was advocated by the English thinkers More and Fludd, are pointed out as rocks to be avoided; and a promise is given of a *Physica mechanico-vitalis*, which does not, like them, lead to atheism, and which may therefore be called *Physica divina*. The outlines of what is contained in his later and larger work, are to be found in his *Philosophia synthetica*. According to this, all beings created by God,—even spirits,—are created out of and with *materia prima* or extension. In addition to this, corporeal beings are also elastic, *i.e.*, there is in them equilibrium between the two principles of ether and air, which manifest their activity in expanding and contracting motion,) and which contrast with one another both in the respective shape of their atoms, as star-like and round, and in the respective effects of heat and cold. In living beings there is combined with a body which is similarly elastic, but at the same time organic, a spirit which, as ἀρχαῖος or soul, forms the body, and, as understanding, guides and illumines it. (From the three principles of ether, air, and spirit all essential natural phenomena are deduced, and in the detailed descriptions use is often made of graphic diagrams.) As regards the second part of his system, *Justitia*, the principle of all practical philosophy is the will of God. This is discussed first of all as the source of inviolable laws or unconditioned obligations and duties. As we owe these either to God or to our neighbour, this part of the system falls into two portions. The former may be called metaphysics, for in assigning to this portion all that concerns God, the ancients adopted a course far preferable to that of the Schoolmen and of modern thinkers, who have substi-

tuted for metaphysics its least important subdivision, ontology. Metaphysics teaches us why we have to fear (God,) to love and to obey Him. Next comes natural law, the principle of which is likewise obedience to God, that is, in regard to the regulations He has laid down for our conduct towards others. By the gift of language He shows us that we are intended for life as members of society, from which we can deduce not merely, as Pufendorf did, the *officia necessitatis* (duties of obligation) but also the *officia commoditatis* (duties of affection). The third part deals with *Prudentia*, that is, the conduct which aims at the highest good or the highest practical advantage. We are compelled to seek this, not so much by the law of God as by an innate tendency of our nature. As among the three blessings of health, truth, and virtue, the highest place belongs to the last-mentioned; medicine and logic, which would require to be included in any elaborate treatment of the subject, may be passed over, and discussion confined to ethics as the most important part of the whole. Here a very great affinity with Thomasius is apparent. It shows itself not merely in the theory of the affections and the reduction of these to three, the combinations of which produce the chief vices, in his exhortation to peace of mind, etc., but also in the fact that he lays so much stress upon the laws of ceremony, and that the treatise of the Spaniard Gratian, which had become known through Amelot de la Houssaye's translation, serves to a great extent as a guide, as being the best compendium of practical wisdom.

13. CHRISTIAN ADOLF CRUSIUS, born, in 1712, at Leuna, in Merseburg, and who died in 1776 as Senior of the theological faculty and professor of philosophy at Leipsic, was partly won over to the views we have been describing, not directly, but through the influence of one of Rüdiger's pupils, Adolf Friedrich Hoffmann, the author of a *Doctrine of Reason*, which enjoyed a high reputation in its day. Crusius exercised a great though transient influence; for in theology his followers, as the advocates of a mystic and apocalyptic system of exegesis, were opposed to the adherents of Ernesti, and in philosophy to the adherents of Wolff. Amongst them was his enthusiastic disciple, Justin Elias Wüstemann, who in his *Introduction to the System of Dr. Crusius*, Wittenberg, 1757, has given an abridged review of his master's philosophical system. Of Crusius' own writings, the first that call for mention are his

three dissertations, *De corruptelis intellectus a voluntate pendentibus*, Lips., 1740; *De appetitibus insitis voluntatis humanæ*, Lips., 1742; *De usu et limitibus principii rationis determinantis, vulgo sufficientis*, Lips., 1743, the last of which contains his declaration of war against the philosophy of Wolff. To these must be added the larger works in the German language: *Directions how to Live a Rational Life* (Ethics), Lips., 1744 (and frequently); *Sketch of the Necessary Truths of Reason*, etc. (Metaphysics), Lips., 1745 (and frequently); *Way to the Certainty and Trustworthiness of Human Knowledge* ("Noology" and Logic), Lips., 1747; *Directions how to Reflect on Natural Events with System and Foresight* (Physics), 2 pts., 1749 (enlarged, 1772). Besides these, there are minor treatises in Latin, which in 1750 were published at Leipsic as *Opuscula*.—He agrees with Rüdiger in claiming for philosophy only those truths that can be discovered through reason; but at the same time he contrasts it with historical knowledge, inasmuch as its object endures permanently. Finally, however, just like Rüdiger, he contrasts philosophy and mathematics as knowledge of the possible and knowledge of the actual, and rejects the mathematical method. As regards the subdivision of his system, the twofold contrast between speculative and practical, and between necessary and contingent, was bound to lead properly to four different sciences. For convenience sake, however, he places on one side *Metaphysics*, as the sum of those speculative truths that are necessary, and on the other,—not as three, but as a single science, which he calls *Disciplinary Philosophy*,—those branches of knowledge that have to do with such speculative truths as are contingent, and with (necessary and contingent) practical truths. Of the three subdivisions of this science, *Logic*, which shows how our intellect must of necessity act, is treated of before Metaphysics on pædagogic grounds, while the first (Physics) and third (Ethics) are not taken up until afterwards. With it there is incorporated, under the name of "noology," practically the whole of empirical psychology, so far as it deals with the speculative part of the mind. This natural history of thought is followed by rules for the regulation of thought. The supreme law is said to be: What cannot be imagined, is false; and what cannot be imagined to be false, is true. From this principle of conceivability, three subordinate laws of thought are deduced. Among these the most important is

the *principium contradictionis;* then come the *principium inseparabilium* and the *principium inconjungibilium.* From these may be deduced further laws, amongst others the law of sufficient reason, according to which everything which is now, and before was not, has a cause, (which possibly contains more, and has further capacities). Instead of this very limited principle, Leibnitz and Wolff are said to have set up their *principium rationis sufficientis,* which should properly be called *principium rationis determinantis,* and in this way to have reached the fatalism that mars so seriously Leibnitz's theory of the best possible world. Lastly, from these principles there results a fifth, the law of contingency, according to which everything that can be conceived of as non-existent, must at one time have had no existence. Crusius divides *Metaphysics* into the same four parts that Wolff did, except that empirical psychology no longer finds a place in it. It is important to note, that in his *Ontology* existence is defined as being anywhere and at any time, and that from this he concludes that there is nothing which is not limited in its existence by time and space. Even God is no exception to this rule; time and space accordingly are abstractions which the intellect must distinguish in existence. After ontology, Crusius states his views on *Natural Theology,* the most important point of which is the refutation of the ontological argument, on the ground that it commits a fallacy owing to a confusion between "to exist" and "to be conceived of as existing." Besides, the law of sufficient reason and the law of contingency are said to furnish sufficient data for proving the existence of God, not to mention the proofs that rest upon grounds of probability. The qualities of God are then discussed in great detail, as well as His actions, both those that are "immanent," or necessary, and those that are "transient," or free; the distinction between creation and preservation, the idea of government, and miracles, are the most important of the other points dealt with here. After natural theology, Crusius takes up *Cosmology* as the "theory of the necessary nature of a world, and what can be apprehended from this *a priori,*" while physics has only to do with the present world and its contingent nature. By "world" we must understand such a system of finite and really connected things as is not itself in turn contained in some other system of which it is a part. From this it follows that the world is unique. Further, as it is

only possible to exercise an influence on things by means of motion, there must be substances whose nature consists in their capacity for motion, that is, material things. Besides these, there are spirits, which are capable not merely of motion but also of thought. The two can exercise influence upon each other; and the advocates of pre-established harmony really assume the existence of material things to no purpose at all. The further discussion of cosmology contains protests against the idea that the world is a machine, that the sum of motions, or even of motive forces, is always the same, that everything has a reason which determines it, that the world is the best possible (which is really self-contradictory), that every miracle requires a *miraculum restitutionis*, etc., in short, against all the main points of Wolff's cosmology. Crusius' treatment of metaphysics closes with "*pneumatology*," or the theory of the necessary nature of spirits. The main points in this are the onslaught upon materialism and determinism. Against the former, appeal is always made to consciousness, which supplies a refutation; against the latter, he holds up the fact that the will, and not the understanding, is really the controlling power, and lays stress upon the faculty that the will has of initiating motions by means of an inward activity. By a spirit is to be understood a simple substance that can think and will, which, when associated with a body, is called the soul of this body. The supreme purpose of the world is, that the free actions of spirits should be brought into accord with the perfection of all things. In this too lies the assurance of immortality, which cannot be deduced from the nature of spirit alone.—In spite of the care with which he has brought together, in his two volumes on natural philosophy, all that was known at that time, the *Physics* of Crusius are of little interest at the present day. More important is his *Practical Philosophy*, which he expounds in his *Directions how to Live a Rational Life*. Here the groundwork is formed by "*thelematology*," or the theory of the powers and qualities of the human will, which, if Crusius had written his treatise on metaphysics before that on practical philosophy, would probably have been completely incorporated with the former. Just like the understanding or faculty of knowledge, the will, which is entirely distinct from it, consists of a number of fundamental powers, amongst which he examines in detail, as the principal fundamental impulses, that which makes for one's own perfec-

tion, that which demands union with what is perfect, and that which is supplied by conscience. Next follows an investigation into animal impulses. As regards the *Moral System* proper, of which "thelematology" is the groundwork, it is divided according to Crusius into ethics, moral theology, natural law, and practical wisdom. In the three first parts unconditioned obligations are treated of, in the last those that are conditioned. The supreme law is said to be: "Out of obedience to the command of thy Creator, as thy natural and necessary superior, do all which is in accordance with perfection." Obedience, therefore, is always defined as the formal aspect, and perfection as the material aspect of virtue. In dealing with the supreme purpose of the world, Crusius comes again upon the question of immortality. In addition to other moral proofs, he introduces the one already employed by Plato (*vid.* § 79, 7) and Cicero, and afterwards adopted by Kant, to the effect that the contradiction between merit and happiness in this world is a guarantee of immortality. Here, too, he repeats, that from the nature of the soul we can draw no conclusions as to its immortality, inasmuch as at one time it had no existence and its life therefore is contingent. Incorruptibility is not immortality. As a matter of fact, the contents of the three first parts of practical philosophy coincide with duties towards oneself, towards God, and towards one's neighbour. For, although, properly speaking, all duties are, according to the fundamental principle already laid down, duties towards God, still there are some duties toward God which are so directly and in a special degree. These include amongst others rational faith. In his discussion on practical wisdom he treats not only of all that concerns ceremony, but also of the proper way to govern a State (political philosophy), while obligation towards authority is treated of under the head of natural law.

14. JOACHIM GEORG DARJES was first an adherent and then an opponent of Wolff's. He was led to take up the former position through the influence of Carpov at Jena; but when he gave up the study of theology, he also gave up the philosophy of Wolff, or at least the strict form of it. His lectures at Jena, which in a very special degree looked at things from a practical point of view, and dealt with practical philosphy, natural law, and political philosophy, were frequented by fabulous numbers of people. Accordingly, when, after Baumgarten's death, the University of Frankfort looked about for

a professor who would attract audiences as large as he had done, they could find no one to suit them better than Darjes. Besides his work as a lecturer, he was also very active as an author. The *Introductio in artem inveniendi, s. logicam*, appeared in 1742; *Elementa Metaphysices*, 2 vols. 4to, 1743–44; *Institutiones jurisprudentiæ universalis*, 1745; *Remarks on several Propositions of the Wolffian Metaphysics*, 1748; *Philosophical Leisure Hours*, 1749–52; *First Principles of Moral Philosophy*, 1755; *Via ad veritatem*, 1755. The last-mentioned treatise, which contains an applied logic, as well as a criticism of what others had accomplished, (Zeno, Euclid, Plato, Aristotle, the Stoics, Epicurus, Lully, Ramus, Bacon, and Descartes are discussed), may be regarded as his principal work in so far as it gives, in the preface, a review of what, according to his idea, philosophy should contain. It begins by contrasting philosophical with non-philosophical knowledge, pointing out that the former deduces the connection between truths from the concepts of things, the latter from the perception of them; and then it proceeds to divide the subject-matter of philosophy into the possible as such, dealt with in *philosophia prima*, and the possible more closely determined. As this latter is either substance or non-substance, one of the parts of philosophy has to do with what follows from the idea of substance as such. So far, then, as it discusses substance as such, it is *Metaphysica*, in fact *Ontologia*; so far as it discusses simple substance, it is *Monadologia*; so far as it discusses the soul, it is *Psychologia*; so far as it discusses the spirit, it is *Pneumatica*; so far as it discusses God, it is *Theologia naturalis*; so far as it discusses the body, it is *Somatica*. What is possible, and yet not substance, is either *accidens* or activity. Of the former, Darjes takes no further account in this review; but he proceeds to divide activities (*operationes*) into moral and non-moral. The former are dealt with in practical philosophy, which is in turn subdivided into natural law, ethics, and political philosophy; the latter are the activities of bodies, which form the subject-matter of physics. The fact that Darjes' writings have so soon been forgotten, is a proof that his fame was chiefly due to his brilliant gifts as a teacher.

§ 291.

D.—EMPIRICAL IDEALISM.

1. The advance that philosophy makes beyond Leibnitz,

is not to be measured by the work done in the way of completing his system (§ 289, 1). It takes a more important step where it does not merely fill up the gaps which he had left, but also improves and fundamentally *transforms* what he and his disciples had accomplished, by avoiding the want of thoroughness that characterizes their views. If the philosopher beyond whom an advance of this kind is made were, like Descartes, one who disregarded all that had been done before his day, and built up his system as if his were the first attempt of the kind, the only way in which philosophy could progress, would be by starting from what he had said; and the necessary condition of such progress would be an accurate acquaintance with his views. It is otherwise in the case of a system like that of Leibnitz (*vid.* 288, 1). He deduces results from the teaching of Descartes, and results the opposite of those which Spinoza and Locke deduced; and thus it is possible even for thinkers who take no notice of him at all, to advance beyond him along the lines which he laid down. This they can do by drawing anti-pantheistic and anti-realistic conclusions from the common premisses, just as he did, but with greater energy. It must, however, be admitted, that it is the greater one-sidedness of such philosophies, as compared with the comprehensive magnitude of Leibnitz's system, which entitles them to the more advanced position. Just as, under certain circumstances, the half is more than the whole, so there are times which require one-sidedness. The point on which Leibnitz and his school were undecided,—and decision is always one-sided,—was his theory of corporeal things. Since he conceives of these as *entia semimentalia*, or as *phænomena bene fundata*, the word *semi* and the notion of a real foundation for phenomena make his system only semi-idealism. When Wolff and, in a greater degree, Baumgarten and Meier declare it to be one of Leibnitz's merits, that he avoids the one-sidedness alike of materialism and of idealism, they attribute to him a higher point of view than he is entitled to. For he knew nothing of the idealism to be discussed in this Section, while they were familiar with it. Just as the realism towards which Leibnitz took up a position of hostility, had not yet advanced to the extreme of materialism, just as Locke had conceived of spirits only as *perhaps* material, so Leibnitz ventures to maintain only that *quasi*-souls, or things *like* spirits, are the real elements even of what is corporeal. If an attempt, like that

of Wolff, is made to get rid of this ambiguous character of simple substances by foregoing their psychical nature, harmony ceases to be a necessary element of the system; if, however, this is retained, there result quite a number of contradictions in addition to the doubtful *quasi* and *semi*. Leibnitz admits that, properly speaking, we cannot say that one body communicates its motion to another, but only that our idea of a body in motion is followed by one of a body set in motion, and so on. It is only, he says, for brevity's sake that he employs any other language. This language, however, since language is thought, soon leads him to attribute to bodies a power of resistance, and indeed to animated bodies an actual substantial nature. And yet he came very near to avoiding this incompleteness. For in regard to a large number of those qualities of bodies which Locke called secondary, indeed in regard to all which we perceive through the senses, he constantly asserts that they are merely our (confused) perceptions. He only required to look a little more closely, and he would have found that even impenetrability is only perceived by sense, and that therefore all qualities, even those which Locke called primary, are simply relations to ourselves, that is, *entia mentalia*, phenomena, behind which there is no necessity to assume a real substratum. This advance was made by an Englishman and an Irishman contemporaneously, but quite independently of each other. The former was driven to his conclusion by Descartes and Malebranche, the latter by these thinkers and by Locke. Quite justifiably, the world took almost no notice of the first as compared with the second, and soon forgot him; and therefore an equally detailed account of both is not to be expected here.

2. In 1713, an English clergyman, ARTHUR COLLIER (12th Oct., 1680, to Sept., 1732), published *Clavis universalis, or A New Inquiry after Truth, being a Demonstration of the Non-existence or Impossibility of an External World.* The first edition of this work has become so rare that his biographer affirmed there were only seven copies of it in existence. It was reprinted in Edinburgh in 1836, but only forty copies were struck off. For these reasons it was chiefly known in Germany only through the German translation by Eschenbach: *Allgemeiner Schlüssel*, etc., Rostock, 1756, until Samuel Parr again made it more accessible by including it in his *Metaphysical Tracts by English Philosophers of the Eighteenth Century*,

London, 1837. When it appeared, the author's opinions, according to his own assurance, which is confirmed by Robt. Benson: *Memoirs of the Life and Writings of the Rev. Arthur Collier*, Lond., 1832, had undergone no change for ten years. This makes it impossible that Berkeley's writings, which appeared some years earlier, could have suggested his theory. All the more probable is it that he owes a good deal to Norris, who has been called the forerunner of Malebranche (§ 270, 8). That thinker lived quite near Collier, who was acquainted with his: *Essay towards the Theory of the Ideal or Intelligible World.* 2 vols., 1701, 4to; and we have seen how near Malebranche came to denying the existence of the corporeal world. The extent to which Collier, during the first period of his literary activity, was in accord with Malebranche, is shown by an essay, preserved for us by Benson, in which he expressly declares that God cannot properly be called a Being, he must be called *the* Being. Collier's theological views, which he looks upon as quite in keeping with his philosophical opinions, are not regarded as very orthodox; he had to submit to being accused of Arianism and Apollinarism. In Church politics he was a Tory, and a defender of unconditional obedience; as, however, he laid stress upon the point that obedience is to be rendered to that authority that has power over us, he refused to associate himself with those who were intriguing on behalf of the Stuarts.

3. The *Clavis* consists of two parts. The *first* of these deals with the visible world, *i.e.*, everything which we perceive by the eye. After pointing out,—as Hume did, though with an entirely different purpose in view,—that the difference between impressions and ideas is one of degree, Collier reaches the result that what we see, or the visible world, can certainly not be "external." The "extra-existence of the visible world" is therefore a contradiction in terms; and for this reason Descartes, Malebranche, and Norris had felt compelled to distinguish from the visible world an invisible one, *i.e.*, to distinguish an unknowable substance from phenomena, which lie within ourselves alone. This hypothesis is argued against in the *second* and much more elaborate part, which endeavours to prove that a world external to the spirit that perceives it, is an impossibility. If once we conceive of it as knowable, all the difficulties apply to it that apply to a visible world; if we conceive of it as unknowable and in-

visible, we charge God with having created something that is utterly useless. Further, the hypothesis of a universe existing external to the mind, leads to contradictions,—one philosopher proves that it is infinite in time and space, and that each part of it is infinitely divisible, another proves the exact opposite of this. Accordingly, for the philosopher there is no real external world; but, just as the Copernican speaks of sunrise, the philosopher may speak of real objects, or even of objects external to us. For the ideas of bodies do not exist in us alone, but in other spirits as well; and further, they do not exist in us of our own good pleasure, but because God produces them in us. It was against the latter misapprehension that Malebranche's theory of seeing in God was directed. We are therefore justified in saying that the ideas of bodies exist outside of ourselves, that is, in other spirits.

4. Some years earlier than Collier, GEORGE BERKELEY, an Irishman (born March 12th, 1684; Bishop of Cloyne from 1734; died Jan. 14th, 1753), had published his *Essay towards a New Theory of Vision*, 1709, which formed the basis of his two principal works, *A Treatise concerning the Principles of Human Knowledge*, 1710 (and often afterwards), and his popular exposition of the same views in *Three Dialogues between Hylas and Philonous*, 1713 (and often afterwards). As compared with these, little importance attaches to *Alciphron or the Minute Philosopher*, 1732, a work which aims at showing the superficial character of the line of reasoning adopted by the so-called freethinkers. His *Siris*, the immediate purpose of which is to commend the healing virtues of tar-water, is interesting, as showing how well Berkeley was read in the whole literature of natural philosophy. All these works, as well as some minor ones, of which that upon *Passive Obedience* may be mentioned, are to be found in Berkeley's collected writings, *The Works of George Berkeley, D.D., late Bishop of Cloyne in Ireland*, etc. London, 1784, 2 vols., 4to. They have often been republished since, *e.g.*, in 1834, and in the one volume edition brought out by Thomas Tegg and Son, London, 1837. The latest is that of Professor Fraser, of Edinburgh.

5. Collier is very far from being ready to admit his substantial agreement with Berkeley. Nor can we wonder at this. For the premisses upon which his theories rest, are found in those philosophers whom we have already described as showing a tendency towards pantheism, while Berkeley bases his chiefly

upon the individualism of Locke. In the Introduction to his *Principles*, which is the most important passage bearing upon this, Berkeley extends the nominalist principle, that only individual things exist, even to the content of our perceptions. The latter only represent individual things, although, when we make a statement in regard to any (particular) triangle that in no way depends upon its being right-angled, we imagine that we have spoken of a triangle that is neither right-angled nor acute-angled, in other words, of a triangle in general. Just as there are no such triangles, so there is nowhere any such thing as a universal; and the mistaken idea that there are abstract or universal ideas is, in Berkeley's view, one of the two obstacles to true philosophy. If we stand by the rule that what cannot exist without something else, is also inconceivable without this other thing, we shall admit that there is no idea to correspond to those words which denote a universal idea, that is, really, to correspond to any words at all. This does not imply any censure upon language, for its purpose is not so much to communicate ideas as to call forth passions, and to move men to action. That process, as well as the process of thought, is assisted by words, even when there is no definite idea associated with them, and they are used like algebraical symbols. Everything that Berkeley has said so far, a consistent follower of Locke would be bound to subscribe to, and it has therefore been approved of in so many words by those who have consistently developed Locke's philosophy (*vid.* § 282, 3). At this point, however, differences arise between them, which,—just because both theories are individualist,—develop into diametrical opposition. At one with Locke in holding that we must begin by examining the elements of all knowledge, Berkeley investigates the origin of ideas, and in doing so he simplifies Locke's theory, as Brown and Condillac (§ 283) did after him, though with a very different result. All ideas, without distinction, even those which Locke assigned to sensation, simply express states of our spirit; they are actions of this spirit. To make ideas into effects produced by bodies, means, to transform the spirit into a passive, and therefore a material being, and the body into an active being, and therefore one which exercises will, or is spiritual. It is admitted even by the advocates of a corporeal world,—the "materialists" or "corporealists," who are represented in the *Dialogues* by Hylas, while Philonous gives

expression to Berkeley's own view,—that the ideas "blue," "sweet," and so on, do not express the nature of things, but relations to the percipient subject. Their hypothesis, therefore, is an entirely useless one; for the real nature of the bodies whose existence they assume, always remains unknown; for us such bodies do not exist at all. The distinction between primary and secondary qualities does not carry them any further, for what is true of colour and taste, is true also of extension and impenetrability. Both kinds of qualities exist solely in the mind that perceives them; outside of us they are nothing. To suppose that, behind phenomena, there exist unknown substrata upon which the predicates applied to these rest,—substances which always remain concealed from us,—is neither so simple nor so correct as to admit that a thing is nothing but a constant aggregate of qualities, *i.e.*, sensations or perceptions, and that therefore its existence depends upon the percipient subject, its *esse* is *percipi*. The sun, then, is simply the constant association of brightness, warmth, and so on; and every dream that makes it visible to us, is a proof that the only condition essential to its being perceived is, that there should be a subject to perceive it. There are in existence, therefore, nothing but spirits, *i.e.*, active beings whose nature consists in thought and will, and ideas, *i.e.*, perceived, passive beings, the constant aggregates of which are called things. The difference between a thing and an idea does not, therefore, consist in the former being real and the latter notional, but in the former being complex and the latter simple; both are "notional beings." Instead of the world of Leibnitz, which consisted of quasi-spirits, we have one which consists solely of spirits and of their images or ideas. The principle which Leibnitz applies to some substances—that they have the power of thought and of will—is in this case applied to all alike. Instead of Leibnitz's Semi-idealism, we have here a consistent form of Idealism. Berkeley himself does not employ this name for his system. If he had wished to give it a distinctive title, he would probably have called it "spiritualism," possibly "notionalism," or "phenomenalism." Suffice it to say, that he takes up a position directly antagonistic to what he called, as we do, materialism, and that he is never tired of arguing against the mistaken notion involved in the "supposition of external objects," which really "subsist not by themselves, but exist in minds." This notion he bewails as the second great error of philosophers.

There is such a great difference between the existence of spirits and that of their ideas, that Berkeley laments having to employ one and the same word for both. The "existence of objects without the mind" is, in his view, quite as much of an absurdity as the statement that a perception exists outside of the percipient subject. By consistently maintaining and applying the view of Descartes and Locke, that the object of consciousness is an idea, Berkeley had been brought into the position of denying to the material world any existence outside of the spirits that perceive it; and this helps us to understand why the expressions "ideal system," "idealism," and the like, which up till now had been applied only to (Locke's) theory of ideas, henceforth are used of those who deny the existence of corporeal substance. This is so even in Wolff, *vid.* § 290, 6.

6. So far as the principles hitherto laid down are concerned, it looks as if Berkeley had done away with the distinction between the sun as it is seen at midday, and the sun as we dream of it at midnight, or as we represent it to ourselves by the help of imagination. But he is too fond of proclaiming his respect for sound common sense to allow us to entertain any such notion of his views. He tries to discover wherein the difference consists, and he finds that in the first case the idea of the sun forces itself upon all spirits alike, while in the second case it is present only in a single spirit, and in the third case only when that spirit wills that it should be so. The first case can only be explained by supposing that the aggregate of ideas, which we call the sun, is *given* or suggested to all percipient spirits simultaneously. This suggestion cannot come from a body, a real sun, external to us, for nothing can be given which the giver does not himself possess; and even those who allow that there is a corporeal sun, will not go so far as to assert that it possesses ideas. It can only come, therefore, from a thinking being, a spirit that controls all spirits simultaneously. This is God. His thought is far exalted above our thought, so that in speaking of His ideas it must not be forgotten that these ideas are not like our own. The constant aggregates of ideas, which we call real things, as opposed to the creations of our own fancy, have their origin in the action of the Almighty Being, who associates ideas in spirits with absolute impartiality, and therefore in all alike, and with absolute immutability, and therefore

in the same way at all times. We are quite right to draw a distinction between the two classes; in fact we may call the one class things external to us, for if I close my eyes the sun continues to exist, that is, it exists still in other spirits. The regularity that characterizes those combinations of ideas which are common to us all, a regularity which results from the unchangeableness of God, we call laws of nature. They are a far more cogent proof of the existence of an omniscient God than all imaginable miracles. Only by bringing God down to the level of man, can we come to believe that extraordinary acts further His glory more than the maintenance of an order that has once been established, and according to which the idea of the bright sun is not so much the cause as the announcement of the idea of heat that follows it. The laws of nature, then, are the principles upon which God combines ideas in all human beings. These are discovered solely by means of observation. It is impossible to demonstrate, or to know *a priori*, that one idea will be accompanied by another; this we learn by experience, and we expect the same thing to happen in the future because we have a well-grounded belief that God has not changed His will. Berkeley's idealism, as Kant afterwards truly observed, is pure empiricism; and his example is sufficient to show the mistake made by those who contrast idealism with empiricism, instead of with rationalism. Towards rationalism Berkeley takes up a purely negative attitude. Hence the almost barbarous fashion in which he often speaks of mathematics, although he was no mere tyro in that subject himself. Ultimately, in his view, the chief function of philosophy is to study the Divine wisdom as manifested in the laws of nature, not excluding teleological connection. To say that teleology is absolutely incompatible with empiricism, and that therefore Berkeley cannot be called an empiricist, is to lose sight of the distinction already pointed out (§ 287). Here the individual things that form the truly real, are held to be spiritual, and not material; and accordingly he expressly affirms that will is the sole form of activity. (Materialism did not allow that there was any form except motion.) Just as motion is determined by outward impulse, so will is determined by ends. Motives (*Beweggründe*), which the realists sacrificed to causes of motion (*Gründe der Bewegung*), must therefore be put in the forefront by the individualist who is also an idealist, whether his philosophy

be rationalistic like that of Leibnitz, or empirical like that of Berkeley.

7. A large part of his two chief works is occupied with demonstrating the simplicity of his system and its agreement with the demands of religion, and in particular of sound common sense. The hypotheses put forward on the opposite side have, he says, led many to scepticism, owing to the difficulties which, if these are accepted, result from the idea of space, and so on. The theory that bodies exert an influence upon the soul, has brought even a larger number into the position of asserting that the soul is material. His own theory, on the other hand, according to which every idea is a word which God speaks to us, every regular succession of ideas a rule which God follows, he maintains to be the best safeguard against atheism. Not as though this would give us an idea of God. How would it be possible for God, who is pure activity, to be represented by something non-active, as an idea is? Rather, in this case, what applies to our certainty of the existence of our own spirit and of other spirits, applies also to our certainty of God. For the reason just stated, we have no ideas of these, but only of their manifestations. We have, however, a "notion" of them; and the existence of our own spirit is for us an immediate certainty, while the existence of other spirits, though not directly known, is still a highly probable deduction. Finally, God's existence is, like that of other spirits, deducible from the effects He produces (ideas), and is therefore not directly deducible. But while this is so, it is more certain than anything else, since everything of which we are conscious, every idea, is a proof of His existence, inasmuch as it is a manifestation of Him. Where Berkeley, as often happens, describes this process of being illuminated by God, he comes very near to the position of Malebranche, whose favourite text he is fond of quoting: "In Him we live, and move, and have our being." For the rest, he was in religion a faithful son of his Church, and in politics an adherent of the theory of passive obedience, on behalf of which he also employed his pen,

Cf. J. F. Ferrier: *Berkeley and Idealism*, 1842 (first in *Blackwood's Magazine*, afterwards in the collected edition of his philosophical remains, Edin. and Lond., 1866). F. Collyns Simon: *The Nature and Elements of the External World*, 1847; and *The Present State of Metaphysics in Great Britain*, in *The Contemporary Review* for June, 1868.

§ 292.

E.—PHILOSOPHY AS INTROSPECTION.

1. The counterpart to the realism of the eighteenth century had reached a climax in Berkeley's philosophy, as was afterwards recognised by the *Système de la Nature* (*vid. supra*, § 286, 3). No theory could be more idealistic than this, which transforms bodies into more constant kinds of perception, just as Holbach subsequently represented thoughts as finer kinds of motion. While Berkeley shows himself in this respect more consistent than Locke and his semi-idealistic disciples, still in another point he suffers as much from want of thoroughness as they do. The counterpart to pantheism,—which in this work has always been called individualism, in order to reserve monadism, the expression proposed by others, for the one system that invented it,—led in its realistic form to atheism. It was remarked in passing (*vid.* § 286), that the series of idealistic systems would show a similar result. That this remark was true in the nature of the case, and that we are justified in charging Leibnitz, Wolff, Baumgarten, Meier, and Berkeley with want of thoroughness, inasmuch as they remained theists,—an attitude they all maintained in honesty and uprightness,—is proved by the difficulties and contradictions in which they became involved solely owing to this fact. In the first place, as regards Leibnitz, who may here be taken also as the representative of his three disciples and followers, the Godhead appears in his system, for the most part, by being introduced as the ultimate basis of the general harmony of the world. As, however, it has been shown (*vid.* § 288, 2), that this harmony results spontaneously from the conception of the monads, God is really represented as carrying out something which does not require to be carried out. If we say that, not merely the harmony among the monads, but their existence, is only conceivable upon the hypothesis that they are the work of a Creator, we must remember the metaphysical mechanism (*vid.* § 288, 3) by which they force themselves into existence, and also Leibnitz's express statement that no new monads were created and no existing monads destroyed, as well as the fact that it is in no way harder to assume the eternity of the monads *a parte ante* than their eternity *a parte post*. If we reflect that, because God does not possess that which forms the bond between the monads, He is really banished to

the region where the deities of Epicurus dwelt, and further, that Leibnitz is very unwilling to allow any interference at all in the world on the part of God, we might perhaps trace in the expression he sometimes uses, *Deus* SIVE *harmonia rerum*, a feeling that in his system a God has, in both senses of the word, *nothing to do*, (*vid. Leibnitiana* in Feller, *Otium Hanov.* p. 169. *Cf. Letter to the Duke Joh. Friedrich* in O. Klopp's ed., vol. iii., p. 259). And, besides, at what a sacrifice of consistency does he purchase this God, who has nothing to do! He calls Him the highest of the monads; but as the nature of the monad was expressly made to consist in its being one among many, in its being limited power, in its being burdened with matter in order that it might remain a part of the universe, and so on, we have in God a monad which is not a monad at all. We may compare this with the position in which Wolff gets entangled. That unwearied opponent of the philosopher who made God the only substance, becomes doubtful as to whether God is substance at all, and finally reaches the result that He is so only in a loose sense, *i.e.*, that properly speaking, He does not subsist at all. The idea of God introduces an exactly similar contradiction into each individual monad. This was said to be self-active power; but it remains so, only so long as no account is taken of its relation to the Godhead; if we do take account of this relation, the monads become "emanations" of the Divine nature, *i.e.*, to use Spinoza's phraseology, its *affectiones*. What happens to Leibnitz and Wolff, happens also to Berkeley. He says that God never varies from the established method of combining ideas; and a God of whom this is directly asserted has nothing to do. His place can easily be supplied, if the law of association of ideas be substituted for Him who has once for all laid it down. This is all the more easily accomplished in that the hypothesis of a God and of an activity so directed threatens the fundamental principles of the system. For spirits are said to be purely active beings, to suppose that they are passive is equivalent to making them material; now, towards God they are said to stand in a relation of receptivity, *i.e.* exactly in the position of the rejected *tabula rasa*. And further, bodies, it is said, cannot give us any ideas, because it is impossible to give what one has not got. God, however, is expressly stated *not* to have such ideas as we have; and yet He gives us ideas which are certainly such as we have. These

contradictions are a symptom and a penalty of the want of thoroughness characteristic of this point of view. Neither Leibnitz nor Berkeley ever gets beyond semi-individualism, because, while they had declared that the individual is the only reality, they do not maintain that which makes the individual thing an individual thing—its separation from everything else. It was impossible that Leibnitz should do so. For his monad is a mirror of the universe, and therefore in his psychology he can see in the laws of thought merely the reflected laws of the world, (metaphysical principles, he calls them in a letter to Locke); while in his ethics, he is compelled to make personal perfection consist solely in the furtherance of philanthropy. His own life and character accord well with his theory. He could not think without society (conversation, correspondence, reading); a many-sided activity in the world, in the service of the State and the Court, and so on, was for him a necessity; indeed, even his religious life is not such as requires that zealous attendance at church which promotes sectarian isolation; it rather consists in that great yearning for union with others which produced his schemes of reconciliation. Berkeley, again, who substitutes ideas for reality, though only such ideas as are common to all, can—just on account of this limitation—never get to the position of saying that the subject draws everything from within itself and finds in itself complete satisfaction. This sense of inadequacy,—which in himself appears in the form of his proverbial philanthropy, of zeal for missionary enterprise, of submission to the control of the State, and which also his theory allows to the subject,—excludes everything which in his time or our own could be called egoism. But, just for this reason, it is conceived much more in the spirit of the period that has been called the period of organization than in that of the "disorganizing" eighteenth century. This explains why on certain points Leibnitz and Berkeley alike show an affinity to Malebranche.

2. An important step towards getting rid of this want of thoroughness was taken by those who taught the human spirit to dive into the recesses of its own being, not so much in order to find out what is outside of us or beyond us, as in order to discover what lies in the individual as such. The more practical aspect of this movement is represented by

ROUSSEAU, that hermit in the midst of the busy world, who before the eyes of all men buried himself in the depths of his own being and found satisfaction there, while at the same time he confined this process chiefly to the practical side of his nature. So far as theory is concerned, its chief champions are the solid phalanx of the SCOTTISH SCHOOL. These thinkers made philosophy an observation of the facts of consciousness, including those which form the basis of the speculative, and those which form the basis of the practical aspect of life. We are justified in connecting these two tendencies not merely by the circumstance that the Scotsmen were fond of extolling Rousseau as "their" philosopher, but also by the very similar effect which the two produced without and within the country where they originated. In France these have been the two influences that have opposed the power of sensationalism. That of the Genevan was felt earlier, but its success was less marked; that of the Scotsmen asserted itself later, but its triumph was more enduring. The reverse was the case in Germany. There Rousseau's ideas at once produced an immense effect, especially in extra-academic circles, but in academic circles too, as the example of Kant proves. The doctrines of the Scottish School, which for a while were expounded only from the professorial chairs at home, remained for a long time unknown in Germany. When this condition of things came to an end, the case of F. H. Jacobi shows how important was their influence upon German philosophy also.

3. The story of the life of JEAN JACQUES ROUSSEAU, born at Geneva on June 28th, 1712, and died at Paris on July 3rd, 1778, is universally known through his world-renowned autobiography (*Confessions*). By means of his numerous works, the best collected edition of which is that of Musset-Pathay, Paris, 1818–1820 in 22 volumes, he exercised a great influence, chiefly upon the history of civilization in general, but also to some extent upon the history of philosophy. His first piece of writing was the essay upon the (baneful) influence of the arts and sciences, which was awarded a prize at Dijon in 1750. Of his other works, we may mention as the principal ones, his other prize essay upon the inequality of man (1753), the *Contrat social* (1762), and his two novels, *La nouvelle Héloise* (1761) and the more important *Émile* (1762). All of his books, from first to last, are marked by the one

fundamental idea, that man, when he comes from the hands of nature, is good, and that it is simply society that ruins him. This destructive process, he holds, can only be checked when education produces a better set of human beings, by allowing man to develop naturally and in his own particular way, and by confining its efforts to preventing the entrance of evil into him. It naturally follows from these premisses that this could be best effected in complete isolation from the world, outside of the family circle, by means of a private tutor selected for the purpose, in a solitude which might be called an artificially constructed Crusoe's island. (It is unnecessary to go into the detailed educational precepts given in *Émile*, more especially as most of what is nowadays cited as having been first taught by Rousseau, is found in Locke, from whom Rousseau can be shown to have borrowed it.) The pronounced individualism, expressed in the principles just quoted, accords very well with the fact, that in Rousseau's ideal State, in spite of the stress he himself lays upon the important distinction between *volonté générale* and *volonté de tous*, the will of all—indeed, in default of this, the will of the majority—decides everything; so that, for example, every year the majority determines whether the constitution is to continue or is to be altered. Rousseau's antipathy to all corporations, to all systems of representation, to the subdivision produced by separating the functions of government, and so on, is a necessary consequence of the fact that the citizen never ceases to be "a man," which means here, an individual; and that even in the State the "rights of man," *i.e.*, the rights of the human atom, or individual man, continue to be the chief consideration. His theory is much more revolutionary than he was himself. It leads to anarchy—a result which individualism is bound to reach, exactly as pantheism is bound to insist upon the oppression of individual citizens. Just as his politics are in this respect anti-social, so his religion is anti-ecclesiastical. The famous confession of faith made by the Savoyard vicar in Rousseau's *Émile*, led at one and the same time to two widely different results. His book was burned by the public executioner, and yet it earned him the contempt of the Encyclopædists, who began to look upon him as a bigot. This confession exhibits a point of view in which the subjective side is exalted so far above the objective that, while God really becomes of little import to man, man's

enjoyment of the consciousness that God exists, becomes correspondingly important. The foremost place is given to the certainty that we are immortal, and that we shall one day see merit and happiness brought into accord with each other. As neither of these is conceivable without a Godhead, a belief in the latter is accepted into the bargain. Hence the vehemence with which it is maintained that the nature of the *être des êtres* is unknowable. Hence the wrath against all dogma, which makes Rousseau portray so affectionately the atheist Wolmar in the *New Héloise*, and which has led many an orthodox critic, wrapped up in dogmatism, to put Rousseau into the same category with Voltaire and Diderot, as if fire and water were the same thing because they both destroy man's handiwork. In Rousseau's religion of the heart we cannot help recognising the first germs of the sentimental theology which afterwards became supreme, especially in Germany, and under the influence of which real theology was driven out by pietism. In maintaining *pectus est quod theologum facit*, as against those who would deify reason, men of this school were in literal agreement with Rousseau, who is never weary of proclaiming to the world that heart and feeling are more than reason. We can hardly imagine a nature better fitted to be the active apostle of such a form of subjectivity. Living in constant self-contemplation, always meditating upon himself, and therefore, even in the passion for nature, which became fashionable after his day, paying much less heed to nature herself than to the emotions which she calls forth, often spoiling his enjoyment by this reflective tendency, he yet is more afraid of losing himself than of anything else. Hence his cry of *j'abhorre Spinoza*. Rejected and ridiculed by those who, like Helvetius, find their all in the sensuous side of human nature, Rousseau enthroned the Ego revelling in its own thoughts. The solitude that closed round this prophet of idealism in the midst of materialistic culture, drove him always further and further into himself; for him whom the world thrusts forth as a "savage" or a "bear," there is nothing left but to find satisfaction in his own self. In Rousseau's case this is pushed to excess. He is as much, or even more, of an egoist than Helvetius; but his egoism shows itself in that admiration for his own excellence, which makes him exclaim,—even when he is recounting acts of meanness of which he had been guilty,—"There has never been a better man than I am." Spinoza could not have

read without repugnance a book like Rousseau's *Confessions;* Rousseau's own age saw in it a new gospel. We, who have fallen heir to the legacies of both, pass, as we read it, from admiration to disgust, and from disgust to admiration. Up till now, owing largely to the charm of his style, the sentiment of admiration has prevailed almost universally in France. The remarkable article on Rousseau in the *Revue de Deux Mondes* by St. Marc Girardin, is a brilliant exception to this, and one which, it seems, is beginning to find imitators.

4. The efforts of the SCOTTISH SCHOOL were not crowned with such striking and immediate success; but their influence has been almost as great, and it has been more permanent. As the merits of James Beattie (5th Nov., 1735, to 8th Aug., 1803) lie rather in the sphere of æsthetics, while James Oswald exhibits no originality, and Adam Ferguson (1724–22nd Feb., 1816) marks no important step in advance, it will be sufficient to mention here only the founder of the School, and the youngest of his own pupils, who not merely dedicated his chief work to his master, but had a like honour paid him in return. While only in his twelfth year, THOMAS REID, born April 26th, 1710, was entered at Marischal College, Aberdeen, of which George Turnbull (1698–1748) had just become head. Turnbull, though almost forgotten nowadays, was an extremely suggestive writer; and in the admirable work by McCosh, referred to in § 281, 7, attention is very properly directed to him, because Reid is so greatly indebted to him, that it is surprising to see that no acknowledgment is made. After finishing his studies, Reid first held the post of librarian at Aberdeen, and then had charge of a country parish until he finally received a university chair. In 1752 he became a professor in Aberdeen, and from there he was transferred to Glasgow in 1764. He died on Oct. 7th, 1796. His views, originally expounded only in his lectures, were first given to the world in his *Inquiry into the Human Mind on the Principles of Common Sense,* Edin., 1764 (often reprinted since). This contains in a compact form all that was afterwards developed in the more elaborate and sometimes prolix works of his old age, viz., *Essays on the Intellectual Powers of Man,* Edin., 1785, and *Essays on the Active Powers of Man,* Edin., 1788. (These two have often been printed together in three volumes at Edinburgh, *e.g.* 1819, as, *Essays on the Powers of the Human Mind.*) In 1847 Sir William Hamilton, of whom

we shall have to speak later, published the collected works of Reid in one volume; and as early as 1858 this edition (Edin., Maclachan and Stewart) had been reprinted five times. Thoroughly acquainted with the teaching of Hume and of Berkeley, Reid admits that both are perfectly justified in the conclusion they draw from Locke's theories, even although one denies the existence of the Ego, and the other the existence of matter. As scepticism of this kind is absurd, the principles upon which these conclusions rest must be given up. Not, however, the point of view of empiricism; for, just as natural science made no progress until it was based upon experience and experiment, so too the second branch of science, pneumatology,—which is still waiting for its Galileo, Torricelli, Kepler, Bacon, and Newton,—can follow no other road but the analytical method of observation, which endeavours to discover the laws that regulate the phenomena (*Inquiry*, ed. vi., pp. 3, 10; *Essays*, Pref.). What must be given up is "the ideal system," according to which we have at first mere ideas, and only afterwards, by combining these, become able to decide about the reality of the object of thought. As a matter of fact, the reverse of this would be much nearer the truth; just as in nature what we have first presented to us, is bodies or combinations of elements that we only discover afterwards by analysis (*Inquiry*, pp. 44, 45). Nothing but the assumption that there is a primitive judgment of this kind,—a certainty that does not rest upon ideas,—can furnish any protection against scepticism. The Peripatetic view avoided this extreme by holding (wrongly) that ideas are actual copies of things themselves; but it became an inevitable conclusion, after Locke, Hume, and Berkeley had proved, first of some and then of all ideas, that they could not have the remotest resemblance to the nature of the things they represent (*Inquiry*, pp. 187–192). The sum-total of the primitive judgments which are present in the consciousness of all men, and upon which all certainty ultimately rests, is called common sense; anything that runs counter to this is called absurd (*Inquiry*, p. 52). With regard to these, the greatest philosopher is no higher an authority than an ordinary man (*Essays*, vol. ii., p. 316). Pneumatology has not to construct or to explain these principles; it has simply to discover them as facts. Nor must it yield to the desire to reduce them all to a single principle; for this endeavour, which proceeds from the

tendency to analogy, may far too readily lead us to look for greater simplicity than is given in nature, and is therefore often a hindrance to free investigation, just as philosophy usually suffers more from too much than from too little ingenuity (*Essays*, vol. ii., p. 275; *Inquiry*, p. 9). Of undemonstrable principles of this kind, which form the established facts of our consciousness, Reid brings forward twelve as essential for our knowledge of contingent truths. Amongst these is the Cartesian axiom, that the fact of thought is a proof of the existence of the thinking Ego. The only fault he finds with it, is that it is thrown into the form of a reasoned conclusion, although the truth it expresses is an immediate certainty. Another such primitive judgment is, that every feeling "suggests" an object felt, not because it is an effect of the object, for that we do not know, but because we are bound to look upon it as a sign or indication of it; another is, that things are such as we perceive them to be, and so on. It is possible that in all this we are deceiving ourselves, but that does not matter, for, if so, we are so constituted that we are bound to deceive ourselves (*Essays*, vol. ii., pp. 304–328). Just as these twelve principles form the basis of our knowledge of matters of fact, or of the contingent, so too our knowledge of rational or necessary truths rests upon certain principles, the validity of which has hardly been seriously questioned. To these belong not merely the familiar axioms of logic and mathematics, but also certain metaphysical principles, which have indeed been attacked by Hume, but which common sense continues to maintain, *e.g.*, that every event has a cause, and so on (*Ibid.*, pp. 331–352). Just as these intellectual principles are a refutation of Locke's *tabula rasa*, so sound common sense is made up of certain practical principles, to the consideration of which the third volume of the *Essays* is devoted. It begins by reducing all action to three sorts of principles—mechanical, on which instinctive and customary action depends, animal, which form the basis of appetites and desires, and rational, which are the foundation for our affections for individuals. It then goes on to show that a moral sense, or moral consciousness,—our conscience,—enjoins us to esteem the fulfilment of duty more highly than our own well-being; and ends by laying down those (six) principles which no rational being can deny: common sense teaches us that there is a difference between praiseworthy and

blameworthy; further that we are responsible only for what stands within our own power, that we must treat every one as we ourselves should like to be treated, etc. From these principles even an uneducated man can construct a system of ethics.

5. DUGALD STEWART was regarded by Reid himself as the foremost of his disciples; and his own and succeeding generations have confirmed this opinion. He was born on Nov. 22nd, 1753, and after filling first the chair of mathematics and then that of moral philosophy at Edinburgh, he died in retirement in the country on June 11th, 1828. Of his works we may mention, *Elements of the Philosophy of the Human Mind*, 5 vols., 4to, Edin., 1792–1827; *Outlines of Moral Philosophy*, 1793; *Philosophical Essays*, Edin., 1810; and his last book, *Philosophy of the Active and Moral Powers of Man*, 2 vols., 1828. Besides these, he wrote memoirs of Adam Smith, Reid, and Robertson. After a complete edition of his works in seven volumes had appeared in America, Sir William Hamilton, Reid's editor, published *Collected Works*, etc., Edin., 1854–58, in ten octavo volumes. Stewart agrees with Reid in holding that philosophy has only to enumerate the principles upon which our certainty rests, and which he calls at one time fundamental laws of human belief, at another, elements of reason, and at another, principles of common sense. The chief points of difference between him and his master depend upon the fact that he tries to bring himself more into sympathy with views which the latter criticised. Thus he follows Descartes in holding that the Cartesian principle should be put in the form of an enthymeme: we are directly certain only of the fact of our thinking, we must really take a step forward from this, before we reach the certainty of our own existence. Similarly, he does not agree with Reid in holding that Locke's distinction between primary and secondary qualities should be given up; impenetrability does not stand in exactly the same relation as colour and taste. Still less does extension, which he assigns to a third group of qualities, mathematical. Finally, he will not allow that all doubt as to the reality of things is set at rest by Reid's (fifth) principle, that we are bound to supply in thought an object felt, to correspond to every feeling. This would leave it quite undetermined whether the object supplied in thought is something independent, self-subsisting. At the same time, it is not necessary to assume a

new (thirteenth) principle ; the twelfth, according to which we are certain of the unchangeableness of the laws of nature, is sufficient to supply the defect. Last of all, we must mention this other point in which Stewart differs from Reid,—association of ideas occupies a much more prominent place with him than with his master. If Reid deduced association from custom, Stewart attempts to achieve the opposite result—to explain custom by association.

6. The relation of Reid to Stewart finds an analogy in that of Stewart to his pupil, THOMAS BROWN (9th Jan., 1778, to 20th April, 1820), who, both in his lectures and in his writings, carried over into the nineteenth century the attitude which Reid had been the first to adopt. As a physician and a poet, he is not to be compared to his namesake, who lived a century and a half earlier ; but as a philosopher, he is highly esteemed, and shows in this latter respect more independence towards Reid than appears in Stewart. Perhaps this is partly due to the fact that—as his juvenile article in the *Edinburgh Review* shows—he already knew something of Kant, though only from French sources. Subsequently he studied German, and read German works. Of his writings, the first of which was a book against Darwin's *Zoönomia* (1798), the earliest that calls for mention is his criticism of Hume's theory of causality (1804) ; in the later editions it is less of a criticism than of a thesis. In Beneke's *Metaphysik und neue Psychologie*, I find it stated that he wrote, but did not finish, *A Sketch of a System of the Philosophy of the Human Mind*, Edin., 1820, that he died while it was in the press, and that it was completed by his pupil, David Welsh. From other sources I know that this pupil and biographer of Brown published in 1820, in four volumes, his master's *Lectures* on mental philosophy, which were stereotyped, after having gone through eight editions. The most important variation from his predecessors is, that he claims to have substituted sensation, simple suggestion, and relative suggestion for feeling, memory, and judgment,—the expressions they employ,—and that he increases the number of laws for the association of ideas which they laid down, by adding various secondary laws. He is remarkable as being a freethinker in religion. The ideas of this school were elaborated in a much more independent fashion by Brown's severe and even merciless critic, SIR WILLIAM HAMILTON, who died a few years ago. He was a professor

in Edinburgh. To his edition of Reid he appended two *Dissertations* of his own, the most important writings he published in his life-time. Besides these must be mentioned: *Discussions on Philosophy and Literature, Education and University Reform*, London, 1852. Soon after his death there appeared: *Lectures on Metaphysics and Logic, by Sir William Hamilton*, edited by Mansel and Veitch, Edin. and London. Blackwood, 1859, 4 vols. With regard to making empirical psychology the basis of philosophy,—or rather transforming philosophy, except natural philosophy, into psychology,—he holds much the same views as Reid and Stewart did. He accordingly demands that philosophy should begin by enumerating the various phenomena and manifestations of mind (Phænomenology), that it should then go on to search for the laws regulating those phenomena (Nomology), and that finally it should deduce, from the laws thus discovered, conclusions as to the nature of mind (Ontology, or Metaphysics). It is in dealing with the third of these that it becomes most apparent that a great deal, especially his acquaintance with Kant, helped to make his position more advanced than that of his predecessors. Since Hamilton's day, the use of the phraseology employed by Locke, Hume, etc., has become increasingly common. They held that knowledge is conveyed through the medium of something which only *re*-presents the objects; while, in opposition to the *re*-presentative or ideal system, Reid upheld "presentationism," according to which we have an immediate and intuitive knowledge of things themselves. "Mediate" and "representative" therefore come to mean the same thing, just as "presentative" and "immediate" do. That Hamilton, while adopting the former phraseology, is not quite decided as to which of the two lines he should follow, has been shown in a striking manner by Stirling (*Sir William Hamilton*, London, 1865). Besides the doctrine that knowledge is immediate, the main point in Hamilton's system is considered to be, that there is no knowledge of the unconditional or infinite. This statement, which was afterwards the chief ground of difference between him and Cousin, drew down upon him numerous attacks, including some from the religious point of view. Through Hamilton's influence, the views of the Scottish School, in this modified form, have continued to make way. To what an extent they are regarded in the country where

they originated, as the *ne plus ultra* of true philosophy, was shown some years ago in a manner that certainly seems strange to foreigners, when there was a talk of Ferrier (whose too early death we have to lament) being appointed to a chair in Edinburgh. But the effect produced by this school has not been confined to the land of its birth. Reid became known in France through Royer Collard, while at a later period the translations of Prévost and Théod. Jouffroy made their countrymen familiar with Dugald Stewart, whose reputation there almost surpasses that of his master. Both were summoned to lend their aid in France in the battle against the prevailing sensationalism and materialism. Nor in vain, for Cousin, the real founder of the eclecticism that was the result of this struggle, always maintained that its one leading feature belonged to the Scottish School. For it was they who first made psychology the basis of philosophy. In addition to showing that the chief characteristic of the Scottish School was its "spiritualism," *i.e.* what has been here called idealism, the school of Cousin has the further merit of having at least rendered it difficult to continue making a mistake generally made in Germany and even in France, particularly by theologians,—the mistake of putting Rousseau in the same category as Voltaire and the Encyclopædists. Just as these latter recognised their true relation to Rousseau, when they attacked him as their most dangerous foe, so the Scottish School found one of its bitterest opponents in the materialistically inclined JOSEPH PRIESTLEY (13th March, 1733, to 6th Feb., 1804). Won over by Hartley and Bonnet's theories of the vibrations of the brain fibres, he wished to substitute a physiological account of the nervous system for the analysis of the facts of consciousness, which Reid, Beattie, and Oswald had made their first duty. Against these thinkers he directed a special attack (*An Examination of Reid's Inquiry, Beattie's Essay on the Nature of Truth, and Oswald's Appeal to Common Sense.* Lond., 1774). Besides writing this strictly polemical work, he developed his views in his *Theory of the Human Mind,* Lond., 1775, which he published as a third part to Hartley's *Observations on Man, his Frame, his Duty, and his Expectations.* Further, he brought out, in defence of his doctrines: *Disquisitions Relating to Matter and Spirit,* etc., 1777, and: *Free Discussions of the Doctrines of Materialism,* etc., London, 1778. The latter also contains the objections

put forward by Richard Price (1723–1791) on behalf of "spiritualism." With Priestley's purely scientific works, which have been of special importance in the department of chemistry, we have here nothing to do.

7. The position which we have assigned to Rousseau in France, and to Reid and his school in Great Britain, belongs in Germany to the EMPIRICAL PSYCHOLOGISTS, who were to some extent influenced by these two philosophical forces, although most of them developed their views independently. Berkeley's example proved that empiricism and idealism are not mutually exclusive, and Wolff even made the attempt to graft empirical psychology on to the rational "pneumatics" of Leibnitz; still, the fact that this could only assume the form of a supplement, is an evidence that those who wish to devote their attention solely and entirely to empirical psychology, will in so doing break away from the idealism of Leibnitz, and approximate to the views of English and French thinkers. This helps to explain how the Empirical Psychologists were led to take up a position midway between the movements begun respectively by Leibnitz and by Locke, and that in turn makes intelligible their affinity to those doctrines which will appear below (*vid.* § 294) as a form of syncretism, the elements of which are taken from the systems of these two philosophers. Thus the statement made by FRIEDRICH CASIMIR CARL VON CREUZ (1724–1770) in his *Essay on the Soul* (Frkf. and Leips., 1723, 2 Pts.), to the effect that mind is a mean between a simple and a complex nature, does not seem so strange, if we bear in mind that Leibnitz and Wolff had maintained that it was simple, Hume that it was complex. Similarly, his assertion that while the soul produces all its ideas by itself, these must yet be occasioned by something external to ourselves, shows him as a follower at once of Leibnitz and of Locke. His constantly repeated demand to base psychology solely upon experience, his statement that the soul, besides being prompted to produce ideas itself, prompts the body to produce motions, a fact which we are bound to admit, are features that remind us of Bonnet. And the view that the soul must be immortal, because, if it ceased to exist, an "aspect" of the world would be lost, since each soul views the world in a different way, is borrowed from Leibnitz. Accordingly the physician JOH. GOTTL. KRÜGER was following in the footsteps of Creuz when, in his *New Theory of the*

Emotions (1746), and more decidedly in his *Dreams* (1754), he set aside all inquiry into the question of immortality, on the ground that we can get no light upon it from experience. The same may be said of JOH. JAC. HENTSCH, who, in his *Essay on the Sequence of Changes in the Human Soul* (1758, Leips.), declares that the theory of the soul belongs to physics, and not to metaphysics. The Latin work by JAC. FR. WEISS, : *De natura animi et potissimum cordis humani*, Stuttg., 1761, bears evidence in its title of where the author's chief interest lay. For him, just as for Krüger before him, it lay in sensation, which had been hinted at by Leibnitz in his unconscious perceptions, and had been more closely examined by the Wolffian School, especially by Meier, and which under the name of feeling was soon to play such an important part. The first to give it a permanent place in psychology was the man who beyond doubt occupies the chief place among the empirical psychologists of the pre-Kantian period. This is JOHANN NICOLAUS TETENS (16th Sept., 1736, to 1805), who, before being transferred to Copenhagen and while professor first at Bützow and afterwards at Kiel, had published a number of works, amongst which the *Philosophical Essays on Human Nature and its Development*, Leips., 1776, 2 vols., decidedly occupies the first place. (Of his other works we may name: *Thoughts on some Causes why there are only a Few Established Truths in Metaphysics*, Bützow, 1760; *Discussion of the Chief Proofs for the Existence of God*, 1761; *On the Origin of Language and of Writing*, 1772; *On Universal Speculative Philosophy*, 1775.) In his investigations he combines with his observation of the modifications of the soul a criticism of the views of others. On the most various occasions he pronounces against the hypothesis of brain oscillations as put forward by Hartley, Priestley, and Bonnet, who really explain nothing; against Hume and Berkeley, who arrive at untenable conclusions; against Leibnitz and Wolff, because, in reducing all psychical activities to perception, they overlook other sources of such activities; and finally, against the Scottish School, which makes no attempt at scientific explanation. The *Essays* contains fourteen different essays. The first part consists of eleven, dealing respectively with the nature of perceptions, with feeling, with sensations and sensibilities, with perception and consciousness, with thinking power and thought, with the origin of our knowledge of the

objective existence of things, with the distinction between sensuous and rational knowledge, with the necessity of universal truths of reason, with the relation between the reasoning faculty and common sense, with the fundamental principle of sensation, perception, and thought, with the relation of imagination to the other active capacities of the soul, with the fundamental power of the human soul and the character of humanity. The second part is composed of three essays, which treat of independent activity and freedom, of the nature of the human soul, and of the perfectibility and development of man. To make against Tetens the reproach that this succession of subjects betrays an entire want of system, would be to forget that his purpose is not to lay before his readers a careful epitome of the final result of previous meditations upon his part, but simply to induce them to accompany him in these meditations. We can accordingly see no inconsistency, but must rather see the advance, *i.e.* progress, necessary to every meditation, in the fact that Tetens begins by reducing all acts of knowledge to sensations, perceptions, and thoughts, the sources of which are said to be feeling, imagination, and reason, and yet in the tenth essay gets so far as to state that the fundamental faculties of the soul are feeling, understanding, and will. To this result he is led not merely by a criticism of the distinction which most people, "like the Catechism," make between understanding and will, as well as of that which Sulzer (*vid. infra*, § 294, 4) draws between sensibility and knowing power, but by a comparison of all the phenomena which up till now had been sharply distinguished. For it is found that the sensations of the external senses, as well as the feeling that we are ourselves affected, and the feelings of pleasure and its opposite, are all marked by the characteristic of receptivity. In our ideas and thoughts, on the other hand, there appears activity, from which, as remaining within ourselves (*actio immanens*), there must be distinguished that which passes beyond ourselves (*transiens*), and which we exhibit, for example, when we resolve to make a movement. But receptivity, then immanent, and finally transient activity, are the three fundamental faculties which, since the days of Tetens, it has been customary to distinguish. In addition to the strictness of his analysis, in which no one but Bonnet can be compared to him, what made the investigations of Tetens so valuable to Kant and the epoch that he inaugurated, was

that tendency towards a reconciliation of extremes, which marks him as standing on the threshold of the succeeding period. In his discussions on language he attempts to steer a middle course between Süssmilch, who had maintained the impossibility, and Herder who had maintained the necessity, of man's inventing a language for himself; and he believes that he has found this middle course in the statement that under certain circumstances it would be possible for man to invent a language. In the same way, he says that his point of view lies midway between determinism and indeterminism, while he demands that we should pay some regard to common sense, but should not pay regard to it alone. To disregard it, is sophistry; to neglect everything else, leads to fanaticism; true philosophy is distinct from both, and occupies an intermediate position. Similarly, in discussing the question as to whether memory is a function of the soul alone or of the brain alone, he expresses the opinion that the third view, which assigns a share of it to both, is most probably correct because it lies midway between the other two. Further, as in the case of Bonnet (*vid.* § 283, 7), it may be pointed out how nearly Tetens approaches Kant, when (in the thirteenth essay) he classes as mere "appearances" or "phenomena" not only what we learn of things through sensations, but also what we learn of ourselves through self-consciousness; the real nature alike of things and of the soul remains concealed from us.—For the rest, the extent of the interest shown during this period in observations of individual psychical states is proved by the abundance of psychological literature, in reference to which, among other works, the third volume of Carus' *Geschichte der Psychologie* may be consulted. It even survived the Kantian revolution. The *Magazin für Seelenerfahrungs Kunde*, founded by Karl Philipp Moritz (1757–93) well known for his strange and morbid habit of introspection, was afterwards continued by Maimon, and at a still later period was revived in the *Psychologisches Journal* of C. Chr. Ehr. Schmid.

§ 293.

F.—THE ENLIGHTENMENT IN GERMANY.

F. G. Schlosser: *Geschichte des achtzehnten Jahrhunderts.* Vols. 3 and 4. Bruno Bauer: *Geschichte der Politik, Cultur und Aufklärung des achtzehnten Jahrhunderts.* Charlottenburg, 1843–45. M. v. Geismar: *Bibliothek der deutschen Aufklärer des achtzehnten Jahrhunderts.* 5 Parts.

Leipz., 1846–47. K. Biedermann: *Deutschland im achtzehnten Jahrhundert.* 1st vol., Leipz., 1854. 2nd vol., 1st pt., Leipz., 1858, 2nd pt., 1868 (no more published). H. Hettner: *Literaturgeschichte des achtzehnten Jahrhunderts.* Third part, 1st Book, Brunsw., 1862; 2nd, 1864; 3rd, 1869–70. A. Tholuck: *Vorgeschichte des Rationalismus*, 2 vols., each in two parts, Halle, 1853–4, 1861–2; and the same author's, *Geschichte des Rationalismus*, 1st pt., Berlin, 1865.

1. The step which, in pursuance of the line hitherto followed, idealism has to take in order to bring itself into complete correspondence with the *Système de la Nature* (§ 286, 3), was too small to be made the life-work of an outstanding genius. On the other hand, however, the denial of the evidence of the senses requires not merely a greater power of abstraction than is necessary for plain materialism, but also philosophical gifts of no common order. And thus arises a dilemma, the solution of which is given us by men who, as a matter of fact, occupy the point of view of the most extreme idealistic individualism, but whose consciousness of their own position is not so distinct as to enable them thoroughly to comprehend the consequences it involves. Although this failure to understand themselves excludes them from the number of great philosophers, yet it does not prevent them from exercising an important influence. The energy and the time which would have been necessary for such a descent into the depths of their own thoughts, is devoted by them to securing the supremacy, in all departments of life, of the fundamental idea that inspires them as a feeling and as an instinct. And so the success of their work, because its force is expended entirely on the surface, may appear greater than if they had been philosophers of the highest rank. The Sophists (§ 54 ff.), the syncretism of the Romans (§ 105 ff.), and the philosophy of the Renaissance have proved that there are periods when philosophy requires, not so much that a new and important step should be taken, as that a group of ideas already established should work itself completely out. Such a stage had been reached by the philosophy of the eighteenth century, when it entered the service of the *Enlightenment in Germany*, and became one of its prominent features. Only one of its features; for while the scope of the Enlightenment is unduly narrowed by those who, as is very often the case, only think of certain phenomena in the sphere of *religion*, it would not do to put forward, in opposition to this the equally narrow conception that understands by Enlightenment merely popular *philosophy*. Rather, the En-

lightenment is a crisis and a revolution in the history of the world and of civilization, a movement that penetrates into all departments of life, that began in the eighteenth century and still continues, so far as the mass of the people in our day is in the condition which at that time was characteristic of the few. The first thing to be done here is, to try to sum up the nature of this important phenomenon in a formula that will enable us rightly to estimate the large number of definitions which found utterance, but which are at once stamped as partial and one-sided by the fact that they express, or at least imply, praise or censure. This condition seems to be fulfilled by the formula that in the Enlightenment an effort was made *to raise man, so far as he is a rational individual, into a position of supremacy over everything.* The first striking feature in this, is the prominence given to the human *subject.* Now, as all that we call progress consists in the subject gaining the mastery over things, intellectually by their becoming for him objects of knowledge or of amusement, practically by their being made to serve his ends,—in both cases they serve, the subject controls them or plays with them,—we can understand how Mendelssohn was led to define enlightenment and culture as the forms in which progress manifests itself. It is, further, easy to see why during this period *man* is always praised so emphatically, whether he be exalted at the expense of the Christian, at the expense of the scholar, or at the expense of the German. Even before Herder had given currency to the word humanity, what he called by this name had become the leading motive with all those who had their hearts set upon enlightenment and light. In the second place, the formula laid down gives prominence to the fact that man's importance belongs to him as an *individual.* Man, as he is for himself, not as he is for others, *e.g.* as the member of a larger community, is put in the highest place and required to be responsible for himself. If this is called being of age, or, independence, it is easy to comprehend how Kant was led to make the essence of the Enlightenment consist in emancipation from the nonage which we had to endure, and others, at a later period, to make it consist in independence, as opposed to the fetters of authority. According as, in so doing, stress was laid upon the intellectual or upon the practical aspect of the matter, Bahrdt was able to make the Enlightenment consist in following nothing but one's own intuitions, others to make

it consist in freethinking and love of freedom. Neither of these is reconcilable with the acceptance of a judgment that one has not tested for oneself (*i.e.* a prejudice); and, therefore, war against prejudices is the universal battle-cry of the freethinkers or strong minds. As, however, in the first instance in all cases, and throughout life in most cases, natural dependence and piety do not rest upon a carefully tested judgment, others saw in the war against all prejudices a war against all authority, however just; and the expressions, freethinker, intellectual freedom, strong mind, and so on, acquired a disreputable significance. Further, no man is entirely isolated; at the outset, each finds himself organically connected with historical associations, which must be disregarded if we are to conceive of him as an individual. Thus, there is no difficulty in understanding the position of those who make the essence of the Enlightenment consist in the substitution of the abstract for the historical, or even in an inability to regard things as parts of a organism. If we always keep in view that it is for man as an individual, that the Enlightenment manifests such enthusiasm, it becomes easy to explain the flood of autobiographies that characterized this period. Rousseau, with his isolation of man, had shown the way; and he had also furnished an example of how to lay before the world that element in each individual, which is not universal and human, but particular and personal. His autobiography was followed by hundreds of others; and the interest aroused by the careers of such veritable scoundrels as Laukhardt and others can only be explained by the fact that nothing was held in higher esteem than the individual human being. Nor were the men of greatest piety during this period content with the preaching of sin and forgiveness, *i.e.*, of what is universal and human; they were anxious to hear more individual experiences, detailed histories of conversions, which only differed from one another in incidental circumstances. The interest in the saved themselves was stronger than the interest in salvation and in the communion of the saved. Similarly, where all relationships in which man finds himself involved without his own co-operation, or into which he is bound to enter, are regarded as fetters, it is easy to understand why the social impulse finds satisfaction only in those which are of an incidental or even an artificial character. Hence the praises bestowed upon friendship, which is often

ranked above marriage, the relation between those who, as Aristotle justly says, cannot live without each other; hence, too, that inclination towards all kinds of societies, which down to our own day goes hand in hand with a strong dislike of the spirit of corporations and guilds.—Thirdly, in the formula we employed, stress was laid upon the fact that the subject here occupies its high position in virtue of its being a *rational, i.e.*, a thinking being. This determines the contrast which distinguished the rationalistic Enlightenment of Germany from the materialistic Enlightenment of France, and which helps us to understand why the precursors of the former speak with such contempt of Voltaire, the Encyclopædists, Lamettrie, and the *Système de la Nature* (*cf.* §§ 285 and 286), while Rousseau (*vid.* § 292, 3) always commands their respect. Only where it is a question of fighting on common ground, against such powers as are hostile to individualism, is it possible for the German Enlightenment to make common cause with that of France. Both struggle against those all-embracing organisms, at the construction of which the preceding period had laboured, and complete the process of disorganisation which has already (§ 274) been pointed out as the distinctive feature of the second period of the modern epoch. It was of set purpose that the expression "rational" and not "thinking" individual was employed in the formula. For the latter might be taken to mean speculative thought, which is identical with its object, while here, in conformity to the subjective character of the particular point of view, must be understood subjective, rational thought, that reason which is called "our own," or (because it is found also in connection with what is non-speculative) "common,"—in other words, understanding, the strength of which consists in its conceiving of everything in simplicity and freedom from contradiction, and, therefore, in its analysis of everything that is complex. This explains the dislike felt by the men of the Enlightenment for all that they call confused thought or mysticism, contrasting it with their own clearness or definite conceptions. Such a feeling prevented them from drawing a proper distinction between that in which opposites are not yet clearly distinguished (confusion of thought), and that in which they are reconciled again (depth of thought), so that their own sharpness and clearness had afterwards to bear the reproach of dulness. A fourth point in the formula we employed, was that *no exception* was made to the supremacy of

the rational subject. This prevents that narrowing down of the movement, which has been already censured, and which would limit it to one single department, the philosophical or the religious. And it also shows why the leaders saw nothing wrong in the conduct adopted by themselves and their Enlightened contemporaries towards the unthinking multitude, whom they treated as if they were absolutely devoid of rights, nothing wrong in the force which they, the free, employed to compel the enslaved to burst their fetters, nothing wrong even in the opinion expressed by Bahrdt in a now classical formula, where he says that submission to the authority of those who have received the light, is one of the signs of Enlightenment. What has since been called the worship of genius, was never more flourishing than during the age of Enlightenment, though nowadays we usually understand by a genius, something more than an unprejudiced man. It has already been stated, that in our own time the mass of the people thinks as the few thought in that epoch. Any one who is inclined to doubt this, should compare the readiness shown by the high-spirited youths (such as are pictured for us by Jean Paul, or even by Goethe himself in *Wilhelm Meister*) to submit themselves to every apostle of the light, with the way in which nowadays the mob, in order to show its independence of mind, declaims against the Government candidate, and makes choice of some one utterly unknown, simply because he was proposed by an unknown committee. Such is the humble position in which he who has not received the light, stands towards him who is already Enlightened. Closely connected with this, is what has been called the inability to comprehend historical phenomena, or the fact that the Enlightened man could apply no other standard to "darker" times than his own point of view. Goethe rightly calls this the age of self-conceit, and reproaches it with arrogant self-satisfaction. "Thus would I speak if I were Christ," are words which he puts into the mouth of Dr. Bahrdt. Mendelssohn declares that he has made Socrates speak as he would speak nowadays; Nicolai professes to find in the *Critique of Pure Reason* only a confirmation of the ideas he had himself long entertained; and so on. Let this suffice by way of analysis of our formula. Its correctness is confirmed by every characteristic feature of the Enlightenment, and there is no definition of which we are aware, that it can-

not be shown to include. A complete and comprehensive account of the Enlightenment in Germany would be foreign to the purpose of this work, and the lines originally laid down in Schlosser's investigations have been followed up with such excellent results in the books mentioned above, that there can be no hesitation in referring readers to works upon the history of culture and of literature. Still, an account of the philosophy of this period must be prefaced by a sketch of the form which the Enlightenment assumed in those two departments of life which have always up till now been represented as conditioning and accompanying philosophical development—the Church and the State, or, as it would be more correct to say in this case, religion and society. This sketch is all the more necessary here, because the movements in these two departments stand in a peculiar reciprocal relation to the development of philosophical ideas, inasmuch as the sustenance they afford one another is mutual. It will, accordingly, form the subject-matter of the succeeding section.

2. We shall begin with an examination of the *religious Enlightenment* in Germany, because, to mention only one reason, the word "enlightened," where it first occurs, is employed to denote the opposite of superstition and religious narrowness. This springs from three different sources. Two of these are purely German—*Pietism*, which began with Spener, and was afterwards specially fostered by the theologians of Halle, and rationalistic *Philosophy*, founded by Leibnitz and then developed chiefly through the influence of the Halle professors, Thomasius and Wolff. The mutual regard that subsisted between Leibnitz and Spener, the (originally) friendly relation between Thomasius and the pietists of Halle might have repeated itself between the pietists and Wolff, had not particular circumstances prevented it. Those who look upon the personal need of salvation as a guarantee of the truth of the doctrine they hold, cannot find it hard to appreciate a point of view which makes personal conviction the criterion of truth. Such a fusion of pietism with the philosophy of Wolff as we see in Jac. Siegm. Baumgarten of Halle, and in a very special degree in Franz Albert Schultz of Königsberg, a man equally great as pastor, teacher, and administrator, and in his pupil Martin Knutzen (1713–1751), need not surprise us, for the two movements are alike in their individualism and their subjectivity. For this very reason too, both are bound, sooner or later, to lead to a

non-ecclesiastical or private form of religion, which was always the charge made against them by orthodox thinkers. It has already been pointed out (§ 131) that the difference between the Christian community and the Church lies in the fact that the latter has a creed, *i.e.* a system which has the validity of a statute, while the former confines itself to preaching the message of revelation, from which the system is afterwards developed. Just as, among the Schoolmen of the Middle Ages, ecclesiastically-minded theologians neglected the Bible for individual dogmas, so now the orthodox Protestant theologians, who had reached a new form of Scholasticism, neglected it for dogmatic formularies. On the contrary, it cannot be looked upon as a mere coincidence, that hand in hand with the enthusiasm for the study of the Bible, which pietism rekindled, there goes the tendency to return to the condition of the early Christian community by forming *ecclesiolæ;* or that Spener shows himself lax in regard to pledging oneself to creeds; or that during the supremacy of pietism dogmatic works appeal but seldom to the creeds, upon which, further, no lectures are delivered; or finally, that in the community of the Brotherhood, so closely connected with pietism, they have hardly any validity at all. In short, pietism did almost as much to prepare the way for the loud cry that was soon to be echoed by all the apostles of Enlightenment—"Away with creeds," as did Leibnitz with his efforts after union, and Thomasius with his polemic against the validity of dogmatic formularies. There is a second point in which pietism finds itself at one with the philosophy of Leibnitz and of Wolff; and here the positive assertion is not, as in the former case, made from the side of the orthodox, but from the other. The conviction that purity of doctrine is the one thing needful, had made the advocates of orthodoxy to some extent indifferent towards morality of life; and this indifference was increased by the disputes about good works. In fact, there were instances which proved that (just as the Cartesians took to torturing animals, § 267, 5) defenders of orthodoxy purposely made a parade of loose living, in order to give a practical proof that works were of no account. This was met by the pietists with their demand for the putting off of the old man, and by the philosophy of Wolff with a morality which, though home-made, was earnest. Before long a serious and strictly moral manner of living came to be looked upon as a sign that,

in the language of the orthodox, a man was inclining towards the pietists or the atheists. If we reflect that the men of the Enlightenment before long came to consider morality the main element in religion, if not a substitute for it, we may say that in these two points,—disregard of creeds and regard for a moral life,—pietism and Wolffianism were equally the precursors of the subsequent Enlightenment. But there is a third point, in which pietism is far less decided than German philosophy. This is in all questions affecting evil. Leibnitz had never lost sight of the idea that the individual, as a mirror of the universe, is only a member, and therefore subservient to the good of the whole. It is quite compatible with this relation of subservience, that individuals should serve as examples of corrective justice, and therefore Leibnitz found nothing irrational in the theory of eternal punishment. Wolff, by depriving the individual elements of this reflexive character, did much more to isolate them. Hence he lays greater stress upon the perfection of individuals than upon anything else; and it follows that he can admit no punishment save that which aims at the improvement of the individual, and that he is therefore bound to deny the theory of eternal punishment (§ 290, 7). In doing so he gave utterance to the second negation which was soon to become the Shibboleth of all 'Enlightened' men. "No dogmatic formularies! No eternal punishment!" these are the watchwords for which Nicolai makes his Sebaldus Nothanker endure martyrdom. But this isolation of the individual leads to still further consequences. If each one has to answer for himself, there can be no such thing as guilt that passes beyond the individuals who have actually sinned. All theories which speak of a dominion of evil that extends beyond the individual subject, whether this appears in the expression "original sin," or in the word "devil," or in both, must fail to find favour. Like eternal punishment, to which they are very closely akin, they will have to be rejected, even although this policy at first appears only as a policy of silence. So it was with Wolff and his followers. In this last respect it seems very improbable that the pietists should be the forerunners of the Enlightenment, and yet signs are not wanting that they were. They laid great stress upon the process of conversion in each individual, which differed according to his individuality, and which is sometimes called being born again, sometimes breaking with

the past, and sometimes by some other name. In so doing they weakened the significance of the new birth that resulted from the Sacrament, and from admittance into the membership of the Church. How can baptism any longer be called an outward symbol of the new birth, if the baptised require another such new birth, which is the issue of deadly struggles? And again, if baptism is only a promise that we shall one day be free from the bonds of sin, what significance has exorcism? And so on. We shall be doing pietism no injustice if we say that it at least loosened stones on the same lines on which the Wolffian philosophy afterwards removed them, while the Enlightenment overthrew the whole structure.

Cf. Benno Erdmann: *Martin Knutzen und seine Zeit.* Leipz., 1876.

3. One of the links between pietism and the Enlightenment is GOTTFRIED ARNOLD (1666–1714), who was himself a pietist, although, both before and after his connection with Spener, Jacob Böhme and Gichtel exercised great influence upon him. Thomasius called his *Impartial History of the Church and of Heresy* (1698–1700) the best book after the Bible; and, what is more remarkable, this praise was repeated by Joachim Lange, Francke's most trusted friend. And yet in this book not merely does he show the most decided preference for every form of that religious subjectivity which sets itself up against all ecclesiastical formulæ, but by his frequent hints that the defenders of the latter had not acted quite honourably, he was one of the first to stir up in Germany the outcry against priestcraft and sacerdotal cunning. In his time, and to some extent in the places where he lived,—places which had long been the centres of separatist tendencies,—there sprang up anti-ecclesiastical movements, mutually united by dislike of the Creeds and, in some cases, of the Sacraments as well. Just as Arnold looked back wistfully to the apostolic age, so those who took part in these movements, always appealed to Scripture, which, however, as the famous Berleburg Bible shows, was subjected to a mystical and allegorical method of exegesis. JO. CONR. DIPPEL (1673–1734), who wrote under the name of *Democritus Christianus*, was a man entirely devoid of moral self-control. He began by being an advocate of orthodoxy; then, after he had gained at Strasburg a more thorough acquaintance with Spener's writings, he became inclined towards pietism, and was warmly received by Arnold at Giessen.

In his *Orthodoxia Orthodoxorum*, his *Papismus Protestantium*, his *Fatum fatuum*, and other writings, published in the Geismar collection, he expresses with growing emphasis his hatred of priestcraft. After having lived as a physician in Holland, Denmark, and Sweden, and everywhere suffered persecution, he found refuge in Berleburg, like so many others who had fallen out with the Church. There there appeared, as: *An open Way to Peace with God*, 1747, a collected edition of his works in three volumes, including his autobiography, which had been already published.—JOH. CHR. EDELMANN (1698–1767) was originally an adherent of pietism, to which he had been converted by Buddeus; and therefore throughout life he remained an opponent of the Wolffian philosophy. After allowing himself to be influenced by all the separatist tendencies of his time, to a large extent even by Dippel, a man to whom morally he is far superior, and after co-operating for some time in the Berleburg translation of the Bible, he became acquainted first with Spinoza's *Tractatus theologico-politicus* and then with his *Ethics*, and ultimately adopted his philosophy in its entirety. Even in his *Innocent Truths*, and in his *Moses with uncovered Face*, 1740 (only three "*Visions*" have been printed, the others are extant in manuscript form) he argues against the theory that there is a God outside of ourselves, and against the worship of the letter. He takes up a more advanced position in his *Divineness of Reason*, 1741, and particularly in his *Necessary Creed not imposed upon Others*, 1746; and in: *Evangel and First Epistle of St. Harenberg*, 1747, the latter being a defence of the *Necessary Creed* against the attack of the prior Harenberg. There he shows us the culminating point of the Enlightening movement that proceeded from pietism, and the genesis of which we see in his *Autobiography* (Berlin, 1849), which has been edited by Klose. Disappointed in his hope of finding any one who had actually been born again, he was next repelled by the theory of eternal punishment. He had never attached any importance to creeds; his method of interpreting the Bible had made him lose his reverence for it, and finally the persecutions to which he was subjected had filled him with an ever deeper hatred of the clergy. As a consequence, he was ultimately led to take up a position of cynically-expressed hostility both to the Scriptures and to the priesthood. It was only in this latter respect that he was followed by the large number of people who are called

his friends and adherents. They belonged to the uneducated, partly to the lower, class of his countrymen; and they were quite unable to grasp the positive side of his system, his "*Pantheisterei*," as Harenberg calls it. The scholars of his own day, who might have understood it, are, like the whole age in which they lived, anti-pantheistic in their views, and consequently they take no notice at all of this aspect of Edelmann's writings. At least in Hamburg, where he lived for a long time, Reimarus seems to have ignored him entirely. In Berlin, where he made a much more lengthened stay, Mendelssohn contents himself with making a remark about his outward appearance. Edelmann was an isolated, meteor-like phenomenon; and he was so, because he attempted to combine with the revolutionary spirit that is characteristic of the Enlightenment of the eighteenth century, doctrines that breathe a spirit of quietist resignation. Perhaps Edelmann would have taken less interest in the pantheism of Spinoza's *Ethics*, if it had not been the work of the man who had so sharply criticised the authenticity of the Bible in the *Tractatus theologico-politicus*. However that may be, it is certain that, while he employs the word "Spinozist" as a title of honour, he treats with contempt the names of Wolff, Voltaire, and others, which were most revered among his contemporaries.

4. The road from the Wolffian philosophy to the philosophy of the Enlightenment was shorter than that from pietism. It has already been shown how the substance of Wolff's natural theology was ultimately resolved into belief in the existence of God and in the immortality of the soul; although he also admits that something may be added through supernatural revelation, still the miraculous is limited by him to such a small sphere, and is hampered by so many conditions, that in the end it can hardly be said that he allows it to be possible at all. In the Wolffian school, too, owing to the importance attached to individual opinion, there is a marked decrease of respect for that collective opinion which found expression in the Creeds ("*Nostri docent*"). It is not the Creeds but the Bible to which appeal is made. The Berleburg translation of the Bible and its accompanying commentary, found a counterpart in that prepared at Wertheim. The author of the latter, the Wolffian Lorenz Schmidt, also made a name for himself as the translator of Spinoza's *Ethics* and its refutation by Wolff, as well as of Tindal's book, *Christianity as Old as the*

Creation. Subsequently, he lived at Wolfenbüttel; and after his death Lessing tried to make the world believe that he was the author of the notorious *Fragments.* The "historical method of interpretation," which makes him draw a distinction between what is said in the Old Testament and what is quoted in the New, runs directly counter to the tradition of the Church. Further, many of the statements of Scripture are rationalized and deprived of much of their significance. Alongside of those Wolffians who honestly believed that the Wolffian method would enable them to justify the dogmas of the Church, there appear some who try to use it for an opposite end. The former are represented by Stattler and other Jesuits, who make the Wolffian philosophy a buttress of Catholicism, the latter by Gebhardi, Hatzfeld, and others, who are brought by it into complete agreement with the English deists. A similar division can be traced among the philosophical disciples of Al. Gottl. Baumgarten. Some saw in his indubitable piety a sign to preserve as much dogma as was possible. Others again attached importance mainly to the facts that in his natural theology he admitted no more than Wolff had done, that his theory of the best possible world was inconsistent with the orthodox view of evil, that he always spoke of the miraculous exactly as his master had done, and so on; consequently they disregarded the distinctive doctrines of Christianity. J. GOTTL. TÖLLNER (1724–1774) used to say that his own opinions were entirely formed and moulded under the influence of Baumgarten. While at Halle, he was intimate with Baumgarten, the theologian, and when he was afterwards a military chaplain at Frankfort-on-the-Oder, he was brought into contact with his brother, the philosopher. As Baumgarten and Meier had done before him, he applied the Wolffian philosophy to Christianity, particularly after being appointed a professor. His *Thoughts on the True Method of Teaching Dogmatic Theology*, 1759, as well as his *Outline of Dogmatic Theology*, 1760, and his solemn declarations about his own position, show clearly that he was one of the more orthodox philosophers. And yet in him we see perfect indifference towards dogmatic formularies; we see a denial of the vicarious character of Christ's death, and of all supernatural intervention on our behalf; and we are told "that God makes use of natural revelation also to lead men to blessedness" (1766). Others,—men, however, of less importance,—were brought

through the influence of Baumgarten, to adopt a purely negative attitude towards Christianity. But by far the most famous and most advanced of those who were led through the Wolffian philosophy to a modification of their religious ideas, was HERMANN SAMUEL REIMARUS (22nd Dec., 1694, to 1st March, 1768). After studying at Jena first theology and then philology and philosophy, he spent some time as *Privatdocent* in philosophy at Wittenberg, and travelled through England and Holland. He became rector of the school at Wismar, but was ultimately appointed Professor of Hebrew in the Johanneum at Hamburg, where he also delivered philological and philosophical lectures. Besides an edition of Dio Cassius, which he completed after the death of his father-in-law (Joh. Alb. Fabricius), we have from his pen: *Discussions on the Chief Truths of Natural Religion*, printed in 1754 (and often since); *Doctrine of Reason*, published a year later; and lastly, *Considerations on Instinct in Animals*, 1760, which deals with a subject touched upon slightly in the *Discussions*. It was not until the year 1814 that what had long been suspected, was confirmed beyond the possibility of a doubt, and the world learned for certain that the anonymous *Wolfenbüttel Fragments*, which Lessing had published, are really parts of a larger work by Reimarus, which bears the title, *Apology or Defence for the Rational Worshipper of God*, etc., Hamburg, 1767, and a manuscript copy of which is in the library at Hamburg. Besides the portions of this manuscript published by Lessing, about a fourth of the whole has been printed by W. Klose in Niedner's *Zeitschrift* (1850–52); and Dav. Fr. Strauss prepared an analysis of the rest. The fact that Reimarus professes to have been led to publish his *Discussions* by his strong feeling against the atheism of France and against irreligion, and that further, this work was warmly praised as the best antidote to Spinozism and materialism, and was translated on that showing into Dutch, French, and English, while all the while his *Apology*,—the most powerful scientific attack that had up till then been directed against Christianity,—was lying hidden in his desk, is neither so incomprehensible nor so striking an instance of the irony of fate as many suppose. The view of the world held by Reimarus is thoroughly teleological; and his investigations into external and internal perfection (*Disc.* iii., § 4) show how carefully he had examined the category of adaptation to an end, and to

what an extent he was the precursor of Kant. It is probable that the teleological views of Reimarus were in the first instance derived from his father, for it is no mere coincidence that Brockes, the author of *Earthly Pleasure in God*, was a pupil of Reimarus' father, and one of the few confidential friends who knew of the existence of the *Apology*. These views were strengthened, and received a scientific basis and development through the Wolffian philosophy, which was adopted by Reimarus, with the exception of a few points, such as the pre-established harmony between body and soul. In his *Discussions*, he tries to prove,—without reference to strictly scholastic forms, but merely from "sound reason," *i.e.*, by the method of reasoning,—that physical perfection (*i.e.*, the manner in which the bodies of animals and men are adapted to the ends they are meant to serve) cannot be explained by anything in matter itself. We are compelled, therefore, to conclude that there is a Being outside of and above the world, who, just because He transcends the world, was unable to impart to the world, which is the work of His hands, the Divine attribute of eternity (iii., 8), and who always acts from the most beneficent motives—above all, with the highest wisdom. It would be out of keeping with this last characteristic, if our soul, which is something different from the body, were to perish (x.). It is clear that these views are antagonistic to Spinozism, which only admits the existence of a God immanent in the world; and Reimarus and Edelmann, when the latter was in Hamburg, had but little in common. Similarly, Lamettrie's writings were bound to prove repellent to a man who was in such earnest about the existence of a wise Providence and of an immortal, immaterial soul (vi., x.). The real end of the world Reimarus always declares to be the well-being, not merely of man, but of every living being. In this he congratulates himself that he is at one with Derham (the inventor of the term "physico-theology") and Niewentyt; and he tries to prove to Maupertuis that, in spite of all his denial of ends, he himself is a teleologist (iv.). It cannot of course be denied that in all respects man has advantages over the other creatures. Still, the purpose of the all-wise Creator is to produce all possible living beings, and to bring every arrangement into conformity with their well-being, *i.e.*, the largest possible amount of pleasure for *all* his living creatures. To recognise this in detail, or to admire in everything the

wisdom and goodness of God, is religion, according to the view of Reimarus. And what he says (x.) of its benefits, and of the misery of him who is devoid of it, is so warmly expressed that there can be no doubt it comes from the heart. This religious feeling, however, is in no way inconsistent with the negative attitude towards Christianity adopted in the *Apology*, in the first part of which a destructive criticism is directed against the Old Testament, in the second against the New, in the third against the Protestant body of doctrine. From this we see that he himself is one of those whom he mentions in the preface to the *Discussions*, as having "come to feel contempt and inward hatred of their religion" because "they were brought up in a Church in which what is essential is choked by excess of nonsense and superstition." Holding such views, he could not but take exception to some points of Church doctrine, and these points just the most critical. He attached so much importance to the existence of God above and beyond the world, that he declared it an impossibility that the world should possess divine attributes; was it then conceivable that he would admit that the attribute of divinity or Godhead should belong to an individual man, who is merely a part of the world? The real purpose of the world was, in his view, the greatest possible amount of pleasure for all living beings; was it possible that he should accept the theory of eternal punishment? (He himself says that it was this theory that first led him astray.) Lastly, in Reimarus' opinion, religion rested entirely upon the wise ordering of the world. Every interruption of this must either be at variance with the wisdom of God, or, if it is necessary, will be a proof that the foresight of God has not been perfect. Every miracle must therefore be absolutely rejected; and it is not difficult to see that with the miraculous there also disappears almost entirely what is called special Providence. But all these views, which he was bound to reject just because he was so much in earnest with his natural theology, were urged upon his acceptance by Christianity, which, like the orthodox of his time, he completely identifies with the Bible. Against the Bible, accordingly, he had to take up arms. And since for him, as well as for his opponents, the whole Scripture narrative wears the aspect of historical fact, he has no resource but to represent the narrators, or even the hero of those narratives, as impostors, which is what he actually does in the fragment, *On the Object of Jesus.*

Reimarus marks the climax of the Enlightened theology that was the outcome of the philosophy of Wolff, just as Edelmann marks the climax of that which sprang from pietism.

Cf. D. F. Strauss: *Hermann Samuel Reimarus und seine Schutzschrift.* Leipz., 1862.

5. Besides these two purely German sources of the religious Enlightenment, there must be mentioned a third—the influence of English Deism, which, like the two former, was entirely brought into play through the medium of the University of Halle. The man to whom this connection is really to be traced back, is JACOB SIEGMUND BAUMGARTEN (14th Nov., 1704, to 4th July, 1757), who, although brought up amid pietistic associations, and never quite able to rid himself of them, contributed largely to the spread of the Wolffian philosophy. He readily communicated to his pupils the contents of his library, which was rich in deistic writings, or prompted them to read the books for themselves. How much of this was due to unconscious sympathy with these writings, and how much to a desire to steel men's minds against them,—the sole object which Löscher at Wittenberg had had in view in making known the titles of deistic works, or Thorschmidt and Trinius in preparing their *Freethinker's Lexicon*,—it is as impossible to decide in the case of Baumgarten as it is to understand the motives of a Mosheim, a Jöcher, or a Grundig in spreading the fame of the writings of Tindal, Morgan, and Herbert of Cherbury. Suffice it to say that the consequence was, that the younger generation, which had not, like Baumgarten himself, been brought up to respect the doctrine of the Church, gradually grew more and more accustomed to the idea that had been expressed first by Hobbes and afterwards by Locke. This was the idea that, besides its moral precepts, Christianity contained only one article of faith—Jesus is the Christ; subsequently the deists made this mean that He is the restorer of natural religion. Baumgarten's school produced not only Joh. David Michaelis (27th Feb., 1717, to 22nd Aug., 1791), whose influence was so important in Old Testament exegesis, but also JOHANN SALOMO SEMLER (18th Dec., 1725, to 14th March, 1791), whose work marks an epoch in the general development of German theology. Both of these men have left autobiographies. In his two chief works, *Hermeneutics* and the *Inquiries regarding the Canon*, Semler put forward the theory that Catholicism

reconciled the opposition between the Judaic Christianity of Peter and the gnosticism of Paul. This marks him as a pioneer in Church history; and, on the dogmatic side of his subject, it found a parallel in his distinction between religion and theology, *κήρυγμα* and *δόγμα*, private religion and local (ecclesiastical) doctrine. He protested most energetically against a "local" theology being made a standard for all times, professing to see in this a Judaizing and hierarchical tendency. But the distinction just mentioned made it possible for him to combine with that protest the view that in our age, which is not apt at organizing, the "territorial" Church system is the only means of preserving peace. This explains his attack upon Bahrdt's *Confession of Faith* and upon the *Wolfenbüttel Fragments*, as well as his defence of the Prussian religious edict, and so on. Lessing, as we see from an essay published after his death, held that this distinction was untenable; and Lessing's attack was repeated in almost identical language by Schulz (1739 to 21st Aug., 1823), the "*Gielsdorfer*" or "*Zopf*," whose advanced position is characterized by individualism to a greater extent than is that of any of those intellectually akin to him. For in his *Demonstration of the vast Difference between Morality and Religion* (Frkf. and Leips., 1786), he gives up the belief in God's existence, while he continues to maintain that in personal immortality. Semler's own contemporaries too, as well as later generations, have refused to believe that he was in earnest in defending the privileges of the national Church. On the other hand, however, this distinction contributed largely to soothe the consciences of those theologians who, like him, softened the views of the English deists so far as to make them compatible with practical service in the Church. This compromise, which soon came to be called Theism or even Rational Christianity, was defended by those much-respected preachers who looked beyond mere distinctions of confession, and devoted their attention chiefly to morality. These were Sack (1703–1783) and Spalding (1714–1804) in Berlin, and Jerusalem (1709–1789) in Brunswick, all of whom regarded natural religion as the essence of Christianity, and everything positive as merely a deliberate addition, which was necessary perhaps for the weak, but which did not affect the strong. Wilh. Abr. Teller, of Berlin (1734–1804), actually "coupled before the altar of humanity," not merely the Lutheran and the Reformed confession but also "Judaism and Christianity."

Mendelssohn was quite right in saying that Christianity of this kind differed in no way from (his) Judaism. The two currents of thought already mentioned reached their fullest development in Edelmann and Reimarus, men of the highest reputation; the corresponding position in the movement that sprang from Deism, is claimed by a man who was anything but reputable, KARL FRIEDRICH BAHRDT (25th Aug., 1741, to 23rd April, 1792). Living when he did, he could not help writing an autobiography (Frkf. 1790, 2 vols., along with a supplement dealing with his imprisonment). From it we see that his orthodoxy had been very superficial, and yet it was in defence of this that he first made a name for himself. After his disgraceful conduct had necessitated his leaving Leipsic, where he was a catechist and an extraordinary professor, he was brought to Erfurt by Klotz of Halle, with whom his very irregularity of life had been the means of effecting a reconciliation. There he became professor of philosophy; but within a few months he quarrelled with his theological colleagues and passed over into the opposite camp, simply, as he himself admits, on account of personal grievances (vol. i., pt. 2, p. 83). In 1768 he published his *Biblical System of Dogmatic Theology*, 2 vols., which went much too far for those who adhered to the old faith, but not nearly far enough for some of his Berlin friends. His *System of Moral Theology*, which appeared about the same time, is a revised version of sermons preached at Leipsic. In Giessen, where he went in 1771 to be professor of theology, mercenary motives led him at first to continue his work of compiling books such as the *Impartial Ecclesiastical History of the New Testament*, although, always under the pressure of outward circumstances, he gave up one dogma after another. Thus, in his *Suggestions for the Enlightenment and Improvement of our Ecclesiastical System*, and the Appendix to it (1770, 1773), he renounced the doctrine of the Atonement. It was in Giessen, too, that there appeared the first (and most moderate) edition of his *God's Latest Revelations in Letters and Narratives* (*i.e.*, a modernized paraphrase of the Epistles and Gospels), Riga, 1772 ff., 4 vols., with which there began that propagation of deistic ideas amongst the illiterate public, to which Bahrdt devoted his extraordinarily prolific literary activity. To fulfil this end and that of making money, he wrote his *Confession of Faith*, 1779, his *Lesser Bible*, and his *Defence of Reason*, 1780,

his *Popular Letters on the Bible*, 1782–91, and his *System of Moral Religion*, 1787. After leaving Giessen, he had held the post of director of the Philanthropin at Marschlins, and then of general superintendent at Dürkheim on the Hardt. From 1779 till his death he lived in or near Halle, without occupying any official position. The hurriedly-composed compendia for lectures which he delivered in Halle on eloquence, metaphysics, and so on, did not interest either the educated or the uneducated, nearly so much as did a great number of controversial works, which roused the wrath of the former and gave intense pleasure to the latter. In these, Bahrdt attacked Michaelis of Göttingen, "Zopf" Schulz, Zimmermann, and above all Semler and the theological faculty at Halle. Two satires against the edict of religion,—in spite of the fact that he disavowed the authorship of them,—and the part he took in a German secret society, resembling the order of Illuminati, and a modification of the order of Freemasons, to the latter of which Bahrdt naturally belonged, led to his imprisonment. He was a year in confinement, and busied himself in writing new books. Soon after his release he died, despised by the better among his contemporaries but highly popular with the multitude. As Bahrdt's literary activity was not confined to the religious sphere, but also dealt with the theory of education, and indeed, in his masonic labours, with the revolution of society, he will be the most suitable figure from whom to pass to the second point that requires to be considered, before going on to speak of those who may be called the philosophers of the period of the Enlightenment.

6. This is the *Social Enlightenment.* The corresponding religious movement had among its representatives those who found satisfaction in the enjoyment of the feeling that they were free and unprejudiced, *i.e.* not slaves, but masters, even although no one (Reimarus is a case in point), or only the small circle of the educated, shared this enjoyment. In the social movement of the period, on the contrary, special importance is attached to that part of our formula (*vid. sub* 1) which says that the individual must (first) be brought into this state of liberty. Accordingly it assumes the form of a vast educational process, in which we have, on the one side, those who have already reached the light and are capable of taking care of themselves, and on the other, the weaklings who are entrusted to their charge. The first place among these 'Enlightening'

educationalists belongs to FREDERICK THE GREAT, inasmuch as through his influence a whole nation was trained; and Kant, who was the first to call the age of the Enlightenment the age of Frederick, gave expression to a truth which is still universally accepted. Born some months after Hume, and some weeks before Rousseau, Frederick speedily became denationalized, partly owing to his father's well-meant, if somewhat foolish, enthusiasm for what was German, partly to his mother's leaning towards what was English, and his own early-aroused fondness for all that was French. So too his pietistic training in religion, combined with the zealous study of Bayle, whom he knew almost by heart, and with the reading of the French philosophers, made him before long a thorough-going materialist. Feeling the hopeless nature of this point of view, he lent an ear for some time to the doctrines of Wolff; but he soon grew weary of the speculative part of that philosophy. He fell back upon the opinions of French thinkers again, and, disgusted with all metaphysics, he figured sometimes with D'Alembert as a sceptic, but usually as a deist like Voltaire, the only difference being, that he was much more decided in his denial of immortality. He did not require to believe in this. For one thing had been impressed upon him by his strict bringing up, and fostered by the Wolffian philosophy,—the moral earnestness which made him find in the fulfilment of his duties the true way of serving God, the true philosophy ('*pratiquons la*' is a common saying of his), and therefore also that feeling of satisfaction which did not require a belief in compensation after death. He was as firmly convinced as was his great father, whose merit hardly any one has recognised so fully as did his greater son, that for himself there was only one duty—to further the well-being of the State, which was the same thing as the well-being of his own house. And it was this worship of duty, strengthened by the study of Locke, of Montesquieu's earlier writings, and of works of a similar tone, that made him say the King was "the first servant of the State," in which famous phrase he laid at least as much emphasis upon "*premier*" as upon "*domestique*." The end to the accomplishment of which he was bound to devote his energies, was in his view the well-being, not of a whole which had been determined by nature, a nation, but of the subjects who had been brought together under his sway by the (diplomatic and military) skill of his ancestors and of himself. Their well-

being meant for him their earthly happiness, for that was the only happiness he knew of. For this purpose the State must be outwardly strong and respected, while at home comfort and intelligence must be generally distributed. The one was essential to the glory, the other to the prosperity, of those who could not attain to either of these without his assistance. The former he achieved as the greatest statesman and warrior of his time, the latter as the man who, in acuteness of intellect, was head and shoulders above his contemporaries. His powers were as patent to himself as they were to every one else, and this explains the absence of opposition to what has been called Enlightened,—and it must be added, Enlightening, —despotism, a quality of which Frederick, more than any one else, was the incarnation. Its principle is, that as all are so incapable of looking after themselves, they must be compelled to be rational and happy. And the right of the man of superior wisdom to exercise this compulsion seemed so much a matter of course to everybody, that when Frederick ordered one of his officials, on pain of dismissal, to indulge in the educative pleasure of visiting the theatre, not a single cry of alarm was raised on behalf of the "silly bigot." In the progress of this period towards reasonableness and light, much less importance is attached to following understanding, than to the fact that understanding is something belonging to ourselves. Naturally, therefore, he whose function it is to bring men to reason, must himself entertain, and must also spread amongst those whom he teaches, a dislike, or even a hatred of the established order of things—of all by which man finds himself limited when he comes into the world, or as he grows up in it. Among limitations of this kind are nationality and its chief manifestation, language, in which it is embodied. Characteristically enough, Frederick had a contempt for the German tongue; he himself employed the language which in his time was as much the language of the educated world as was the language of the Church in the Middle Ages. Equally characteristic was the attitude he adopted to the one national institution, the Imperial Constitution of the German nation. The more he made his subjects feel that they were Prussians, and his foes that they were Saxons and Austrians,—those who were neither had, as Goethe puts it, no resource left but to become *Fritzisch* (Frederick's men),—the more was the natural order of things sacrificed to what was purely arbitrary. The

same process was repeated on a smaller scale in other spheres. Through no fault of his own, the individual is subject not merely to the limitations of nationality, but also to those of the particular society and class to which he belongs. This explains the feeling of hostility which the men of the Enlightenment,—and therefore Frederick, the most 'Enlightened' of all,—entertained for the spirit that found expression in corporations and guilds. (Only so far as experience had shown it to be the best training school for military bravery, did he foster the nobility; otherwise he knew perfectly well how much he owed to the ancestor of whom he said,—speaking with uncovered head to none other than the nobles in his train,—"Gentlemen, he accomplished a great work.") In this feeling he found himself at one with the most Enlightened among his subjects. They wished that a man should take rank simply according to the result of his own efforts, and therefore they strongly objected to the nobility, to guilds, and to the clergy, on account of the class feeling characteristic of such institutions. Hence, too, the joy with which these men hailed the promulgation of a legal code that struck at the supremacy of privileges, as well as at the differences between the various provinces of the empire. They, no less than their great leader, saw clearly and without regret that in this code a great many of those laws and privileges "that grow from generation to generation," were set aside, to make way for the right "that is born along with us;" that the spirit of Thomasius could be traced everywhere; but that further, in exactly the same proportion, decentralization and self-government,—only possible under the reign of privilege,—were set aside in favour of supervision by the State. Accordingly, when men appeared who, in their interest for privilege and self-government or even for the well-being of Germany as distinct from Prussia, could not bestow unqualified praise upon Frederick, their conduct was looked upon as reactionary, no matter how great the respect in which they themselves were held; and it is still regarded in this light by many who know nothing higher than the spirit of the eighteenth century. A case in point is the old-style gentleman, Justus Möser (14th Dec., 1770, to 1794), whose works (collected in ten volumes by Abeken, 1842), especially his unfinished *Osnabrück History* and his *Patriotic Fancies*, show that he did not see in the great Prussian king the saviour of society. For he held that the main-stay of a healthy political

life was not the abstract idea of humanity, with its subdivision of everything into units, but citizenship, with its positive religion and its respect for rank. Another instance was Fr. Karl von Moser (18 Dec., 1723, to 1798), who inherited from his father the well-deserved name of gentleman. Although, in his *Master and Servant*, he had almost adopted the point of view of Enlightened despotism, yet in his book, *On the National Spirit of Germany*, 1765, and his *Record of Patriotism*, 1784–1790, he attacked Frederick as the most dangerous foe of Imperial unity. Although he was the greatest, Frederick was not by any means the only monarch who educated his people. The march of the times strengthened the force of his example. The reforms undertaken from above in Bavaria, Baden, Saxony, Brunswick, Dessau, etc., dwindle into insignificance when compared with those attempted by Frederick's most able rival, Catherine the Second, and by his most enthusiastic imitator, the son of his bitter enemy. Joseph's heart cherished more love than that of Frederick, but he lacked the clear understanding of the man he tried to follow. And thus a tragic fate overtook him, for at the end of his career he was compelled to revoke all his previous ordinances. It was otherwise with Frederick. No single scheme of his failed of its accomplishment. Prussia was respected abroad, and at home was as enlightened and as free from prejudices as he could have wished it to be. And yet there was a tragic element in his life too. He was not indeed, like Joseph, brought to see that it was an impossibility to force freedom upon the slave who loves his chains; but he came to know with sorrow that those who had shaken off their prejudices at his command, remained in bondage *to him*. The forty-six years of the reign of their greatest King furnished perhaps the main reason why the Prussian people were for so many years destitute of enthusiasm, and therefore of capacity, for self-government.

7. Subjects formed an unresisting mass in the hands of those rulers to whose care they had been entrusted by a higher power, acting through the laws of succession. And the same relation was repeated on a smaller scale in the case of children, who were unable to act for themselves, and who were handed over by their natural masters (their parents) to those who were busy with experiments in rational education. Even before Locke's educational principles had been stripped by

Rousseau of their national colouring, only thereby to find an echo that sounded louder than the original cry, JOHANN BERNHARD BASEDOW had come to recognise their importance. Born in Hamburg on Sept. 11th, 1723, he became a student at Leipsic, and devoted his time to the reading of deistic and apologetic works, the former of which he found the more convincing. He was at first a private tutor at Holstein and then a lecturer at the Academy at Soröe. But he lost this latter post in 1761, owing to his heterodoxy, and became a teacher in the Gymnasium at Altona. His *Philalethia*, 1764, his *Theoretical System of Sound Reason*, 1765, his *Meditations on true Orthodoxy and Toleration*, 1766, and finally, his *Attempt to formulate a Candid and Independent System of Dogmatics*, and his *Private Hymn-book for innocent social Edification*, 1767, made his position at this school also untenable, and for some time he had to hold aloof from public employment. In the works we have mentioned, the statement of Reimarus, to the effect that the well-being of living creatures is the end of the universe, is strictly limited to human well-being; and so prominently is this latter put forward, that even theoretical propositions are regarded as proved, (established by the "duty of belief"), simply because to accept them increases our happiness. For example, Basedow does not prove the immortality of the soul from the simplicity of its nature, but from the fact that immortality would add to its happiness. Very similar views were held by GOTTHELF SAMUEL STEINBART (1738–1807), with this difference, that in his case a more elevated tone is traceable than in Basedow, whose ideas of happiness, like himself, were somewhat coarse. Steinbart's *System of the Theory of Happiness*, 1778, and *Philosophical Discussions on the Theory of Happiness*, 1782–86, led to his receiving the degree of Doctor from the theological faculty of Halle, at the instance of Semler. In Steinbart as well as in Basedow, however, as is proved by its association with immortality, we are not to understand by happiness physical enjoyment, which was the view of it taken by Helvetius. It consists rather in self-approbation; and this explains why both so often substitute for it perfection, and why Basedow considers what produces happiness and what is useful, as one and the same thing. It was not, however, this ennobling of eudæmonism that made Basedow so famous; it was rather his proposals towards educational reform, as well as the practical attempts he made

in the same direction. He hailed Rousseau with enthusiasm, when he met him on the path he himself had already entered upon. (Campe, a kindred spirit, always called Rousseau "his patron saint.") In 1768, in his *Remonstrance to Friends*, etc., he put forward the demand that we should not educate children to be scholars, but to be men; this would be effected if, in the giving of instruction, play were substituted for gloomy seriousness, and if therefore the mind were kept occupied solely with concrete things, instead of being early made familiar with abstract ideas; practical utility must, he urged, always be kept in view, so that, for example, the boy would learn Latin solely through actually using it, and would do so with a view to actually employing it in speaking. The climax of his educational activity was the opening (1774) of the "Philantropin" in Dessau, to which, with a view of making men, he invited, not merely the children of Christian parents, but the children of men of all creeds (*i.e.*, of Jews as well). Simultaneously with this, there appeared the *Handbook for Parents* and the *Elementary Work*. His want of perseverance and of moral control account for the fact that, as early as 1776, he transferred the conduct of the institution to stronger hands. The restless wandering life which he now began, came to an end on July 25th, 1790, at Magdeburg, while his contemporary, Bahrdt, was lying in prison there. His work survived him. For institutions of a similar character sprang up, and, what was even more important, the principles upon which they were based, were applied in education outside of them. The names of Wolke, Campe, Salzmann, Gutsmuths, and others, are of importance in the history of education, because they once again combined education more with instruction, and because they made a place for practical branches even in the most scholastic of schools. On the whole, however, it must be admitted that failure was the usual result of the attempt to educate children to be "men," *not* scholars, *not* gentlemen, *not* Christians, etc., *i.e.*, to emancipate men from all real ties and associations. (Hence, too, the best book for which we are indebted to these "Philanthropists," represents Robinson Crusoe living contentedly upon his solitary island.) The picture of modern education drawn by Justus Möser, and the specimen of it that Iffland gives upon the stage, can hardly be pure calumny. What Basedow and the other "Philanthropists" attempted to do for the middle classes, was undertaken almost

at the same time on behalf of the peasantry, by two men whose names are not remembered nowadays as they deserve to be. One of these was JOHANN GEORG SCHLOSSER (1739–1799), the friend and brother-in-law of Goethe, whose *Ethical Catechism for Country Folk* has been very often reprinted, sometimes without the author's name being given. Its object is to make the lower classes familiar with the distinction of morality from religion, so current among the educated classes. Foremost of all, was FRIEDRICH EBERHARD VON ROCHOW, feudal superior of Rakehn, and patron of the bishopric of Halberstadt (11th Oct., 1734, to 16th May, 1805). He was the author of the justly celebrated works: *An Attempt to supply a School-book for Country Children*, 1772, and *The Children's Friend, A Reading Book for Country Schools*, 1776; and subsequently he wrote: *A Handbook of a Form of Catechism for the Use of Teachers who have the Will and the Opportunity to Enlighten*, 1783, and *A Catechism of Sound Reason*, 1786. Besides, he made practical endeavours to establish schools in which, instead of the ordinary Christianity of the Creeds, there should be taught "natural knowledge of God and universal Christian virtue," and in which "the Bible should no longer form the primer for children from six to eight years old, but an appropriate reading-book should be introduced." It is characteristic of the age, that Frederick the Great opposed the spread of Rochow's model schools, because he was anxious that invalid non-commissioned officers should be appointed school-masters. Whether, in this conflict between the great educator of his people and the landlord who wished to extend his influence beyond its proper sphere, and rule schools everywhere, the wrong was solely on the side of the former, is a point upon which, to some extent at least, later generations have passed a very different judgment from that current at the time.

8. Both monarchs and school-masters, in their educational efforts, limited their activity to those over whom they had received power, either through divine right or through human delegation; but in that great educational process,—to apply a definition that has already been given of the Enlightenment,—they were joined by those who could lay claim to neither of those titles of authority. These latter took up the work of education entirely on their own responsibility; and as this was, in its essence and nature, a high-handed act which disregarded all limitations, it was not to be expected that they themselves

should limit the sphere of their activity. They wished to be teachers, not of their own subjects, like Frederick and his imitators, not of their own "Philantropin," or landed estate, like Basedow and Rochow, but of the world; and the language they used, was not like that of the author who is addressing men capable of thinking for themselves, and who hopes to convince by argument, but like that of those who try to keep people in leading strings. As it was hardly likely that the world would willingly accept this subordinate position, stratagem had to be employed to compel it to do so, and SECRET SOCIETIES were used to further the Enlightenment. They aimed at extending their ramifications throughout the whole world, and leading it to the truth by lying artifices, and at spreading light by darkness and through all sorts of dark devices. They form a counterpart to the princes who tried to force people to be free, and to the educationalists who blessed children by depriving them of their childhood. The most important, because the most characteristic, of these societies was the order of Illuminati, which attempted to do, not for the religious Enlightenment alone, but for the Enlightenment in general, what the Freemasons had done for deism, particularly in England, and what the Jesuits had done for the Papacy in its decline. Both of these were consciously adopted as models by ADAM WEISHAUPT (born Feb. 6th, 1748), professor of ecclesiastical law at Ingolstadt, who, owing to his hostility to the Order of the Jesuits, which continued its activity in spite of its suppression, was led to found upon May 1st, 1776, a rival Order which was to outdo the children of darkness by its exertions on behalf of the light. This light, —a mixture of ideas borrowed partly from Leibnitz, Wolff, Rousseau, and Basedow, and partly from Robinet, Helvetius, and Diderot,—was to be made supreme by means of a secret society (the Perfectibilists, or ILLUMINATI). This society, particularly after the accession of the Baron von Knigge (10th Oct., 1752, to 6th May, 1796), with his rich and varied experience, took the Masonic lodges as a model. Its aim was to free men from all limitations, and therefore, ultimately, from those of nationality and of civil ties, further "*faire valoir la raison*," and therefore to begin a battle against pedantry, intolerance, theology, and constitutional rule. As men in their present condition were quite unfit for this, it was gradually to prepare them for such a movement by stratagem, which could

be learned from the Jesuits. Each individual must accordingly be attacked upon his weak side. The pious man was to be persuaded that this was true Christianity; the prince, that the sole end in view was the overthrow of the power of the Church. No study, therefore, was so highly commended as that of the human heart; knowledge of human nature was regarded as the highest wisdom, because it confers the power of persuading every one to anything. Just when the Order was celebrating its greatest triumphs, when princes like the Dukes of Saxony and Brunswick, when the Coadjutor of Mainz, when Goethe and Herder were extending their sympathies to it, and Weishaupt was in hopes of winning over his own ruler, there came the catastrophe. The revengeful hatred of the ex-Jesuits did no more than help to hasten the crash. In the nature of things it was bound to come, not only because the consistent development of the higher grades by Knigge did not stop at the grades of priests and regents, but went on to the grades of magi and kings, the latter of which could not but excite the distrust of the reigning powers and their adherents, but also, and especially, on account of the differences between the two chief leaders, Weishaupt (Spartacus) and Knigge (Philo). It was inevitable, although it makes a very amusing impression upon us, that each of the two should begin to be afraid that the other was after all a member of a still higher grade, and was throwing dust in his eyes by Jesuitical devices. This dread of being treated like a child is a peculiar feature of proceedings of this sort, which we rightly regard as childish, but which, at that time, could not fail to impose even upon the best, because they showed clearly how universal was the desire to become capable of thinking for oneself, and therefore how incapable of doing so everybody was. When the Bavarian Government prohibited the Order, and followed this up by the publication of "*Some Original Documents of the Order of Illuminati, found after a Search at Landshut, on Oct. 11th and 12th, 1786, in the House of the Privy Councillor Zwack (Cato)*," (Munich, 1787, 2 vols.), Weishaupt, who had fled to Gotha, for the first time made a public statement in regard to his objects. In 1786 there appeared his *Defence of the Illuminati;* and then followed the *Introduction* to this (1787), and *The Improved System of the Illuminati, with all its Arrangements and Grades* (Frkf. and Leips., 1787). He did not do much good by these, and he did

still less by his *Pythagoras, or Considerations on the Secret Art of Diplomacy and Government*, 1790. In his work *On Truth and Moral Perfection* (1793), Weishaupt comes forward as an opponent of Kant's, an attitude he maintained until his death (18th Oct., 1830). In these apologetic writings he made the characteristic feature of the Enlightenment consist in the opposition to everything that disturbs the pleasure and happiness of men; but he lays special stress upon the fact that it is not sensual pleasure that makes men happy, but only the inward peace that lies in the consciousness of being oneself free from prejudices and of helping others to reach the same position.

B. Bauer: *Freimaurer, Jesuiten und Illuminaten in ihrem geschichtlichen Zusammenhange.* Berlin, 1863.

9. Just as the Empirical Psychologists had approximated to Sensationalism and Materialism in respect of the source they drew from and the method they employed, so the leaders of the social and religious Enlightenment in Germany had done in respect of the content of their principles. This was possible because both movements were individualistic, opposed to every theory of an organic whole, and therefore hostile to that view which advocated the absorption of the individual thing by the organic whole, as Spinoza had done. At the same time, such an approximation was made much easier for German than for French thinkers, because their leaders had plainly paved the way for a reconciliation with the opposite point of view—Thomasius by his praise of the eclectic philosophy, Wolff by his substitution of empirical for rational psychology,—while Baumgarten and Meier, in their investigations into the beautiful, had indicated the point that can be opened to the light, only if man be regarded at once as a thinking and as a corporeal being. The reconciliation in this case, however, was merely external; the elements that were combined, remained what they had been before, and we cannot apply the expressions Ideal-realism or Real-idealism, for these naturally suggest an organic combination of the two tendencies, in which the opposition disappears in a higher unity *i.e.*, is at once denied and maintained. The philosophy of the Enlightenment, too, to the consideration of which we must now pass, and which gave definite expression to the principle that had guided the efforts we have been describing, could not

but have that character of syncretism, and therefore of want of system, which places it so far below the philosophy of the following period. Still it cannot be classed either under one or under the other of the movements already discussed; it forms a third, which must be distinguished from both. As this philosophy did not lean solely in one direction or in another, it lost the national character possessed by the other two. (A doctrine such as is put forward in the work *De l'Esprit*, could only have been produced by one born in France, the *Système de la Nature* by one naturalized there; none but a German could have written *Reasonable Thoughts upon God, the World, and the Soul.*) Further, since, owing to its syncretism, it became unsystematic, it ceased to fufil the requirements which an academic, as well as a philosophical, school imposes upon philosophers. Unlike a university philosophy or that of a particular school, and unlike any form of German or French philosophy, it assumed the character that one of its ablest advocates has attempted to ascribe to it in his principal work. It became *Philosophy for the World.* As a matter of fact, Thomasius had already hinted at something of this kind in his *Philosophia aulica.* But he was still heart and soul a professor, and thus his works all breathe a magistérial or academic tone. Now, however, it was quite otherwise. The men we are about to discuss, were not merely philosophers for the world, they were also men of the world. They are usually called popular philosophers; but the other name, which was proposed by Engel, is more suitable because—to use his own words—"they mean by a *philosopher* a man who brings forward any truth that belongs to philosophy or that is considered philosophically, it matters not what it may be or in what form; and they mean by the *world* the whole mixed public, where one man favours one set of objects, another another, where one man has a liking for one particular tone, another for another." From the point of view of form, their merit consisted in their tasteful way of putting things, including of course the cultured style of language employed in their investigations; from the point of view of matter, it consisted in the opposition they offered to all that was one-sided.

THIRD DIVISION.

Philosophers for the World.

§ 294.

1. Among the men who have to be discussed here, there is hardly one who does not quote somewhere or other Pope's saying "The proper study of mankind is man"; and accordingly, in view of the formula laid down in the preceding section, we need not be surprised that they regarded the advocates of religious and social Enlightenment as kindred spirits, and that this feeling was reciprocated. Similarly, it was the supreme position thus assigned to man that justified us, when we were speaking of the Sophists (§ 54), in frequently referring to the Enlightenment of the eighteenth century. And yet we may hesitate before calling these men the Sophists of our era. Not merely because, in spite of all attempts to keep up its dignity, the word "sophist" has an evil sound, but because a comparison of this kind does not lay sufficient stress upon the difference between the man whom Protagoras looks upon as the measure of all things, and the man who in Mendelssohn's view is higher than all things. The man of the eighteenth century, separated by two thousand years from the Sophists, finds himself hemmed in amidst a large number of moral relations and concerns of all sorts, of which the Sophists had absolutely no idea. As the aim of the leaders of the modern movement was to make man independent of all these ties, and to place him upon his own feet, the strength of mind and capacity which they advocate involves a great deal more than the mere ability to make anything out of anything, and thus to turn a bad argument into a triumphant one. It involves more, not merely something different; and therefore all that was said of the Sophists, holds good of these Philosophers for the World, but the converse is not true. Hence we shall find that in their eclecticism these philosophers could not but adopt, just as the Sophists had done, the sceptical element without which no syncretism is possible at all (*vid.* § 104); and we need not be surprised at their often-repeated assertion that the differences between systems are unessential and only affect the form of expression. On the other hand, we shall not find among the Sophists anything to correspond to the polemic of the

popular philosophers against esoteric schools, or to their partly bantering, partly contemptuous treatment of scholars trained at the universities. For it was they who by introducing the system of fees had led to the formation of esoteric schools, and it was they who were the representatives of the educated class, so that we need hardly be surprised to find a Mendelssohn applying the term "Sophists" to those very philosophers of an academic type. Among the Sophists we were able, in spite of the syncretism that was common to all, to distinguish between those of an Eleatic, and those of a Heraclitean type, according as one or the other element was most strongly present. In the same way, among these Philosophers for the World we can draw a distinction between such as were tinged with realism, and such as were tinged with idealism; these shades of difference naturally go along with the predominance of the French or of the German element. Just as the University of Halle had been the point from which all three branches of the religious Enlightenment sprang, so Berlin became the real seat of both these elements. When the French colony there began to flourish, and when the Jewish element also came into play, there was developed a spirit analogous in many respects to the Hellenistic spirit that was cradled in Alexandria (§ 108). Had not "Berlinism" at a later period become a term of reproach, it might have been employed here, as "Alexandrinism" has already been in the analogous case. In Berlin, the main-stay and the centre of the philosophy that proceeded from this spirit, was the Royal Academy. Germans are apt to be ungrateful towards this institution, and to forget that for some decades it did real service to philosophy. They keep repeating that (after these decades) in a prize-essay it ignored the existence of the *Critique of Pure Reason*, which had been published for eleven years, and elected F. Nicolai a fellow in the very year in which he published *Sempronius Gundibert*. It was high time that a Frenchman should teach us to be just towards this institution.

Chr. Bartholmèss: *Histoire philosophique de l'Académie de Prusse.* Paris, 1851. 2 vols.

2. From Maupertuis' "*point de systèmes*," and Merian's declaration that eclecticism was the official philosophy of the Academy, down to Schleiermacher, who (on more substantial

grounds as well) did not wish to have Hegel admitted as a member, all men of penetration have recognised that, owing to his despotic character (§ 12), the epoch-making founder of a philosophical system must necessarily be excluded from the republican institution which is called an Academy. While this is so, a number of circumstances combined in the case of the Berlin Academy to make it the seat of an anti-scholastic popular philosophy. When Frederick the Great revived the decaying institution of Leibnitz as a Royal Academy, and introduced the unheard-of innovation of a section for speculative philosophy, as well as the doubtless novel arrangement that the King should not merely be the patron of the institute but should also read in it papers written by himself, there could be no doubt what form of philosophy was to take up its abode in this creation of a prince who, in spite of his French education, was so thoroughly German—this incarnation of the Enlightenment. It could only be that of which he himself, the hero and philosopher of Sanssouci, was an adherent. Hence it could be no pedantic philosophy of the Schools; it was bound to be one which should appeal to the *bon sens* of good society, and there further the purposes of Enlightenment. It would have been inconsistent with this, had the records of the Academy appeared in the language of the learned, as the *Miscellanea Berolinensia* had done up till now. Rather, the language of the courts, French, was declared to be the official language of the Academy, and in it were published, in the *Histoire de l'Académie Royale*, even those papers which had originally been written in German or in Latin. The first president was a man who had been proscribed from France; and the vice-president and perpetual secretary were two men who belonged to the French colony in Berlin. These facts may be said to be quite as characteristic, as the unfavourable reception accorded to the views that exhibited a pure form of French realism or of German idealism. Wolff saw instinctively that he would not be at home in this society of men of the world, and declined the post of vice-president; Lamettrie, on the other hand, and the well-informed but superficial D'Argens, failed to earn great respect in it, in spite of the favour of the King, who introduced them to the Academy. Indeed, much the same may be said even of a man like Johann Philipp Hein (born 1688), who was certain to be very highly esteemed, not merely because he had already been a member

of the Royal Society, but also because Frederick the Great had made him director of the philosophical section, and above all, because his knowledge of the history of philosophy was not only greater than that of his colleagues, but was really very great, as is shown by his works on Pherecydes, Clitomachus, and Anaxagoras. With his Latinized name, and his papers written in Latin, but translated into French for the benefit of the Academy, he appeared to have too much German learning for this elegant society, and to be anything but at home in the midst of it. On the other hand, it is easy to see why Swiss and Alsatians, *i.e.*, half Germans and half Frenchmen, so soon came to the front. Their supremacy forms, at the same time, the bridge between the predominance of the realist (French) element and the predominance of the idealist (German) element. The former was clearly pronounced immediately after the restoration of the Academy, the latter shortly before the rise of the Critical school. Although the difference between the realist and the idealist forms of popular philosophy justifies us in considering the two separately, yet we must begin by drawing attention to the points in which there is necessarily an agreement between them. As, according to the line of Pope already quoted, man is the only subject that interests the philosopher for its own sake, all others will be discussed only so far as they exist for man or are of importance for him. Hence the Philosophers for the World renounce, as a body and individually, all efforts to know anything of the nature of God; but almost without exception they devote attention to our knowledge of God, to the proofs of His existence, to the soothing effects of religion, and so on, although they sometimes employ the term Providence instead of God. Equally little interest do the popular philosophers take in things and the aggregate of things, regarded by themselves; and a proportionately great interest in their relation to us. This latter point explains the investigations as to whether and how we can be certain of the existence of things; further, what good they do to us, and how they contribute to our happiness; lastly, and more especially,—since here the sensible and the intellectual nature of man are both taken into account,—as to when they produce in us a feeling of æsthetic satisfaction. The only thing in which the philosopher takes an interest for its own sake, is the individual Ego. Now, as nothing contributes more to the isolation of man as an individual than does the

most subjective part of him, his sensations and feelings, in a word, what is called his heart, attention is particularly directed to this. The prevailing fashion of writing autobiographies, which has been already noted, the contributions to the knowledge of the human heart, which proceed from a kindred interest, the investigations into dreams, into madness and crime, —all are ultimately based upon nothing but the interest in what makes the man into an individual. Now, since the individual is not, like the universal, discovered by thought but by perception, it is natural that, in these studies of man, observation should play the most important part. Hence the connection with Rousseau, with the Empirical Psychologists, and with the Scottish School when it afterwards arose. This interest in individual personality explains also the eagerness with which these philosophers discuss the question of immortality. In this connection, it is characteristic that all theological arguments are expressly excluded. In other words, the purpose of these thinkers is to assure man of his continued existence, simply as a human atom and quite apart from his relation to God, distinct from the Divine government of the world or the Kingdom of Heaven. What wonder if the proofs brought forward are the same as those employed to demonstrate the indestructibility of an atom! It goes without saying, that on the question of eternal punishment these philosophers ranged themselves on the side, not of Leibnitz, but of Wolff (*vid.* § 293, 2). For them the individual as such was the highest end, and any destiny which did not ultimately compass his happiness, was therefore an absurdity.

3. We shall begin, then, with an account of the popular philosophy so far as it was *tinged with realism.* And here our attention is at once demanded by PIERRE LOUIS MOREAU DE MAUPERTUIS (28th Sept., 1698 to 27th July, 1759), who was for many years president of the Berlin Academy. He was one of the first in France to adopt Newton's views, and he was also the occasion of Voltaire's *English Letters.* He first came into notice by taking part in an Arctic expedition that settled the dispute between Cassini and the followers of Newton as to the shape of the earth. In 1745 he took up his residence in Berlin; and it was in the Academy that he first brought forward the *Loi de la moindre action*, which was afterwards developed into greater detail in his *Essai de Cosmologie*, Leyden, 1751, and was zealously defended by Euler

and others. König, who was an adherent of Leibnitz, saw in this law of the conservation of energy simply an application of Leibnitz's *lex melioris*, and this gave rise to a declaration of the Academy, which Voltaire, in his *Diatribe du docteur Akakia*, ridiculed at the expense of Maupertuis, whose reputation has suffered severely in consequence. It is in strict accordance with his own maxim, "No system!" that he combines the teleological point of view with the teaching of Locke and Newton, and that, in order to guard himself against materialism, he approximates to the doctrines of Berkeley. The treatises which he laid before the Academy deal partly with evidence and certainty, partly with the proofs of God's existence; and, therefore, they do not go beyond the sphere of the investigations already indicated as likely to be found in philosophers of this period. His last production of the kind was the tribute he paid to the memory of Montesquieu, whose moderation and avoidance of extremes he particularly commends. His works were published in four volumes at Lyons in 1756. The Newtonian President of the Academy had at first, though only for a short time, at his side as permanent secretary, the jurist, Des Jariges, born in 1706 in the French colony at Berlin. He opened the philosophical section with a discourse upon Spinoza, which breathes the individualist spirit of the century. Perhaps it was the feeling that he was too much of a Wolffian, that led him, as early as 1748, to resign his post and make way for some one more suitable. This was the moderate Wolffian, SAMUEL FORMEY (31st May, 1711, to 8th March, 1797), also one of the French colony at Berlin. He began by being a preacher among his countrymen there, and was afterwards a professor at the Collège Français. As journalist, secretary to the Academy, and author, he showed himself marvellously prolific. His Wolffianism, which appears in a particularly characteristic form in *La belle Wolfienne*, is not merely free from pedantic heaviness, but is frequently relieved by ideas borrowed from Locke and Hume. His treatises presented to the Academy are chiefly of a psychological, or sometimes of an ethical, character. In the latter he maintains the principle of perfection, but in such a way as always to draw attention to the fact that happiness consists in the consciousness of this perfection. His *Ebauche du Système de la Compensation*, 1759, rests upon a Leibnitzian basis; but in many respects it resembles the

theory shortly afterwards developed by Robinet (*vid.* § 285, 5). It is unnecessary to give any detailed account of how he deals with the question of immortality, or of his proofs for the existence of God. In the latter, he makes the ontological argument the basis of all the rest, while this in its turn is founded upon the proposition that we have an innate idea of God, just as all men have an innate consciousness of their own existence.

4. Just as Maupertuis became a centre of attraction for Frenchmen, and Formey for the descendants of the French colony at Berlin, so LEONHARD EULER (15th April, 1707, to 7th Sept., 1783), during the fifteen years of his residence in Berlin, took care that the Academy should be recruited from the ranks of the Swiss. The great mathematician had originally been trained by Joh. Bernoulli. However high the position he assigned to Leibnitz in his own particular subject, he was utterly unable to reconcile himself to his philosophy. This is shown not merely by the fact that, through his influence, a treatise written to confute the *Monadologie* was crowned, but also directly by the interesting paper which Euler laid before the Academy, and in which he argued against the theory of the ideal nature of time and space. Among the Swiss who worked in the section of the Academy devoted to speculative philosophy, the first that calls for mention is NICOLAS DE BÉGUELIN (25th June, 1714, to 3rd Feb., 1789), who, since every philosophical system looks at things only from one side, urged that we should choose from the various systems all that was most surely established. In accordance with this advice, he attempted to put an end to the dispute between the followers of Leibnitz and of Newton by trying to show that the law of gravitation was deducible from the graduated series of monads. Similarly, he proposes in his psychological inquiries to combine the Lockian principle of observation with Leibnitz's deduction from the power of perception. This intermediate position explains why, in the five papers upon the first principles of metaphysics, which are to be found in the records of the Academy, there is so much that is suggestive of Kant. More important than Béguelin was his fellow-countryman, JOHANN BERNHARD MERIAN (28th Sept., 1723 to 1807), who from 1748 onwards resided in Berlin, and who, after Formey's death, became permanent secretary of the Academy, to the interests of which he devoted all his energies. Following his own

maxim, that an Academy could not rightly profess adherence to any philosophy save eclecticism, he insisted upon the study of the history of philosophy, and censured the Scottish philosophers for their neglect of this, although he agreed with them in regard to the importance of introspection. He expresses the relation between Locke and Leibnitz in words almost identical with those employed previously by Bonnet, and subsequently by Kant—"Leibnitz," he says, "transformed sensations into thoughts; Locke transformed ideas into sensations, and this was a mistake." In the same way he demands in ethics a reconciliation between the (English) theory of the moral sense and the (German) view that the dictates of reason are to be obeyed. Just as, in regard to its substance, philosophy was not to be one-sided, but was to combine all views; so, in form, it was to be characterized by elegance, such as Leibnitz, for example, exhibits in his *Théodicée*. For the Kantian philosophy, the triumphs of which, however, he lived long enough to see, he prophesied such a fate as the Wolffian philosophy had met with. There was a third native of Switzerland who took up a very influential position in the Academy very soon after his admission into it. JOHANN GEORG SULZER (5th Oct., 1720 to 25th Feb., 1779) knew nothing of higher studies in his early years, and it was only after he was a preacher that he became acquainted with the philosophy of Wolff. On the advice of Bodmer and Breitinger he made his first appearance before the public with a physico-theological work, *Ethical Essays on the Works of Nature*, 1740, which Formey made much better known by his translation as: *Essais sur la physique appliquée à la morale.* After he had been for some time a tutor at Magdeburg, and afterwards a teacher of mathematics at Berlin, and had published his *Summary of the Sciences*, 1745, and his *Essay on Education*, 1746, he was admitted as a member of the Academy in 1750. The papers which he read there, appeared in German as *Miscellaneous Writings*, in two volumes. Besides these, he wrote: *Practice in Rousing Attention and Reflection*, 3 vols., 1763, and from 1771 onwards: *General Theory of the Fine Arts*, which is his most famous work. His fundamental principle was, that the examination of one's own mind was the chief function of philosophy. As preceding philosophers, particularly Wolff, had not done enough in this direction, he very early began to supply the deficiency. The way in which

Wolff contrasted the faculty of knowledge and the faculty of will, seemed to him to imply an undue disregard of the sensations of what is agreeable and what is disagreeable. Accordingly, he had recourse to Leibnitz's obscure perceptions, and saw in these the first springs of feeling or sensibility, which he distinguishes from the power of knowing. His æsthetic philosophy is based upon his inquiries into the feeling of what is agreeable, as these were laid before the Academy in 1751 and 1752. Like the followers of Wolff, he makes the nature of the beautiful consist in perfection, *i.e.*, plurality in unity; but, at the same time, he is careful to point out that our pleasure in it rests solely upon the feeling of heightened intellectual activity. Thus, in his view, the enjoyment of the beautiful ranks higher than sensual enjoyment, but lower than moral satisfaction, to the latter of which it should therefore be made subservient. He insists very decidedly that æsthetic taste is not nearly so subjective a thing as physical taste; there are objective reasons why one thing is beautiful, and why it is more beautiful than another. (Sulzer here, exactly as Lessing did afterwards, ranks epic higher than dramatic poetry,—a position which neither of them continued to maintain.) While the points in which he agreed with Wolff, accounted for the recognition accorded to Sulzer's æsthetic labours even by adherents of Gottsched, his friendly relations with Bodmer and Breitinger and his consequent maxim to deduce rules from acknowledged (especially English) works of art, instead of laying them down *a priori*, explain why he was so much praised by Gottsched's opponents. For a long time he was looked upon as the highest authority in æsthetics. For the rest, the circumstance that Sulzer read in public in the German language the papers he laid before the Academy, and that he wrote his more important works in German, may be taken to indicate a preponderance of the German element in the Academy, which accounts for the conduct of the Parisians in beginning to make merry over its idiom. The same thing would have happened to Philo, had an Athenian come to Alexandria. Prémontval (1716–1764) made himself the mouthpiece of this reaction against the tendency of the Academy to become German. In the papers he presented to it, and in other writings (*Du Hazard sous l'Empire de la Providence*, 1754; *Diogène de d'Alembert*, 1754; *Vue Philosophique*, 1756, etc.), he was never tired of

urging the followers of Wolff to think, not in German or in Latin, but in French—to exchange their ontology for his "psychocracy," the latter of which stood (he averred) in much the same relation to the former as the system of Copernicus did to the popular view. It was too late. The German element is still more pronounced in the Alsatian JOHANN HEINRICH LAMBERT (1728–1777), who, after acquiring a very varied culture as a tutor in Switzerland, and in travels with his pupils, wrote at Augsburg his *Photometria*, 1770, his *Letters on Cosmology*, 1761, and afterwards, at Munich, his *New Organon*, 2 vols., Leips., 1764. A plan to found, through his instrumentality, an Academy at Munich came to nothing, and he was subsequently elected a member of the one at Berlin. Besides his papers for the Academy, he now wrote his *Architectonics*, Riga, 1771, which forms a sequel to the *New Organon*. Although he was more of a self-educated man than any of those who have been mentioned, still in his *Organon* he describes with perfect correctness his indebtedness to Wolff and Locke. Of the results achieved by these two, he forms much the same estimate as Bonnet and Merian had done; and further, in his *Organon* he sets himself to answer the four questions:—Has the understanding the power of recognising truth? (Dianoeology.) How is truth to be distinguished from error? (Aletheology.) Does verbal symbolism stand in the way of the recognition of the truth? (Semiotics.) How can we guard ourselves against being deceived by appearances? (Phenomenology.) These two circumstances roused in Kant great expectations, to which he gives expression in his letters to Lambert. It is true, however, that he afterwards retracted his words of praise when, subsequent to the appearance of his own epoch-making dissertation, Lambert's *Architectonics* propounded an ontological system of the old type. All the warmer was the commendation of Bonnet, who found in it a great deal that accorded with his own views. After Lambert's death, Joh. Bernoulli published a selection from his papers (Berlin, 1782).

5. While, under the influence of Sulzer and Lambert, the Berlin Academy showed a stronger tendency to what will afterwards be discussed as an idealistic form of popular philosophy; that form, which, up till their day, had been almost the only one to find defenders, was beginning to look for other places of abode. These may be regarded as offshoots

of the Berlin Academy, in so far as the men who advocated or propagated such views, had either been actual members of that Academy, or were at least connected with it as correspondents and *laureati*. PIERRE PRÉVOST (3rd March, 1751 to 8th April, 1839) belonged to the former class. He was educated in Geneva under Le Sage, a disciple of Newton's; and in 1780, after spending some time in Holland, in England, and in Paris, he became Sulzer's successor in the Academy at Berlin. While there, he conceived such an admiration for Merian, that he may be called his most faithful pupil. It was Merian who first drew his attention to Lambert. In 1784 he was appointed professor of literature at Geneva, and in 1793 he exchanged this chair for that of philosophy. From this period dates that activity through which he exercised such an influence up to the time of his death. Philosophy, which should rest solely upon observation, is the investigation of nature. When it deals with material nature, it is physics; when it deals with intellectual nature, it is metaphysics. The latter science, therefore, rests entirely upon introspection; and it should deal with the three fundamental faculties of the mind—feeling, faculty of knowledge, and will. Directions how to observe correctly were given long ago; and hence the philosopher cannot dispense with the study of the history of philosophy. Of the three schools which he distinguishes—the French, the German, and the Scottish,—he ranks the last-mentioned highest. (This explains, too, why he translated Dugald Stewart.) Condillac he places far below Bonnet, and Kant below Leibnitz and Wolff. In general, however, he attaches much less importance to the German school, than to either of the others. Among his works, we must specially note the *Essais de Philosophie*, 2 vols., 1804, which contain a selection from his lectures. His valuable treatises upon magnetism and upon the influence exercised by symbols in the formation of ideas, were very warmly received, and he gave proof of the grateful recollection he cherished of Berlin, by continuing a contributor to the *Berliner Monatsschrift*. A remarkable and many-sided culture was the chief characteristic of the man, through whom the scientific condition of Geneva experienced a modification no less important than it had done once before, when Chouet transplanted Cartesianism thither.

6. It was men who, though not former members of the

Berlin Academy, were yet connected with it as *laureati*, correspondents, and friends, that were instrumental in carrying out a movement we have now to discuss. They transplanted to the academic atmosphere of a German university this popular philosophy, freed as it was from the dust of the Schools, and devoid of distinctive national colouring. This was an undertaking which, in view of what has been already said (§ 293, 8), it would have been absurd to attempt, had not the university in question been the one which was least purely German, inasmuch as it was founded by the King of England, and which lacked some of the characteristic features of the old universities, inasmuch as, at the foundation, its object was declared to be, to produce statesmen educated as men of the world. What the *Magister* of Leipsic or Wittenberg could not have done without following a suicidal policy, was not impossible for the *Hofräthe* of Göttingen. The first that calls for mention here is ABRAHAM GOTTHILF KÄSTNER (1719–1800), who lectured in Göttingen upon philosophy as well as upon mathematics and physics. Originally, when in Leipsic, he was a comparatively strict disciple of Wolff. But in an essay crowned by the Berlin Academy, he made all sympathetic inclinations rest ultimately upon the enjoyment guaranteed to us by the heightening of our own perfection; and here he exhibits that blending of the strict principle of perfection with eudæmonistic tendencies, which may be called the programme of the Göttingen philosophy in the proper sense of that term. Its most characteristic representative was JOHANN GEORG HEINRICH FEDER, (born May 15th, 1740; professor in Göttingen from 1768 to 1797; and then director of the Georgianum at Hanover till his death, May 22nd, 1825). To deduce a practicable system of philosophy from those ideas which are most natural, or which cannot well be disputed, and to do this by adopting a method of reconciliation and eclecticism, to be a disciple neither of Locke, nor of Wolff, nor of Crusius, nor of Kant, but to work out the most various lines of thought, and assimilate them so as to strengthen his individual intellectual activity,—such was, in his own words, the end which he set before himself. His *Outline of the Philosophical Sciences*, written at Coburg, was the first of the series of his writings, many of which have been often republished, and a complete list of which will be found in Pütter's: *Gelehrtengeschichte der Universität Göttingen*. Among these, the following

are specially worthy of mention,—*Institutiones logicæ et metaphysicæ*, Frankf., 1777 (often reprinted); *Investigations into the Human Will*, Göttingen and Lemgo, 1779–93, 4 pts.; and his autobiography, edited by his son: *J. G. H. Feder's Life, Character and Principles*, Leips., 1825. To the last-mentioned are appended general propositions, which contain the main points of Feder's philosophy. According to these, philosophy has only to do with man; everything with which it deals, ultimately depends upon him for its existence, nor is it ever to be forgotten that only *Moderata durant*. Following this principle, Feder adopts a point of view which he calls philosophical realism, and from which it is impossible to discern any difference between Kant and Berkeley; but he admits that the nature of things is known only as modified in, and according to, our knowledge of them. In ethics, while refusing to accept either such a determinism as Spinoza's, or such a freedom from determination as Crusius had maintained, he keeps firm hold of the fact, that we consider ourselves as free, that we accuse and excuse ourselves. The end of action is peace of mind, resting upon the approval of conscience. In political philosophy, his masters were Locke and Rousseau; but he qualified to some extent the revolutionary conclusions of their principles, particularly after the experience of the Reign of Terror. He reached the zenith of his fame in the years immediately succeeding 1780. And the order of the Illuminati considered it a great triumph to have secured the adherence of Feder (Marcus Aurelius). A review of the *Critique of Pure Reason*, written by Garve and revised by Feder, appeared in the *Göttinger Gelehrte Zeitung*. To this Kant published a crushing reply in his *Prolegomena*; and from that moment Feder's reputation speedily declined. His work, *On Space, Time and Causality* was coldly received; his *Library of Philosophy*, edited conjointly with Meiners, soon collapsed, and he was glad to be able to exchange his chair for the post of director of a higher educational institution in Hanover. In spite of all his gentleness, he could never speak of the Critical School without bitterness. His most intimate personal friend was CHRISTOPH MEINERS (1747–1810), who had also received the honour of being laureated by the Berlin Academy. This writer, in his *Revision of Philosophy*, published anonymously (Gött., 1772), expresses the opinion that philosophy should be based upon psychology; and in his *Outline of Psychology*,

1773, his *Elements of Psychology*, 1786, and finally, his *Investigations into the Powers of Thought and Will*, 1806, he treats this fundamental science from the point of view of progress and enlightenment. He adopts a similar attitude towards all kinds of ethical questions in his *Miscellaneous Writings*, Leips., 1775–76, 3 vols., and towards philosophy, forms of religion, and culture in general, in a large number of somewhat superficial historical writings. More important than this prolific writer, but an intimate friend of his and of Feder's, was CHRISTIAN GARVE, a Silesian (7th Jan., 1742, to 1st Dec., 1798). While he was at Frankfort, Baumgarten aroused his interest in philosophy. After his master's death, he studied at Halle, where he devoted his attention chiefly to mathematics, and at Leipsic, where he applied himself to classical literature and the fine arts. He came a great deal into contact with older scholars, such as Gellert and others, and formed a close intimacy with his immediate contemporary Engel. He began to lecture at Leipsic; but before long he gave this up, and from 1772 onwards he lived at Breslau, devoting his time wholly to literary work. It was by translations of English works that he first made a name for himself. A translation of Ferguson's *Moral Philosophy* appeared in 1772; and this was followed in 1773 by one of Burke's *On the Sublime and Beautiful*. At the suggestion of Frederick the Great, he prepared a German rendering of Cicero, *De officiis* (4 vols., 1783, very often republished). In addition to these, he translated Paley's *Principles of Moral and Political Philosophy* (2 vols., Leips., 1787), Adam Smith's *Wealth of Nations* (4 vols., Breslau, 1794–96), and lastly Aristotle's *Ethics* and *Politics* (published posthumously in 1799, each in 2 vols.). Of his original works we may mention, *On Peasant Character* (Bresl., 1786), *On the Connection between Ethics and Politics* (Bresl., 1788), and *Essays on Various Subjects in Ethics, Literature and Social Life* (Breslau, 1792–1802, 5 vols.). All of these show how well-deserved is the epithet of "fine" thinker, which was usually applied to him. He does not go very far beneath the surface. As he himself admits, this was impossible in his case, as he was always indulging in speculations about himself. But we do find in his writings suggestive reflections upon the subject under discussion, and therefore novel points of view, from which to form a judgment upon it. His books remind us sometimes of Plutarch's *Opera moralia*, sometimes of Lucian's

treatises. To Garve, more than to any one else, may be applied the term "sophist," in the sense in which the word was employed by the later generation of Greeks.

7. We have now to consider that form of popular philosophy which was *tinged with idealism*, and which accordingly had no longer a French tendency, but was *purely German*. That it asserted its superiority over what we have just been discussing—popular philosophy, so far as it was tinged with realism—even in Berlin, its greatest stronghold, was due to the action of the French party in the Academy, who, however, did not anticipate the results of the course they pursued. A prize was offered for a dissertation against the optimism of the school of Leibnitz and Wolff, a subject with the choice of which Sulzer had nothing to do; and this provoked the cutting satire of Mendelssohn and Lessing, *Pope a Metaphysician!* 1755, the authors of which did not long remain unknown, in spite of the fact that it was published anonymously. (That both of them were afterwards elected members of the Academy, shows what a change a few years had produced.) These two, along with F. Nicolai, who was several years their junior, form the centre round which there group themselves all the other "philosophers for the world," whose tendencies were purely German. Their own contemporaries never doubted but that these three, as friends and associates in one work, should be all classed together; but nowadays such an estimate is resented by many admirers of Lessing. They are partly right. For we shall see that, both subjectively and objectively, Lessing takes up a different position from the other two. But only partly right. For, in the first place, they fail to understand the relationship that actually existed between the three, if they suppose that Lessing always gave and that the other two merely received. Many ideas, the development of which has made Lessing famous, can be proved to have been originally suggested to him by Mendelssohn. (Even in regard to language, Lachmann has affirmed, Lessing must have profited by his intercourse with one who had acquired a thorough knowledge of High German, not in his childhood, but when he was possessed of all his powers.) In the second place, they overlook the fact that Lessing died in the year in which Kant's *Critique of Pure Reason* appeared, and that therefore the struggles that went to make up his life, were directed only against expiring principles. Indeed, nothing but the kindness

of fate prevented him from carrying out his intention of falling foul of Goethe's *Werther*, a proceeding which would hardly, as Nicolai thinks, have done so much damage to Goethe's reputation as a similar attack did to that of Klotz. Mendelssohn, on the other hand, immediately after Lessing's death, was led into expressing his opinions upon Kant, upon Spinoza, and against Jacobi. That is, he attempted to judge men who stood partly outside of and partly above the range of eighteenth-century ideas, within which he himself was confined. Nicolai, much more even than Mendelssohn, lived too long for his reputation. Had he died soon after Lessing, while he was in the midst of editing the *Universal German Library*, and before his much-discussed *Travels* had thrown out a challenge to Kant, Fichte, Schelling, Schiller, Goethe, and so on, no one would have been surprised to see him ranked with Mendelssohn and Lessing. He stands midway between the metaphysician and the critic of the popular philosophy, as the editor of the journals devoted to its interests.

8. MOSES MENDELSSOHN, the son of a Jewish scribe and schoolmaster, was born at Dessau on Sept. 6th, 1729. It was not until some time after 1760 that he assumed as a family name the patronymic of Mendelssohn; previous to that, he was always called, even in print, simply Herr Moses; and he signed his letters, Moses, or not seldom, Moses Dessau. Too early for his health, he was introduced by the learned Rabbi Fränkel to the study of the Old Testament (which he afterwards knew by heart), of the Talmud, and of the writings of Maimonides—a training which greatly strengthened his capacity for the fine analysis of ideas. In his fourteenth year he went to Berlin; and there, after a struggle of many years with indescribable difficulties, he learned Latin from a translation of Locke, the philosophy of Wolff from Reinbeck's treatise on the Augsburg Confession, and pure German in his intercourse with members of the Joachimsthaler Gymnasium. It was not until 1750 that things took a more favourable turn for him; he became tutor to a rich Jewish merchant, in whose house he remained till his death—first as book-keeper, and then, after the death of the head of the firm, as managing partner. In 1754 he made the acquaintance of Lessing and, through him, of Nicolai. The influence that these three friends exercised upon each other, was of the most varied description. As early as 1755, up to which time he had

published nothing but Hebrew, he came before the German public with the anonymous *Pope a Metaphysician!* which he wrote in conjunction with Lessing, as well as with his *Letters on Sensation*, and his *Philosophical Dialogues*. In the following year, there appeared his translation of Rousseau's second Dijon prize-essay, with notes. He at first assisted Nicolai with his *Library of the Fine Arts*; and from 1759 onwards, he was, along with Lessing, the most active contributor to the *Letters on Literature*. He learned Greek, and pursued the study of it earnestly in the company of Nicolai, with whom he also went once more carefully through Newton; and in 1763 he won the Academy's prize with his work, *On Evidence*. (Kant was his fellow-competitor on that occasion.) With the *Phædo*, which appeared in 1767 and has been very often reprinted, he attained to the height of his fame, and to a position which but few German authors have succeeded in reaching. We cannot help being surprised that the challenge addressed to Mendelssohn by Lavater in 1769, either to refute Bonnet's defence of Christianity or to become a Christian, was regarded by him not as unreasonable importunity, but as nothing less than a mortal offence. Perhaps he had a foreboding that in his reply that claim to an exclusively privileged position, which is just what makes a man a Jew, would assert itself too strongly, and that, in spite of all his dreams of equality, his isolated position would become apparent. For in that reply, just as, long afterwards, in his *Jerusalem, or Of Religious Power and Judaism* (1783), with all the fulness of conviction he declares his adherence, not to Deism but to Judaism; and he makes the essential nature of the latter consist in the fact that, besides natural law—the commands laid upon the children of Noah,—which was given to all men, that by obedience to it they might attain to blessedness, the Jewish nation alone received the Mosaic law, from obedience to which even the transition to Christianity does not grant a dispensation. It is certain that this incident made him ill, and for the rest of his life even more irritable than he had been before. Nor could it tend much to improve his temper, that, when the Academy chose him as a member along with Garve in 1771, Frederick the Great struck his name out of the list. The *Jewish Ritual*, which appeared in 1778, and the translation of the Pentateuch into pure German, printed in Hebrew letters in 1780, show his zeal for reforms in his own religious com-

munity. When the Prussian laws were being revised, he was asked his opinion upon some points affecting the position of the Jews; and this led him to give expression to the results of his reflections in the preface which he wrote for *The Salvation of the Jews*, by Rabbi Manasse Ben Israel (1782), and in his own book, *Jerusalem*, which has been already mentioned. The *Morning Hours*, which were published in 1785, were originally notes for religious and philosophical lectures which he delivered to his eldest son, his son-in-law, and young Wessely. The appearance of this book led to F. H. Jacobi's publishing a correspondence he had had with Mendelssohn in regard to Spinozism, and Lessing's attitude towards it. In these letters, Mendelssohn, by the superior tone which he had at first assumed towards Jacobi, as well as by his inability to enter into the ideas of Spinoza, had exposed himself too much to be able to look upon their publication with indifference. He wrote a very angry reply, *Mendelssohn to the Friends of Lessing*; and when he was carrying this to the printer, he caught cold, and died on Jan. 4th, 1786. His collected works were published at Ofen in twelve volumes; but there is a much more careful edition in seven volumes by his grandson, Prof. B. Mendelssohn, Leips., 1843. This latter edition also contains the biography of Mendelssohn by his son, the father of the editor, and a treatise upon Mendelssohn's position by Prof. Brandis of Bonn, as well as Mendelssohn's correspondence.

Dr. M. Kayserling: *Moses Mendelssohn. Sein Leben und seine Werke.* Leipz., 1863.

9. Mendelssohn's direct admission, that he has not the least interest in anything that is called history, explains why, in the preface to his *Jerusalem*, he goes so far as to speak almost slightingly of his idol Lessing, because that writer allows it to be possible to educate the human race, although as a matter of fact only the individual progresses, while the class, the abstract whole, remains unalterably the same. As he always contrasts history with metaphysics, which is his goddess, it is clear that the metaphysics of a thinker for whom humanity is nothing but a figment of the brain, and for whom the individual alone has any reality, can only be of the variety which in the Middle Ages was called nominalistic, and which has in this work been termed individualistic. This was, first and foremost,

the metaphysics of Leibnitz and Wolff, to which Mendelssohn always professed adherence, an attitude quite in accordance with his repeated declaration that Baumgarten was the greatest metaphysician among living philosophers. But that did not prevent him from borrowing a great deal from the opposite school of thought. That Locke was the first western philosopher whose works he read, and that Lessing had prompted him to study Shaftesbury, were circumstances which did not fail to affect him. In one of his earliest writings he says that we are bound to combine observation, in which the English surpass us, with reason, in which the Germans excel; and in his very last book he attempts to reconcile Hume's view of causality with Wolff's doctrine of the sufficient reason. In him too we can trace that sceptical tendency which has already been noted as a feature of all syncretism; we often find him asserting that the dispute between materialists and idealists is one that concerns phrases much more than matters of fact. And it is quite true that they are at one in regard to what is the main point in Mendelssohn's metaphysics; that is, they agree in holding that reality belongs only to the individual. Mendelssohn, therefore, differs in respect of his metaphysics from Baumgarten and all the other followers of Wolff, inasmuch as he introduces into his system certain realist elements. But there is a further point of difference between them; for, in spite of the praise he bestows upon this queen of science, he still makes metaphysics merely a handmaid to free thought in religion and morality. So angry was he with Baumgarten for being an orthodox Christian, that he actually came to distrust his metaphysical system on the ground that none could be genuine which did not deliver him who held it, from prejudices. (And his sceptical tendency compelled him to regard as prejudice every certainty that one was in possession of the truth. Like all the other men of the Enlightenment, Mendelssohn demands toleration with one single exception—none must be shown to those who are intolerant; and he regards every one as intolerant who declares: "As my view is true, the opposite one cannot be true." Hence Baumgarten, the orthodox Christian, is intolerant.) One consequence of the subordinate position which he assigns to it, is that in Mendelssohn metaphysics loses much of its purely theoretical character. He says in so many words, that it is merely a refinement of speculation to employ metaphysics otherwise

than as a means to further happiness and as a motive to action, and urges that men in their speculations should always let themselves be guided by *sensus communis*. The whole purpose of philosophy, he declares, is really to clothe the teachings of common sense in the form of rational truth. But the chief difference between Mendelssohn and Baumgarten, or any other metaphysician of the old school, lies in the method of philosophizing. Not merely must German be employed, it must be cultivated, and elegant German; Plato's claim to be regarded as a great philosopher rests not only on the doctrines he teaches, but in a much greater degree on his brilliant style. Mendelssohn's ideal is not strict syllogistic reasoning, but the form of cultured dialogue. Hence his fondness for dropping into the epistolary or conversational style, even where some other form had been originally selected. In spite of the stress he lays upon definite ideas, and in spite of the regret he expresses that the imitation of French models has made authors write solely for ladies and neglect solid science, he is fond of drawing attention to the fact that he was not a scholar with a university education, and of assigning to himself a position intermediate between a metaphysician and a man of wit. He writes, he says, neither for any particular school nor for scholastic philosophers generally, but for the world. On what subjects? He has not neglected to discuss a single one of those which we have already mentioned as the only ones that had an interest for these philosophers. And it is in virtue of this completeness that he occupies such a high place among the philosophers of the world of refinement, quite apart from the fact that, like Protagoras among the Sophists, he was the one who was at most pains to remind people what the real question at issue was—man. In the *Letters on Sensation* there is an allusion to the medium between simple and complex, which shows that Mendelssohn had studied the work of Creuz, which had appeared a short time before (§ 292, 7). In these *Letters* he subjects to a thorough examination the feeling of pleasure, which Sulzer had been the first to investigate particularly, and, as a result, he assigns to this feeling,—even earlier than did Tetens, who follows him in this,—a position intermediate between the faculties of knowledge and of desire. The distinction between sensual pleasure, the feeling for beauty, and delight in moral perfection, is brought into connection with the distinction made

by Leibnitz between obscure, clear, and distinct perceptions (§ 288, 2). With these investigations are combined, not merely some that deal with the nature of art, but also an examination of the question of suicide, which shows how much value is here laid upon the individual existence. For the decision of this question, he says, it is quite indifferent whether man is immortal or not. The rational man will prefer a life of the greatest misery to non-existence. In the *Philosophical Dialogues*, which appeared simultaneously, he shows that the harmony between body and soul, which results from the conception of the monads, is represented by Leibnitz as pre-established of God, simply to lead to the truth even those who reject the doctrine of monads, and that in thus modifying his theory Leibnitz borrowed a good deal from Spinoza. He then goes on to compare Spinoza to Curtius, because he flung himself into the gulf on either side of which lay the true view—that of Leibnitz; nor can we wonder at this comparison, in the light of what we have seen of his feeling against pantheism, which abandons individuality. Of the positive merit of pantheism the individualist can have no appreciation. The fact that Mendelssohn here betrays an accurate acquaintance with Spinoza's *Ethics*, and yet in the correspondence with Jacobi expresses himself in the well-known manner with regard to the *Opera posthuma*, compels us to suppose—unless we are willing to assume an utterly unheard-of act of forgetfulness—that he had only read the *Ethics* in the translation. In the last of the *Dialogues*, Leibnitz's principle of the indistinguishable, as well as his distinction between necessary and contingent truths, is defended against Prémontval, who has already been mentioned as eulogizing the French philosophers. When, in 1761, the two works just named re-appeared as the first volume of his philosophical writings, they were supplemented in the second volume by some essays, namely, *Rhapsody on Sensations*, *On the main Principles of the Fine Arts and Sciences*, *On the Sublime and Naïve in the Fine Sciences*. The distinction between involuntary and arbitrary symbols supplies the basis of division for the separation of the fine sciences (poetry and eloquence) from the rest of the arts. These two are distinguished from one another, inasmuch as one aims at pleasing, the other at persuading. Poetry and sculpture represent simultaneously what is sensuously perfect, music and poetry do so successively; and hence the difference in what they

represent, as well as the difficulties in the way of bringing them into combination. Although Mendelssohn's treatise, *On Evidence in Metaphysical Sciences* (1763), owed its existence to the Academy, yet it treats only of subjects which, apart from this, had the highest interest for the author. Two elements are distinguished in evidence—certainty and comprehensibility. With regard to the former, metaphysics is no whit inferior to mathematics. But the inferiority is all the more marked in the latter respect, and is due partly to the fact that the mathematicians have the advantage of well-selected symbols, partly to the fact that their results are practically indifferent, and are therefore accepted more freely. There is still another point of difference between mathematical and metaphysical investigations. The mathematician does not need to care in the least whether the objects of which his propositions hold good (circles, triangles, and so on), have any existence in reality. Metaphysics, on the other hand, after carefully framing and arranging all its notions, has still to solve the most difficult of all problems. It has to make the transition to the kingdom of reality, that is, not merely to show (as mathematics has to do) that a certain predicate naturally belongs to a certain subject, but also to prove that this subject or this predicate is real, or, it may be, has no existence in reality. Descartes has the merit of having made this transition in two points. In the first place, when he argued from thought to the existence of the thinking Ego; in the second place, when he reasoned from the idea of the absolutely perfect being to its real existence. The ontological proof of God's existence, which forms the subject of the whole of the third part of the treatise, finds in Mendelssohn an enthusiastic defender; for he tries to show that, as mere possibility is inconsistent with the idea of the absolutely perfect Being, there is no alternative left but to face the dilemma: "Either God is impossible, or He actually exists." The fourth part is an attempt to do for moral philosophy what the third had done for rational theology, and to prove that its principle—the obligation to strive after our own perfection and the perfection of others—is as certain as mathematical axioms are. None of Mendelssohn's writings, however, was so well received as his *Phædo.* This was partly because the subject discussed, the immortality of the soul, was one in which the men of the Enlightenment were all the more fond of revelling because

they, like Mendelssohn, maintained that the lot of all men after death was bound to be a happy one. But this was not all. The method of treating the subject in this "compromise between translation and original work" proved very attractive, and that just on account of a feature which many would nowadays regard as objectionable. Socrates, in the description of him prefixed to the *Dialogues*, is transformed into an educated citizen of Berlin of the eighteenth century, who regards religious enlightenment as the highest end, and who, on account of his moral excellence, may be excused for sometimes having visions. Just as the consuls of Rome used to be called "burgomasters"—an affectation which people are again beginning to take pleasure in—so men were charmed if any great figure of antiquity were represented exactly like one of themselves. It was just that, "So would I speak, if I were Christ," to which attention has already been drawn (§ 293, 1). This modernizing spirit appeared most prominently in the last of the three *Dialogues*, of which even Mendelssohn himself admits, that in it he has made Socrates speak as he would have spoken in our own day. The impossibility of God having predestined beings to misery, the impossibility of a being whose end is perfection, being checked in the effort to attain it, finally the necessity of a life after death, if a normal relation is to be established between actions and reward—these are the main arguments put forward here on behalf of immortality. Mendelssohn himself admits that they are borrowed from Baumgarten and Reimarus. It has been asserted by many, including Kant, that Mendelssohn's *Jerusalem* is his finest work, and yet it was the signal for a number who had hitherto been his admirers, Hamann for example, openly to declare against him. The first part of this treatise contains the outlines of Mendelssohn's natural law. He is strongly opposed to the view that duties and rights are only brought into existence by the social contract; according to him, the latter has merely the power of transforming imperfect obligations (of conscience) and rights into perfect (compulsory) rights and obligations. As such a transformation can only affect actions, and not thoughts or convictions, he declares in the most decided manner against every Church which, as a moral personality, wished to claim the right of binding its teachers to a creed, of exercising powers of discipline and excommunication, etc. Naturally it follows that the State acts irrationally if, by con-

ferring privileges on the adherents of one religion, it misleads or bribes its subjects into adopting it. It is only against atheism, Epicureanism, and fanaticism that the State has any right to take proceedings; for he who does not allow the existence of God, of Providence, and of a future life, cannot realize the end of civil life, any more than he who believes that there is an opposition between temporal and eternal well-being, and neglects this world for the sake of the other. These three articles of faith embrace the whole of Mendelssohn's natural theology. Further, in the second part of his *Jerusalem* he is at some pains to explain that Judaism does not profess to be a revelation of religion, but merely a revelation of law, that it does not possess a single article of faith nor any creed, but simply prescribes usages for the descendants of Jacob. If we bear these facts in mind, it is easy to understand the action of Hamann, who saw in Mendelssohn's demands an exaltation of Judaism at the expense of Christianity, and expressed this in his *Golgotha and Scheblimini* in a manner that offended Mendelssohn almost as deeply as did Lavater's attempt to convert him. In point of smoothness and refinement of style, the *Morning Hours* perhaps rank highest among Mendelssohn's works. And yet, if they have met with less recognition than the *Phædo*, for example, their fate is not altogether undeserved. In the first place, they appeared three years after the *Critique of Pure Reason*, in fact, not until after Kant's *Prolegomena* had convincingly proved to the whole world that the old style of metaphysics had passed away for ever. Again, the main point, the ontological argument for God's existence, is discussed, in what is evidently a more thorough manner, in the treatise, *On Evidence*. Lastly, his correspondence with Jacobi led him to attempt to devise a modified system of pantheism, which was to be put into the mouth of Lessing; and the more signal the failure of this attempt, the greater the wrong done to the spirit of Lessing, whose admirers were bound to take it ill. In this work, Mendelssohn appears like a man who has been left behind, and who is sullenly watching the onward march of progress. He says modestly that he is quite unable to follow the younger spirits, like Tetens, Lambert, and Kant, the giant who crushes everything before him; and yet in his heart he is glad when the younger Reimarus writes to him that Kant is not really very important.

10. FRIEDRICH NICOLAI (19th March, 1733, to 8th Jan., 1811) was also a self-taught man, though not nearly to such an extent as his friend Moses. After a somewhat unsystematic course of training at the Orphanage at Halle, and a very good one at the Real Schule in Berlin, he became an apprentice in a bookseller's shop at Frankfort-on-the-Oder. Here in his leisure hours he learned English, as well as Greek, which he had begun before but had afterwards given up; and he also read notes taken down at Baumgarten's lectures. At Berlin, where he went with the intention of devoting himself entirely to the pursuit of knowledge, especially in æsthetics, he further enlarged his mind by the study of Wolff. The first thing that he printed was a controversial work upon Milton, published anonymously. Becoming acquainted with Lessing and Mendelssohn, he published, also anonymously, in 1755, his *Letters upon the Present State of the Fine Arts in Germany*. In the very next year, however, we see him enter upon the career where his strength really lies, that of an editor. When, in 1759, he was compelled to take over the charge of his father's bookshop, he resigned to Weisse of Leipsic the editorship of the *Library of the Fine Arts*, which had been begun in 1757, and he then started the *Letters on the most Recent Literature*, which continued to come out until 1765. These were quite distinct from Nicolai's greatest undertaking, the *Universal German Library*, which he edited single-handed for twenty-one years. He himself selected the reviewer for each work, and altered the reviews where he found it necessary; and during all this time he only quarrelled with one of his fellow-workers, Klotz of Halle. It is not without reason that Nicolai, at the age of sixty, points with pride to the change in critical periodicals during the previous thirty years. Of the immense influence exerted by these three reviews during the period of their existence, no small part was due to the efforts of Nicolai; and accordingly what he did for the spread of "sound philosophy," must be measured more by his activity as an editor than by his literary work. And yet it is of the latter alone that those people think, who talk of his verbosity, his platitudes, and so on. There can be no doubt that he is honest when he says that in writing he never thought of fame, but only of the public good; and no doubt that he is straightforward enough when he says of his own literary work, that he wrote like a dog lapping water from the Nile,—others,

like Mendelssohn, Göcking, and Biester had to cut down and correct the manuscript. This will explain why no complete list of his writings need be looked for here. Any one who wishes to be filled with amazement at the many-sidedness of Nicolai's interests, can put together such a list for himself from the fifth, tenth, and fourteenth volumes of Meusel's *Gelehrtes Deutschland.* His "sound philosophy," in the first place, does not profess to be the only one that can make men happy; and he detests any system, such as a Church, which puts forward a claim of that kind. He compares philosophers to men looking through different loopholes into the same room; they must be content to allow those who stand opposite them, to take quite different views of things. Nor, in the second place, is it in any way a philosophy only for the learned; he is fond of boasting that he is a business man, and can thus take a more unprejudiced view of things than men of academic training usually do. Such men he esteemed so lightly that when, in 1799, the philosophical faculty of Helmstadt conferred a degree upon him, he never made any use of the title. As we might expect, he does not expound his sound philosophy in the form of a system, but in romances, and in his description in twelve volumes of a journey of eight weeks through Germany. Closely connected with this anti-academic feeling is his dislike of learned terminology. It is not merely to produce a comical effect—for then he would have done it only in his burlesque novel *Sempronius Gundibert*—that he translates Kant's *a priori* and *a posteriori* by *vonvornig* (from-beforely) and *vonhintenig* (from-afterly). Finally, his philosophy did not proceed from a purely speculative interest. It was intended to be useful to every one. It was to further true happiness, his own as well as that of his fellow-men, and was to guarantee us security in action and peace in our last moments, so that we should fear death as little as we do grey hairs. All these requirements are met by philosophy, where it consists in a constant warfare against prejudices of all kinds, and endeavours, by establishing distinct notions, to put an end to that blind faith which rests upon want of clearness. Nicolai's philosophy accordingly is devoted to the advancement of the religious Enlightenment. His much-read novel, *Sebaldus Nothanker*, is a continuous struggle against the validity of creeds, against eternal punishment, against intolerance, in short, on behalf of the watch-

words of the Enlightenment and its leaders. Pietism, with the developments of which he became acquainted at Halle, found in him an unwearied foe. But the real field which he chose for the exercise of his activity, was the warfare against the order of the Jesuits. His eagerness to track out their secret movements earned for him the nickname of "the man with the good nose for Jesuits," which reminds us of Frederick the Great's "man with the good nose for coffee." Lavater, Sailer, and others were accused by him of wittingly or unwittingly furthering the ends of the Jesuits. It was no small triumph for his friends when it was discovered that the Court Chaplain Stark of Darmstadt, against whom he had directed so many attacks, had really been a Jesuit in disguise. The chief ground of his hatred towards them was the claim they put forward to be the sole possessors of the truth, a claim which found its natural complement in the desire to make proselytes. Not seldom, it is true, he and his friends showed themselves very intolerant against intolerance, and strove to make proselytes against proselytizing. The social no less than the religious Enlightenment won Nicolai's approval. Thus he had a warm appreciation of the great monarchs who strove to educate nations. In particular, this incarnation of the spirit of Berlin, this indomitable patriot, cherished the deepest reverence for Frederick the Great, as may be gathered from the *Anecdotes* which he put together from the stories of the musician Quanz, of the Marquis D'Argens, and of Major Quintus Icilius (Guichard). But he was also a sincere admirer of Catherine the Second, Joseph the Second, and other Enlightened princes; and no less warm was his feeling towards the educational reformers, amongst whom he used particularly to eulogize Herr von Rochow. Lastly, as regards the secret societies of the Enlightenment, Nicolai, like all his contemporaries, took an interest in them; indeed he was a member of the order of Freemasons and of the Illuminati. But, as a matter of fact, mysticism was so much against the grain of his nature that he could not give way to it very far. His opinion of Freemasonry in his work upon the order of Templars, to the effect that it is a mantle that receives all its value from him who wears it, proved that he was not a very enthusiastic brother, and ultimately led to his leaving the lodge. The order of the Illuminati he looks upon as an institution that could only impose upon youths;

and he has a thorough contempt for Cagliostro and all other charlatans of his time. The sphere in which his interest lay from his earliest youth, and in which he aimed at confirming the supremacy of sound philosophy, was the sphere of æsthetics. So great an enemy was he of all that was imaginative, that when, by a strange irony of fate, he came to have visions, he took care to inform the world that these disappeared before leeches properly applied. It was only in sculpture, where the study of Winkelmann and his own observation kept him right, that he rose to the ideal point of view. In poetry he can never quite get beyond the moral purpose. The bad example which *The Sorrows of Werther* might furnish, led him to give another issue to the story, and by his *Joys of Young Werther* (Berlin, 1775), to draw down upon himself the well-merited castigation of Goethe. Nicolai did not take this too much to heart. With the intrepidity characteristic of Berlin, he set his face against all those tendencies which prevented one from being a reasonable man, a capable citizen, a good man of business. The chief tendencies of this kind he considered to be—in poetry, the views which had their advocates in the friends of Schiller and Goethe, and for a long time their organs in the *Horen* and in Schiller's *Musenalmanach*; and in philosophy, transcendentalism, as it originated in Kant, was developed by Reinhold and Fichte, and found expression in the *Jenaer Literaturzeitung*. All of these men he attacked simultaneously in the eleventh volume of his *Travels*, for his nature was not sensitive and nervous like that of his friend Moses, but strong and bitter. The replies which were made to him—Kant's *Essay upon Bookmaking*, Schiller and Goethe's *Xenien*—did not annoy him at all; they led to elaborate rejoinders, as Fichte's cruel work, *The Life and Strange Opinions of F. Nicolai*, afterwards did. In these replies we always hear the same sound common sense, which knows nothing higher than actual individual human beings, and which therefore holds that the most valuable studies of all are physiognomy and biography, while it makes light of those who wish to lay down *a priori* any principle about mankind without having first learned to know men. Concern for the public good, to which Nicolai returns in all his works, was not in his case a mere empty phrase. Not only has he given an accurate description of his native town, but he served it as an exemplary citizen. For, during the French invasion, he bore

the heaviest burdens without a murmur, and in his will he remembered the town very much to its advantage. But the reverence with which this incarnation of the spirit of citizenship inspired even the representatives of the interest of the State, the friendship of a Dohm, the confidence of a Zedlitz—these prove, just like the attitude he adopts to the French Revolution, how intense was the loyalty with which he clung to the State to which he belonged.

Fr. Nicolai: *Ueber meine gelehrte Bildung.* Berlin and Stettin, 1799. F. L. G. v. Göcking: *Fr. Nicolai's Leben und literar. Nachlass.* Berlin, 1820.

11. Among the many younger men who gathered round Mendelssohn and Nicolai after Lessing had left Berlin, the first that calls for mention is JOH. AUGUST EBERHARD, of Halberstadt, (17th August, 1739 to 6th Jan., 1809). By his *New Apology for Socrates* (2 vols., Berlin, 1772; frequently reprinted since) he made a name for himself as an advocate of the theory that blessedness was possible for the heathen; he became preacher at Charlottenburg, and in 1778 professor of philosophy at Halle, where he continued to be held in the greatest respect until his death. His *General Theory of Thought and Sensation*, Berlin, 1776, his *Rational Morality*, 1781, and his *Prolegomena to Natural Theology*, Halle, 1781, although not so important as his first work, still show the same feeling of confidence as the works of his older friends did. This was before the appearance of Kant's *Critique.* His attempt, however, to prove that Kant had really nothing new to teach, called forth a scornful reply, and showed that Eberhard's point of view was an antiquated one. His reputation survived longest in the domain of æsthetics, in which his *Theory of the Fine Arts and Sciences*, Halle, 1783, supplemented afterwards by his *Handbook of Æsthetics*, 4 vols., Halle, 1803–5, went through several editions. His *General History of Philosophy*, Halle, 1788, was also well received. To judge from Schleiermacher's letters to Brinkmann, he must have exercised a very stimulating influence upon those who came into contact with him. The last of his more important writings are *The Original Spirit of Christianity*, 3 vols., Halle, 1807–8, and *Attempt towards a Complete German Synonymic*, 1795–1802, the first six volumes of which are by him (the last six by Maass and Gruber). The latter work, as well as the *Dictionary of Synonyms in the German Language* (Halle,

1802, very frequently reprinted), was with him—and his was not the only case of the kind—a result of the eclectic and reconciliatory view, that the majority of scientific disputes hinge merely upon words.—THOMAS ABBT, of Ulm (25th Nov.; 1738, to 3rd Nov., 1766), flashed upon this circle like a brilliant meteor. After studying at Halle theology, philosophy, and mathematics, and at the same time making diligent use of S. J. Baumgarten's library, he was led, largely by the latter influence, to turn his attention to English literature. In 1760 he was appointed an extraordinary professor of philosophy at Frankfort-on-the-Oder, and while holding this position he wrote *On Dying for one's Country*, Berlin, 1761. He then lived for almost a year at Berlin, where he became particularly intimate with Mendelssohn, and succeeded Lessing as a contributor to the *Letters on Literature*. He kept up this connection during his professorship at Rinteln, upon which he entered at the end of 1761, but the duties of which he really discharged only for a year and a half. A longing to exchange his academic career for a practical one first led him to study jurisprudence, and afterwards to travel in Germany, Switzerland, and a part of France, in order to gain a knowledge of towns and customs. After his return, he wrote *The Life of Alexander Baumgarten*, and then published his chief work, *On Merit*, Berlin, 1765. While occupied with a number of other writings, he was offered simultaneously a professorship at Marburg and at Halle, but he refused both in favour of the post of privy councillor and treasurer at Bückeburg. While thus engaged he finished the first volume of his *Selection from Universal History*, Halle, 1766, in which, following Voltaire's example, he attempts to establish one fundamental idea—the disappearance of barbarism. After his unexpectedly early death, his collected works were published in six volumes, as: *Thomas Abbt's Miscellaneous Writings*, Frkf. and Leips., 1783, and following years. These contain both what had been already printed (not, however, his contributions to the *Letters on Literature*, and to the *Universal German Library*), and unpublished papers, as well as his correspondence with Mendelssohn and others. The extraordinary success that Abbt's writings met with, is explained by the fact that he was one of the first to do in Germany what Montaigne had done in France, and Bacon and his imitators in England,—to lay before the public works in which

the labour involved in the thought was concealed by the gracefulness of the style, the scientific basis of the whole by the conversational tone and the mixture of jest and earnest. But in this respect he is far surpassed by a somewhat younger man, who also belongs to the Berlin circle. This was JOHANN JACOB ENGEL (11th Sept., 1741, to 28th Jan., 1802), who carried farthest the cleverly reasoned examination of all possible subjects, which was at that time called philosophy, and from whom, therefore, we have borrowed the name which he bestowed upon it. Educated at the Universities of Rostock, Bützow (particularly under Tetens), and Leipsic, he perfected his style very early by exceedingly thorough classical studies, and translations from ancient and modern languages. He also studied the history of philosophy; but what interested him most was human nature, of which his opportunities at Leipsic gave him the most varied experience. His greatest friend was Garve; their mutual esteem was largely due to the fact that they were always arguing with each other. The small success which Garve met with as *Privatdocent* frightened Engel from adopting this career, and he made his first public appearance as the author of two comedies, *The Grateful Son*, 1770 and, *The Young Noble*, 1772, both of which were well received. The year 1774 he spent at Gotha, in order to be near Seidler's company, in which Eckhof was playing. There he was welcomed in the highest circles; and in 1775 he published the first volume of his *Philosopher for the World*, (2nd vol. 1777, 3rd vol. 1800). This is a collection of essays upon all possible subjects, the greater part of which are by Engel himself, although some are by Mendelssohn, Garve, Eberhard, and others. He received an appointment in the Joachimsthaler Gymnasium at Berlin; and a feature of his teaching there was, that he made his pupils deduce the rules of logic for themselves from the Platonic Dialogues, a method of which an account is given in a paper printed in 1780. For some time, too, he was tutor to the prince who afterwards became King William the Third; and his unfinished *Theory of the Various Kinds of Composition* (1783) was likewise originally an educational manual. The distinguished lecturer was in 1787,—in which year he also became a member of the Academy,—appointed manager of the Royal National Theatre, partly no doubt on account of his *Hints towards a Science of Mimetics* (Berlin, 1785, 2 vols.). In 1794 he resigned this post in order to take up his abode at

Schwerin. Here he finished a drama which he had begun long before, *Oath and Duty*, collected his minor works (1795), and wrote the short sketch, *Herr Lorenz Stark*. The *Mirror of Princes*, in which he set forth what he had taught the royal children, was also written here. In 1798 he was invited back to Berlin. There he lived a very retired life, occupied with papers for the Academy, and the collection of his works; and he died while on a visit to Parchim, his native town. The collected edition of his works, the preparation of which, quite in accordance with his own instructions, was continued after his death by his friend Friedländer, comprises twelve volumes (*J. J. Engel's Schriften*, Berlin, 1801–6, 12 vols.). Engel, in a style which secures for him a place of honour among the prose writers of Germany, philosophized upon all possible subjects in a spirit which he recommends in his *Tobias Witt*, his *Safe Cure*, and other papers: "Let us have no extremes, and let one thing always be connected with another!" Hardly one of the eclectics who attempted to combine English and French theories with German, believing both to be at bottom correct, was so pronounced, or so forcible and tasteful as he was. He was a disciple of Newton, as his papers upon light for the Academy prove; he agreed with Locke and Condillac that all varieties of knowledge ultimately rest upon the senses; and yet he declared himself upon the side of Leibnitz on the question as to individual difference and general notions. He welcomes the figure of the statue employed by Condillac and Bonnet; like the former, too, he maintains the specific importance of the sense of feeling, although he finds that a sufficient distinction has not been made. Feeling, such as is characteristic of the skin as a whole, may be called feeling proper (*Gefühl*), that which is characteristic of the hand may be called touch (*Getaste*). Distinct from both is the feeling of exertion, which is transmitted by the muscles under the skin, and for which Engel proposes the name of effort (*Gestrebe*). If Locke and Hume had made this distinction, they would have seen that the idea of power, just like that of colour, has its origin in a single sense, that is, in effort. Where Engel has occasion to speak of Kant, it is usually to indulge in polemics against him. Sometimes that thinker goes too far for him, sometimes not far enough. The last who calls for mention is Nicolai's most faithful friend and companion, JOHANN ERICH BIESTER (17th Nov., 1749 to 1816),

who, after studying law at Göttingen, as well as classics and the history of literature, lectured for a long time at Bützow. Through Nicolai's influence, he became private secretary to the minister Von Zedlitz; and when he died, he was royal librarian at Berlin. He deserves to be named here because in 1783, along with Gedike, he founded the *Berliner Monatsschrift*, of which he was sole editor from 1791. This periodical fulfils in a more ambitious style the purpose for which Engel's *Philosopher for the World* had been intended—to instruct, and to spread the doctrines of the Enlightenment by means of entertaining papers. Biester's numerous connections secured very important contributors to the *Monatsschrift*, not the least important of them being Kant. As is the case with all periodicals of the kind, its reputation subsequently waned. In antipathy to Catholicism and in hatred of the Jesuits, Biester was so completely in accord with Nicolai, that down to this very day they are usually mentioned together in connection with a keen scent for Jesuits. This, however, is apt to make us forget that they were also alike in their conscientious adherence to what they had come to see to be right.

12. While Mendelssohn and Nicolai with pardonable pride gave it to be understood that they were something quite different from men of university education, only the third of the three friends could say of himself that he was *more* than this, for he was the only one of the trio who could boast (and he did it to Klotz) of having deservedly won the master's cap. GOTTHOLD EPHRAIM LESSING was born at Kamenz in the Oberlausitz, on Jan. 22nd, 1729. After an unusually thorough school training at Meissen, he came with a store of classical and mathematical learning to Leipsic, where he set about making himself not merely a sound scholar, but also a polished man of the world. And he succeeded perfectly in both respects. He first won a name for himself as a writer of epigrams, fables, and comedies, as well as by his *Contributions to the History and the Improvement of the Theatre* (1750). Afterwards he was for some years (1751–55) literary critic to the *Berlinische* (*Vossische*) *Zeitung* at Berlin, and also edited *The Latest from the Realm of Wit*, as a supplement to the *Berlinische Staats- und Gelehrten-Zeitungen* (1751). After taking his degree at Wittenberg, he published, besides some translations in 1753, two volumes of *Writings*, which partly contained matter already published, and partly critical letters.

One of the latter, which referred to Lange's translation of Horace, drew a protest from the translator, and then Lessing printed, in 1754, his merciless reply: *A Vade mecum for Herr Sam. Gotth. Lange, Pastor in Laublingen*, which completely crushed the poor poetaster. As if to prove to the public that the critic is no mere fault-finder, he published in the third volume of his *Writings* (1754), his "*Rescues*" of Horace, Cardan, and others, whom he defended against unjust criticisms. In this same year,—the year, too, in which he introduced Nicolai to Mendelssohn,—he began his *Theatrical Review* (1754–58). Of the essays that appeared in this, the following deserve special mention—that upon the tragedies of Seneca, that upon the history of the English stage, and that upon unprinted Italian comedies. In conjunction with Mendelssohn, he wrote and published anonymously (1755) the witty satire upon the Berlin Academy: *Pope a Metaphysician!* Then he exchanged his residence at Berlin for life at Leipsic, and did not return to his friends till 1758. He took but a small share in the work of the *Library of the Fine Arts and Sciences*, published by Nicolai, and he had thus all the more time to spare for the *Letters on Literature*. Besides the numerous contributions supplied to this periodical in 1759 and 1760, he published in 1759 his *Treatise on the Fable*, worked hard at an important essay upon Sophocles, and lived on intimate terms with the most distinguished men in Berlin. Perhaps it was the dread of becoming too closely identified with a particular clique that led him to take a resolution which surprised everybody. In the autumn of 1760, he accepted the post first of private, and then of government secretary to General Tauentzien, at Breslau, in order that he might be brought into relations with an entirely different set of people. What the five years spent in military society were for him, he showed the world in his *Minna von Barnhelm*, which was begun in 1763, and the *Laocoon*, the preliminary work in connection with which was done at Breslau, although the book itself did not appear till 1769. At the same time he made a very careful study of the Church Fathers, as well as of Spinoza. Further, the beginning of a translation of Leibnitz's *Nouveaux Essais*, which Lessing's brother took for the commencement of an original work, may be assigned to the last weeks of his stay at Breslau. Very soon after going to reside there, he had been elected a member of the Berlin

Academy. In the spring of 1765, Lessing was in Berlin once more, busy with the preparation of the *Laocoon*, and for a short time full of hope that he would be appointed to the charge of the Royal Library there. Rejected by Frederick the Great, he accepted a post in connection with the theatre at Hamburg, during his tenure of which he published the *Hamburg Dramaturgy* (1767–69)—a work which marked an epoch in the theory of the drama, as the *Laocoon* had done in that of the formative arts. At the same time there appeared his *Antiquarian Epistles*, 1768, and *How the Ancients represented Death*, 1769, both directed against Klotz of Halle, upon whom they entailed a fate very similar to that which the *Vade mecum* had brought upon Lange. When a publishing and printing enterprise failed, and a projected journey to Italy fell through, and when he could not make up his mind to accept a professorship at Königsberg—only Göttingen, the University of men of the world, might have had charms for him—he acceded in 1770 to a proposal that he should go to Wolfenbüttel as librarian. In that very year the fortunate discovery of a hitherto unknown work by Berengar of Tours, was announced to the world in an essay which proved that this "lover of theology" was as well versed in the knowledge of Church history as the *Hamburg Dramaturgy* had shown him to be in knowledge of antiquity. *Emilia Galotti* (1772) was followed by *Contributions to History and Literature*, which were drawn from the unprinted treasures of the library. A journey to Vienna, undertaken in 1775, and continued with the Prince of Brunswick to Italy, failed to prove as instructive as he had hoped. After an engagement of many years, it at length became possible for him to marry happily; but in little more than a year death carried off his wife. He published some extracts from the *Apology* of Reimarus (*vid. supra*, § 293, 4). (These were the famous seven *Wolfenbüttel Fragments*, of which the first, *On Toleration of the Deists*, and the two last, *On the Story of the Resurrection*, and *On the Object of Jesus and His Apostles*, gave great offence.) And the discussions in which the publication of these involved him, owing to the appearance of replies to which he wrote answers, occupied his mind, and gave him opportunity of showing his great skill as a many-sided and keen controversialist. His essay: *On Demonstration of the Spirit and of Power* (1777), with its supplement, the *Testament Johannis*, presents him to us as

disputing in the most polite fashion with the Director Schumann. On the other hand, his *Rejoinder*, 1778, written in reply to an anonymous author, and his *Parable* (1778), his *Axiomata*, and particularly his *Anti-Göze*,—all three directed against Pastor Göze of Hamburg,—are masterpieces of merciless criticism. But these disputes also filled him with the sense of isolation, which finds distinct expression in one of his letters. The *New Hypothesis in regard to the Evangelists* (written in 1778), the *Talks for Freemasons* (1778, 1780), the dramatic poem, *Nathan the Wise* (1779), and finally, the *Education of the Human Race* (1780), part of which had been already published, develop the positive principles of Lessing's theory of life, without the introduction of any controversial elements. Soon after his death, which took place on Feb. 15th, 1781, an edition of his collected works began to appear. These were published first in thirty (1781–94), and then in thirty-two parts (1825–28). Lachmann, in his edition of thirteen volumes (Berlin, Voss'sche Buchhandlung, 1838–40) gave them in critical order, and with a conscientious respect for Lessing's peculiarities of grammar and orthography. The revised and enlarged edition by Maltzahn (Leips., 1853) does not profess to be so scrupulous in these respects. In 1875 there appeared the (first illustrated) edition of R. Gosche (8 vols., Berlin, Grote), the eighth volume of which contains an interesting biography of Lessing.

Th. W. Danzel: *Gotthold Ephraim Lessing, sein Leben und seine Werke* 1st vol. Leipz., 1850. 2nd vol. by Guhrauer. Leipz., 1853.

13. Lessing insists, with greater emphasis than either of his Berlin friends, upon the philosopher keeping Enlightenment in view more than anything else, and therefore, upon his reducing everything to distinct notions. Like them, he assigns the highest place to sound reason, which—as he acknowledges to his brother in the course of his theological disputes—he values more highly than theology. One of the reasons why he is inclined to accept the doctrine of transmigration is, that this theory was the oldest, and therefore the first, which occurred to sound understanding. Further, he was far superior to either of his friends in intellectual acuteness, so much so, indeed, that Mendelssohn declared he even felt solely with his intellect; and at the same time he had a great advantage in having been trained from his school-days

in the distinctions of the Wolffian philosophy. The consequence of this was, that a great deal of what the other two regarded as distinct, seemed to him to require further analysis, *i.e.*, to be confused. Accordingly a large proportion of his intellectual activity was expended in attempting to separate what all the world confounded, and thus to re-establish clearness of ideas. At the very outset of his acquaintance with Nicolai, he warns his friend against confusing the indirect result of tragedy, moral elevation, with its direct purpose, the rousing of compassion. That there may be no misapprehension in regard to the latter, he draws a distinction between it and admiration, and says that the hero whom we admire should belong to epic poetry, while to tragedy should belong only the hero whom we pity. In the same way he warns Nicolai against confounding passions with character; and writes to Mendelssohn to beware of mixing up the various kinds of poetry, and further, not to be led away by the similarity of the views of Leibnitz and Spinoza with regard to the relation of body and soul, into forgetting the opposition between them, and so on. This tendency to separate, which is shown in these extracts from his letters, reappears in the writings intended for the public eye. His *Laocoon* is an attack upon the prevalent idea *sit ut pictura poëma.* Its chief purpose is to fix the distinction between the speaking or vocal arts, and the shaping or plastic arts; and he carries the process of separation so far as to reject all descriptive poetry, as well as all painting that is allegorical, or even represents a succession. Similarly, in the *Dramaturgy*, one main object is to distinguish the unity of action from the other two supplementary unities; and as a consequence of his line of argument he is led to take the all-important step of breaking with the French drama, or, to be quite accurate, with French tragedy, which he himself had formerly regarded as a model. Finally, in every case, Lessing's theological disputes ultimately rested upon the separation of certain fundamental ideas, which are partly enumerated in the *Axiomata*, written as a reply to Göze. Religion is not the Bible, and is not theology; nor does revelation teach us what it is. Miracles that compel belief, are not the same thing as miraculous narratives. The religion of Christ and the Christian religion are two different things. Modern rational Christianity has lost by the fusion both reason and Christianity. These are constantly recurring

antitheses, directed as much against the "advocates of orthodoxy" as against the friends of "rational Christianity." Lessing disliked nothing so much as indecision. He was unwilling to pronounce too harsh a judgment on Berengar of Tours, who recanted because he "was prepared for arguments, not for death"; but the idea that he concealed his real views, irritated Lessing much.

14. Just as he was at one with his friends in holding that philosophy consists in the transformation of all that is obscure into distinct ideas, so he agreed with them that the real subject of philosophy was man; only, being better read, he was able to remind them that the poet Pope had not been the first to teach this, but that they could learn it from the philosopher Charron. At the same time, hardly any one was so pronounced as Lessing in the opinion that by "man" must be understood the self-sufficing subject. Just as, according to the letter to his mother, he tried at the University to become, not a scholar, but a man, just as he teaches in his *Nathan*, that we should not be Jews or Christians, but men, just as, in a letter to Gleim, he frankly admits that he does not know what love of country means, while elsewhere he says, that "one's country" is an "abstract idea," so in the *Talks for Freemasons*, he expresses his conviction that the salt of the earth consists of those who, free from distinctions of nationality, religion, rank, and fortune, are nothing but men. Accordingly, he declares decidedly against the view that the State is an end in itself. It exists for the sake of men; and the sum of the happiness of individuals is the general well-being. His ideal, therefore,—which he admitted could never be more than an ideal,—is a state of things in which there is no government, because each man governs himself, As in politics, so too in religion and philosophy, he was a pronounced individualist: in religion, when he says that the church stands in the same relation to faith, as a lodge does to freemasonry, and when he contrasts the religion of the heart with that of the head, the Christian of feeling with the dogmatist and theologian; in philosophy, when he declares it to be impossible for a philosopher either to form a school or to belong to one. In his *Rejoinder*, there is a declamatory passage, often quoted, to the effect that to strive after truth is better than to possess it—a statement which finds a counterpart in his preference for the philosophical defence of something which is unphilosophical

(*i.e.* untrue) as compared with its unphilosophical rejection, and in his view of the continual extension of power as the only happiness, and of the attainment of blessedness as *ennui*. It shows that he ranks the enjoyment of subjective activity (effort) above everything else, and it forms a remarkable contrast to the self-forgetting devotion of Spinoza, whose only concern is, that there should be adequate ideas, not that these should enter into *his* mind. As Lessing, *e.g.*, in the *Letters on Literature*, makes his theory of man depend upon physics, and physics upon ontology, we are entitled to ask what his views on ontology are. In maintaining that there is a graduated series of existences, in which no link is passed over and none omitted, and in which the simple existences are divine in nature but limited in power, and form a harmony,—all of which is found in his *Rational Christianity*,—he exhibits a marked agreement with Leibnitz, of whom he says that, if he had wished to formulate a system, it would not have been that of Wolff. His theory, too, of moral beings, and the infinite number of ideas which they bear about with them, shows so much affinity with Leibnitz that it is not difficult to see why he was anxious to translate the *Nouveaux Essais* immediately on their first appearance. But his intimate acquaintance with views diametrically opposite,—with Bayle, who was a kindred spirit of his own, with Shaftesbury, whom he advised Mendelssohn to read, with Hutcheson, whom he partly translated,—did not fail to exercise an influence upon his own ideas, as is proved, for example, by the remarkable essay, *That Man may have more than Five Senses* (*Works*, Lachmann's ed., vol. xi., p. 458). In this, by his imaginary description of existence before and after this present life, he really transfers into the region of reality Condillac and Bonnet's fiction of a statue; and in spite of all his dislike to the latter, there are many points in which he agrees with the views of his *Palingenesy*.

15. If, however, on account of this combination of heterogeneous elements, and on account of his repeated declaration that truth always lies midway between the extremes, we were to call Lessing an eclectic like Mendelssohn and Nicolai, we should be forgetting that he had good reason for saying that in poetry his place was not that of a poet but of a critic, and in theology, that of the servant who sweeps the dust from the steps of the temple. He was always inclined to adopt the

view that everybody else found fault with. This inclination, which his friends looked upon as mere love of paradox, and which is what led us to call Bayle his kindred spirit, he himself describes in his *Bibliolatry* as an "antiperistaltic tendency of his mind," in the following terms: "The more convincingly any one tried to demonstrate to me the truth of Christianity, the more doubtful I became. The more boldly and triumphantly another wished to trample it under foot, the more inclined I felt to maintain it intact, in my heart at least." One result of that is, that his greatest achievements are either "rescues"—to those to which he himself gave this name, we may add that of Berengar of Tours—or exposures (of Gottsched, of the French, of Lange, of Klotz, of Göze, etc.), both of which are alike attacks upon what is universally accepted. While his two friends, in their somewhat weakly toleration, see truth in every statement, Lessing always begins by discovering what is erroneous; for no error has he a keener eye than for the want of thoroughness, and that is a fault which everything around him seems to manifest. This explains his isolated position, which reminds one of that occupied by other important thinkers at the conclusion of a period. Nicolaus of Cusa, or Bacon and Hobbes, are cases in point. His immediate friends see in this feeling of discontent simply an "exaggeration which he is fond of setting against exaggeration;" and they regard it as a venial weakness, that he does not exhibit the same enthusiasm as they do for the apostles of Enlightenment. He has no great admiration either for Frederick the Great, who would compel men to be reasonable, nor for Febronius, who attacks the rights of the Popes. The educationalists, in Rousseau and Basedow's sense, could not feel edified by his saying that God gave us the soul, but genius we get through education, for the latter half of the proposition is too strongly suggestive of Helvetius. Finally, those who resorted to underhand means in order to educate and enlighten the world, could easily gather from his *Talks for Freemasons* the scorn for freemasonry which a well-known anecdote represents him as expressing. Peculiar as was his attitude to the progressive movement in society, still more peculiar is his attitude to it in religion, when compared with the unreserved approbation which this met with at the hands of his Berlin friends. Nowadays the orthodox, or those inclined towards Catholicism, simply in order to add the

weight of a famous name to their own side, are in the habit of repeating from his letters to his brother,—which are certainly one of the most important sources of information on this point,—the one fact that he there calls the rational Christianity of Spalding, Teller, Semler, and others "dirty water," or, on the other hand, of telling how often in his *Anti-Göze* he brings forward tradition and the Church Fathers against the purely exegetical basis of dogmas. This is folly. The one party omits to notice, or forgets, that he regards the orthodox theory, too, as simply dirty water which is not thrown away till we get something purer, and that he says in so many words that it is worthless, that it is a good thing to get rid of it, and so on. The others have not noted with sufficient care that he applies the term "fencing arts" to his device of breaking up the phalanx of theologians by appealing to the Catholic doctrine. The fact of the matter is, that, in his view, all the theological movements of the eighteenth century are, without exception, modern, and therefore faulty creations. This is the case with the orthodoxy of Göze and others. It is scarcely fifty years, he says, since the first appearance of this orthodoxy, which is based "upon historical proofs," or upon what would nowadays be called apologetics. And it is kept alive only by the invention of lying harmonies of the Gospels, in which it is compelled to take refuge because it confuses the letter and the spirit, the Bible and religion. But, according to Lessing, modern rational Christianity is equally far from the truth. Its advocates have torn down the wall of partition between revelation and reason, and they preach a revelation which reveals nothing at all, since it only professes to teach what reason tells; in short, they are bad theologians and still worse philosophers. But even the deism of Eberhard and others, which goes considerably further, he entirely disapproves of, and he attacks all their watchwords vigorously. Instead of their outcry against creeds, and their exhortation to cling to Scripture alone, he puts forward the *regula fidei*, to which he assigns a higher antiquity than to the books of the Bible; reminds them that from the beginning heretics have always based their views upon the Bible; and asserts that, just as the Church has existed without the Bible, so it would be possible for Church tradition and the continuity of Church life to be maintained without Scriptural authority and simply by a form of creed, while, on the other hand, without a tradition of this kind, no man would be able to gather the dogmas of belief from

the Bible. Equally objectionable must it have been to deists of a Unitarian tendency, and particularly to Mendelssohn, that Lessing attempted to prove that the dogma of the Trinity was rational, as he did in the *Education of the Human Race*, and had done at an even earlier period in his *Rational Christianity*. The only consolation that Mendelssohn has, is that his friend was always fond of witticisms. Indeed, even the dogma which, as has been already pointed out (*vid.* § 293, 2), was most repulsive to the men of Enlightenment, the doctrine of eternal punishment, found a defender in Lessing; indirectly through his praise of Leibnitz for seeking to prove it rational, and directly, as we see from his letters to his brother, through the arguments he put forward in favour of it against Mendelssohn and Eberhard. When their differences were so marked, it was impossible for him to make a rallying cry of toleration, in the same sense as the others did. The remark he makes to his brother, to the effect that it was really the old orthodoxy that had been tolerant, while modern theology was intolerant, shows that in his view true toleration was not incompatible with the conviction that one's own point of view is also objectively the highest. Accordingly in his *Education of the Human Race* he ranks Christianity, as the religion of more fully developed humanity, far above Judaism, in which the human race, being yet in its infancy, was reduced to obedience to the one God by means of earthly reward and earthly punishment. It was natural that Mendelssohn should speak of this work with a certain feeling of uneasiness, and that, on the other hand, he should hold fast by *Nathan the Wise*, which was written at the same time, and which he regarded as the greatest achievement of its author. He was quite right in looking upon *Nathan* as Lessing's true confession of faith, for the latter in a letter to his brother expressly says that he put into the mouth of his Nathan the opinions he himself had always held. Would that the opinions of Lessing's Nathan were only as clear as Mendelssohn and a very large number in our own day believe that they are! Lessing must certainly have had some reason for altering the story he borrowed from Boccaccio. Out of a valuable, but ordinary, ring he makes, not one to which a delusion attributed a spell, but one which "*had*" the secret power of giving favour in the eyes of God and man to him who wore it, provided he possessed the firm conviction that it would do so. When Les-

sing, following Boccaccio, has two other rings made and only two, he has not got, as Boccaccio had, three rings exactly alike; two of them lack the secret power of the third. As, however, ultimately none of the three rings, not even the genuine one, manifests this power, there is, if we follow Lessing's own hints in regard to the allegory and take it quite literally, only one way of explaining the failure. The condition upon which success depended, *i.e.* the conviction that (only) *it* had this power, must have been lacking in the case of the possessor of the ring. But if we supplement this moral, as is done in Kuno Fischer's able exposition, by saying that "such a conviction" is conditioned by self-forgetting love and devotion, there always remains the objection that even this would be of no use to two of the brothers, because success depended upon the *two* conditions—the conviction *and* the possession of the genuine ring. Thus, however likely may be Fischer's suggestion, which makes the transition to the exhortation of the "discreet" judge so natural, it fails to solve the problem which Lessing has propounded for us in his allegory, and of the difficulty of which Mendelssohn had literally no idea. The feeling that in all these questions he occupied an entirely different position from those who looked upon him as altogether upon their side, makes Lessing say to Jacobi that he had once (!) spoken to Mendelssohn of his real views, that they could not agree, and that there he had let the matter stand. Again, he writes to Herder in regard to Nicolai, that his "paltry" romances were for many a necessary step upon the ladder which must some time or other be ascended. Both of the men, however, to whom he could speak thus frankly, belonged to the succeeding period, into which Lessing never entered, like Moses into the Promised Land.

Cf. D. F. Strauss: *Lessing's Nathan der Weise.* Berlin, 1864. Kuno Fischer: *Lessing's Nathan der Weise.* Stuttg., 1864.

16. But he must have got a glimpse into it, when he turned away dissatisfied from what was offered him, not merely by his opponents, but by his own circle as well. In the latter there lived, transformed into the syncretism of elegant popular philosophy, all the ideas that had been brought into circulation by Bayle and Locke on the one hand, and by Leibnitz and Thomasius on the other, along with the various additions made by Hume and Condillac, by Berkeley and the psychologists. But all these ideas were individualistic. This ex-

plains why Lessing's own circle were incapable of appreciating a point of view that requires the subjection, perhaps even the sacrifice, of the individual. It explains why it was impossible for these men to comprehend the spirit already described (§ 264), which in the sixteenth century had established dogma and securely laid the foundations of the modern State, and in the seventeenth had found conscious expression in the philosophy of Spinoza. Finally, it explains why it was impossible for them to form a correct estimate of antiquity and its greatest philosopher, whose guiding principle was, that the whole is prior to the parts (*vid.* § 89, 2). In all these points, Lessing occupies a very different position from his friends, who were satisfied with what seemed to him inadequate. Like them, he had rejected the orthodox system of belief; but he could not help being angry at the proud thinkers of Berlin for calling it a "patchwork of bunglers and half-philosophers." He knows of nothing, he writes to his brother, which has afforded more scope for the exercise and the display of human ingenuity, than has the old system of religion. Similarly, his attitude towards Spinozism differs entirely from that of his friends. We must indeed say that Jacobi is exaggerating when he declares that Lessing was an adherent of Spinoza; but his *Rational Christianity* shows that, in repeating the inconsistent (*vid.* § 292, 1) statement of Leibnitz, that simple existences are emanations of the Godhead, he was much more in earnest than its author had been, and therefore was much more nearly a disciple of Spinoza than he was. So too his essay: *On the Reality of Things outside of God*, proves that he had long got beyond the idea of a God who, in the Leibnitz-Mendelssohn sense, is outside of, apart from, and above the world. In his view, God is outside of the world, but the world is not outside of God, for God is the more comprehensive. It matters little whether Lessing, in saying so, was thinking of Malebranche (*vid.* § 270, 4); it is enough that he is in complete accord with this thinker, who must be regarded as the final stage of preparation for Spinozism. Lastly, in regard to antiquity, his attitude is entirely different from that of his friends. As he had got over the mere linguistic difficulties while he was still a schoolboy, he early learned to devote himself lovingly to the study of the classical writers and to revel in the enjoyment of their works; while his Berlin friends only learned Greek when they were quite grown up, and never succeeded in altogether

mastering it. Among the ancients he esteemed no one more highly than Aristotle. He "believes" in him, to quote his own expression. And first of all, he believes in the *Poetics*. But he knows Aristotle too well not to see that this is not an independent work; no one, he says, can understand the *Poetics* unless he is familiar with the *Ethics*. How different is the attitude of Mendelssohn and Nicolai to their much-praised Plato! The former studied him in order to improve his own style; the latter is graciously pleased to shut his eyes to Plato's "fancies" (*i.e.* his Theory of Ideas). In them there was none of that feeling for antiquity which was characteristic of Lessing. Had Lessing been a man merely of the calibre of Nicolai, or even of Engel, he would perhaps have extended further that process of combination which they applied to rationalistic and empirical elements, and have brought together elements which were individualistic and pantheistic, modern and classical. And, on the other hand, had he really been a great philosopher, he would not have brought together these elements in any such fashion, but would have combined them systematically in a higher unity. He could not do the former, because the cast of his mind was too philosophical; he could not do the latter, because it was only the cast of his mind that was philosophical (to adopt his own phrase), he was not a philosopher. For although this is the most important element in a philosopher, it is still only an element. The obstinate persistency which is necessary if one is to systematize philosophy, and which Kant possessed in such a high degree, was entirely absent in the case of Lessing. What he did not succeed in accomplishing at the first rush, he never carried out; and (again like Bayle), he never philosophized in order to form a system, but simply to get light upon particular questions. Thus it is only in regard to particular points that Lessing makes the attempt to pass beyond the views of the eighteenth century—a course of action which, as he himself was fully aware, could not but result in making him unpopular with all parties in his own day. These points, if we except questions relating to art, are entirely confined to the sphere of religion. Just as, in order to explain the differences between the Gospels, he introduced the hypothesis of an original Hebrew gospel, an hypothesis suggested by the Fragmentarians, so he tries to overcome the opposition between the orthodox thinkers, who sacrifice reason to revelation, and the modern theologians, who sacrifice

revelation to reason. He succeeds in doing so by means of the conception of history, of development, or, as he calls it, of the *education of the human race*—a conception which had been entirely lost. In order to lead men to truth by the surest way, God communicates to them that which transcends reason, not absolutely and essentially, but relatively to them; and the process is, that mankind gradually comes to transform the truth of revelation into the truth of reason. (Similarly, a boy can do a sum more easily, if he is told beforehand what the answer is to be.) This road is gradual and circuitous, and yet it is the shortest way. The oneness of God was revealed to the Jews; the promise of earthly reward gradually accustomed them to obedience towards one God; and after a long time, not indeed until after the Captivity, they came to hold this belief quite firmly. In our day the oneness of God is a truth which can be demonstrated by reason. An exactly similar process has gone on in the case of that truth which Christ was the first to place beyond all possibility of doubt,—the doctrine of immortality. Just as earthly hopes had influenced the Jew, so the Christian, by counting on a reward laid up in Heaven, became accustomed to look upon God and immortality as certain; in our day immortality is capable of scientific proof. It would be absurd to doubt that a day will come when, just as the Christian can dispense with earthly promises, so man will no longer require Heaven, but will do what is right simply because it is right. Then a great deal that at present transcends our reason will be quite comprehensible; nor is the doctrine, held by many mystics, about the Kingdom of the Father, which is followed by the kingdom of the Son, and will be followed by the kingdom of the Spirit, by any means so foolish as many suppose. How close at hand Lessing believed this third stage to be, can be gathered from the fact that, in his *Education of the Human Race* (§§ 73–75), he tries to represent the doctrines of the Trinity, of original sin, and of reconciliation through the Son of God, as being in accordance with the requirements of reason. We cannot wonder at his writing to Herder, that now he has suddenly become too orthodox for people. At the same time, he does not profess that his theories in regard to these dogmas are anything more than hypotheses. On the other hand, he regards as an indubitable fact the doctrine of the education of the human race, his form of that belief in Providence which, along with a belief in God and in immortality,

went to make up the creed of his Enlightened friends. This theory, according to which progress is really characteristic only of the race, is inconsistent with his individualism, otherwise so decided. He solves the contradiction, as Cardan had done before him (*vid.* § 242, 3), by making the same individual re-appear at different times, and therefore at different stages of development.

§ 295.

Concluding Remark.

While Lessing's friends, by adopting all the ideas that had come to the surface in the eighteenth century, had recognised the truth that was in them, he himself had exposed their weaknesses and their want of truth. At the same time, these teachings did not remain the possession of a single school, but were communicated to the whole educated world. The consequence was the recurrence, though on a smaller scale, of such a state of affairs as has been already described (*vid.* § 115). On the former occasion the syncretism of Eastern and Western ideas revealed how much truth there was in each, scepticism showed how little there was; and thus the way was prepared for a systematic combination of the two, which should get rid of both by absorbing them. Similarly, the Ciceros and the Ænesidemus of the eighteenth century made possible a point of view that will stand to the syncretistic popular philosophy in the same relation that the Socratic philosophy stood to the Sophistic, and the Patristic philosophy to that of Philo, while to the critical popular philosophy of Lessing it will stand related as to the ideas of an eminently philosophical mind, for it will be the system of a philosopher of the first rank. The founder of this system had made himself at home in all the circles of thought of the eighteenth century. In each of them he had kept pace with the most representative men; and when those who had hitherto played the chief parts, began to rest upon their laurels, he, though older than they, struck out new paths for knowledge with all the vigour of youth. In the very year in which Lessing, the greatest critical genius of Germany, sank exhausted on his deathbed, Kant, the greatest philosopher of Germany, made his first appearance on the world's stage with his *Critique of Pure Reason*, and thus with the system of Critical philosophy.

THIRD
PERIOD OF MODERN PHILOSOPHY.

PHILOSOPHY OF THE NINETEENTH CENTURY: MEDIATION.

K. Fortlage: *Genetische Geschichte der Philosophie seit Kant.* Leipzig, 1852.
Friedrich Harms: *Die Philosophie seit Kant.* Berlin. 1876.

§ 296.

INTRODUCTION.

1. SINCE the period that is usually designated as that of the *most modern philosophy* occupies the same position in the history of modern philosophy that would be assigned to the latter in the whole history of philosophy, its problem cannot, as can that of the periods already considered, be brought within a single formula. There are required several, which, obviously, must agree in this respect, that they all demand the mediation of opposites. In the *first* place, the preceding development of the philosophy of the eighteenth century has raised the problem of getting beyond the mixture of idealistic and realistic theories to what in contradistinction thereto was above (*vid.* § 293, 8) termed ideal-realism or real-idealism. This superior position, which is at the same time negative and sympathetic, philosophy, as opposed to the two one-sided tendencies, can take only as it attempts to comprehend, in the two-fold sense of the term, those tendencies. This it does when it makes them its object: only by so doing does it rise above them. Precisely in a similar manner had also the philosophy of the Christian era taken its beginning; namely, by so transcending the Grecian and the Jewish worlds as to assign to each its proper place (*vid.* § 122, 1). Locke's realistic theory of knowledge was easily united with the idealistic theory of Leibnitz by a kind of addition, if one brought the two under the common generic notion of self-observation, and then told how the mind receives impressions

and forms conceptions. In both, popular philosophy and empirical psychology played a very important part. It is an entirely different problem that Kant places before himself when he seeks after the presuppositions and conditions of perception and the formation of conceptions. His transcendental investigations are specifically different from the psychological, or anthropological, investigations of his contemporaries. The former show upon what cognition is grounded, the latter in what it consists; the former explain, the latter exhibit and describe; the relation between the former and the latter is really, as Fichte later formulated it, the same as that between biology and life. Kant lifts philosophy above the opposition of empiricism and rationalism, not by making it a mixture of the two, but by conceiving it as the knowledge of rationalism and empiricism. It is clear that with this entirely new problem which was set before philosophy, a very essential step was taken towards the solution of the problem which was settled as the goal of philosophy in general (*vid.* §§ 2 and 3), viz., that it is the mind's knowledge of itself, a thing as essential to the perfection of philosophy as to that of anthroposophy, which (*vid.* § 259) modern philosophy was held to be.

2. If the problem just now stated to be the first problem of the most modern philosophy is solved, we have, in this solution, just because realism had not yet in the first period of modern philosophy entered into conflict with idealism, a return to that problem; and the most modern philosophy must consequently attempt a fusion of the philosophy of the eighteenth century with that of the seventeenth. By the solution of this *second* problem the most modern philosophy becomes what, indeed, every philosophy should be, a conscious formulation of what, as unconscious impulse, rules the age. Upon the process of disorganization which (*vid.* § 274) was stated to be the distinctive characteristic of the second period of the modern era, there followed the impulse towards *reorganization;* this, or, as it has been otherwise called, the Restoration, is the goal to which everything tends in the period in which we still are. As regards the life of the *State,* this process of reorganization was introduced by the political commotions in America and, especially, in France. Whoever looks upon the French Revolution as a process of disorganization forgets that the disorganization had already begun

before it, and that it was not a mere phrase when with the egoistic cry for *liberté* and *égalité* was united the self-forgetting cry for *salut public*. Rousseau taught that the former, Richelieu, that the latter, should be placed above all else. That, thanks to a Washington, the process of integration in North America ran a normal course, does not forbid our seeing in the French Revolution also a process, not so much of decomposition as of healing, the end of which, although the process has, alas! been again and again interrupted, is in no respect different from what all the revolutionary commotions of the last hundred years have to show,—the bringing of the immutable rights of individuals (whether persons, corporations, or States) into harmony with the sovereign right of the whole (whether it be a State or a union of States). An entirely similar tendency characterises the *religious* life of this period. In opposition to ecclesiasticism, which had come almost to regard piety as not indispensable, and to anti-ecclesiastic insistence upon personal piety or conviction, there appears now a healthier, now a more or less diseased, longing for religious union without ecclesiastical inflexibility. Among the phenomena that arose out of this desire, there must be added to this latest event, the earlier desertion to Catholicism and the formation of religious circles, viz., the union of the Evangelical Confessions, whose purpose is to gain greater dogmatic definiteness than the Reformed Confessions, greater subjective mobility, and greater lay-participation than the Lutherans, and for whose inner justification the fact speaks, that from its establishment dates a more vigorous ecclesiastical and religious life. As far, finally, as concerns the *relation of Church and State*, and the constitution of the former, the changing preponderance which in all European States, at one time the territorial, at another the independent, element, acquired, shows how the age endeavours to possess without one-sidedness, and hence, simultaneously, what the two preceding periods had sought one-sidedly. The philosophy of this period acquires the same mediatory character when (as was said above) without sacrificing the acquisition of the eighteenth century, namely, individualism, it returned to the totalism or universalism of the seventeenth century, and then, by raising itself above pantheism and atheism, struggles towards monotheism, which stands midway between the two, just as certainly as one stands between zero

and infinity (o...1...∞ expresses in a schema the relation of the three tendencies). The philosophy of the period of reorganization will seek therefore to rise above the system of rigid necessity, to which the denial of all teleology led, and likewise above the one-sided teleology which, carried to its consequences, leads to a deification of contingency and caprice, and to strive for a concrete doctrine of freedom, according to which the State is neither the all-devouring Leviathan, nor an unavoidable evil, which is to make itself useless, and is until then ignored by the cultured man,—a doctrine of freedom, too, with which politics and morals, compulsory law and the sanctity of the individual conscience, are possible.

3. As from the solution of the first problem there results a second, just so there presents itself with this latter a *third*. It has been shown (*vid.* § 264) how far in the organizing period of modern times the spirit of antiquity has lived again in a rejuvenated form. In a precisely similar way the spirit of the disorganizing period shows decided analogies with that of the Middle Ages. It is easy to make this assertion appear paradoxical, perhaps even ridiculous, since it connects knights and monks with hoop-petticoats and pigtails (which, however, every one does more than I, who talks of a "mediæval pigtail"). But this comparison should not deny the differences, the contradictions, in fact, between an age that allowed the State to crumble through guild and corporation interests, and an age that declared war upon guilds and corporations. It asserts only that the latter means going further in what the former began. Their opposition to all uniformity, this sign of the most recent times, places, notwithstanding their divergence, the Middle Ages and the eighteenth century upon a level, much as the knight going forth upon an adventure and the adventurer of the eighteenth century stand upon one. (Both would at the present day be incarcerated by the police officer.) Only because of inner relationship does the Enlightenment hate the Middle Ages. What the individualistic spirit, which gives to that age so poetical a colouring, and the Church, that institution of grace, which opposes nature and hence annuls national boundary lines, had brought to pass in the Middle Ages, is equally affected here by the not less individualistic emphasizing of private judgment, and by an abstract cosmopolitanism. There, as here, an interest

in nature and in the State, resting more or less upon a national basis, was impossible. The utilitarian view of nature which obtained in the eighteenth century is just as teleological and *un*physical as the mystical view of the Middle Ages; and the ultra-catholic jurists come to the same theory of the State as did Rousseau. As the modern age is heir to antiquity and to the Middle Ages, so this relation is repeated in the modern age in such a way that its first period (one may style it modern antiquity, or the antiquity of the modern age) and its second (the modern Middle Ages) are testator to the third (the modern modern-age, or the modern age of the modern age). Philosophy, naturally, exhibits a counterpart to this. In this third period, more completely than it succeeded in doing in the other periods, has it to solve the problem which was designated (*vid.* § 259) as the problem of modern philosophy. This it will do if it rises above naturalism and the deification of the State, and so likewise above the theosophical hatred of nature and contempt of the State, to a standpoint on which physical and political philosophy, moral philosophy and theology are integral constituent parts of a system. That this elevation to a higher standpoint will here take place in a manner similar to that of the first problem, and that the same holds true also of the second, that is, by making an object of what the mind had previously accomplished, lies in the nature of the case.

4. If the three problems should be completely solved by one and the same system, it would be the alpha and omega of this period, and completely fill it. The fact that he who was above designated as the beginner of this period and as the greatest German philosopher, only began it, makes him the epoch-making philosopher. The further development of philosophy after him consists in the fact that the solutions begun by him were carried further towards completion. This development may the better be compared to what the Socratic schools (*vid.* §§ 67–72) did for the philosophy of Socrates, since, as they scientifically reproduced always one *side* of the master, so here it is the separate master*pieces* of Kant which were successively the starting-point of a profounder investigation. But the post-Kantian philosophers display an advantageous divergence from the followers of Socrates, in that those who came later did not overturn what the master had laid down, but accepted it, and only extended and carried it

out more rigorously; so that their relation resembles not so much that between the Cyrenaics and Cynics, as, rather, that between these two schools and Plato, or that between Plato and Aristotle. Naturally the further development begins where the solution demanded was most nearly attained by the epoch-making system; that is, as will be shown, in the case of the first problem, with the solution of the question put by the eighteenth century: How are Leibnitz and Locke, Berkeley and Hume, to be reconciled? After this had been answered more satisfactorily than Kant had answered it, by Reinhold and his Critical opponents,—since, as Fichte admirably said (of Reinhold alone), they gave to what Kant had taught in the *Critique of the Theoretical Reason* a solid foundation,—there appears in the foreground the second question—which had been put by the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries,—but upon a Kantian basis, *i.e.* after Kant had already pointed the way to its solution. Fichte and Schelling agree throughout in holding that philosophy must be ideal-realism, and therefore adopt what Reinhold and his opponents had taught, though supplementing it,—the first by seeking a still deeper foundation upon which to base what Kant had taught in his *Critique of Practical Reason;* the second by seeking a foundation for what Kant had taught in his *Critique of Judgment.* At the same time, however, the antithesis, developed and established by them, of the Science of Knowledge and the System of Identity, makes clear how, upon the basis laid by Kant, the conflict between the Enlightenment of the eighteenth century and Spinozism may be renewed, only to lead to a more lasting peace. The philosopher, finally, who sought to mediate between Fichte and Schelling, namely, Hegel, who at the same time sought to adjust the opposition, which had contemporaneously made its appearance upon a critical basis, between pagan naturalism and mediæval theosophy, is also he through whom and whose school Kant's *Religion within the Limits of Mere Reason,* which had been almost forgotten, received due recognition. From the foregoing statements it is apparent into what divisions the following account will fall. The original form which Kant gave to his system, as well as what his disciples made of it in the mere desire to extend it and secure it against assault, is here treated under the title *Criticism.* Those forms of Criticism which in reality transcend it, because they

give his doctrines a profounder basis, and were in consequence discountenanced by him (*vid.* § 6), will receive their corresponding titles.

FIRST DIVISION.

Criticism.

A.—KANT.

§ 297.

Life and Writings.

Borowsky: *Darstellung des Lebens und Charakters Kant's.* Königsb., 1804. Jachmann: *Immanuel Kant geschildert in Briefen an einen Freund.* 1804. Wasiansky: *Immanuel Kant in seinen letzten Lebensjahren.* Königsb., 1804. Schubert: *Immanuel Kant's Biographie,* in the 11th vol. of Kant's *Sämmtl. Werken.* Leipz., Voss, 1842. Reicke: *Kantiana.* Königsb., 1860.

1. Immanuel Kant was born at Königsberg, on the 22nd of April, 1724, of an artisan family that had come from Scotland, and had formerly written its name *Cant.* He attended school and the university in his native town, and studied at the latter, besides mathematics and philosophy, theology, and conducted reviews in these subjects with students. Although, inasmuch as enrolment with one of the higher faculties was required, he had himself registered as a student of divinity, it was never his intention to devote himself entirely to theology. After he had, in the year 1747, by the work: *Thoughts upon the True Estimation of Living Forces,* declared to the world that one defends the honour of reason when one defends it in the various personages of acute-minded men; that, where there are opposing views, the truth must always be presumed to lie in an intermediate position, etc., and that he had sought to settle in accordance with this principle the dispute between the Cartesians and the Leibnitzians by drawing a distinction between dead and living forces, he left his native town, because of discouraging prospects, and was for several years private tutor in various families. In the year 1755 he habilitated himself as *doctor legens* by defending the prescribed dissertations; and remained such until the year 1770, there being as yet no extraordinary professors. As

his first work had attempted to reconcile Descartes and Leibnitz, so had his Latin habilitation-thesis, on the Principle of Metaphysical Knowledge, attempted to reconcile Wolff and Crusius; so, finally, had his anonymously published work: *General Natural History and Theory of the Heavens* (1755), attempted to reconcile Newton and Leibnitz, or the mechanical and teleological points of view. If this work displayed, as did some slighter pieces having a physical content, an enthusiasm for mechanism in nature, which makes it clear why Kant was so attracted by Lucretius, so, on the other hand, the following-named works: *On the False Subtlety of the Four Syllogistic Figures* (1762); *Attempt to Introduce the Notion of Negative Quantity into Philosophy* (1763); *Only Possible Proof of the Existence of God* (1763), and the prize essay, *On Evidence*, with which he competed with Mendelssohn (§ 294, 8), show with how great a number of questions he was, at one and the same time, occupied in which an interest had been first aroused by the Middle Ages. In short, it is clear that the subjective conditions for the solution of the *third* problem were given already in this period. For the rest, it appears from the report of the drift of his lectures in the winter-semester of 1765–66, that in this period he occupied essentially the standpoint of an "Enlightener" of the school of Wolff. Indeed, he was then also lecturing on the Compendia of Baumeister, Baumgarten, and Meier. But now modifications of his standpoint became visible, which are exhibited point by point in Kuno Fischer's *Immanuel Kant* (the third and fourth volumes of the work mentioned above, § 259), a work which may here, once for all, be given as on the whole the best monograph on Kant. Anticipations of a newer and higher standpoint are to be found, as indeed the title indicates, in his: *Dreams of a Spiritualist explained by the Dreams of Metaphysic* (1766), and: *On the first Ground of the Distinction of Objects in Space* (1768). This new standpoint, however, appears quite clearly in the work with which he entered upon his office as ordinary professor, but which, having been written in Latin as an academic specimen, and printed in but few copies, received no attention.

2. The dissertation: *De mundi sensibilis et intelligibilis forma et principiis* (1770) forms the limit between the two periods in Kant's life which Rosenkranz properly distinguishes as the heuristic and the speculative-systematic. It

shows us Kant as he was after Hume had "waked him out of his dogmatic slumber," and when he had risen above the opposition the reconciliation of which we called the *first* problem of the most modern philosophy. At the same time ideas began to form in his mind the fusion of which was called the *second* problem. The positiveness with which Kant, after the beginning of the disturbance in North America, placed himself on the side of the Colonies as against the Mother Country, and later, when opposite tendencies prevailed in America, upon the side of those who desired to strengthen the power of the Union as against the individual States; further, his rejoicings at the earliest commotions in France; the severity, again, the horror even, with which he declared himself against the execution of the King,—these go hand in hand with the theory of the State that was then fermenting in his mind. In this theory he was later not so close a follower of Rousseau as at an earlier period, conceding room to the claims of the entirely opposite standpoint, that occupied by (the almost unknown to him) Spinoza and (the very well known to him) Hobbes. The fact that both elements are combined in him explains how such diverse judgments concerning the French Revolution could proceed from his school as those of Rehberg and Fichte. Eleven years the thoughts of the above-mentioned dissertation were maturing, and then, in the course of a few months, they were thrown upon paper, and appeared as the work which marks the birthday of the most modern philosophy, just as, a century and a half earlier, the *Essais Philosophiques* marked that of modern philosophy. This work was the *Critique of Pure Reason* (Riga, Hartknoch, 1781). Connected with this, as having been occasioned apropos of the Garve-Feder review of it, is the: *Prolegomena to Every Future Metaphysic* (Riga, 1783), in the very first lines of which, as if he had divined how men would sin against it up to this very moment, Kant says that it was not written for tyros but for masters, and that even they might learn something entirely new from it. In rapid succession now followed, after so long a silence, the most significant works. There appeared the second edition of the *Critique*, not indeed always improved where changed, yet by no means so spoiled as it has been the fashion to assert. There appeared also: *The Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals* (1786); *Metaphysical Foundations of*

Natural Science (1787); *Critique of Practical Reason* (1788); all in perfect agreement with the teaching of the *Critique of Pure Reason*. This cannot be said, without qualification, of the *Critique of Judgment* (1790) and *Religion within the Limits of Mere Reason* (1793), which are here, contrary to Rosenkranz's arrangement, considered as belonging to the second period of Kant's activity.

3. Accordingly we date the third, or practical, period from the moment when the reprimand, which the last-named work brought upon him from Wöllner's ministry, impelled him not only to avoid certain subjects in his works, but also in his academic activity to limit himself to a narrower field, by giving up his private lectures. The work, *On Everlasting Peace* (1795); *The Metaphysics of Morals* (1797), which, as a general title, he had prefixed to the *Metaphysical Foundations of the Theory of Right* (which had been reviewed in February, 1797, and must have appeared in 1796), and the *Metaphysical Foundations of the Theory of Virtue;* as well as a large number of short essays in the *Berliner Monatsschrift*, belong to the last period of his life. On the accession of the new sovereign to the throne, the above-mentioned difficulties being removed, there appeared *The Conflict of the Faculties* (1798), and *Anthropology from a Pragmatical Point of View* (1798). Further, there were printed singly during his own life-time his courses of lectures, the *Logic*, edited by Jäsche (1800); the *Physical Geography* (1802) and the *Pedagogics*, edited by Rink; to which were added after his death, which occurred on February 12th, 1804, the lectures on the *Philosophical Theory of Religion and Metaphysics* (1817), edited by Politz; and likewise those on *Anthropology* (1831), edited by Starke. The minor writings of Kant were collected by Tieftrunk and others. On the other hand, a complete edition of his works was long awaited. Then appeared, nearly contemporaneously, the ten-volume edition of Hartenstein (Leipsic, 1838-39, since 1866 in an improved edition) and that of Rosenkranz and Schubert in twelve volumes (Leipsic, 1840-42). The latter contains, besides the above-mentioned biography of Kant, a history of the Kantian philosophy, by Rosenkranz, in the twelfth volume. (Wherever pages are cited in the present work, the reference is to the older Hartenstein edition. Since in that edition the *Critique of Pure Reason* occupies the entire second volume, "ii." always

signifies *Critique of Pure Reason.* There is also a supplement, pp. 636-698, which contains such matter as is found in the first edition only.) Besides these two editions, the *Critique of Pure Reason* is often cited nowadays in the edition of Kirchmann (Berlin, 1868). It was, therefore, a very happy idea of Dr. Kehrbach's to give throughout, in his reprint (which has just been published at Leipsic by Reclam) of the first edition of the *Critique*, the corresponding pages of both the first and second original editions, of the Rosenkranz edition, of the two Hartenstein editions, and of the Kirchmann edition.

§ 298.

The Groundwork of the System, and The Transcendental Æsthetic.

1. To the ordinary dogmatic philosopher—by this term Kant means mostly the metaphysician, and hence he very frequently opposes empiricism to dogmatism, just as Wolff opposed the experimental to the dogmatic—the question does not occur, whether there is such a thing as metaphysics, *i.e.*, whether knowledge gotten *a priori*, or independently of all experience, and having real universality and necessity, is possible. But this question cannot be put aside, since Hume has shown that the conception of causality does not arise out of experience, but is added to impressions by the mind; nor can it, furthermore, be derived from the principle of identity, since it contains a synthesis. The sceptical distrust of metaphysics to which Hume thereby came, is, in his case, a consequence of having limited his investigations too narrowly; namely, to the conception of causality. For had he extended them further, he would have found that the whole of mathematics rests upon such superimposed syntheses, and he would therefore have been confronted by the alternative courses, either to deny also the evidence of mathematics, which his sound sense would have kept him from doing, or not unceremoniously to repudiate metaphysics. If from the spark struck out by Hume a clear light is to come, then what he has demonstrated must be the occasion of our investigating how our knowledge comes to make such syntheses. Since these investigations do not take for their subject-matter known

objects, but knowing itself, they must transcend those objects; and since they do not do this as empirical psychology does, which merely tells us what takes place in the act of knowing, but consider what is antecedent to knowledge as its condition or presupposition, Kant gives to the term *transcendental*, long since naturalized in the Scholastic and the later philosophy, this new import: every kind of investigation is so termed which relates to the *conditions* of knowing. Primarily, therefore, only one kind of investigation can be termed transcendental. But then Kant extends this predicate also to the conditions of knowledge themselves, and so it comes about that (*vid. infra*) he is able to speak of a *transcendental* object, which differs from the object falling within knowledge just as the precondition of knowledge does from the content of knowledge. If, in the first place, we here neglect this broader meaning, then all those investigations would be *transcendental* which consider what makes knowledge, hence the power to know (the faculty of knowledge), possible; and if there are, besides this, still other conditions of knowledge, these also would be transcendental; but by no means would what is known be such. The complex of all these investigations may be termed Transcendental Philosophy, and of this philosophy the *Critique of Pure Reason* aims to be an outline. It is called a critique of pure reason, because it is concerned before all things else, with discovering what makes possible knowledge that is free from all that is empirical, and hence is *a priori*. Consequently one must not at all imagine that it will give, or will represent, a metaphysics; no! it will be merely a propædeutic to this, for it will merely answer the one question: Is metaphysics possible, and how? If the answer to this question proves to be affirmative, then metaphysics may begin just where the *Critique of Pure Reason* leaves off. Since it is established that every species of knowledge is a judgment—of that, indeed, no one since Aristotle has had any doubt (*vid.* § 86, 1)—for the question whether there is *a priori* knowledge or metaphysics, may be substituted as its equivalent the question, Are *a priori* judgments possible? As to analytical judgments, which merely predicate of a subject what is already contained in it—of body (extended being) the being extended, of the straight line the being straight—no man doubts that these are possible. But since these tell us nothing new, do not increase our knowledge, at

the most merely explicate, they are here of no interest to us; all the more are synthetic judgments, in which the predicate adds something to the subject, as when the having weight is predicated of that which is extended, and the being the shortest line is predicated of the straight line. Whether there is knowledge in which we gain something new, and which is at the same time *a priori*, is the question; and the problem whose solution constitutes the *Critique of Pure Reason* is therefore best formulated as follows: Are synthetic judgments *a priori* possible? and if they are, How are they possible?

2. But this question immediately falls into several. The whole of mathematics, that is to say, consists of such judgments. Neither out of 3 nor out of 4 can I by analysis deduce the fact that together they make 7. In the conception of the straight line there does not lie the truth that it is the shortest, etc. Since the *fact* of mathematics proves its possibility, the question in hand acquires here a more specific character: How is mathematics possible? Furthermore, pure, *i.e.*, non-empirical, natural science, *physica rationalis*, contains propositions which by their universality and necessity plainly show themselves to be *a priori* propositions, and are, for that reason, synthetic judgments *a priori*, *e.g.*, Every change must have a cause. The fundamental question acquires therefore the narrower meaning, How is pure natural science possible? Finally, in the sphere of the supersensible exactly analogous propositions are to be found, *e.g.*, The soul must be immortal, etc.; and even those who do not admit that these propositions are self-evident, at least show nevertheless by their interest in them, that they have put to themselves the question to which these propositions contain the answer. In that fundamental question, therefore, is, thirdly, contained the question: Is a metaphysics of the supersensible possible? The answer to these three questions forms, then, the content of the First Part, by far the more important, of the *Critique of Pure Reason*, viz., The Theory of Elements. (The second main part, the Theory of Method, which answers the question how all these propositions acquire a scientific form, may be regarded as a kind of appendix.) While the *Prolegomena* brings into special prominence the connection of the three questions with the fundamental question; and while, just for that reason, the three parts of the Theory of Elements (The Transcendental Æsthetic, Analytic, and Dialectic) appear in

it as completely co-ordinated; the *Critique of Pure Reason* reaches the same goal by another way, in which Kant's relation to Leibnitz and Locke becomes clear, and, at the same time, the designations selected by him for the individual parts are explained. After complaining of Leibnitz and Locke, in almost verbal agreement with Bonnet and Merian, that the one reduced everything to intellect and the other everything to sense, he assigns to human knowledge two stems not merely quantitatively different; sense as the faculty of having perceptions through the medium of receptivity, and thought as the faculty of forming conceptions through that of spontaneity. Transcendental philosophy, as the critical consideration of the power to know, falls, therefore, primarily, into two parts which, with names borrowed from the terminology of Baumgarten (*vid.* § 290, 10), are called Transcendental Æsthetic and Transcendental Logic. But since in thought there must be distinguished a lower, or the understanding, and a higher, or the reason, the Logic subdivides into Analytic and Dialectic, which therefore appear here as subordinate parts of the Logic, itself co-ordinate with the Æsthetic. But the two presentations of the subject agree, in that the Transcendental Æsthetic answers the question, How is mathematics possible? the Transcendental Analytic the question, How is a pure science of nature possible? and the Transcendental Dialectic the question, Is a metaphysics of the supersensible possible? *

3. The *Transcendental Æsthetic* (ii. pp. 59–87) answers the first part of the main transcendental question, viz., How is mathematics as pure, *i.e.*, non-empirical, science possible? (*Proleg.*, Works, vol. iii. pp. 195–210) by a critical investigation of the activity of sense. Through sense we have perceptions, *i.e.*, such ideas as are distinguished from conceptions by their immediacy and particularity. Upon a closer consideration of these ideas characterized by immediacy and particularity, we discover that there is contained in them what is empirical, *i.e.*, what is given to us without co-operation on our part, and these are our sensations (yellow, fragrant, sour, etc.; pain, pleasure, sorrow, etc.). But, in the second place, the thing given, by virtue of the fact that we unite the manifold, first acquires through us the form of the perception,

* *Werke*, ii. pp. 1–56. *Proleg.* (*Werke*, iii.), pp. 165–194.

or becomes such. The content of the perception, or its matter, is, therefore, given; its form, on the other hand, is *a priori*: the latter is pure, the former empirical; but both together first constitute the perception; or, rather, an individual presentation is matter that has received form. Since the faculty of sense thus gives the form of unity to sensations, it makes them (makes out of them) perceptions, which, therefore, are not its creation though its work. But sense always unites sensations according to two different norms of combination, or forms, which it bears in itself: these are, space, by virtue of which the combination is co-existence or simultaneity, and time, through which it is a series or a succession. That time and space are not something empirical and given to us from without, but that they are *a priori*, is proved, beforehand, by their necessity, since we are not able to think them away, to abstract from them, which can be done with everything that is empirical. That, further, they are not conceptions abstracted by the understanding is shown by the fact that they do not presuppose many individuals (times, spaces); but, on the contrary, in order to think times and spaces we must have beforehand time and space. That, finally, they lie *only* in us, are something wholly subjective, is shown by the fact that mere space-distinctions, as that between a hand and its reflection in a mirror, cannot be fixed by objective description, but only by having recourse to the distinctions "left" and "right," etc., that is, to references to the perceiving subject, "to relations which," as Kant expresses himself, "refer immediately to perception." (The *punctum saliens* in this proof [*Proleg.*, § 13] is,—If space were something [only or also] objective, the space-distinctions of symmetrical bodies could be [at least *also*] objectively fixed. But now they are to be fixed *solely* by means of the subjective distinctions "left" and "right," hence, etc.) Since by means of the forms of synthesis which lie in us, namely, space and time, we combine the various sensations, yellow, fragrant, sour, into a total which we call a lemon; or the sensations, pain, pleasure, and sorrow, into a series of inner occurrences which we call our empirical Ego, or our soul, those sensations become two perceptions, two particular presentations, or, since the being perceived *by* us is equivalent to appearing *to* us, phenomena. Phenomena, therefore, or perceptions, or particular presentations (all these words have precisely the same meaning; but Kant was not the first

so to employ them, for in Mendelssohn, and even in Bonnet, we find the assertion explicitly made, that a phenomenon is a presentation) have, as was said above, received form, and are, as is now further determined, temporalized and spatialized sensations; and it is mere tautology to say that there are no phenomena that are not temporal. It is, therefore, purposely that the temporalized is put before the spatialized, and only temporal being is predicted of all phenomena without exception. Although, that is to say, time and space are alike in that they are both subjective conditions of our perception, or forms of human perception, yet there exists this difference, that space is primarily the form for the sensation of the outer sense only. (This word, which Locke had already employed instead of *sensation*, as also *inner sense* instead of *reflection* [*vid.* § 280, 3], was converted by Wolffians, Meier, for example, into a technical expression.) Just so, is time primarily the form of the combination of our own states only. Since there are no external sensations that are not accompanied by inner or subjective sensation, time is (indirectly) the form of external perception also, though space is not that of the inner. Since the matter of perception was of an empirical nature, the two forms of perception are, of course, what is pure in perception; hence the frequently occurring expression "pure forms." (For the other expressions, *pure perception*, or *a priori perceptions*, which occur frequently, it would in most instances be better to substitute, *what is pure in perception*, or *what is a priori in every perception*. Only in the rare instances, where Kant is thinking of the fact that mere space itself may in turn be made an object of thought, instances which, later, Reinhold went into more specifically, should such a substitution not be made.) That therefore all phenomena are temporal, those of the external sense spatial also; or, that all phenomena occur in time, these in space also, is clear. It is just as clear, conversely, that time and space, as conditions of perception, have no validity for what is not an object of sensuous perception, or not phenomenal. That which is of this nature Kant terms *noumenon*, or, more commonly, *thing-in-itself*. That things-in-themselves are not temporal nor spatial, but only phenomena are so, is a fact having the same ground as the fact that the invisible is not seen, but only that which strikes the eye. If by the "thing-in-itself" one understands with Kant the

non-phenomenal, or that which never becomes phenomenon, it is self-evident that, in the two examples employed above, the soul, the empirical Ego, is no more a thing-in-itself than the lemon. They are both phenomena; the former of the inner, the latter of the outer, sense. Since they are sensuous, they are, of course, sensible objects, or beings of sense.

4. But if space and time are recognised as the *a priori* forms, lying in us, of all phenomena, by entering which phenomena, or perceptions, first become what they are, it is clear that, since "*a priori*" means *created out of ourselves*, various things can be predicted of phenomena—everything, that is to say, that concerns their space and time determinations. But to these only do all mathematical propositions have reference, geometry relating solely to configurations in space, and arithmetic, since number arises by repetition of the unit, and repetition presupposes succession, resting upon the perception of time. (In the *Dissertation* pure mechanics was coupled with time, but number was taken as derived from time and space. For the rest, since Aristotle, time and number have been assumed to have a close relation.) Mathematical principles, therefore, were not given to us; we create them out of ourselves; they are *a priori* or pure, and we can say with absolute certainty that no phenomenon will ever present itself which contradicts mathematical principles (that is to say, mathematics as pure science is possible), since time and space lie in us. Conversely, however, the fact that we determine *a priori* various things in respect to every phenomenon, proves the correctness of the theory by which alone that fact is explicable. (Kant terms this indirect proof of the correctness of his theory the transcendental discussion of it.) From that it of course follows, as being self-evident, that the validity of mathematical propositions is limited to the realm of phenomena; to things-in-themselves they have no application.

5. If, however, we compare with this Kant's theory of sense as the faculty of receptivity, in which one is justified in expecting to find the closest relationship with realism, we discover that Kant really agrees with Locke in holding that the first elements of all knowledge are passively received impressions made upon the outer and the inner sense. These first elements are, however, with him not yet the material for knowledge, but only a constituent portion of that which Locke

regarded as such. In order for them to become particular presentations (what Locke had called *ideas*), the unity posited by the mind must be added to the sensations. In this, Kant approaches Leibnitz, who saw spontaneity where Locke had assumed only passivity. But he differs from Leibnitz in that he places the self-activity only in that which results from sensation, not in sensation itself. Exactly as here between Leibnitz and Locke, Kant also mediated betweeen Hume and Berkeley. In literal agreement with the latter, he asserts that the distinction between the primary and secondary qualities must be given up (*vid.* § 291, 5), and that even extension lies in us; but just as decidedly does he pronounce against Berkeley and for Hume, when, instead of making the Ego consist in mere self-activity, he, the rather, holds it to have its origin in the circumstance that the (given) sensations constitute a (made) time-series. He himself, therefore, called his doctrine as much realistic as idealistic; it is an empirical realism and a transcendental idealism; it teaches, that is to say, that objects in space really exist, are not mere appearances, but that space (the condition of their existence) lies in us. Only by the latter supposition can we rescue ourselves from the difficulties into which Berkeley fell through the view that space lies without us, and which made him a transcendental realist, though *ipso facto* an empirical idealist.

§ 299.

The Transcendental Analytic and the Metaphysics of Nature.

1. The *Transcendental Analytic* aims to answer the second question: How is natural science *a priori* possible? (*Prolegom.*, §§ 14-39; Wks., iii. pp. 211-248.) It accomplishes this by a critical consideration of the activity of the understanding, and begins, in a manner quite analogous to that in which the Æsthetic begins, with the question, What, in the case of this activity, constitutes the stuff or matter? This is furnished by sense in the perceptions (phenomena) which it had made out of sensations. If the understanding did not receive phenomena, its thought would be without content, its conceptions empty. Just as, above, sense gave form to the matter given it by an act of combination that was governed by certain norms,

thus producing phenomena, so these latter, brought together, combined, by the understanding, become a synthesis which is known to us all under the name of the judgment. By this means does mere (empty) thought first receive a content, or become knowledge. To know, therefore, means to think given perceptions; and hence, as thought without perception would be empty, so perceptions without conceptions would be blind. As, in the case of sense and its product, perception, what was pure came to view when all that was empirical was excluded, so here also what is pure, the *a priori*, in every act of knowledge, or in the formation of conceptions, or what may be termed pure conception (as, above, what was pure in perception was termed pure perception) is brought to view by abstracting from the matter of the judgments and then turning attention to the way in which the understanding produces its syntheses. There is presented here an advantage that the Æsthetic did not afford, namely, that one has certain previously accomplished results to lean upon. The ordinary school-logic, to which Kant frequently attributes fixed authority, such as the Elements of Euclid enjoy, teaches how to treat judgments without reference to their subject and predicate, which, of course, constitute the matter of them; teaches us, therefore, the various ways in which the understanding produces syntheses. If, now, we analyze these more carefully, we discover in them the norms of its synthesizing, or the pure conceptions of the understanding underlying the same. Kant terms these still further: stem-conceptions of the pure understanding, stem-forms of the act of judgment or of pure synthesis, and even pure syntheses; usually, however, categories. Instead of this term, the ordinary Latin translation *predicaments* also occurs. The various judgments give, of course, the *Key to the Discovery* of these (pp. 101–118). Underlying the distinction which logic makes between singular, particular and universal judgments are the three Categories of Quantity, viz., Unity, Plurality and Totality, and underlying positive, negative and infinite judgments are the three Categories of Quality, viz., Reality, Negation and Limitation. In the categorical, hypothetical, and disjunctive judgments analysis discovers the three Categories of Relation, viz., Inherence and Subsistence, Causality and Dependence, Community or Reciprocity. Finally, the assertatory, problematical and apodictic judgments rest upon

the ordinary conceptions of Possibility, Actuality and Necessity, as the three Categories of Modality. There are no predicaments besides these, although the predicables may be termed more proximate determinations of them. If one opens a work on ontology, as, for example, that of Baumgarten, it is discovered that, as force is only a more proximate determination of causality, so all other conceptions given therein may be traced back to one of the twelve given above. Likewise, for the rest, a fully completed system of all predicables would have to exchange the lofty title of ontology for the more accurate one of an Analytic of the pure Conceptions of the Understanding.

2. Since the categories lie in our understanding exactly as time and space do in our sense-faculty, the most important question is, What right have we to attribute to them objective validity, as we do when we say, for example, "There can never be any experience which would clash with the law of causality"? The justification for this, which Kant calls the *Transcendental Deduction of the pure Conceptions of the Understanding* (ii. pp. 113–153), and which, he himself intimates, is the most difficult part of his *Critique*, is abridged in the *Prolegomena* and the second edition of the *Critique*, but not decidedly improved. In order to understand it, it is indispensable that one should always bear in mind the Transcendental Æsthetic and its result. Above all, it must not be forgotten that the phenomena which sense furnishes as material to the understanding are particular *presentations;* that they, and consequently also their combination, fall within consciousness, so that a judgment is nothing other than an event in consciousness. But there are, according to Kant, two cases to be distinguished here: First, two presentations are united only in a single consciousness, an empirical Ego, and their combination consists only in the time-succession in which the two come together, since, as we know, it was shown in the Transcendental Æsthetic that the empirical Ego is nothing other than sensations of the inner sense bound together in a time-series. In this case, therefore, the empirical Ego and the time-succession constitute the only bond of union. Kant, now, calls such a judgment a judgment of sense-perception or, more concisely, a sense-perception. As an example of such a judgment may be cited the following: "With me, sadness follows sunshine." If, then, empirical or sense perceptions are perceptions which are united

only in me and only through a *post hoc*, we can understand why Kant attributes to them merely subjective validity. From them, now, he distinguishes, in agreement with the common usage of speech, the judgment of experience, or experience, which has for its content what is of universal validity (*e.g.*, Warmth is a consequence of sunshine), and considers more closely how the two classes of judgments are distinguished and how judgments of experience arise out of judgments of sense-perception. After what was said above, Kant's answer that this takes place by virtue of the fact that the validity for *a* consciousness only ceases, can cause no surprise. This answer leads to a new question, By what is that validity made to cease? By the fact, answers Kant, that into the place of the empirical Ego, which as time-series of sensations was phenomenon and as which I find myself passive, there enters the pure Ego, which is also the condition of the empirical Ego and hence may be called transcendental, which has not for its content, as the empirical Ego has, *how*, but only *that*, I am, because it is not passive self-finding but an active self-making; and by the fact that thus out of the mere finding-together (synopsis, empirical apperception) arises the putting-together (synthesis, pure apperception), by means of which the act of combination falls within the Ego underlying every empirical Ego, *i.e.*, falls now within consciousness as such instead of, as above, within *a* consciousness. This change (as the result of which, no longer, as before, the *I feel* but the *I think*, which always accompanies it and makes it first possible, is the source of the combination), necessarily coincides, of course, with a second, namely, that there is no longer the form of the finding-together (or of the sense-faculty), time-succession, but the form of spontaneous activity, of thought; that is, the category, which unites the members of the judgment. If I no longer (as above) say for *me* but for *all* or in general; if warmth no longer as above follows *upon* but rather *from* the sunshine, I have a judgment that is valid no longer for me, but rather for all, a judgment objectively instead of subjectively valid, or a judgment of experience, which just because it is such, not some individual one but any and every one pronounces. Experience, therefore, is made by the application of the categories. Really made,—that is to say, out of pure and empirical perceptions; and when Kant

says in the first line of the *Critique of Pure Reason* (first edition) that experience is the production of the understanding, this proposition possesses literal correctness. It is similar to the artist, who terms that which is made by him out of a given material his production. But since by the application of the category, instead of the mere time-relation, the subjective validity of the judgment of sense-perception is done away with, it is clear why Kant says that that application objectifies (sense-perception into experience), or that by it the *object* of experience is produced. (In general, it must always be borne in mind that by *objectivity* Kant understands independence of the subject, and hence conformity to law, not being that is external to consciousness.) From what has been said thus far it follows that with the same certainty and for the same reason that it can be said that no perception (*i.e.* temporalized sensations) can ever arise which is not temporal, may it be said that no experience (*i.e.* phenomena united through the categories) can arise which is not subject to the categories. The deduction of the categories is, therefore, stated as follows: What justifies us in applying the categories to all objects of experience, even such as never arise for us, *e.g.*, in affirming *a priori* that no experience can ever clash with the principle of causality? The fact, that only through their application do we have objects of experience at all. Just as in the Transcendental Æsthetic the indirect proof of the transcendental criticism of this theory joined itself to the justification of pure mathematics by the fact of the subjectivity of space and time, so Kant, after having shown how, if the categories lie in our understanding, it is self-evident that we by the application of them form universally valid judgments of experience, subjoins the dilemma that we must either deny experience (as distinguished from mere perception) or else assent to a theory which alone explains the possibility of it.

3. The parallelism with the Transcendental Æsthetic appears further in the circumstance that, as there, so here also, it is constantly insisted that we must not overstep the natural limits of the investigation. If the employment of the categories is justified only by the fact that without it no experience is possible, of course it is obvious that they may be applied only to that from which experiences can be produced, hence to possible objects of experience. But of such a cha-

racter were the phenomena furnished by sense, which, just because they are furnished by sense, may be called the sensible, or objects of sense. Therefore, precisely as it can be predicated only of phenomena that none of them can ever contravene the laws of arithmetic, so also only of the combination of phenomena is it absolutely certain that nothing therein will come into conflict with the law of causality. The validity of the categories (and hence the use of the understanding) is limited to the sphere of phenomena; it is "immanent" (in the empirical domain), cannot pass beyond it, cannot become "transcendent," as claiming dominion over the non-phenomenal, over noumena, over things-in-themselves. To the same result still another consideration leads. Granting the justification for applying the categories to the matter given by sense, it is still not shown how such an application can be made. The categories are pure, are intellectual, whereas the matter to be brought under them is empirical and sensible. Thus appears to be wanting the likeness in kind which is requisite for every subsumption, unless there appear somewhere a middle term which makes this subsumption possible. As such middle terms Kant designates the transcendental schemata given in the section *On the Schematism of the pure Conceptions of the Understanding* (ii. pp. 157–164). Although it can hardly be doubted that Hume's assertion, that we reason from the *post hoc* to the *propter hoc* was what first turned Kant's attention to time-relations as such middle terms (schemata), still, wholly apart from this subjective cause, the same result follows quite naturally from what has already been said, viz., that time, like the categories, is a universal *a priori* form; on the other hand, it is the form of the sensible, and time-determinations, therefore, have really the intermediate character sought. Obviously, since sense is the faculty that furnishes the sensible material, and the understanding the faculty that furnishes the categories, there must be adduced a third faculty for these schemata. Kant calls this the *productive imagination*, and attributes to it the power of introducing into space definite space-character and giving to time more proximate determinations. From the definition given above of the schemata it follows that there must exist a certain parallelism between them and the categories. The schemata yield quite readily, for the categories of quantity, Number (a time-determination, according to the Æsthetic); for

those of relation, the time-determinations, Change, Permanence, Succession, and Co-existence; for those of modality, the time-determinations: Any Time, Now, Ever. It is otherwise with the categories of quality. Time filled, time empty, time filling itself, should be the schemata for reality, negation and limitation; but, since time appears filled to us only through the medium of sensations which we have, there is substituted for the time-filling, the being-felt, and then is enunciated the principle, *sensatio est realitas phænomenon*, which does not exactly harmonize with the others,—*numerus est quantitas phænomenon, perdurabile est substantia phænomenon, æternitas est necessitas phænomenon*, etc. These investigations, from which it results that, if we apply the conception of substantiality to (the sea and the waves) we conceive the former as substance, and the latter as accidents (but not the converse), and cause, in like manner, as only that which precedes, never that which follows, etc., are summed up by Kant himself as follows: The schemata are *a priori* determinations of time according to rule, and refer according to the order of the categories, to the time-series, the time-content, the time-order, and the time-comprehension. But it is now doubly clear that the categories are applicable only to what is temporal, *i.e.*, phenomenal. This limitation not only *ought* to be made but *must* be made. If now, as was said above, the distinction between thought and knowledge be this, that, in the latter, perceptions furnish the content, since, as is now evident, these are by means of the schemata subsumed under the categories, whereby the conceptions, which would otherwise be merely formal, receive real meaning, or become "realized," it is clear that all knowing is limited to objects of possible experience, to phenomena, to what is sensible. This does *not* mean what empiricism has made out of it, viz. knowledge and knowing must limit themselves to being mere experience. But it means, rather, that we have the power to know many things independently of all experience, *i.e.*, *a priori*, and, accordingly, can justly claim that to our knowledge be conceded universality and necessity, though we can have knowledge only of what can also be an object of experience, never of things-in-themselves.

4. But in what has been said there is also really an answer to the second of the questions contained in the main question, whether and how pure or *a priori* natural science, *i.e.* a

metaphysics of nature, or a philosophy of nature, is possible. It is here of prime importance to distinguish between the mere sum of phenomena, which Kant calls the world of sense, and their law-determined arrangement, which he calls nature. These two do not, of course, differ from one another in that one lies more within us than the other. Like all phenomena, the world of sense and nature are both made up of our presentations, and, if the thinking subject were taken away, they would both alike fall away (ii. pp. 649, 650, 684). But they differ by the fact that the world of sense is a lawless aggregate, and nature is an orderly coherence. Order and coherence are introduced into the aggregate of sense when the understanding unites phenomena according to the norms lying within it (the categories). Thereby the understanding does not, indeed, *create* nature, but makes it—out of the originally given sensations, namely, which sense had converted into perceptions or phenomena, and empirical apperception united into sense-perceptions. Therefore, just as the laws to which every phenomenon must conform are created out of the *a priori* forms of sense, so the understanding finds in itself the laws to which nature must conform, an assertion which Kant would fain set over against its opposite, viz., that the understanding must conform to nature, as he would the Copernican theory of the heavens over against the geocentric. It is just for that reason that he criticises the dictum that knowledge does not penetrate into the "inner" of nature. "Observation and analysis penetrate further than is supposed." Indeed so completely is the understanding coupled by Kant with the knowledge of nature that to him *conception of nature*, and *conception of the understanding*, are synonymous terms. This does not conflict with the earlier reference of knowing to objects of experience. Nature, in fact, is only the system of experiences, just as the world of sense is the sum of pure and empirical perceptions. The understanding, therefore, is able to know nature *a priori*, or creates her laws out of itself, because only through the laws lying in it and applied by it to nature does nature as such exist,—a verdict which has an import as regards the pure science of nature, therefore, quite analogous to that which it has as regards pure mathematics.

5. In the Transcendental Æsthetic Kant, after having shown the right of mathematics to pronounce *a priori* its

synthetic judgments, had left it to mathematics to make use of this right in the future as in the past. It is otherwise here. He himself, after having shown the possibility of a natural science *a priori*, gives the main features of such a science, and that in two-fold form. Once in the *Critique of Pure Reason*, where the "*System of the First Principles of the Pure Understanding*" (ii. pp. 165–236) lays down the *a priori* laws to which every Nature must be subject; and again in his *Metaphysical Foundations of Natural Science* (Works, viii. pp. 441–568), of which Kant himself confesses that they properly have connection at this point, and which one of the leading Kantians, Beck (*vid.* § 308, 7), always treats at this point in his expositions of the Kantian Philosophy. If this were always the case, perhaps we should not be still compelled to be always hearing the assertions, that according to Kant, all metaphysics is impossible, and that his Metaphysics of Nature stands in no sort of organic relation with the *Critique of Pure Reason.* Since, according to Kant, the transcendental principles that contain the conditions of all objects become metaphysical when they are referred to a given object, it was entirely proper for him to treat the universal science of nature, which contains the laws without which no nature is thinkable, in his transcendental philosophy; and, on the other hand, to treat the special science of nature, which considers those laws in their application to (according to Kant, empirically given) matter in motion, in a special work, and to designate this science as the Metaphysics of Nature. In both presentations the system of first principles is preceded by the establishment of the principle which, in the *Critique of Pure Reason*, is formulated as follows: Nature as order of phenomena is subject to the conditions of the possibility of experience, hence to the conceptions of the understanding. In this formula is directly enunciated the dependence of the first principles upon the table of categories. Of course this principle has validity likewise in the special science of nature, the Metaphysics of Nature, which for that reason lays down just as many fundamental laws as, in the other case, were laid down first principles, if, indeed, it be not more correct to say, "which it repeats only in a more developed form." But since, in the special science of nature there supervenes upon what is laid down in the Transcendental Philosophy a given empirical matter, the Meta-

physics of Nature must, first of all, formally state wherein consists its fundamental difference from the Transcendental Philosophy. This is done as follows. The empirically given is given as perception; hence it is required to exhibit the conceptions fixed in perception by the understanding. Since such an exhibition is a construction, the special science of nature corresponds to its conception only as construction is employed in it, or as mathematics is applicable. This, now, brings Kant directly to limiting the province of mathematics strictly to nature. Since there are phenomena of the inner and the outer sense, nature also is in part outer (corporeal, extended), in part inner (psychical, thinking). Since, then, the latter lies without the province of the mathematical method (only *in minimo*, as regards the constant flux of inner changes, were such a method conceivable), there is applicable to the inner nature only an empirical mode of treatment, mere theory of nature. Properly speaking, the science of nature relates only to corporeal nature, and since this appears to us solely through motion affecting us, it is a theory of motion. If now we pass to the deduction of the first principles themselves, and combine directly therewith the more proximate determinations which they receive in the *Metaphysical Foundations*, we have, corresponding to the categories of quantity, the first principle which Kant terms the Principle of all *Axioms of (pure) Perception*, and formulates as follows: All perceptions are extensive quantities. An application of this theorem to matter in motion gives, as the first part of the Philosophy of Nature, *Phoronomy* (Works, viii. pp. 454–476), or theory of the Mathematics of Motion, wherein from the definition of motion first laid down, that it is change of distance, hence something relative, appertaining to both of two bodies approaching one another, the law of the communication, velocity, and direction of motion is not only explained without the absurd hypothesis of a *force* of inertia, but is construed in perception. To the three categories of quality there correspond in the system of first principles the *Anticipations of Sense-perception*, which concentre in the proposition: All qualities have degree. An application of this first principle to the empirically given matter in motion gives the second main division of the *Metaphysical Foundations*, the *Dynamics* (pp. 447–530), in which the qualitative distinction of solid, fluid, etc., are referred back to the various

degrees of space-filling, *i.e.*, to the various relations of the forces of attraction and repulsion. Further, the "System of First Principles" lays down three *Analogies of Experience* corresponding to the categories of relation; and these analogies are repeated almost *verbatim* in the third main division of the *Metaphysical Foundations*, the *Mechanics*, only, again, with more proximate determinations of the same; and there result the three *à priori* laws: The quantity of material substance is unchangeable; every change has an external cause (which excludes Hylozoism with its merely inner causes, and so does away with this death of the philosophy of nature), and that in all communication of motion, action and reaction must always be equal. Finally, the three *Postulates of Empirical Thought*, in which the Transcendental Philosophy had established, that what is physically (*i.e.*, in accordance with experience) possible is real and necessary, are applied, in the fourth main division of the *Metaphysical Foundations*, the *Phenomenology* (pp. 554–568), to rectilinear, circular, and relative motion. For the rest, Kant frequently implies that in these principles he intends to exhaust all that a metaphysics of nature has to offer; and he warns us against the attempt to go further into detail, instead of relinquishing this to observation and calculation.

6. As at the close of the Transcendental Æsthetic there arose the necessity for explaining its relation to the doctrines of the English realists, so at the close of his Transcendental Analytic Kant himself deems it necessary to distinguish his doctrines from the idealistic theories of Berkeley and Leibnitz. In this, from the circumstance that in the second edition of the *Critique of Pure Reason*, which appeared after the Garve-Feder review had brought against it the charge of relationship with Berkeley, there was incorporated the *Refutation of Idealism* (ii. pp. 223–226), some supposed they saw evidence of anxiety, inconsistency and what-not on the part of Kant. But a point was overlooked here to which Fichte had already called attention, viz., that in the inserted refutation it is not Berkeley, but the "problematical" idealism of the Cartesians that is discussed (particularly in mind were the Egoists mentioned in § 268, 3), and that Kant, without giving the lie to his fundamental principles, so refuted the supposition that there is only inner perception, that he shows that the being-affected presupposes an affecting cause. Further,

there was a failure to note what the work by Frederichs (cited below) with justice points out, that very much of this refutation has merely been taken out of the more unsuitable place in the first edition, and put in a more suitable one in the second. But, finally, it is forgotten that even in the first edition Kant had expressed himself very decidedly against the "so-decried empirical idealism": indirectly in the section on the *Distinction of all Objects into Phenomena and Noumena* (ii. pp. 236–253); expressly in what he says on this subject in the sixth section of the *Antinomies of Pure Reason* (ii. pp. 389–393). Berkeley's name, it is true, is not mentioned there; but since even later where it occurs, Kant appears to be acquainted with him only at second hand, I can still only hold to the opinion, in spite of the objections put forward in the profound treatise by Frederichs, that Berkeley was in Kant's mind at this point. The idealism combated by Kant, which that refutation calls materialistic idealism, is designated as empirical and subjective, since it is merely able to tell how presentations are habitually combined in the empirical Ego, whereas Kant's idealism is not an empirical, but a transcendental (rational), not a subjective, but an objective, idealism, because it shows how consciousness *must* combine presentations. (In Kant's terminology, the distinction may, therefore, be stated thus: According to Berkeley there are only perceptions; according to Kant experiences; hence the former denies all metaphysics of nature, the latter proposes one.) In the second place, Kant with justice makes much of another distinction. According to Berkeley, bodies are things in which, and behind which, there is absolutely nothing, mere appearances, not essentially different from dreams; he wholly denies things-in-themselves. It is quite otherwise with Kant: he is always insisting that appearance, or the mere presentation, should not be confounded with phenomenon, which is a presentation *of something*, and underlying which there is its transcendental object, *i.e.*, a condition of its existence that is independent of us. On this point he is fond of appealing to the healthy human understanding, which rightly repudiates this denial of things. But Kant thereby appears to place himself in perfect agreement with Leibnitz, of whom it was shown that he did not, as did Berkeley, convert bodies into purely mental existences ("notional things") or appearances, or into half-mental existences, beneath which lay, as their "good

foundation," reality, which was related to the phenomenon as the water-drop to the rainbow (*vid.* § 288, 3). What reasons had Kant for controverting so decidedly the Leibnitzian idealism, not only in the above-mentioned section, but in a section written especially for that purpose, *On the Amphiboly of the Conceptions of Reflection* (ii. pp. 254–273)? Very weighty reasons. He criticises it on the ground that it is dogmatic, *i.e.*, that it asserts positively of the true essence assumed to lie behind phenomena, that it consists of simple thinking beings, which are subject to the law of sufficient reason, whence also his doctrine in its completeness has been called Ontology. To all this, of course, Kant must come into opposition, because he repudiated the presuppositions that had guided Leibnitz. According to Leibnitz, phenomenon or sensible object is something confusedly known, real being, on the contrary, an object of the understanding, is something clearly known. Naturally, therefore, his assertions in regard to the latter are made with positiveness. According to Kant, the understanding can indeed *think*, but not *know*, unless sense furnishes it the material for knowledge; and he refutes in the above section the particular assertions of Leibnitz, inasmuch as he shows that they rest upon an unjustifiable isolation of the activity of the understanding. But further, his view, that conceptions without perceptions are empty, brought him to the position that all knowing is limited to phenomena, to the sensible. For that reason a knowledge of the non-phenomenal is impossible, about as impossible as it is to see a dark room in the light. The non-phenomenal and the thing-in-itself coincide; and hence we have no knowledge of things-in-themselves, neither a confused nor a clear knowledge; and in opposition to Leibnitz's dogmatic idealism, he calls his own a critical idealism: this makes no affirmation concerning things-in-themselves. It does not even decide concerning them whether they are in us or out of us; only the negative characteristic can be predicated of them, that they are not subject to the conditions of phenomena, namely, time, space, and the categories. They are mere limiting conceptions, guide-posts, which tell us that the realm of sense and of the understanding is not the only one, that it is not the world, but an island.

Cf. Frederich's: *Der phænomenale Idealismus Berkeley's und Kant's.* Berlin, 1871.

7. As it was shown above that Kant's divergences from Locke and Hume as regards the faculty of receptivity were approximations towards and leanings upon Leibnitz and Berkeley (§ 298, 5), so it is not difficult to show that here, where he considers the spontaneity of the mind, the thorough study of the idealism of Locke and Hume has removed the semi-idealism of Leibnitz. The Lockian doctrine of the receptivity of the mind, according to which the mind is dependent upon impressions from without, had made too deep an impression upon him to permit of his conceiving mind with Berkeley as pure activity. And again, he had been too fully convinced by Hume that the causal-nexus does not lie in things themselves, to be able with Leibnitz to subject to this law purely substantial beings. On the one hand, he was warned by the idealists against reducing all to sense; on the other, by the realists against the opposite danger of reducing all to intellect.

§ 300.

The Transcendental Dialectic and Practical Philosophy.

1. As the critique of sense answers the first of the questions into which the main question subdivided itself, and the critique of the understanding the second, so the critique of reason is to answer the third question, namely, the question whether a metaphysics of the supersensible is possible (*Proleg.*, §§ 40–60, Works, iii. pp. 249–301). This problem is solved by the *Transcendental Dialectic* (ii. pp. 276–532). The word *reason*, which in Kant (*e.g.*, in the title of his work) often has a signification so broad that it covers the mind in all its functions, and hence is what he also indeed terms *das Gemüth*, is here opposed to sense and the understanding, and is, therefore, taken in a narrower meaning. As they were the faculties of perception and conception, so it is defined as the faculty of Ideas; but these are immediately defined as "regulative" principles, which are not "constitutive," *i.e.* do not declare that anything *is*, but only that something should be; and hence reason speaks only in postulates, requisitions, problems. These are directed to the understanding; so that, as the understanding illumines sense, the reason guides the understanding. As the latter had converted the matter

furnished it by sense into experiences, so reason gives it the norms by which it has to govern itself in the act of synthesis resulting in experiences. Reason, therefore, transcends both, and has a function entirely different from theirs. As the activity of the understanding was combined with sense in cognition, it is not to be wondered at if Kant often opposes sense and understanding taken together, as faculties of knowledge, to the reason (later to the faculty of desire), or, also, as theoretical, speculative reason (an expression instead of which the term *understanding* also occurs), to the practical reason. It must, however, be confessed that, in spite of his apparently strict terminology, Kant's mode of procedure is here, as elsewhere, very free, for there are very many passages in which the reason is treated as a higher faculty of *knowledge*, whereas there are just as many in which it is opposed to the two faculties that are the sources of knowledge. He was also led to treat reason again and again as a faculty of knowledge by his fondness for symmetry in method. Since it was made the business of the understanding to judge, there remains for the reason the function of inference. The reason is, therefore, in one aspect, the faculty of Ideas; in another, the faculty of inference. This conjunction is very skilfully brought about, and all possible acuteness employed to bring the three Ideas which are afterwards discussed, into correspondence with the three kinds of syllogism, the categorical, the hypothetical and disjunctive. But since where the deduction is once made, it is forgotten, and in the sequel the Ideas are spoken of only in so far as they are problems, this aspect may be overlooked, and reason here spoken of, so far as, as a faculty of rules and problems, it forms a contrast with the other two theoretical faculties. Whereas these two faculties taken together have to do with what is, reason is concerned with what should be, that is, what lies beyond all existence. But, now, it had been shown that knowledge, as the combined activity of sense and understanding, was limited to the possible objects of experience, hence to what was sensible; and, just for that reason, the application of the categories was immanent (in the province of experience). Likewise it had been shown that the law-determined arrangement of the sensible, or of phenomena, to which, as to its only province, the understanding was assigned, is called nature. It is, therefore, quite natural, that to reason is assigned the province of the supersensible; that it is said of the

Ideas, that they stand for what can never present itself in experience; that to them immanent application is denied and the transcendental is assigned as the only proper application: finally to the conceptions of nature are opposed the conceptions of freedom which lie in reason. If it is of questionable propriety even to designate the content of the understanding, which knows, and that of the reason, which puts problems, by the common name of "conceptions," then Kant's terminology becomes positively barbarous, when he calls the problems of reason, *e.g.*, duties—because they are not phenomena,—things (!)-in-themselves. The expression *noumenon*, which he likewise employs, gave Reinhold, later, occasion for distinguishing more exactly things which in Kant are still undistinguished and hence interchangeable, namely, the unknown causes of our having sensations, and the requisitions of the reason. But just because Kant had not drawn strict distinctions at this point, it is easy to understand why he says, If we were only (sense and) understanding, we should be satisfied with the realm of phenomena, it would be for us the world; but the fact that we are also reason, makes that realm an island, for now we know that there is a realm of that which is not, but should be. Hence the reason, by its requisitions, causes to arise those limiting conceptions which tell us that the realm of experience, or of the existent, is not the only one. Since phenomena are in themselves only relations (to that for which there are phenomena), the realm of phenomena, or of the understanding, is of course that of the relative. On the contrary, all the requisitions of reason have in view not the holding fast to the relative, the conditioned, but the quest of the unconditioned, the absolute. The Idea of the absolute, as well as all others, is a problem to be solved, it is a regulative principle; a mistake is made when a constitutive use is made of it. This mistake, however, is very easily made. For the solution of a problem, that is to say, it is necessary that one should *think* this solution, *i.e.*, should think the problem as solved. If, now, we confound thought and knowledge, to the latter of which there belongs, besides thought, also the being given in perception, reality is ascribed to the required solution, that is to say, a category (the first of Quality), which, as was shown, is valid only of possible objects of experience, is applied to what can never be an object of experience. In this case the reason becomes sophistical, or dialectical. Now in many cases such

a confusion appears to be unavoidable; and then we have illusions, sophistications (or dialectic) of the reason, which are as unavoidable as that the sea appears to be a mountain, or that the moon appears to all, even to the astronomer, larger at its rising. Precisely as in these cases the illusion does not vanish when we perceive that the sea is level and the moon does not become smaller, but thereby becomes harmless inasmuch as we will certainly take no measures that rest upon that illusion, so the perception that those unavoidable sophistications are nothing but illusions, will not, indeed, obviate them, but make them harmless. Since this part of the *Critique* has for its object to lay open to view the sophistic and dialectic of the reason, Kant calls it Transcendental Dialectic. (Properly speaking he should have said Anti-dialectic.) This critique of the reason as becoming dialectic is at the same time, of course, a critique of the previous (*i.e.*, the Leibnitz-Wolffian) metaphysics, the leading principles of which are alleged to consist wholly of such illusions, may in fact all be reduced to the one illusion underlying them, that the unconditioned, instead of being merely employed as a norm in the use of our understanding, is taken as an extension of knowledge given by our understanding, and we hence treat what is merely problematical as if it contained for us something positively given. Since a critique of ontology had already been given (*vid.* § 299, 1) in the demonstration that it is impossible and that an analytic of the understanding must be put in its place, Kant limits himself to criticising the three other parts of metaphysics, but in this criticism allows psychology to precede cosmology. His aim is to show to all three that they so far mistake the demand that we should go in quest of the unconditioned (in us, without us, finally, as regards all possible existence) as to assume that in these mere postulates positive information is given us.

2. The critique of rational psychology receives with Kant the title, *On the Paralogisms of Pure Reason* (ii. pp. 308–329), because in these it is to be shown that the main principles of that science (*vid.* § 290, 6), viz., that the soul is simple (and hence immortal), that it is a substance, that it is a person, that it is distinct from the body, rest upon as many paralogisms. In making this assertion, Kant has in view not so much Wolff's own arguments as those of Mendelssohn and Reimarus, perhaps also those of his teacher Knutzen, who, all

three, made the unity of self-consciousness the basis of their proof of the immateriality and immortality of the soul. But just herein lies the paralogism. Through the Idea of the unconditioned, that is to say, the reason demands that in all phases of thought the Ego always assign to itself the place of subject, never that of predicate; further, that it posit all its ideas as its own by referring them to a unity, and that it posit all that it presents to itself, as its counterposed other (Non-ego, as Fichte, later, calls it). These demands, instead of being fulfilled as such, are by a variety of confusions (hence paralogisms) converted into positive assertions. In general it was a confusion where the demand relating to the Ego, *i.e.*, pure consciousness, which is not an object of experience, was immediately treated as applicable to the soul, which is an object of experience, hence a phenomenon, or thing of sense. Connected with this, however, was a variety of other confusions: the logical conception of subject was confused with the metaphysical conception of substance, and then this conception was applied to the soul, which is given to us only as a flowing stream of ideas, although the schema of substance was the permanent. Likewise, a real simple substance was made of the logical unity of the subject, to say nothing whatever of the fact that even the simple may perish, not indeed by dissolution, but by gradual diminution. Further, it was a *petitio principii* to conclude, from the fact that I am for myself in every moment purely an individual, that my soul is objectively (for all others) an identical person. Finally, it was a fourth paralogism, when from the mere direction (given by reason) to oppose self to all else, it was directly concluded that the soul is distinct from the body, since the inner and the outer sensations which form the matter of those two phenomena (*i.e.*, soul and body) may be caused by two very similar x's, perhaps, indeed, by one and the same x, which last, as regards the intricate question concerning the *commercium animæ et corporis*, would have its peculiar advantage. On the standpoint of transcendental idealism, which places time and space within us, this question receives for its precise formula the following: How is it possible that there should be in a thinking being the forms of pure perception, time and space, in which it appears to itself? The sum of the entire critique is, Every rational psychology that pretends to be a doctrine, *i.e.*, to contain real affirmations, instead of being a discipline,

i.e., of containing only admonitions against certain points of view, is a delusion. In the place of all principles that a metaphysics of the soul usually gives, must be put the plain *non liquet*, an exchange by which we lose nothing, for, since we know that no one, not even our opponent, can know anything concerning the real fact, no materialistic reasonings against immortality can disturb us.

Cf. Jürgen Bona Meyer: *Kant's Ansicht über die Psychologie als Wissenschaft.* Bonn, 1869.

3. The critique of cosmology is treated in the section on the *Antinomies of Pure Reason* (ii. pp. 332–439). The Idea of the Unconditioned demands that all phenomena be not left in their isolated being, that we attempt to find in a system of the same what we call the world. This world-Idea has modifications corresponding to the four classes of categories, and hence gives a plurality of world-Ideas, which are also termed world-conceptions. They require that we do not always cling to the incomplete, but seek completeness and perfection. If one regards the requisitions as positive assertions, there arise principles which, since there underlies them an Idea of the reason, commend themselves to us as true, may, in fact, be proved; only, those which are the opposites of them have exactly the same demonstrative force. These are the well-known antinomies which are treated in The Antithetic of the Pure Reason. On the one side are, as theses, the main principles of the cosmology of Wolff, or rather, of Meier, *i.e.*, the principles of "pure dogmatism"; on the other, are their antitheses (of Hume), which are to be regarded as the main principles of "pure empiricism," and both are proved in a manner recalling Wolff's demonstrations. To the propositions; The world is limited in time and space, Consists of simple parts, Has place for necessity as well as for freedom, Presupposes the existence of an absolutely necessary essence, correspond the opposites; The world is infinite as regards time and space, Only the composite is, There is only causal relation, hence no freedom, There is no necessary cause of the world. Transcendental idealism, or the distinction of things-in-themselves and phenomena, that is, of reason and understanding, which explains the origin of these antinomies, accomplishes here still more: it solves them. It solves the first two (the mathematical) by showing that the theses as well as the antitheses are false, or that they consist in illusions. (Properly speaking

this was already done when it was shown that that which is complete,—hence the world-whole, and likewise, the last part are Ideas, *i.e.* demands not to remain at any one point, but to seek further). The last two (the dynamical), on the other hand, are solved in a different manner; since he shows that both may be true if the thesis be referred to things-in-themselves), and the antithesis to phenomena. It is conceivable that in the world of phenomena all acts of man are necessary consequences of the nature of his sense-faculty, or of his empirical character, and hence the subjects of calculation, and that, outside of, or alongside of, that phenomenal world, man exists unaffected by time and space, and hence does not exist prior to his acts but as an intelligible nature pervading them, a thought-nature, and, as such, is free. The moral consciousness, which, even where we recognise the deed to be the necessary fruit of the character, blames the doer, appears to confirm this duality, which shows transcendental idealism to be conceivable and possible. The case of the fourth antinomy presents a quite similar form. What is asserted by the antithesis may be entirely correct, viz., that everything in the world of phenomena is to be explained by some other in turn and never to be referred back to the will of a cause of the world, since we can reason back to this only if we are able to arrive at the limit of the series of causes, to which we can never come; and, after all, the thesis would be justified and there could be posited outside of the realm of phenomena an absolutely necessary being. Transcendental idealism cannot prove that this is so, but can show the conceivability of it. Rather, it can do only the latter. For it has shown that time-succession and causality obtain solely of what appears (to us).

4. The critique of rational theology which Kant had already anticipated in the fourth antinomy is contained in the section on the *Ideal of Pure Reason* (ii. pp. 490–532). Starting from the fundamental principle of Wolff's ontology (*vid.* § 290, 4), that only the completely determined is real, Kant shows that such perfect determinateness is conceived to exist only where all positive predicates are united, hence in the content of all realities. According to the same principle of Wolff, this conception is to be thought as individual, and thus the preceding discussions yield the Idea of perfection *in individuo*, or the Ideal of the same, which is an indispens-

able standard for reason. If, now, this standard is to be conceived as a thing, there results the Idea of God as the *summum ens*, which, therefore, is gotten by realizing, hypostatizing, finally, personifying, a necessary postulate of the reason, or by attributing, as was done in the case of the psychological and cosmological Idea, a predicate to the noumenon that properly belongs only to the phenomenon. Reason itself feels that this is rash, and hence attempts to justify this subreption by supplementary considerations; and from this attempt proceed the proofs for the existence of God. Kant's critique of the Wolffian rational theology is, really, confined to the critique of this the most important portion of it. His predecessors had already opposed the ontological proof, as the only *a priori* proof, to the rest as proofs *a posteriori*. Kant was thereby led to look upon it as the only speculative proof. He was confirmed in his view by the consideration that the teleological proof, the real nerve of which lies in the fact that the order in things does not have its root in things themselves but is accidental to them, rests upon the cosmological proof, which in turn, as Kant seeks to show, presupposes the ontological proof. The critique of this last, therefore, affects all proofs in general for the existence of God. If, after the Cartesian manner, existence be attributed to the most real of all natures because, without it, that nature would be self-contradictory, as a triangle would be without three-sidedness, then it is forgotten that, as we can in the last example think away both subject and predicate without any contradiction, just so is it, indeed, a contradiction to think of God as non-existent, but by no means such to think that no God exists. The other (*i.e.*, the Wolffian) mode of argument, *i.e.*, conceiving existence as one of the realities whose complex God is said to be, forgets that the content of a notion undergoes an increase by the added reality, but not by existence, any more than a hundred dollars are more than a hundred by the fact that they have existence. Existence expresses only a relation to our thought, means that we must be receptive, that something is "given" to us. Since, now, there is only one way in which something is given to us, viz., sensation, but God is not so given to us, the ontological proof, as well as all others resting upon it, is an "advocate's proof," and just as little as one can squeeze out of a hundred imaginary dollars their existence, so little is the existence of the most real of all natures, to be

gotten from the mere conception of it. This impossibility robs us of nothing. On the contrary, since we know that as regards the existence of God there can be no proof, we are, as respects all atheistic demonstrations, entirely undisturbed. The impossibility of His existence can be just as little proved, either *a priori*, for the conception of Him is not self-contradictory, or *a posteriori*, for we have nothing to do here with an object of experience. Therefore *non liquet* is here, also, the highest wisdom; well worthy to be observed as regards the *form* of the existence of this ideal. As regards the content of it, this is a necessary regulative, not only as relates to our consideration of nature, but also as relates to our conduct; and reason demands that we treat nature, not as the materialists do, but as if there were a God, and it obliges us to act not as Epicureans, but as if a God existed.

5. But can we get from this critique of the individual parts of metaphysics enough to answer the question, whether as a whole it is possible? If so, the answer will be of the following import, that there is not a metaphysics of the supersensible, if by that is understood a supersensible being, and that, consequently, the fundamental principle of rational psychology, that the soul must be immortal; of cosmology, that man is free; of theology, that there is a God, cannot claim to be proved, or to be principles of certain knowledge. At the same time, however, the negative result of the Transcendental Analytic, that the sphere of the sensible is not the only one, is here supplemented by the positive consideration that the region of problems lies beyond, or outside of, this sphere. Hence there is no knowledge of the supersensible, because it is not a being (*Seyn*), but there is, indeed, a willing of it, or an endeavour to get beyond the sensible. Since, now, it is possible, in a variety of ways, to arrive at *a priori* firm conclusions regarding this which is the content of volition and endeavour, *i.e.*, regarding ends lying beyond the sensible, and since by metaphysics was understood the totality of all *a priori* principles, there is shown by the Transcendental Dialectic the possibility of a metaphysics of problems. Since among these the ethical problems take the highest rank, the Metaphysics of Morals is connected with the Transcendental Dialectic just as the Metaphysics of Nature is with the Transcendental Analytic, and we, again following a hint of Kant and the example of Beck, connect it immediately with that.

6. Kant has developed practical or moral philosophy partly in the *Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals* (Wks., iv. pp. 1 and fol.), partly in the *Critique of Practical Reason* (Wks., iv. pp. 95 ff.), partly in the *Metaphysical Foundations of the Theory of Right*, and the *Metaphysical Foundations of the Theory of Virtue* (Wks., x. pp. 1 ff.); and attempts to give therein what can be laid down *a priori* on the subject of human conduct. The matter contained in these three works is distributed in such a way that the *Groundwork*, etc., treats the laws of moral conduct, the *Critique* the faculty for it, the *Metaphysical Foundations* the system of moral conduct. Less here than anywhere else, should it be forgotten that Kant passed under the influence of the partial views that divided the eighteenth century into two opposing sides. On the one side was realism, which treated man as a purely natural being, and accordingly demanded a pursuance of the natural impulses, one class of realists, meaning by these, as did Hutcheson, particularly the benevolent, and the other class, as did Helvetius, the selfish impulses (*vid.* § 281, 6, and § 284, 5). Opposed to these, stand the idealists, who conceived man as a rational nature, as spirit, and accordingly represented him as ruled by the idea of perfection, of logical unity with himself. The end of action, which they both, indeed, call happiness, is, with one side, the greatest possible amount of sensuous enjoyment, with the other, self-admiration and self-sufficiency. But both exhibit man as one in himself and sole, inner duality being left out of question; and consequently their Ethics is, in the main, a theory of goods and virtues. The moral philosophy of the men of the enlightenment and the Philosophers for the World sought to combine these two tendencies, but could do this only by ignoring (superficially) their differences. It was quite otherwise with Kant. What is necessary to a really concrete unity and organic fusion was brought forward by him: the opposition between the elements to be fused, their untruth, the truth of both, and their reconcilableness. Even then such a higher unity could be attained by him only by taking a standpoint above the two and making them his objects. He comprehends empiricism and rationalism also in the sense that he explains them. If they had merely said, This is the moral law; he inquired first of all, How is the moral law possible? From the fact that he conceived man

as at the same time a sense-nature and a rational nature, but did not forget that the two are opposed to one another, there immediately came to view, in the reconciliation of the two, the inadequateness of both sides; and hence "the ought," through which ethics acquires the form of a doctrine of duties, which speaks in imperatives. The preference which, confessedly, he here gives to the Wolffian over the English conception of ethics brings it about that the rational nature is conceived as master and the sense-nature as slave. As regards form, therefore, the moral problem appears as a universal and unconditioned (categorical) imperative; as regards content, it is the making of the reason valid as against the natural inclinations. Not he who is benevolent merely by nature is the moral man, but he who does good to others, even "though nature did not make him a friend to man." Such a reconciliatory position is easily combined with transcendental idealism and its distinction of noumenon and phenomenon; in fact, it springs out of it. Man as phenomenon receives the law; man as noumenon gives it. The fact, however, that the moral postulate speaks as an imperative yields immediately an important consequence. That I unconditionally *ought*, I can feel only because I at the same time feel that I *can*, and so, therefore, the fact of "the ought" does not make "the can," or freedom, certain (for this could not be proved), but it makes *me* sure and certain of it. Since without freedom there is no "ought," that is, no moral law would be possible, there is ground of knowledge (or rather of certainty) of freedom, and it, again, is a real ground of the moral law. The Transcendental Dialectic could assert only that freedom is conceivable. Here there enters as a complement the subjective certainty, which, since I cannot act morally without it, is, in the proper sense, moral. This does not widen my knowledge (it would do this if it showed to us objectively what freedom is and how to demonstrate it; but that is impossible); but the certainty that freedom is, is purely subjective, comes to us from the fact that we "ought." At the same time we become certain of a second fact that had been shown in the Transcendental Dialectic to be conceivable; that every human being is a two-fold nature—a temporal sense-nature whose every act is subject to the law of causality, and an intelligible character existing out of time, which as transcendental ground is responsible for all acts. As this intelligible

character, I am really free; transcendental freedom is the possibility of making an absolute beginning, whereas the freedom of the Leibnitzians, as a determination from within, is not much more than the freedom of a turnspit driven by clock-work. The view that does not get beyond phenomena because its space and time are determinations of things-in-themselves must come to the denial of such freedom; only upon the critical standpoint is it, not, indeed, proven theoretically that freedom is a fact, but shown that we are justified in thinking of ourselves, that is, our intelligible nature, as free, upon which depends, not the individual acts but the entire series of them, our empirical nature, upon which, in repentance, we pass sentence of condemnation. (Here, again, as from the fact of mathematics, we can conclude back to the correctness of the theory of space and time.) That we are here brought by practical need to make theoretical (transcendental) assumptions follows from the primacy which the practical reason has over the theoretical. Those assumptions are, hence, postulates (not in the strict mathematical sense) of the practical reason, by which are to be understood presuppositions which are necessary from the practical point of view, but regarding which we cannot hope that they will satisfy a theoretical interest or extend knowledge. That the law-giver and the subject of the law are the same nature, as noumenon and as phenomenon, explains why the law at the same time fills us with fear (strikes us down), and inspires us with confidence, forms of feeling which are commingled in reverence, which therefore unites compulsion and freedom. Just so is it clear why Kant always attributes to the moral law the character of autonomy, and why he combats every form of heteronomy in morals. Such heteronomy Crusius, for example, seemed to him to introduce in founding morals upon theology. We can speak of *a priori* determinations in reference to what should be, only if reason itself gives the law. Only thus, too, can we speak of a categorical character in its imperative; if what should be, depended upon the arbitrary will of God, it would have validity only on condition that God did not alter His will, and would therefore be a hypothetical imperative.

7. As the opposition of the two theories to be reconciled had led to conceiving the nature of man as an "ought" and an imperative, so the perception that the two suffered under just the same deficiencies and were wanting in truth, led to

another important determination: All previous systems of morals, it was said, have made it impossible to give an *a priori* ethical theory, to conceive the law of morals as categorical imperative, because they placed the principle of action in the object willed, in the matter of the action, or, what is the same thing, laid down material principles. Such are the principles of happiness and of perfection, to which all others can be reduced. As regards the first, this is clear: Since only that object is willed which is the source of pleasure, and this is known merely empirically, the principle is an empirical principle. Just so, it has only conditional validity, namely, for beings that have impulses, which one might justly wish to be free from. The principle of perfection, it is held, stands higher than the other, but even to it may be shown that its requirements are merely conditional, and hence that at bottom it cannot get beyond putting intellectual cleverness in the place of morality. Both defects must be avoided, but can so be, only if the norm be not derived elsewhere than from the command of reason itself. To find it in that, we must abstract from the matter of the same, and must consider the pure will (the term being understood in the same sense in which, earlier, we spoke of the pure understanding) and the law in its purity. Since there then remains only the form of the law, or what makes the law a law (as before there remained only the form of the understanding), and this is its universal validity, we have as the principle of morality the formula: Act so that the maxim of thy action may be a principle of universal legislation (more concisely—as thou wouldst wish that all should act). The objection which a critic makes to the principle, that it is a mere formula, Kant pronounces the greatest commendation; and the appeals to the judgment of the mathematicians as regards the importance of formulæ He then shows, further, that there follow from this formula a pair of determinations which are more material in kind. One is, that men, because they are the subjects of that legislation considered as an end, must never be thought of as things but always as persons. A second is, that, since the touchstone is placed not in the fact of validity but in the universality, we are justified in expecting and demanding of all, the observance of the law of reason. It is in agreement with this that he often says that the universal will is not what all will but what all rational beings should will.

8. If the deed in its actuality is in harmony with the formula laid down, it is legal. If, on the other hand, the motive of the deed agrees with that formula, the deed is moral: the former is agreement with the letter, the latter, with the spirit of the moral law. In accordance with this distinction the *Metaphysics of Morals* is divided into the Theory of Right and the Theory of Virtue (Ethics). The first contains the compulsory externalities, the second the duties, which are not conscience, but regarding which conscience renders a decision (the name *virtue-duty* [*Tugend-pflicht*] is an unfortunate coinage). Only the common title "Metaphysics of Morals" unites the two; otherwise they so fall apart that every relation, just so soon as it does not rest upon a pure moral obligation, is at once conceived as purely an institution of right. Such are marriage and the State, which, accordingly, are conceived as mere contracts, inner disposition not being discussed. Here, as in general in the *Theory of Right* [*or Law*], Kant follows the doctrine of natural right laid down by Thomasius and Wolff. After defining legal right as the content of the conditions under which the will of individuals is harmonized according to a universal law of freedom—which is possible only where there is a regulated limitation of the individual will—Kant deduces all rights out of the conception of law-determined freedom, and then divides them into private right and public right. To the first belong rights in things, in persons (right of contract), finally in persons considered as things. (Among these rights "in persons after the manner of things" he reckons marriage.) Public right is subdivided into the right of states, of nations, and of citizens of the world. Between private and public right, or, rather, in both, falls criminal law, in which Kant, in opposition to all tendencies of the eighteenth century, maintains the theory of retaliation, and, with the sternness of a Minos, demands propitiation for guilt, and hence calls the pardoning-power "slippery." Attacks on the death-penalty he terms sophistical because they proceed from the false idea that the transgressor has willed the punishment (then would he, in fact, be rewarded); rather is he punished because he willed the transgression. In the Right of the State he in many respects agrees with Montesquieu. Only, he does not attach nearly so much importance as Montesquieu to the different forms of rule, *i.e.*, to whether one or many wield the highest power. He attaches all the more importance to the kind of government. The re-

publicanism, which he extols, is, in general, to him the opposite of despotism. He finds it wherever the law-giving and the law-executing power are separate. Hence an autocratic constitution may often stand much nearer to it than a democratic, for of all despotisms that of an individual is the most tolerable. The dilemma in which his theory places the citizen, to whom it denies entirely the right of resistance, although his theory at the same time repudiates the views of Hobbes, he thinks himself to have solved by postulating unrestricted expression of opinion. From publicity he hopes there will result the healing of all political evils. His Public Right may be summed up in the following principles: The civil constitution in every state should be republican; the right of nations should be founded on a federalism of free states; and the right of citizens of the world should be bounded by the conditions of universal hospitality. The casuistic questions that are appended to the individual chapters betoken the zeal with which Kant immerses himself in the contemplation of the most individual relations. Much more original does Kant appear in his Ethics, or *Theory of Virtue*, than in the Theory of Right. The above-given formula receives here a more proximate determination, in that the end and motives governing our actions should be tested by the consideration whether their universality may rightly be desired. As compared with legal duties, moral duties are wider, not as though they were more subject to exception, but because the number of acts in which that motive can show itself active is greater. Now at this point, especially, is it that the negative attitude towards the natural impulses becomes conspicuous: since the fulfilment of duty is an over-coming of these, it is called *virtus*, manly strength. For the same reason, he cannot, as do the English moralists, look upon one's own happiness as the goal of action; what natural impulse requires cannot be duty. It is for another reason that he restricts the formula of those who make perfection, whether one's own or another's, this goal: the perfection of another can be furthered only by that other himself; it cannot, therefore, be our duty to further it. Kant, therefore, concludes as follows: One's own perfection and the happiness of another may be demanded solely because duty requires it; hence not from mere inclination. From this formula we get the division of the moral duties. Duties towards one's self are designated as the duties which relate

to one's own culture; and these concern either the animal or the moral side of man. Now among the last-mentioned is included also the duty to have religion, *i.e.*, the duty to regard the voice of conscience (of the *homo noumenon*) as divine, where so doing gives greater strength to the moral law. Just as there are no duties towards animals, but man owes it to *himself* not to be inhuman or to act in an inhuman way, so there are no duties towards God. Duties towards others are divided into duties of merit, or duties of love, and duties of obligation, or duties of respect. Both are united in the duties of friendship.

9. The sharp separation, already mentioned above, of the legal and the moral with a man who, like Frederick the Great and Lessing, as regards natural impulse, thinks and feels as a Stoic, and, as regards nationality, as a believer in the Enlightenment, has no subjective counterpoise where the definitions of marriage and the State are in question. Both are to him contracts. The first, certainly, hardly admits of excuse. But the case is otherwise where his ethnological interests and his cosmopolitan ideas together find expression in the treatment of the history of the world. In the short works entitled: *Ideas for a Universal History from a Cosmopolitan Point of View* (1789); *On Everlasting Peace* (1795), and concerning the progress of the human race in his *Conflict of the Faculties* (1798), one sees how Kant is on the point of rising above the opposition in which his view has its root. The goal of the world's history is to him the rational, *i.e.*, as was above remarked, the republican, form of state. The race, which, since the individual cannot do it, must be assumed to participate in all human perfection, approaches this form of state in such a manner that the individual generations are steps upon the way. A means thereto is the antagonism of individual states, which differ in natural conditions, and the egoistic interests of individuals. But as both draw nearer to that goal, there is presented a harmony between nature and freedom, between natural impulse and reason. This becomes ever greater, for the goal, the true republic, is attained wherever a union of states puts an end to war, as in true politics right and morals are the same. The chief means for ascertaining how far this is already accomplished and for effecting lasting continuance is, again, publicity, the right of the individual to try all that is a subject of dispute by the moral standard.

What publicity tolerates, even more what it demands, is certainly right. But that the human race has already made really important progress, is, according to Kant, evidenced by a most noteworthy fact, which he sees not so much in the French Revolution itself as in the disinterested sympathy with which the world followed this event. He finds this sympathy significant and gratifying in two respects: one is, that it shows how universally it is left to each people to determine its own form of state; the second is, that it proves how widely spread is the respect for the republican form of state. What Kant thought in this connection concerning the individual occurrences of the Revolution appears from his expressions in the *Theory of Right* concerning the *crimen immortale, inexpiabile* of the 21st of January, 1793.

10. If Kant, in what to him constituted the content of his moral duties, gives the solution of the third of what were cited above (*sub* 6) as problems of an organic fusion, namely, recognised the truth of realistic eudæmonism and of the rationalistic perfection-theory, he does this still more, because without the above-noted limitation, in what he gives as the last goal of all legal as well as of all moral action. This is the highest good, and Kant places the same in the union of perfection and happiness, where the latter is conditioned by the former. But in doing this he expressly wishes to make sure of distinguishing happiness from the self-satisfaction that naturally follows perfection, and, in agreement with the realists, places it in a favourable natural condition of existence, *i.e.* he conceives it as sensuous satisfaction. But since in the present no such harmony finds place, inasmuch as the virtuous person often finds himself in an unfortunate, the wicked man in a fortunate, condition of existence; since, further, neither from the notion of nature is it demonstrable that nature is a servant of morality, nor from that of morality that morality is subject to nature, we must assume that a time of adjustment will come, and, further, that there is a ground of agreement between nature and the moral law, which can lie only in the author of both. Thus, therefore, is repeated what appeared in connection with the highest cosmological Idea—the Idea of freedom, and, likewise, in connection with the highest psychological Idea—that of immortality, and with the theological—that of divinity. Not that they become certain to us, but that we become certain of them. What, therefore, had shown itself as

theoretically indemonstrable and as only conceivable, and remains absolutely unknowable, and as regards its *what* and *how* a mere x, becomes morally certain to us as regards its *that*. God, freedom, and immortality are, therefore, postulates of the practical reason, which commands the theoretical reason, which had been able merely to arrive at a *non liquet*, to take as a principle that without the assumption of which the practical end is not to be realized. Since, now, these three form the content of theology, ethics is not to be founded upon theology, but, conversely theology upon ethics: a theological ethics like that of Crusius had been rejected as untenable, and remains so; a theology founded upon ethics is quite admissible. (It was earlier remarked [*vid.* § 281, 7] that Shaftesbury had expressed himself in precisely the same way.) Here Kant acknowledges that whoever can co-operate just as energetically in the realization of that moral order of the world without those assumptions is not obligated by them. He appears to have held it to be the least possible to dispense with the assumption of freedom; hence he often calls it a fact, and the certainty of it frequently a kind of knowledge; it is a *scibile*. On the contrary, it appears to him the most possible to observe the moral law without the assumption of the existence of God. The expressions, that this Idea is "unavoidable," and that the theoretical certainty of an existing God overwhelms us and fills us with terror, which involuntarily recall the *Système de la Nature* (*vid.* § 286, 3); and, finally, the circumstance that God and the harmony between morality and nature are both designated by one and the same term, (the highest good) prove that Kant was much inclined to do what soon afterwards Fichte did: to substitute for the idea of God that of the moral order of the world. The assumption merely of the That and merely for practical ends, Kant terms faith, and opposes it to knowledge as to assumption based on theoretical grounds, which at the same time relates to the What: but just so also does he oppose it, as a rational faith, to the historical faith which is a theoretical, only more uncertain, belief. Only another expression in favour of the primacy of the practical reason over the theoretical is it, therefore, when Kant says that he is obliged to limit knowledge in order to make a place for faith. If, now, one saw in the fact of his having spoken of a (conditional) duty of making such assumptions, nothing more than Basedow's duty of faith

(§ 293, 6), this must, of course, have appeared to Kant very superficial. Kant is not all concerned, as was Basedow, with a "happifying" assurance, but only with an assurance without which it were not possible to act morally. And yet, in the second place, since only that can be believed which the theoretical reason has previously shown to be conceivable, a bolt is shoved against every gratifying delusion and absurdity. Equally right is he in refusing to admit the charge that was brought against him from out the circle of the adherents of Jacobi, that his need-faith is really equivalent to the dictum: What one wishes, that he is inclined to believe. We are not concerned here with the need of any interest but with (practical) reason itself, which, just because it produces this need, causes these assumptions.

11. In the three Parts of the Theory of Elements the *Critique of Pure Reason* had laid down what was known and can be postulated *a priori*, *i.e.*, had marked out the limits of the content of philosophy. The *Transcendental Theory of Method* (ii. pp. 535–636) undertakes another problem: it aims to discover how this content attains a scientific form, or how out of the material the possession of which the Theory of Elements has secured to us, an edifice can be erected. The suggestions that Kant here gives are preponderantly negative; hence the first chapter, *The Discipline of Pure Reason* (536–594), occupies the largest space. It gives a warning against applying the method of mathematics in philosophical investigations simply because of the success of mathematics. What is usually given, *e.g.*, by Baumgarten, as the difference between mathematics and philosophy, viz., that the former has to do with the quantitative, the latter with the qualitative, is, partly, not quite correct and, partly, a secondary consequence of the real difference, which consists in the circumstance that philosophy deduces from pure conceptions, whereas mathematics constructs, *i.e.*, presents notions in perception. Hence philosophy cannot begin with definitions —only with the rarest good fortune does it end with them— is not at liberty to deduce from fixed axioms, must give neither more than one proof nor an apagogical proof for a proposition, and must, finally, abstain from all hypotheses except when by means of them it has to be shown as against the transcendent assertions of an opponent that other suppositions besides his are also conceivable. As the first chapter was

occupied with the opposition in which philosophical (dogmatic) knowledge stands to mathematics, so the second is concerned with the *Canon of Pure Reason* (594–619), particularly with the distinction between theoretical belief and certainty, the ground and end of which are merely practical,—a subject that was discussed, in part, in the tenth paragraph of this section. Opinion, faith, and knowledge are distinguished; under the second of these, again, pragmatic, doctrinal, and moral faith are distinguished; and this part of the work concludes with the consoling assurance that in what relates to the essential ends of man the bounties are impartially distributed, since the greatest philosopher stands on the same footing with him who is guided by the commonest understanding. In the third chapter, *The Architectonic of Pure Reason* (619–632) we have, first, a determination of the conception (not that of the schools but that of the world) of philosophy,—philosophy being the science of the relation of all knowledge to the essential ends of the human reason, and the philosopher being, therefore, not merely an intellectual artist but one who legislates for the human reason. Then it is shown how the two main divisions of philosophy, the Philosophy of Nature and of Morals, have to do, the former, with what is, the latter, with what should be. Those parts which are pure, abstracting from all that is empirical, may be termed the Metaphysics of Nature and of Morals, which are both preceded by Transcendental Philosophy as propædeutic and critique. In a somewhat artificial manner, Kant attempts to force metaphysics into the four parts given by Wolff, only with the modification, that in the place of the rational psychology is put rational physiology (of which the former forms a minimal part). The fourth chapter of the Theory of Method, *The History of Pure Reason* (633–636), classifies previous views, opposing, according to various grounds of division, intellectualism to sensualism, noölogism to empiricism, scientific to naturalistic philosophy, and finally sceptical to dogmatic philosophy. The invitation to enter with him upon the hitherto untrodden critical way, that thus it may become, instead of a footpath, a highway, closes the Theory of Method.

§ 301.

The Critique of Judgment.

1. To what extent Kant has succeeded in solving the *first*

problem of the most modern philosophy has been shown, partly in the account of his theoretical philosophy, partly in the concluding observations upon his Transcendental Æsthetic and Analytic. But likewise it has been brought out in the account of his practical philosophy, although there we were obliged to admit that in this Hutcheson and Shaftesbury were not quite so largely recognised as were Locke and Hume in the investigations regarding knowledge. Instead of that, however, there appear in the practical philosophy very decided suggestions towards the solution of the *second* problem, towards a reconciliation of the views that had distinguished the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. That a child of the latter, as Kant was, should incline far more to it, and that, just for this reason, he should not, in the solution of this problem, advance nearly so far as in the solution of the first, is to be presumed beforehand. But when one sees that the same man who rated the authority of the individual, in the sense of the revolutionary century, so high that, leaving far behind him the self-determination of the Leibnitzians, he ascribes to it the capacity not merely to develop but to make an absolute beginning,—that this man conceives conscience not as one's own inner voice but as the voice of the race; that he whom Rousseau so moved and who owes so much to him and to Montesquieu, yet speaks so decidedly against the right of a people to alter its political compact and to offer resistance to authority, because authority can never to this extent be in the wrong; when one, finally, hears that he to whom, as to all the Enlightened of his century, Spinoza was so abhorrent that he could never resolve upon a thorough study of him, and of whom one must therefore expect that, like Mendelssohn, he would understand by "man" only the individual and would see in "humanity" a merely abstract conception, instead of which he allows (without neutralizing the idea, as did Lessing [§ 294, 16], by an assumed transmigration of souls) that humanity progresses, and says, by way of consolation, to future generations: *fata volentem ducunt nolentem trahunt*—one will hardly need to wonder when one hears that Kant's contemporaries reckoned him among the pantheists. He is not a pantheist; so little is he so, that the individualistic moment greatly predominates in him, although undoubtedly he has, more than his contemporaries, a comprehension of the views of the seventeenth century and has

made room for them more, even, than did Lessing. Likewise one cannot deny that Kant's discrimination between the pure and empirical Ego, the former of which accompanies every (individual) consciousness as consciousness *per se*, would be much more readily accepted by a Spinozist, to whom the idea of the *intellectus infinitus* was familiar, than, perhaps, by Mendelssohn. And, indeed, the later development, precisely of the theory of pure apperception, has shown that in it there lies the germ of pantheistical theories. The *homo noumenon* in practical philosophy, the pure apperception in theoretical philosophy, are insights that did not spring up in the soil of the Enlightenment. Much more, however, than in the works on theoretical and practical philosophy does this appear—and with it appears the tendency to unite with them those of his own century—in the work, which, with the *Critique of Pure Reason* as the first, the *Critique of Practical Reason* as the second, must be called Kant's third masterpiece, viz., in the *Critique of Judgment* (Wks., vii. pp. 3–376).

2. In order rightly to estimate this work, in which Kant really transcends the standpoint of the two other Critiques, it must be borne in mind that the psychological foundations of all his investigations were not discovered by himself, but were borrowed, first from Wolff and the Wolffians, later from Tetens, whose book, as Hamann writes, always lay open on his table. Likewise must it, in the second place, not be forgotten that, according to his express explanation, all determinations usually contained in a complete ontology are to find their foundation in the *Critique*, a position in which he distinctly refers to Baumgarten. But these two facts must lead to Kant's leaving behind him the dualism between understanding and reason, the conceptions of nature and of freedom to which he had come, and then transcendental idealism also. The distinction between the theoretical reason, or the understanding, and the practical reason, or reason proper, is, as Kant expressly confesses, just the same as that which Tetens designates by the words *faculties of knowledge and of desire*. Now even Meier, more clearly Mendelssohn, and most strikingly Tetens, had shown that the faculty of feeling stands between the two as the faculty of pleasure and pain. Likewise, again, there was to be found in every complete ontology, and particularly in that of Baumgarten (*Met.*, 341 ff.), a conception the name for which, on account of its relationship with the problems or

conceptions relating to freedom, Kant had often applied to these, which, however, finds application equally in nature; and that is the conception of the end. By the fact that practical philosophy has shown what end should be realized, nothing is decided regarding the end which we find realized, regarding the perceived conformity to end. Hence is imposed a transcendental investigation of the feeling of pleasure and an analysis of the conception of the end, based on psychological and ontological principles. But both can very well be combined, since, as Kant expressly remarks in justification of this combination, the perception of conformity to an end always excites pleasure, and, conversely, what produces satisfaction must appear to us as end-determined. But that this investigation should have been termed Critique of Judgment instead of Critique of the Faculty of Feeling is explained by the fact that the *vis æstimativa* of the Schoolmen was adopted by the Wolffians as *judgment;* but Kant was without doubt also led habitually to call the faculty intermediate between understanding and reason, judgment, because logic usually places judging between conceiving and reasoning. In so doing, however, he calls attention directly to the circumstance that there is here no concern with an act of judgment in which the particular is subsumed under a given universal, but rather with one in which a universal is sought for the given particular. He calls this last, which alone henceforth is to be in question, an act of the reflecting, as opposed to the determining, judgment, which only subsumes under a known law. But that, in the investigations here to be instituted, Kant begins to transcend those of the other two Critiques, is clear from the fact that he is here compelled to deviate from the previous rhythmus of division. Kant, as did the Middle Ages, adhered to the Platonico-Aristotelian tradition that a scientific division must be dichotomous; and so closely that he cites it only as a "clever notion" that always, in the third category of each class, the two others are contained. The insertion of this third member between understanding and reason forces from Kant the confession that his divisions are mostly trichotomous. He excuses himself by saying that the dichotomous division corresponds to the analytic mode of procedure; trichotomy, on the other hand, to the synthetic. The more there dawns upon his followers the consciousness that his and their philosophy has to solve the problem of mediation (the problem of the age) to bridge over

and get beyond all previous antitheses by synthesis, the more must trichotomy rule in the articulation of the system; for, *dualitas reducta ad unitatem est trinitas*, runs the old saying. The schema of triple-membered articulation in philosophical investigation, which, later, was degraded, by misuse, into a Procrustean bed, dates properly from that table with which the introduction to the *Critique of Judgment* ends (p. 39), where, between the faculty of knowledge and that of desire, is placed the feeling of pleasure and pain, between understanding and reason, judgment, between determination by law and the final end, determination by end, between nature and freedom, art.

3. Corresponding to the problems which the transcendental establishment of the Metaphysics of Nature and of Morals had to solve, Kant formulates also the problem of the Critique of (reflective) Judgment thus: It has to answer the question, How are synthetic judgments *a priori* possible as regards our delight in perceived conformity to an end? *i.e.*, Can we, and why can we, determine, as regards pleasure, anything independently of all experience? But this question immediately falls into two, since, upon closer consideration, conformity to an end shows itself to be twofold. An object, that is to say, may affect the observer in a way that is end-determined as regards the person affected, *i.e.*, is in harmony with his nature and character: this conformity to an end, which contributes as little to the knowledge of the object as the merely finding it agreeable does, may be termed subjective, and the pleasure felt in it should be termed æsthetic, because it has nothing to do with the conception of the object (the logical element in it). It is otherwise where we perceive the conformity of an object to its notional or ideal possibility, *i.e.*, its nature and character; since we attribute to it objective conformity to an end, and our pleasure in it is logical. The *Critique of Judgment* falls, accordingly, into the Critique of Æsthetic and of Teleological judgment. Each of these, just as does the *Critique of Pure Reason*, falls into a Theory of Elements and a Theory of Method; only, Kant here himself confesses what was above asserted by us as regards the *Critique of Pure Reason* (§ 298, 2), that the Theory of Method is merely an appendix. The division of the Theory of Elements is in both parts the same: the Analytic determines in what (subjective and objective) conformity to an end consists, the Dialectic

answers the question how, as regards it, synthetic judgments *a priori* are possible.

4. The *Critique of Æsthetic Judgment* treats, in its First Part, of the *Analytic of Æsthetic Judgment* (pp. 43–202), the Beautiful and the Sublime, and has in the *Observations* written in the year 1764 a precursor similar to that which the *Critique of Pure Reason* had had in the *Dissertation.* Like the word "agreeable," each of those two words denotes not so much a property of the object as its relation to the subject. Only, the judgment which æsthetic taste pronounces regarding the beautiful, and æsthetic feeling regarding the sublime, does not claim, as does the judgment of the physical taste and feeling regarding the pleasantness of an object, to have merely individual validity; but though it does not, as does the moral law, postulate universal validity, it nevertheless requires of every one to recognise its general validity. That Kant terms the demonstration of the justification therefor the key to the entire investigation, and that he calls it the deduction of the (æsthetic) judgment of taste (and feeling) must appear as a matter of course to any one who bears in mind the deduction of space and time, as well as of the categories. Considering the beautiful first, he arrives at the result that where a perceived object causes us to subsume not only, as in the act of knowing, this perception under a conception, but also (because it brings to light a harmonious relation between imagination and understanding) the *faculty* of perception under the *faculty* of conception, there is produced a pleasure that is denoted by the word "beautiful." Since this pleasure is communicable, which an agreeable sensation of smell, for example, is not, we place the ground of the same in the object; and again, since the two faculties which were in concord in this pleasure are found in all men, we assume in all men a susceptibility to the beautiful, which, properly, should alone be called *sensus communis*, or common feeling (*Gemeingefühl*). Strictly speaking, we ought not to say, "The object is beautiful," but, "The object must seem beautiful to every one." Because it is, properly speaking, not the objective property of the object but the idea of it, which excites in an appropriate way the person contemplating it, the beautiful may be termed the formal conformity to end, or conformity to end as regards form; and the æsthetic judgment of taste does not at all concern the *material* existence of a thing. (Even the

imaginary pleases as beautiful.) The more precise definition of the conception of the beautiful may be attained by the aid of the table of categories, or, rather, according to the four classes of these; and the most important results to be mentioned are that an object is to be regarded as beautiful which calls forth a free, disinterested pleasure that does not rest upon a conception and is not to be traced to a conscious intention, and, finally, arises universally and necessarily. The sublime, to which Kant now passes, is held to be distinguished from the beautiful in such a manner that in it perceptions are not compared with conceptions of the understanding, but with Ideas of the reason, so that we feel the superiority of the reason to the imagination in that the extensive or intensive magnitudes which this produces, even the infinite which it fabricates, seem small in contrast to Ideas. Just on account of this disproportion between the two, there is mingled in the feeling of the sublime, as not in that of the beautiful, with the feeling of pleasure a kind of pain, and from this commingling there results the feeling of reverence, whereby the feeling for the sublime is connected more with the moral, the taste for the beautiful, on the other hand, with the theoretical. Since in the feeling for the sublime, just as above in the case of the beautiful, the faculty of perceptions is subordinated to the faculty of Ideas, so there arise thereby æsthetic (*i.e.*, sensible) Ideas (*i.e.*, something non-sensible), which point beyond experience, as do the Ideas of reason, but differ from them in such a way that the æsthetic Idea is a perception to which no conception ever corresponds, and which therefore is inexplicable [*inexponibel*], whereas the Idea of reason is a conception to which no perception can ever correspond, and which is therefore indemonstrable [*indemonstrabel*], since to demonstration monstration is also necessary. The impression of the beautiful and the sublime may be produced by an object of nature as well as by an object created by freedom. The latter, the art-product, will, since the consciousness of ends and intention must be wanting, be able to do this only if it be the work of genius, of freedom become natural endowment, in which the product of freedom has become like nature. In the beautiful work of art, therefore, that mean between nature and freedom is most completely attained. Where genius, the faculty of æsthetic Ideas, calls forth, by the production of the beautiful, or art, æsthetically interesting ideas, it is these that please and not the object,

for this may be hateful. Or more precisely, it is the harmony called forth by them in us, that fills us with pleasure. Since the means by which ideas are called forth (their presentation) may be a word, gesticulation, or tone of voice, art falls into the arts of discourse (poetry and oratory), the formative arts (plastic art and the art of design), and the arts of the play of sensation (music and painting). With the given explanation of beauty and sublimity, now, is also given the possibility of answering the question whether and how, as regards them, there are synthetic judgments *a priori;* which is answered, together with others, in the *Dialectic of Æsthetic Judgment* (pp. 203–226). If beauty were a property of objects, our judgments regarding it would have to be derived from experience. But since it has been shown that beauty and sublimity lie in us precisely as time, space, and the categories do, it is also shown that we must derive our judgments regarding them from ourselves. The idealism of conformity to an end answers the question in the affirmative, and explains the possibility of so doing: it explains at the same time how even that can be beautiful which is very obviously produced without design and by mechanical causes. All this, æsthetic realism, which declares beauty to be an objective property, is unable to do. Whereas according to it a beautiful object of nature would be possible only where nature had a design to please us, idealism teaches us to receive the object with favour, to look upon it *as if* it had the power to call forth in us an end-determined frame of mind. And the idealism of conformity to an end has the advantage, that contradictions that are not solvable by realism can be easily solved by it. The two propositions, The judgment of taste cannot rest upon a conception, for otherwise it would be demonstrable, and, It must rest upon one, for otherwise it could not be at all disputable, are reconciled by æsthetic idealism, in that it shows that in the thesis there is in question a conception of the understanding that extends our knowledge and hence is limited to the realm of experience, whereas in the antithesis there is in question a conception of the reason in an Idea, which transcends the realm of experience (hence the name of this section). Whoever should expect that the Dialectic, which, now, has shown the possibility of *a priori* judgments of taste, will be followed, similarly as was the Dialectic of Pure Reason, by a Metaphysics of the Beautiful, is undeceived by the short *Appendix*

with which the *Critique of Judgment* closes (pp. 224–227), which declares a theory of method of taste to be impossible, because there is no science of the beautiful. Manner (*modus*) here occupies the place of method (*methodus*); the master shows how to do, the pupil imitates. The best means to be employed as propædeutic to all fine art is the study of the ancients, and moral culture; this is with justice termed a study of the *humaniora*.

5. In the First Part of the *Critique of Teleological Judgment*, the *Analytic* (pp. 232–258), there is first determined the conception of the inner end, or end of nature, in opposition to that of utility, which the previous teleology had laid down: it is something that is cause and effect of itself, since in it all parts are determined by the Idea of the whole and are held in reciprocity, so that, consequently, the organized and self-organizing product of nature is to be regarded as an end of nature. On the necessity of such a view, Kant has expressed himself *in extenso* in the Introduction, to this effect: The Transcendental Dialectic and the philosophy of nature resting upon it had laid down all the *a priori* universal laws to which the ordered world (nature) of movable matter is subject. Since they all relate only to motions that are called forth by external causes, they may be termed mechanical, their totality mechanism. Now in one portion of the phenomena of nature we encounter a multitude of particular laws not to be deduced from those universal laws; which particular laws must, when compared with those universal laws, be regarded as accidental, *i.e.*, as not necessary, consequences of the mechanism of nature. The tendency of reason is to seek everywhere a universal law for those accidental particular laws—which indeed had been the business of the reflecting judgment. Such a law is, now, that of a causality that is different from that which is mechanical and depends upon external causes, and hence is an inner causality. But the inner ground of motion is end, or purpose (motive, cf. § 40). The necessity for the assumption of this second or other kind of causality is a necessity determined by the organization of our understanding, hence obtains only of us, is subjective. If we were not constituted so that we have to bring the conception—as that which attests the possibility of the object—into conjunction with the perception, which is a warrant of its reality, or, so that the perception gives to our merely formal

conception all content; if, to express it otherwise, our understanding were perceptive and our perception were intellectual, the case here might be different. It is possible to conceive such an understanding; in fact, it must be pre-supposed that in a nature the reality of which follows from its possibility, thoughts (conceptions) immediately have reality (are perceptions). To such an understanding all the parts may be presented at the same time with the Idea of the whole; but for that reason, also, there can be no difference at all between what occurs as the result of causes and what occurs as the result of ends. With us it is entirely otherwise. Our understanding acts discursively; derives the whole out of the parts, and hence views the latter as antecedent to the former. When, consequently, it encounters phenomena which (like those of life) cannot be understood in this way, it acknowledges that these will never find their Newton, who will construe them as he did the motions of the planets. Hence it is not forbidden, even as regards these phenomena, to carry the explanation based on mechanical causes as far as it will go, and only at the last moment possible admit the other kind of causality. But, sooner or later, we shall arrive at a point where that explanation no longer suffices, but we must consider the living object as regards its inner determination by an end, in order to understand it. But here two things must never be forgotten: first, that there is only one portion of the phenomena of nature in which the Idea of an end in nature is indispensable, viz., those of the organic world; second, that the indispensability of the same is merely subjective, has being only for us, so that we ought not so much to say, These phenomena are, as, rather, They are to be explained *by us* only by the assumption of an inner end. The fact that the Idea of an inner determination by an end is only a subjective maxim explains the delight that we feel on perceiving it; but such is not the case as regards knowledge of mere causal connection. More important is it, that here also only the idealistic view of inner determination by an end places us in a position to solve the contradictions that remain unsolvable on the standpoint of the opposed view. The *Dialectic of Teleological Judgment* (pp. 259–294), that is to say, shows us that the two propositions, Everything happens in accordance with mechanical laws, and, Nothing is possible in accordance with mechanical laws, do not form an insoluble contradiction. The solution

lies in the circumstance that both are false, and that the defenders of the first, Epicureanism and Spinozism, as well as those of the second, Hylozoism and Theism, are untenable systems of natural science, the one fanciful, the other chimerical, because they convert maxims of reflection into dogmatic assertions, entirely apart from the fact that they ignore the above-mentioned distinction of the organic and inorganic world. Here also, to the Dialectic is joined an *Appendix*, which discusses the theory of method of the teleological judgment (pp. 295–376). This contains an extended discussion of teleology and its relation to natural science and theology. Here Kant expresses himself to this effect, that if man be looked upon as the final end of the world, this is admissible only if man, the *homo noumenon*, the subject of morality, be spoken of, and hence, properly speaking, morality must be fixed as this final end. In favour of this view speaks also the fact that the well-being or happiness which that earlier teleology particularly had in view may be conceived also as a result of the mere nature-mechanism, but morality cannot at all be so conceived. As regards, further, the physical theology, Kant does not fail to perceive that in it is formulated what the human heart usually feels in viewing the order in nature,—superiority to it. But he remarks upon this point, particularly where the physico-theological argument for the existence of God is advanced, that so little is known by us of the order in nature, and the amount of what appears to us, by reason of this ignorance, as disorder is so great, that we can at most only conclude to a wise orderer, but not by any means to an all-wise creator. But it is otherwise if we make our point of departure what was just affirmed to be the final end of nature, *i.e.*, morality, and, instead of a physical theology, attempt an ethical theology. Of all proofs for the existence of God, the moral, as given in the practical philosophy, according to which the existence of God is a postulate of the practical reason, is the most cogent, and, like the *Critique of Pure Reason*, and the *Critique of Practical Reason*, the *Critique of Judgment* closes with the praise of the faith of reason, which, because it rests upon morality, is religion, *i.e.*, knowledge of our duty as a divine command.

6. The assertion made above (*sub* 1), that in the *Critique of Judgment* more than in the other two *Critiques* Kant has combined the views of the seventeenth century with

those of the eighteenth, in which he had been bred, will be found justified by the table of contents preceding the work. The relative justification which he allows to the purely mechanical point of view as regards phenomena up to those of life; his agreement, bordering on literalness, with Descartes, where, in opposition to the view that man as a sensible existence is to be conceived as the end of creation, he confesses that to an infinite understanding all synthesis through ends may become mechanism—a position with which may easily be combined, as a complement, the Spinozistic assertion that the mind in philosophizing, being a part of such an infinite understanding, views the universe as this does,—all this makes it clear why to many who were in agreement with the results of the two other *Critiques*, the *Critique of Judgment* was an unwelcome phenomenon, the more so the more antipantheistic they were, whereas to those who constructed a pantheism upon a Kantian foundation it was most welcome. (The former statement will be illustrated in connection with Herbart, the latter in connection with Schelling.) If, therefore, in the practical philosophy, Kant, by distinguishing the intelligible and empirical natures of man, had made it possible, as did Leibnitz (indeed even more than he), to ascribe to him subjectivity, as Spinoza had accidentality, the separation of inorganic nature from the organic places him in a position to combine with the rigid mechanism of the Cartesio-Spinozistic view the teleology of Leibnitz and the Enlightenment; but the conception of an inner conformity to an end had made it possible for him to rise above both these. But at the same time the above-made assertion is thereby justified (§ 296, 3), that in proportion as the second problem of the most modern philosophy finds its solution, the *third* also attains solution, namely, the placing the view of antiquity in possession of its rights. No age has shown so little understanding for this as that of the Enlightenment. Winckelmann and Lessing, the only two who form an exception, are the prophets of a new age, to which Kant, who is their intellectual relative and supporter, already belongs by the fact that he, with them, calls it into life. Even the fact that, in the system of Kant, physics is one of the main divisions, and that in the other division the theory of the State plays so important a rôle, evinces (cf. § 120) an agreement with the philosophy of the ancients; still more the fact that in the

manner in which he views nature all the various ways are combined in which the philosophy of the ancients had viewed it. Before Anaxagoras, there was only one view, which derived all things out of the natural sources of motion, *i.e.*, the mechanical view; with Anaxagoras there begins, and has not ceased even with Plato (*vid.* § 87, 5), the external teleological way of looking at nature, which connects nature with ends lying outside of it, and thus diverges from that first theory. Aristotle was the first who maintained the conception of the inner immanent end, which places him in a position to be even more just than Plato to the earlier theory, which entirely ignored end in nature, to say nothing of the fact that it enabled him to conceive the nature of living being, as well as that of the work of fine art, as self-end. Although Kant had no direct acquaintance with Aristotle, as had Lessing, and hence does not confess to having such reverence for him (regarded as a logician), yet the agreement with Aristotle's theory (of nature and of fine art) is as great in his case as in Lessing's. But if he is in agreement with Aristotle, so also is he with all philosophemes before Aristotle, who had incorporated these into his system. But the third period of ancient philosophy had put forth other theories; and first, those of the Dogmatists (§ 95 ff.), which originally were indeed only in the province of ethics. But the relationship of the Kantian theories with those of the Stoics has been so often affirmed and shown to be just in this province, that, instead of repeating what was long ago said, we must, the rather, bear in mind that the admirer of Lucretius could not, irrespectively of the Epicureans, have come to conceive happiness as an attendant of natural circumstance, and yet give it so high a place in ethics. That Kant has points of agreement with the Epicurean theory even much more in physics than in ethics his *Theory of the Heavens* expressly acknowledges. Further, as regards Scepticism (*vid.* § 99 ff.), Kant is very often obliged to allow himself to find fault with it, and the justification for asserting, when speaking of Pyrrho, that he formulated the problem of philosophy just as Kant has, will very soon be shown. That, finally, the Roman Syncretism (*vid.* § 106) should leave lasting traces upon a man who at school was a rival of Ruhnkenius in Latin and must consequently have had his Cicero well in mind, this last circumstance must be a guarantee, even if he had not, at the beginning of his literary

activity, fixed as a goal the mediation of oppositions, and his proof for the existence of God were not to be found in Cicero. Therefore not only pre-Aristotelian but also post-Aristotelian theories found acceptance with the father of the mediation-philosophy. But since, for a real mediation, it is necessary that the opposition of sides should have become sharpened to the farthest extreme, it becomes necessary to show as regards Kant—if indeed there does not apply to him a criticism analogous to that brought against Platonism in regard to physical and logical one-sidedness (*vid.* § 82), namely, that it carried the whole pagan philosophy into what was indeed a Christian view (*vid.* § 258), but a view already reconciled with the world, and hence conceded to pre-Christian secularity a preponderance—that the diametrical opposite of the ancient philosophy, the mediæval spiritual philosophy, or theosophy, likewise received with him a full recognition. That such is really the case, and that also the mediæval philosophy is, in its most essential forms, contained as a moment in the Kantian system, is proved, above all, by the fourth masterpiece of Kant: *Religion within the Limits of Mere Reason* (Wks., vi.).

§ 302.

KANT'S RELIGION WITHIN THE LIMITS OF MERE REASON.

1. In the Transcendental Theory of Method (p. 601) Kant, in almost literal agreement with Pyrrho, states the task of philosophy to be the answering of the three questions: What can I know? What ought I to do? What may I hope? He designates the first of these as theoretical, the second as practical, the third as at the same time practical and theoretical. This last is done because, as appears from what follows (p. 602), Kant connects immediately with the third question, as its complement, the presupposition that the one who hopes will do what he should do. All three *Critiques*, which have just been characterized, have ended in the faith of reason, or religion, and in all three the theoretical *and* the practical question were answered as if they meant, What may I hope in order to do what I ought? *i.e.*, the theoretical was throughout subordinated, as means, to the practical, as to the end, exactly in a manner corresponding to the steadily inculcated primacy of the practical reason, of which God, freedom and immortality were so often proclaimed by him to be postulates.

But, now, there appears a work, which, according to an expression in one of Kant's letters, has as its object the answering of that third question, or, what means the same thing, to give Kant's philosophical theory of religion. Here his method of procedure is as if he had asked, "What may I hope, *if* I do what I ought? that is, theoretical certainty becomes a consequence and (since this consequence does not enter as unwilled consequence) appears as a willed consequence or proposed end and hence as an essential fact. What wonder that many of his "Enlightened" friends were alarmed at this approach to the orthodox, with whom pure theory was the essential thing, whereas the Enlightened, and hitherto Kant also, had declared it to be right-doing. A work so honestly intended must suffer being characterized as a disloyal condescension; one of the most profound works, as a sad example of the weakness of age. If Kant fixed as the problem of his philosophical theory of religion, to show that what can be known through the doctrines of the Church and of the Bible can also be known by reason, keeping entirely within the limits of reason, and employed, to establish and explain his principles, the history, languages, books of all people, even the Bible itself,—his course is just the opposite of that followed by the Church Fathers, who drew from the Bible the eternal truth, and that by the Scholastics, who made truths of reason out of dogmas. But just on this account must he come into contact with them. Coincidence in the two sides in this encounter shows that all essential dogmas which Patristic activity had established (*vid.* §§ 140–144) were discussed by Kant; as an encounter with those who were moving in an opposite direction, it shows that the course for Kant is the opposite of that which the framers of dogmas had followed. He first comes to terms with Augustine, then with what Cyril and Dioscurus had laid down, and finally with Athanasius. First he attempts to get an unbiased standpoint. Since this is presented neither by supernaturalism, which asserts the necessity of a supernatural revelation, nor by naturalism, which asserts its impossibility, nor even, finally, by Deism, which declares that historical religion contains only what natural religion teaches, Kant takes such a position, that upon all this he decides nothing, but declares natural religion to be necessary, which demands that a thing be recognised as a duty rather than as a divine command. Whoever maintains this principle, hence he

who thinks as he himself does, is characterized by Kant as the pure rationalist.

2. Of the four parts, into which the Philosophical Theory of Religion falls, the first treats of, The Indwelling of the Evil Principle by the side of the Good, or *Concerning the Radical Evil in Human Nature* (pp. 177–216). After characterizing here the two opposed views, according to one of which the world lies in wickedness and daily sinks deeper in, while the other, the "heroic," asserts, in the face of all historical experience, the opposite; and after having expressed the opinion that here, also, an intermediate view is possible, he combats the view that evil is one with sense, or is grounded in a natural impulse. Rather, as evil does not consist in the sense-nature nor in reason, but in the (false) subjection of the latter to the former, instead of the reverse, it proceeds from, or has its roots in, the fact that man has made this conversion a maxim (for only what proceeds from a maxim of the will is good or evil). This maxim, for which no temporal origin can be pointed out, which preconditions all evil deeds, since it is their subjective condition, may be termed an innate propensity; but one may not will to exculpate a human being on that account. For, since this propensity is evil, it must be a deed of one's own, and there remains only that the *peccatum originarium* is an intelligible deed, to be cognised only by the reason, a deed from which the temporal, empirically knowable evil deeds, *peccata derivativa*, proceed. If, now, this fact be represented as historical, as in the Bible, the non-temporal condition of evil deeds is converted into a pre-condition of all evil deeds. Just so the two facts that that maxim has its ground in the mind, and that its origin in man cannot be pointed out, make, when combined, the conclusion almost inevitable that a mind outside the human mind (The Seducer) is the ground. The distinction—represented in the *Critique of Pure Reason* as possible, shown in the Practical Philosophy to be necessary—into the intelligible, and empirical natures, or thought and sense, alone helps us here; as this also enables us to conceive the conversion from the evil to the good, whether this appear always as a gradual change in the sense-nature, or as a revolution in the thought-nature, a new birth or creation. Whoever (like God) knows the intelligible ground of action, will be able to look upon the empirical ground which is still involved in progres-

sion as good, as well-pleasing to Him. As a subsidiary point, because it relates to what the reason can neither construe nor show as impossible, Kant treats of the question whether there be works of grace, by which God can help to that conversion. It should have no practical interest whatever, since we ourselves should always do all that is possible for our own betterment.

3. The Second Part treats of the *Conflict of the Good Principle with the Evil for the Mastery in Man* (pp. 219–257), and discusses particularly the theory of Atonement. Since humanity in its moral perfection is the final end of creation, this man who alone is well-pleasing to God can with right be characterized as existent from all eternity, as He through whom (*i.e.*, for whose sake) all things were made, as the Son of God, etc. This Idea of perfect humanity, since we have not made it, has descended to us and has made its dwelling with us, united itself with us. It is to be thought only under the Idea of a man in whom we practically believe if we seek to become so like him that there is secured to us the assurance of living with him in equal relations. If now, a man of so divine a disposition should come at a certain time, as it were out of Heaven, upon earth, and had given in himself the example of a man well-pleasing to God, and brought about an infinitely great moral good through a revolution in the human race, he *might*, perhaps, be a supernaturally begotten man; we have the less cause to assume this, as the exaltation of such a holy one above all human frailty might be an obstacle to the practical efficacy of his example. Still, he could speak of himself as if the Ideal of the Good were corporeally represented in him, because he speaks only of that disposition of mind which he has taken for his rule. This disposition of mind would be the righteousness that obtains before God. By the death of the old man we receive into ourselves the disposition of the Son of God, hence Him, and the pain that accompanies such death is the punishment that the new man suffers for the old, which then by personification becomes the death suffered by him for our redemption. Only with this view of the theory of redemption is it of practical importance; for we see that only by the receiving of the Ideal, of the Son of God, into our disposition and by change of heart, is absolution conceivable, and with it the certainty that the feared might of evil can avail nothing

against that which is good. The General Observation to the Second Part considers, though as subsidiary, miracles, and arrives at the result that they are theoretically indemonstrable, even though undeniable, and ethically without meaning, since a belief supported by them would be immoral. Practically, moreover, nobody believes in them.

4. The Third Part considers the victory of the good principle over the evil, and the *Founding of a Kingdom of God upon Earth* (pp. 261–325). So far as men can work together, for this victory, they have the condition for the establishment of an ethical community, in which the law-giver is not, as in a civil community, the people at large united into one whole, but the Searcher of Hearts, so that *ethical community* and *people of God* mean the same thing. This Idea can be carried out only in the form of a Church, in which the people are distinguished from their leaders, who are servants of the Church. A true Church (ordered in accordance with the table of categories) will have the predicates of universality, purity, freedom, and unchangeableness. Since the frailty of men makes it impossible that the faith of reason, this foundation of the invisible Church, should be the basis of a visible Church, there inevitably enters into the place of pure ethical religion a religion of worship, in which, it is supposed, one renders proper service to God by fulfilling certain statutory injunctions. Like all statutes, these can be learned only empirically; hence the religion of the visible Church, or the creed, consists merely in a historical faith. Such a faith can be kept abiding only by a scripture believed to be holy, as regards which, it is fortunate if it, like the Bible, contains the purest ethical doctrines. Every creed is one of the modes of faith in which religion, more or less concealed, manifests itself, hence is a vehicle of the pure faith of religion. Properly speaking, it has the latter for its expounder, and a moral exposition of the Holy Scripture, therefore, stands higher than the mere scriptural learning, which has a doctrinal character. The object of every creed is to prepare the way for the faith of reason; if the leading-string snaps before it becomes a fetter, that transition can precede it without revolution, otherwise, not. For that reason, Kant eulogizes his age, because all persons of culture refrain from pronouncing judgment as to whether the Holy Scripture is of divine origin, obliging no one to assent to the doctrine that it is, and regard

moral conduct as the essential thing in religion. This is an approximation to the goal where God shall be all in all, in that the historical faith has prepared the way for the faith of reason. The General Observation to this Part relates to the mysteries, and is occupied particularly with the Trinity, which is interpreted in such a manner that God is to be conceived as having a moral quality of a three-fold nature, for which the designation of each of the various (moral) personalities is not an unfit expression. Without the distinctions of holiness, goodness, and justice, there is incurred the danger of falling into a slavish faith, since God would be thought of as is a human despot (in whom the three forms of authority are united). But it must always be held fast that reason can permit this mystery only in a practical interest. Not with a view to a theoretical knowledge of God, but because it is of practical interest that calling, atonement, and election should not be confounded, can we say that the symbol of baptism expresses complete pure ethical religion.

5. The Fourth Part, which treats of true and false service under the dominion of the good principle, or of *Religion and Priesthood* (pp. 329–389), is linked with the fact that in the preceding Part the transition from the historical faith to that of reason is designated as the proper coming of the kingdom of God. Before the goal is completely attained, true service of God consists in furthering that transition, false service in the hindering of it. If in the Christian religion, which, like the others, contains, besides the doctrines of natural religion, a historical and a statutory element, worth is attributed to the latter alone, or even merely a greater worth than to the former, there arises a preponderance of the learned class, since only they are familiar with the historical element. This preponderance leads to priesthood, which, since the majority of the people consists of laity, is a source of danger to the State, because those who have become habituated to rendering a false show of service at last become clever in rendering only a mere show of obedience to the civil law. If false service consists in the false subjection of the faith of reason to the historical faith, as a part of it must be reckoned also the false education of youth, which bases the theory of virtue upon the theory of godliness, instead of, in the opposite way, awakening first the ethical spirit and beginning a new life. The General Observation considers the means of grace (an expression in

which there is said to lie a contradiction). Prayer, a wish expressed in God's presence, which the majority of people hesitate to use, as they do loud speaking, rests, if it is to be more than a self-exaltation in a soliloquy, upon an illusory personification. Church-going and sacraments are convenient means of keeping alive feeling, but may become dangerous if they betray one into substituting for the only proper way, leading from virtue to grace, the false way which indolence chooses and which ostensibly leads from grace to virtue.

6. One must be blind or must delude himself if he is doubtful as to the answer to the question, To whom does Kant the more incline; to those who recognise only a religion of right-doing, or those who call themselves by preference orthodox? or if one should say, the justification of dogma, and hence of the Middle Ages which originated dogmas, was as clear to Kant as, somewhat later, it was to Franz von Baader. One cannot deny, however, that there was reason for this, when, in earnest and in jest, Kant was proclaimed, after the appearance of his Theory of Religion, as the promoter of orthodoxy; when his friends shook their heads over the supposed fact that he had appeared as an apostle of a new Scholasticism; when Willmann gave him friendly greeting (and was not repulsed) because he agreed in so many things with the mediæval Mystics. The charge of gnosticism which, on account of his interpretation of the dogmas, appears to us to-day as the one lying nearest to hand, was, probably because people troubled themselves little about the Gnostics, not open at that time, but all the more open later. Whoever, finally, as regards that "intelligible act," recalls the doctrine of Origen, as well as individual expressions of Augustine, will hardly call it an unjustifiable assertion that the most essential standpoints of the Middle Ages resound in Kant's philosophy of religion precisely as do those of antiquity in his philosophy of nature. If one bears in mind that, Lessing excepted, none of the spokesmen of the eighteenth century saw in the theology of the Middle Ages anything else than puerilities, one can fathom the gulf that was put by this book between them and Kant. Hence the long-continued neglect of it. If, however, one puts together what was said at the end of the Transcendental Æsthetic (§ 298, 3), of the Transcendental Analytic (§ 299, 6), and in various places in the account of the practical philosophy (§ 304), and finally, in connection

with the *Critique of Judgment* (§ 301, 6), and what was just now said, even the above-made assertion is justified, namely, that Kant is, indeed, not the alpha and omega of the latest philosophy, but the epoch-making philosopher of it, because in him all its problems already have their solution. Whether and wherein these solutions remain incomplete, the further development of philosophy has to show. As by the discovery made by Anaxagoras the circle was described beyond which Attic philosophy did not pass, so Kant, who—if we may institute a comparison—took a step forward as great as (if not greater than) did Anaxagoras, the Sophists, and Socrates together, laid the foundation upon which, up to the present day, all have built.

B.—KANTIANS AND ANTI-KANTIANS.

§ 303.

The Reception of Criticism

1. Although the Kantian philosophy might be expected to have, not less than the Wolffian (*vid.* what was said above, § 290, 9), a numerous following, yet this was a long time in coming. Scarcely any notice was taken of the *Dissertation;* much less was its epoch-making character suspected. One person, however, forms an exception here; naturally so, since he had appeared as respondent for it, and Kant had talked the contents of it over with him. This was the brilliant Marcus Herz, who in his *Reflections in Speculative Philosophy* (Königsberg, 1771) developed further Kant's views on time and space. Attention was directed to the *Dissertation* also by Mendelssohn, whose criticisms of it nevertheless show how little he had perceived its importance. The *Critique of Pure Reason* also appeared, and the best review of it (the Garve-Feder review) Kant could with justice characterize as one in which criticism had preceded investigation. Towards arousing the attention of the public, more was contributed than by Kant's own *Prolegomena* by the court-preacher Johann Schulze (1793–1805), in his *Explanations relating to Professor Kant's Critique of Pure Reason*, and, later, by his *Examination of the Kantian Critique of Pure Reason* (2 vols., Königsberg,

1789–92), because he here distinctly showed that this new system was not dangerous to religion. Much greater desert was won for himself through the dissemination of the Kantian doctrines by K. L. Reinhold, in the *Letters on the Kantian Philosophy* which appeared in Wieland's *Deutscher Mercur* in the years 1786 and 1787, and were published separately later. In these it was for the first time shown that all oppositions that had hitherto divided philosophy were reconciled by this system and that the source of all disputes was cut off. It was of great consequence for the doctrine that the Jena *Allgemeine Literaturzeitung*, founded in the year 1785, and particularly Schütz and Hufeland, the two chief-editors, took a decided stand for the doctrine. Because of this, as also of the circumstance that Reinhold was professor there, and that, besides him, the very prolific writer CARL CHRISTIAN EHRHARD SCHMID (1761–1812) likewise taught in the spirit of Kant, Jena was, almost more than Königsberg itself, the principal seat, and, particularly, the seminary of Kantism. At the end of the nineties there was hardly a German university where the Kantian philosophy was not taught from a professorial chair, hardly any of the more important German towns in which there did not live writers of the Kantian school, and hardly a science that had not found application for Kantian ideas, even though it may have been that many of these applications consisted merely in bringing forward the Table of Categories, and were strongly suggestive of Lully's rotation method. A complete enumeration of the names of the most important Kantians in and out of Germany cannot be expected here. This may be found in my large work on the *Entwickelung der deutschen Speculation seit Kant* (2 vols., Leipsic, 1848–53), in § 14, 2.

2. OPPONENTS of a philosophy the founder of which says at the close of his chief work, "Hitherto all paths in philosophy have led to no goal; there remains, then, to those who find themselves in one of the paths hitherto trodden, only the new critical path," could not be wanting. All attacks upon Kant that proceed from an interest in particular questions, whether theoretical or practical, political or religious, may here be passed by. Only a momentary glance will be bestowed upon those which strike at the basis or the fundamental views of the system. The philosophy that ruled in Germany was, as has been shown (*vid.* § 294), the syncretistic popular philosophy,

having, on the one hand, a realistic, on the other an idealistic, colouring. Both must have divined that the new doctrine would threaten death to them. But of course each would condemn in it, not what was akin, but what was opposed, to itself. From the Göttingen circle came, as has frequently been said, the first more important review (in this class cannot be numbered that by Ewald published in the Gotha *Gelehrte Zeitung*) of the *Critique of Pure Reason*. This review sees in the work pure Berkeleianism. The leaders of this circle, Meiners and Feder, miss no opportunity to attack Kant. To the first, Kant is a sophist, because he professes to doubt sensible reality; to the second, an extreme idealist. Weishaupt, who was trained by Feder, makes about the same objections as his earlier master. A man who stands in close relation with this circle is Tiedemann in Giessen, who, gradually coming to very sceptical views, combats the Kantian system as too dogmatic. Not widely different proves to be the verdict of Platner of Leipsic, although he proceeds with a certain diplomatic prudence. In direct opposition thereto, Eberhard, who belongs to the Berlin circle, asserts that Kant arrived at his divergences from the doctrine of Leibnitz with the assistance of Locke, who is therefore responsible for his errors. Mendelssohn, again, who belongs to the same circle, sees in Criticism only a revival of the scepticism of Hume, and hence, Kant is to him the universal iconoclast. A blunter view of the case is that of Nicolai, who, in romances professing to be witty, attacks the "*vonvornige*" (*a priori*) philosophy. The spirit of Mendelssohn and Nicolai had become the ruling one in the Berlin Academy, when the former was dead and the latter was not yet member of it. Thus in the year 1792, the prize-question on the Progress of Metaphysics was instituted by it, and repeated in 1795; for the answering of this, Schwab received the prize because he proved that metaphysics had remained wholly unshaken since the time of Wolff. (A treatise by Hülsen, which contained the remark that nothing such as the gentlemen called metaphysics really existed after 1781, and particularly after the Science of Knowledge, was generally regarded merely as pleasantry.) The same Schwab published, with a recommendation from Nicolai, *Nine Dialogues between Wolff and a Kantian* (1798), as well as *Eight Letters upon some Contradictions and Inconsequences in Kant's latest Works* (1791). He was also one of the most active

contributors to Eberhard's philosophical journal, which had taken for its especial task the combating of Kant.

3. Neither wholly among the adherents, nor wholly among the opponents, of Kant, are to be counted those who adopt a multitude of ideas which were first set in circulation by him, but combine with them so much that Kant had combated that only more or less of one or another element decides where they are to be placed. Least of all, and yet to some extent, do Kantian ideas make their appearance in the kind and manner in which Ulrich of Jena develops, in his logical and ethical writings, his determinism, to which Kant opposed his "turn-spit"; more, however, in Professor Abel of Stuttgart, who antagonized Kant in a series of writings, but with weapons which he had taken from him. While Brastberger and Bornträger attempt a reconciliation between Kant and the Enlightenment, ABICHT in Erlangen is usually numbered entirely among the Kantians, and has really close connection with them by his works: *Investigation of the Function of the Will* (1788), and *Metaphysics of Pleasure according to Kant* (1789), and by the fact that with Born, the translator of the *Critique of Pure Reason* into Latin, he edited the *New Philosophical Magazine for the Exposition of the Kantian System* (1789–91). But he did not stop there: Reinhold's attempt to be spoken of later, to preface Kant's *Critique* by an Elementary Philosophy as an introduction, found an imitator in Abicht, who also wrote such a work (1795), which, however, differed greatly from Reinhold's. Still more removed from Kant and Reinhold was he in his *Re-examining Critique of the Speculating Reason* (Altenberg 1799–1801), the title of which, even, betrays its positive, and, at the same time, negative, relation to Criticism. Finally are to be mentioned a couple of men who avowedly borrow much from Kant, but, since they learned to know him when they had already received philosophical incitement from other quarters, were incapable of occupying the position of mere pupils. As regards the sources of this instigation they form a kind of contrast one with the other, since the one received his impulse from Spinoza, and the other owes his entirely to the eighteenth century. The former is AUGUST WILHELM REHBERG (1757–1836), a man who was highly respected as a theoretical and practical statesman, whose political views, which were formed in part by J. Möser, were expounded in

his judgments upon the French Revolution, which appeared first in the *Allgemeine Literaturzeitung*, then as a work proper. It touches at very many points the celebrated work of Burke. That it was particularly the study of Spinoza that furnished to him the theoretical basis for his anti-revolutionary views, appears from the earlier-written work, *On the Relation of Metaphysics to Religion* (1787), in which he explains that there is no other metaphysics than the Spinozistic, but defends this against the charge of being dangerous to religion. Wholly different is the position of CHRISTIAN JACOB KRAUS (1753–1807), who was Professor of Practical Philosophy and Cameralistics in Königsberg, and very highly esteemed by Kant. His treatise on *Pantheism*, composed at the suggestion of Jacobi, shows that he had zealously studied Spinozism, but with the individualistic view of his century tenaciously fixed in his conviction. There could not be expected of a pupil of Hume and Adam Smith an inclination towards that "Proteus," as it was the fashion for a long time after the appearance of Kraus's essay to term pantheism. Grateful recognition of Hume was it, also, that caused Kraus, who was in agreement with Kant in the theory of time and space and of transcendental freedom, to wish that scepticism might more fully receive its due in Kant's philosophy. Kraus's works, edited by H. von Auerswald (7 vols., 1808–1813), have for their eighth volume, a work entitled: *Voigt, a Biography of this Learned and Discreet Man* (1819).

4. More was contributed towards the spreading of Kantian Ideas by Germany's Sophocles, JOHANN CHRISTOPH FRIEDRICH SCHILLER (Nov. 10, 1759—May 9, 1805), than by any professed philosopher. The instruction of Abel in the Carlsschule, the ardour with which the youth studied the writings of Lessing and Garve, the enthusiasm with which Rousseau filled him, are the most important *momenta* in the development of Schiller's view of the world before his attention was turned to Kant. The Philosophical Letters of the year 1786 show, attractive as they are, a ferment that had not yet arrived at clarification, of pantheistic and sceptical opinions. That it was, at the very first, the *Observations on the Feeling of the Beautiful and Sublime*, and then (after 1791) the *Critique of Judgment*, that were for Schiller the entrance-gate into Criticism is readily comprehensible. But one underestimates Kant's influence upon Schiller and the capacity

of the latter for philosophical investigation, if one supposes that he had success only with Kant's Æsthetics. Through the encouragement given him by Körner and the assistance given him by Reinhold, but most of all through his own close reading of Kant's works, he identified himself, more perhaps than either of the men named, with the original Kantian stand-point. That the principal business of philosophers is analysis, that we can suppose the existence of an intuitive understanding only in a superhuman being, that philosophy has to limit itself to the deduction of the most universal laws of knowability, but has to discover empirically the particular to be subsumed under them—all this Schiller holds as firmly as Kant, and both, therefore, saw in the Science of Knowledge a mistake. To what Schiller otherwise says in the most various writings, on the distinction between realism and idealism, there arises no objection from the Kantian stand-point. Just as decidedly as in the transcendental philosophy does Schiller agree with Kant in respect to ethics; at least in what is essential, the unconditional—hence independent of an empirically given nature in man—validity of the moral law. This does not imply that the poet, for whom, as artist, the sensuous side of man has great importance, is somewhat doubtful as regards the rigorism of duty, which appears to lead to an ascetic, monkish morality. It appears from Kant's answer to him how highly Kant respected him, and how well Kant knew himself to be in agreement with him. In a political regard, also, must Schiller be placed with Kant in his equally strong opposition to anarchy and despotism; only, in the case of Schiller, there gradually makes its appearance an element that is usually wanting in the then coryphenses of literature, and which had left even him for a long time cold, viz., the national. It is not only the cosmopolitan, it is also the German, that expresses himself in Schiller's political views. Most of all, as was natural under the circumstances, was it the æsthetic doctrines of Kant that interested Schiller. His first teacher in æsthetics, Lessing, whose dictum that the representation of the beautiful is the sole end of art became the rock upon which the edifice of Schiller's Æsthetics continued to stand, had founded upon Aristotle. Schiller first learned to know Aristotle's *Poetics* after he had formed for himself an æsthetics under the guidance of Kant, and is surprised to find in it the confirmation of his own theories. At first, Schiller

had hoped to find in Kant the conception of the beautiful objectively defined. Gradually, what were precisely the cardinal points of Kant's Critique of Æsthetical Judgment, viz., that there is no objectively demonstrable principle for the beautiful, hence no science of the same, but that criticism and analysis have discovered only the subjective conditions under which a thing pleases as beautiful; that æsthetic pleasure is independent of the matter and the existence of the object, and relates solely to its form and its appearance; that that is beautiful which calls forth a free play or a harmonious relation of the powers of representation and hence makes us feel subjective conformity to end, etc.,—won Schiller's assent. The fruits of the reflections that were aroused by Kant are laid down in the Æsthetical Essays, among which are particularly to be mentioned: *On the Ground of Pleasure in Tragical Subjects* (1792): *On the Art of Tragedy* (1792): *On Grace and Dignity* (1793): *On the Pathetic* (1793): *On the Æsthetic Education of Man* (1795): *On the Necessary Limits in the Use of Beautiful Forms* (1795): *On Naïve and Sentimental Poetry* (1796). He shows in these works how æsthetic feeling brings into harmonious accord the form-giving reason and the matter-receiving sense-faculty, and puts the mind in a state of quiet reflection, since what is perceived (the beautiful) produces by the form of its appearance an active play of the imagination. Differing from Kant, who supposes the feeling of the beautiful to be produced only where the dependent, conditioned beauty (of the human form) does not supervene (upon the tone or colour composition), Schiller considers man as the proper ideal, and passes from the grace and dignity to be distinguished in him to the distinction between beauty and sublimity. That the sublime should particularly interest him, who was almost exclusively a tragic poet, lies in the nature of the case. It was so particularly at first, when the beautiful was to him an intimation of the true and good, art a means to these, and subordinated to morals. How this subordination prepared the way for co-ordination and finally for super-ordination, and how he had "poetized himself into philosophy, and again philosophized himself back into poetry," has been very ingeniously shown, step by step, by Kuno Fischer in the work mentioned below. It is clear that here Kant has been transcended. It is wholly peculiar to Schiller that he weighed exactly the importance of the feeling of the beautiful and of art for the development of humanity as

a whole, a point which Kant had hardly touched. The one-sided and fragmentary culture which is a consequence of the wholly necessary modern division of labour demands a restoration of complete and perfect humanity. This, art secures, because, as a joyous recreation, it offsets and supplements hard disintegrating labour, and, as it carries the sense-nature of man back to form and thought, so it carries his spiritual nature back to matter and sense; whereby, indeed, the known truth and willed goodness are invested with the ornament of beauty. Thus he can call the poet the true man, or even say, Man is man only when he plays. Of the very greatest importance for the development of æsthetics is it that Schiller first formulated under the names *naïve* and *sentimental* the great distinction which, now as the distinction between the classic and the romantic, now as that between the simple and the reflective, now that between the ancient and the modern, has played so great a rôle in this science; and thereby, at the same time, indicated the goal, an art-ideal "in which the objective realism and the plastic sense for form of antiquity should be united with the subjective idealism and the wealth of thought of modern times."

Kuno Fischer: *Schiller als Philosoph.* Frankf. a. M. 1858. Tomascheck: *Schiller in sienem Verhältniss zur Wissenschaft.* Wien, 1862. Karl Twesten: *Schiller in seinem Verhältniss zur Wissenschaft.* Berlin, 1863.

5. Considering how long it was before the *Critique of Pure Reason* found recognition in Germany, its recognition in other countries may be called sudden. Already in the year 1796 the *Allgemeine Literaturzeitung* noticed with great pleasure certain *Dutch* works on Criticism, which were soon followed by others. The names: van Hemert, van Bosch, Chandois, Cras, Heumann, Servaas and Kinker are very important in connection with the spread of Kantism. An essay of the last-named on the *Critique of Pure Reason*, was very soon translated into French, and was the occasion of the fact that in *France* already in the year 1801 the highest scientific authority, the Academy, expressed itself concerning Kant. Through the mouth of Destutt de Tracy (*vid.* § 286, 4) it expressed itself adversely, of course. In sharp contrast stands what Villers expressed in his *Philosophie de Kant*, published in the year 1801; so also a verdict given in the following year by Höhne (Wronsky). Both, however,

remained for the most part unnoticed, as appears from Degerando's verdict. No book so smoothed the way for the understanding of the Kantian Philosophy in France as the well-known work of Madame de Staël. But for this, Victor Cousin's *Lectures on the Kantian Philosophy* (1820) would hardly have received such approbation that they could be printed twenty years later. Rémusat also holds an honourable place among the expositors of the Kantian theory, and among the translators of Kant's works Kératry, Tissot, Weyland, Jouffroy, Trullard, Kortet, Barni have made themselves well-known. Men began to occupy themselves with Kant in *England* even earlier than in France. Nitsch and Willich apprised the English public in the years 1796 and 1798 of the great revolution in the sphere of philosophy. Then the works of Beck (*vid.* § 308, 7 ff.) early found translators. And then the representatives of the Scotch School (*vid.* § 292, 4 ff.), and, after them, Englishmen also, began to perceive that German speculation could be no longer ignored; and how little they have done this is shown by Edward Caird's *A Critical Account of the Philosophy of Kant* (Glasgow, 1877), which may here be mentioned in lieu of a long list of works the absence of which it amply compensates for.

§ 304.

The Faith-Philosophy.

1. Attacks made from a standpoint that had become questionable even to one occupying it (Lessing) could not possibly shake a system that stood so high above it. However much those who made the attacks might exclaim against arrogance, when they had brought upon themselves the necessity of hearing repeatedly from the Kantians that they had not understood Kant, the latter could hardly say otherwise than, If a philosophy obviates the opposition between realism and idealism, pantheism and individualism, naturalism and theosophy by the fact that it reflects upon them (by becoming transcendental), and of course no longer says, as do those involved in this opposition, It *is* so *or* so, but So *and* so I must *view* it; and must nevertheless allow itself to be reproached with having denied that it is so, hence with having asserted

that it *is* otherwise, its adherents are in the right if they call this a fighting with windmills, a want of judgment, a misapprehension. Only the attacks of those are worth notice who, like the transcendental philosophers, have abandoned that lower region and have made objections not based upon presuppositions which the transcendental philosopher denies, but upon presuppositions which he himself makes. But precisely this is the position of the three younger contemporaries of Kant, who, personally in close relation with each other, not only agree in what they charge against Kant as an inconsistency, but also in making the word *faith* their battle-cry. Although the meaning of this term is different with each, yet they are properly placed under the common designation *Faith-Philosophers*. The circumstance that what they censure in Kant is precisely the point with the correction of which the further development of Criticism is linked, alone suffices, even though it cannot be demonstrated that their charges occasion this improvement, to refute those who include the Faith-Philosophers in the pre-Kantian period.

2. We name here, first, JOHANN GEORG HAMANN, a fellow-countryman and a valued acquaintance of Kant, who was born in Königsberg on the 27th of August, 1730, and, after a life of very great inner restlessness, died, while on a journey in Westphalia, on the 21st of June, 1788, as emerited superintendent of the Königsberg warehouse. His works, first collected by F. Roth, appeared in Berlin (8 vols., 1821–42). His autobiography, and the letters contained therein, as well, are indispensable to the understanding of the many allusions in his thoughtful but singular works. So hostile was he to all abstractions that lead the disjunctive understanding to the utterance merely of half-truths, that he often proclaimed as his maxim the *principium coincidentiæ oppositorum*, and, just for that reason, scoffs at the Enlightenment, that *aurora borealis* of the eighteenth century, which wrongly separated the divine and the human; and he is in agreement with Kant in this, that neither the materialism of the French nor the rationalism of the Germans satisfies him. But Kant, because of his "two stems" of the faculty of knowledge, appears to him to be held fast in that reprehended separation [of the divine and the human]; the mere fact of language, in which reason acquires sensible existence, seems to him to refute this two-stemmedness. Verbalism, he says, unites

idealism and realism. If in the uniting of opposites Hamann has a place by the side of Kant, often indeed surpassing him in this respect, he falls behind Kant by the fact that this union is with him something merely subjective. Hence his repugnance to all demonstration; hence his eulogies of Hume, as having put in the place of knowledge the subjective certainty of faith. That, he regards as a greater merit than his investigations relating to the conception of causality. Both, his delight in reconciled contradiction and the subjectivism in his thought, are united in the most natural way, in that Hamann was more and more immersed in those religious doctrines which because of their concrete character, are an abomination to the disjunctive understanding and, because of his own inner experience, are certain to the believer. Hence the atonement, in which "apotheosis" is conditioned by the "descent-into-hell of self-knowledge," or, what is the same thing, only objectively expressed, the God-man, being the Word become flesh, solves all contradictions. Just so as regards the triune God, who is one and many. Without these "mysteries" Christianity is to him not conceivable. An attempt, however, to *prove* these, instead of inwardly experiencing them and living them, appears to him just as foolish as the attempt to deny them. Since with Hamann the two, the subjective certainty and the concrete dogma uniting the members of the opposition, are inseparable, he is (for that reason) as far removed from conceiving faith as mere sincerity of conviction as from converting it into letter-service. We may call him the theosophist, or the mystic, among the Faith-Philosophers.

Cf. C. H. Gildemeister: *Joh. Georg Hamann's, des Magus im Norden, Leben und Schriften.* 6 vols. Gotha, 1858–74. The same: *Hamann-Studien.* Gotha, 1873.

3. Contraposed to him as his complementary counterpart is JOHANN GOTTFRIED HERDER, the naturalist among the Faith-Philosophers (born August 25th, 1744, in Mohrungen in East Prussia, died as Superintendent-General in Weimar, on the 18th of December, 1803). In his Complete Works, which were published in Tübingen by Cotta, his philosophical writings fill fifteen volumes. (These alone, as also Herder's influence only upon philosophy, are here considered; his much greater importance for literature and for theology are disregarded. The first of these has been admirably brought

out by Hettner). Inducted into philosophy by Kant, who had not yet made his great discoveries, but stimulated much less by Kant than by Hamann, with whom he always remained in close association, he sees, as does Hamann, in language, with which reason first awakes, a proof that the separation of sense and thought is, *a posteriori* and *a priori*, an abstraction, and that, just for that reason, there is no pure thought, but all certainty rests upon inner knowledge, experience, faith. For that reason also there is need, not of a critique of the faculty of knowledge, but of a philosophy of the same, which always rests upon language and consists in a deduction of the forms of language and thought. But this coincidence with Hamann relates only to the form and manner of attaining certainty. As regards that of which they both are certain, there exists a great difference, even an opposition. The content of Hamann's faith consists in the inwardly experienced divine secrets; that of Herder's experiences, in the ideas with which his finely-discriminating and enthusiastic study of nature supplies him. Even in that which they both magnify with almost idolatrous admiration, namely, language, Herder makes so prominent the natural or purely human origin—the fact, that is to say, that man has to discover language—that Hamann, who otherwise, nevertheless, asserts that the truly human is also divine, returns to the "higher" (Süssmihl's) hypothesis. Nowhere does this accentuation of the natural element appear so plainly as in what, philosophically considered, is Herder's most important work, *Ideas for the Philosophy of History*. To comprehend man, the microcosm, he begins with the universe, and attempts to show how the central position of the planet on which man dwells and its constitution condition the mode of human thought and feeling. Whereas the ape attains only to an essayed perfection, to imitation, man, endowed, by virtue of his erect position, with tools of action, is destined for finer thought, for art and language, in short, for what, since Herder, has been designated as humanity. That the history of man is a great nature-process, or rather that history and nature are ruled by the same law—that is the leading thought in this work, since which there has first existed a philosophical treatment of history. This thought is so opposed to the Kantian standpoint, that even apart from all additional, personal grounds, Kant and Herder would have become alienated, through their

modes of treating nature. Just so, however much one may be pained at the way in which Herder, in his *Metacritique* and *Calligone*, antagonizes Kant, one is obliged to confess that Herder's enthusiasm for nature must have brought him to regard much of what Kant says of æsthetic pleasure as error, quite apart from the fact that he confounded with this theory transcendental investigations regarding the possibility of a theory of the beautiful. That in this accentuation of the natural element Herder occupies himself, with especial predilection, with man in closer proximity to his natural condition, lies in the nature of the case. Hence his enthusiasm for the conditions of humanity and of peoples in their childhood, for Orientalism and Classicism, for folk-songs, etc. Conversely, it is conceivable that he is wholly incapable of appreciating the stages of humanity where it is opposed to the natural. His treatment, particularly of the Middle Ages, frequently of entire Christendom, is extremely harsh; and one might be astonished to hear the finely-sensitive, intellectual companion of Winckelmann and Lessing speak of the Crusades as Herder does, if one did not consider that the spirit that was described (§ 119) as non-worldly must have been repugnant to the man who was nature-intoxicated and world-intoxicated. (Obviously, that Herder was a preacher is a part of the same irony of fate as that Hamann held office as superintendent of a warehouse. But the former did not, as did the latter, bear that irony with humour, but very often with feelings of bitterness.) As regards the frequently-mentioned relation between the view of antiquity and that of Spinoza, one need not wonder if one finds Herder bringing forward in his work, *God*, which contains his philosophy of religion, a peculiarly modified Spinozism, in which, in spite of all his protests against the expression, God is, in reality, assigned the position of a world-soul. It is an attempt—which his intercourse with Goethe could only make more natural—to infuse into Spinozism a more vital view of nature. That Herder's *Ideas* were largely employed by the later philosophy of nature is as easy to understand as that supranaturalism should be drawn from Hamann. We mentioned above Hamann's *principium coincidentiæ oppositorum*. He himself says that he borrowed it from Giordano Bruno. Had he known the source from which the latter drew it, Nicolaus of Cusa (§ 224, 2), he would have called him his authority and

not the other, who in throwing out the idea of the God-man (*vid.* § 247, 4), to Hamann so indispensable, borders so closely upon Spinoza, whom Hamann condemns as "murderer and street-robber of sound reason and science." Herder, whose attention, we may take it for granted, was first drawn to Giordano Bruno by Hamann, can, as having himself an enthusiasm for Spinoza, much more readily respect the intellectual companion of Spinoza as his predecessor, than could Hamann. But with the same positiveness that we can assert that the Cusan had pleased Hamann we can declare that he had disgusted Herder.

Cf. Maria Caroline v. Herder *Erinnerungen aus dem Leben Joh. Gottfr. von Herder's.* 2 vols., 1853 (vols. 39 and 40 of the Historical Works).

4. That the seeds sown by Hamann should not only, as he himself says, bloom in Herder, but also bear the fruits missed by him, there was required a man who united in himself the ideas of the Mystics and the Pantheists, and in doing so did not, as did Hamann, in the name of positive Christian religion, nor, as did Herder, in the name of mistreated Nature aud Art, protest against Criticism, but set philosophy against philosophy. This was done by "the pantheist in head and mystic in heart,"—as the one who stood nearest to him (Wizenmann) was in the habit of characterizing him,—FRIEDRICH HEINRICH JACOBI (born on the 25th of January, 1743, in Düsseldorf, died as pensioned President of the Academy at Munich on the 10th of March, 1819). His works, the collection of which he himself had begun, were published in Leipsic, by Gerh. Fleischer (1812–1825) in six volumes, the fourth of which is divided into two parts. In Geneva, where he went for his education, he was first turned to philosophy by Le Sage, who was an adherent of the atomistic physics. There he was occupied at first only with English and French writings. He knew Bonnet almost by heart, and the writings of Rousseau, naturally very celebrated in Geneva, were read with eagerness. With this fact there later connected itself very naturally his interest in the Scotch School. Having returned to Germany, and living in favourable circumstances, he devoted all his leisure time to advancing himself in science by conversation, correspondence, and reading. No movement remained unnoticed by him. Among others, Kant, by his writings on evidence and on the ontological proof for the

existence of God, gave the first impulse to a more profound study of Spinoza. The revolution wrought by Kant found in him a very attentive observer. Earlier than any other, he directed attention to the not fortunate changes that Kant had undertaken in the second edition of his *Critique of Pure Reason*, and gave warning against ignoring the first, more consistent, edition. (The counsel remained unfollowed, was indeed so fully forgotten, that, forty years later, when Schopenhauer repeated it, all the world supposed that it was given for the first time.) When in the year 1785 he published the correspondence carried on with Mendelssohn regarding Lessing's Spinozism, from which it appeared that the man who had hitherto been known only as a psychological romance-writer and an author of brief essays was the most profound of the students of Spinoza at that time, and a noteworthy philosophical thinker, he already occupied the stand-point, which, changes in terminology left out of account, he always held. This, as he himself always recognised, touches Kant's at many points. His maxim, borrowed from Pascal, that the understanding refutes dogmatism, and nature scepticism, pleased Kant, who had refuted both; likewise the fact that Jacobi is unsatisfied both with the realistic doctrines that originated with Locke, and the idealistic doctrines derived from Leibnitz, although he had not agreed with Jacobi in terming them atheistic; Jacobi asserts further that he can appeal to Kant, when he gives as the reason why those two theories are untenable, that it is common to both that they attempt to demonstrate the truth. But since to demonstrate something means only to show it to be conditioned (by a ground), it is impossible to demonstrate the unconditioned, so that Kant is fully justified in limiting knowledge to the sphere of the relative, finite, phenomena. If one calls the unconditioned, God, one must say that demonstration converts God into a finite nature, *i.e.*, denies Him as God, so that it may be called an interest of demonstrative science that there be no God. A striking example of the correctness of this position is Spinozism, this unexcelled masterpiece of demonstrative science. Kant's argument concerns all other cases as well as the last, and cannot do otherwise, for the principle of the ground upon which all demonstration rests is in reality the same as the principle *totum parte prius est*, of which one may be easily convinced by reflecting upon mathematical demonstrations; but this principle can lead to nothing else than to the whole

of the world, not to a prætermundane cause, or a living God. We must, therefore, concede Kant to be right in holding that the existence of God cannot be demonstrated, that God cannot be known, for a demonstrated God is no God.

5. In the limitation of knowledge to the sphere of the finite or conditioned, Jacobi declares himself to be in perfect agreement with Kant. But in another point he admits that there is agreement only in expression. The faith, that is to say, for which Kant makes room by limiting knowledge, and which Jacobi, after the example of Wizenmann, would call, instead of the faith of reason, rather, the faith of need, is by no means the same that Jacobi has in mind when he says that all certainty regarding that which demonstration cannot attain to rests upon faith. In avowed agreement with Hume and Reid, he understands by this that kind of assumption which is wholly independent of practical need, purely theoretical, but without demonstrable grounds. Its content is, accordingly, therebeing, existence, sensible as well as supersensible. That my body, or that God, exists, I cannot prove; they are immediately certain to me, or I believe them. (What is *verbatim* the same thing may be read in Hamann's *Socratic Memorabilia.*) Since every demonstration is an act of self-creation, the faith that is opposed to this has the character of an act of reception, hence Jacobi's expressions, that existence is revealed to us, that we get it through a miraculous operation, etc.; which made the difference between this faith and that which the orthodox call so, to many so nearly imperceptible that Mendelssohn, for example, appears to have once supposed that Jacobi wished, as did Lavater earlier, to convert him. Even persons having closer relationship with Jacobi, with justice censured these expressions borrowed from religion. Instead of *faith* Jacobi would willingly say *inner life* or *inner experience*, later, very often, *feeling*, frequently *sensation* or *sense;* usually, however, in the latest period of his life, *reason* (so in what he last wrote, the Introduction to his philosophical works), whereby he, as did Herder earlier, laid weight upon the fact that *Vernunft* (reason) comes from *vernehmen* (to perceive, know). Whereas, therefore, sense and reason were formerly opposed, later the opposition has been between sense and understanding, and reason stands on the same side with sense, from which it is distinguished in such a manner that it perceives supersensible objectivity, as eye or ear does sensible

existence. By means of both there is *perception, i.e.*, existence is not made but is known by a receptive act. In the certainty of existence the certainty of the I and that of the Thou are so immediately one that both the one-sidedness of realism and that of idealism are out of the question. (Sensible perception has its origin where soul borders upon nature, and supersensible perception where it borders upon the supernatural.) From this one root all knowledge springs, and that duality of knowledge-stems which Kant inconsistently assumes, and the unity of which Hamann and Herder had already shown by reference to language, must be given up. This dualism is, according to Jacobi, the reason why Kant, who, as the first problem of the *Critique of Pure Reason* shows, had, properly speaking, to come to pure idealism in which assumed things have no place, assumed, with an inconsistency that perhaps does honour to the man but not to the philosopher, existence external to the Ego. If one adopts the stand-point of the two stems of knowledge, the only consistent position remaining is the materialistic idealism of Spinoza, or the idealistic materialism of Fichte. And again, if one is serious in asserting that faith has to do only with the postulates of the practical reason, one must go further and put the moral order of the world in the place of God, and then Kant is only the John the Baptist of speculation, and Fichte its Messiah. Of a quite different nature is true philosophy, which, of course, does not aim to be demonstrative science and speculation. It is certainty of the existence of things, hence not idealism; of God, hence not atheism; it is, in general, knowledge of fact, and is, just for that reason, opposed to speculation, which has for its object not only the *that* but the *how* and *why*, and proves (*beweist*), whereas philosophy is merely a showing (*weisen*); so that the knowledge of reason may be termed an inspiration, to which the knowledge of the understanding is related merely as a token and sign.

6. Thus far Hamann and Herder could pronounce themselves in agreement with most of the principles of Jacobi; for with them, also, faith had been subjective certainty without demonstrative grounds. But as regards the content of faith, Jacobi is evidently in agreement with neither the God-intoxicated Hamann, nor the world-intoxicated Herder, but this "self-tormentor," as Hamann would fain have called him, who was always rummaging in his inner consciousness, was never able wholly to get outside of himself; so that he said of him-

self that he never understood the view of another, and his opponents said that he falsified it wherever he would explain it, and landed in mere self-explanation, which, indeed, he had given as his goal.

Jacobi is interested, not, like Hamann, in the facts of the kingdom of God, nor, like Herder, in the facts of the natural world, but in the facts of consciousness. If we hold fast what was said in the introduction to modern philosophy (§ 259) and combine with that what was just now remarked concerning the opposition between Herder and Hamann, we shall not necessarily term it a trivial remark if we say, that Herder and Hamann represent the ancient and mediæval element in the Faith-Philosophy, and Jacobi the modern. Herein lies one of the many reasons why only in the form which Jacobi gave to it could the Faith-Philosophy become the creed of a school. The individualism which is peculiar to Jacobi's standpoint, which displays itself so visibly in the manner of his philosophizing and in the style of his writings (letters, personal confessions, dialogues, exclamations, etc.), which makes it clear, among other things, why none of the post-Kantian systems was so offensive to him as the System of Identity, why he was so stirred up when Wieland defended Hobbes' principles, etc., must make it impossible for him to feel friendly towards the Kantian categorical imperative. As in his *Woldemar* he had claimed for the heart the immunities and licenses of high poetry, for which the grammar of virtue has no rules, so in his *Letter to Fichte* he claimed the *jus aggratiandi* as against the letter of the law, in that so frequently quoted passage: "*Ja, ich will lügen wie Desdemona sterbend log*," etc. (Yes, I will lie as did Desdemona dying, etc.), because it is a prerogative of man that the law should exist for his sake and not *vice versa*. For himself there is no contradiction if, in spite of that, he closes his romance with the moral, Woe to him who trusts to his heart, or if he shudders at the idea that a Berlin student (probably a pupil of de Wette) finds in the heart pardon for transgression. The subjectivity to which he ascribed sovereignty is by no means an empty subjectivity, but one filled with an ample content, so that his standpoint has been well called that of superior personality. For that reason it has not been unjustly asserted that his two romances develop the theme of his philosophizing, the absolute justification of moral individuality,

better, almost, than all his other works. The subjectivism of Jacobi shows itself in the religious sphere similarly as in the ethical. His work on *Divine Things and their Revelation*, in which he condemns the System of Identity because of its pantheism, and which called out the merciless reply of Schelling, teaches nothing of divine things, speaks merely of their becoming revealed, so that, just as with Rousseau, instead of the theory of God, there is given a theory of piety, theology is supplanted by a pisteuology. Hence his insistence that we only know *that* but not at all *what* God is. All definitions of the nature of the Divine Being are to him anthropomorphisms. To a "religious materialist" like Claudius, who speaks of the historical Christ, he opposes, if not indeed as his own, yet as a standpoint which lies nearer to it than the other, religious idealism, which knows no other Christ than that which a divine nature in us becomes, and is far from all idolatry bound up in one man. It is no wonder that the theology of feeling, which later inclined towards orthodoxy, as well as the rationalistic "sincerity of conviction," appealed to Jacobi. Since he constantly repeats that it is only the being, not the nature, of the object of belief that constitutes the content of faith, it is comprehensible why, also, he prefers most of all to call God being; since, further, his standpoint emphasizes immediacy as opposed to mediacy, it is comprehensible why he antagonizes all who assume mediation in God. Against the defenders of the trinity, he advances the unity, of God; against those who conceive God as a process, His completed perfection; and in this he unceasingly celebrates, with Rousseau, the unknown God. It is, properly speaking, an inconsistency when Jacobi attributes to God the predicate of personality. He is led to do this by the fact that, whereas demonstrative knowledge rests upon the principle of the ground and hence knows only timeless mathematical dependence, he assigns to faith the category of cause and temporal succession (a reminiscence of Hume), and accordingly opposes to the ground of the world (the world-whole) the cause of the world or the, not extramundane, but prætermundane Godhead. Of course when Schelling, in earnest with the personality of God, ascribes to Him what is a condition of personality, a sub-personality which is to be subordinated, Jacobi declares himself against such natural history of the Absolute.

Cf. Eberh. Zierngiebl: *Friedrich Heinrich Jacobi's Leben, Dichten und Denken.* Vienna, 1867.

7. In closest connection with Jacobi stood his early deceased friend Thomas Wizenmann, on whom Al. von der Goltz has written an extended monograph (*Mittheilungen aus dessen Briefwechsel und literarischem Nachlass.* Gotha, 1859, 2 vols.). Under the *nom de plume* "Volunteer" ["*Freiwillige*"] Wizenmann published a work entitled: *Results of the Philosophy of Jacobi and Mendelssohn Critically Examined;* later (1787) also a *Letter to Kant*, because the latter had expressed himself in Mendelssohn's favour more than was proper. Further, a work by Johann Neeb (1767–1843) credits Jacobi wholly with the views contained in it. Neeb was later, however, further removed from Jacobi than Friedrich Köppen (1775–1858), who is to be regarded as the proper representative of the school of Jacobi, whose doctrines he developes particularly in his *Exposition of the Nature of Philosophy* (Nürnberg, 1810), and has defended in many polemical writings. Cajetan von Weiller (1762–1826) and Jacob Salat (born 1766) employed Jacobi's ideas, particularly in efforts towards religious enlightenment within the Catholic church, and both were very prolific writers, the first being, in this regard, of greater depth. Like von Weiller and Salat in Bavaria, only with greater success, worked Leopold Rembold (1787–1844) in Austria, so long as the academical chair was not forbidden him; so, further, the Bohemian, Anton Müller (1792–1843), and the pupils of Rembold, viz., J. N. Jäger and R. Joh. Lichtenfels (1795–1860), who both extended the philosophy of Jacobi from Vienna to the professorial chairs of Austria, as, later, was done with that of Herbart. In both cases the clergy believed it could tolerate a philosophy that declared the knowledge of the Divine Being to be impossible. In a still freer relation towards Jacobi stood Jean Pierre Frédéric Ancillon (born in 1767, died, while Prussian minister, in 1837), whose writings on public law are not to be mentioned here, but only the *Faith and Knowledge in Philosophy* (Berlin, 1824), and *For the Reconciliation of Extremes in Opinion* (2 vols., 1828–31). Related views, confined, however, to the sphere of æsthetics and religion, were developed by Chr. Aug. Hein. Clodius, professor in Leipsic (1772–1836). His *Sketch of a System of Poetics* (2 vols., Leips., 1804); *Outline of the Universal Theory of Religion* (Leips., 1808); and his work *On God in Nature, in the History of Man, and in Consciousness* (4 vols., Leips., 1818–22) are here to be named. His poetical works do not belong here.

C.—THE SEMI-KANTIANS.

§ 305.

1. So long as the doctrines of Kant are defended, as was indicated above, by charging its opponents with not understanding or with misunderstanding it, and by saying again what had once been said, as, for example, Kant says again, in part better, in the *Prolegomena* what had been said in the *Critique of Pure Reason*, the theory preserves, of course, its original purity. It is otherwise where the objections of opponents are actually entered into, since, also here, there is not wanting what has never been wanting, and what was pointed out in connection with the Eleatics (*vid.* § 37): one of the opposing sides in dispute becomes infected with the stand-point of the other. If, now, this latter occupies a lower level than the one defended, it happens as it did with Melissus,—there is a letting down, as in the present case; for it is not to be denied that Kant, in attempting to come to an agreement with the realistic popular philosophy that had been triumphed over by his system, weakened (apparently at least) his idealism. It is otherwise where the stand-point of the opponent is a higher one. Here the putting one's self on a level with it is an advance, as the example of Zeno shows. All three of the antagonists of the Kantian stand-point mentioned in the foregoing sections—the syncretistic popular philosophy tinged with realism, particularly as represented at the last by the Göttingen school—the Wolffian philosophy become popular philosophy, as represented by Nicolai, Eberhard and their intellectual kinsmen—finally the Faith-Philosophy, particularly in the form which it had received at the hands of Jacobi, were the occasion of Kantism's being adulterated with other elements, and of the appearance of those peculiar phenomena which H. Ritter was the first to designate by the excellent name of *Semi-Kantian*. Quite apart from the subjective endowments of the men, their performances will stand in unequal rank always according to the various problems which they propose to themselves. To introduce elements of the realistic or the idealistic popular philosophy into Criticism, which has already taken them up into itself sufficiently, does not mean to enrich it. But if the Faith-Philosophy, which stood upon a level with it, in much, indeed, transcended it, be introduced, something of value for

it may be derived therefrom. It is for this reason that Fries stands so high above Bouterwek and Krug, and he was the only one who put forth a theory and founded a school, both of which had a lasting influence.

2. FRIEDRICH BOUTERWEK, born on April 15th, 1766, educated at Göttingen as a jurist and *littérateur*, began in the year 1791 to give lectures in that place upon the Kantian philosophy, to which his first writings (*Aphorisms*, 1793; *Paulus Septimius*, 2 Parts, 1795) acknowledge adherence in essential regards. He first diverged from Kant in practical philosophy, where he missed a material moral principle; which is, of course, equivalent to renouncing Kant. But he soon showed in the theoretical philosophy, also, that Göttingen was not the soil in which idealism could thrive. The noise made about realism in his nearest vicinity; Schulze's *Ænesidemus* and other sceptical writings; the reckless advance, moreover, of Fichte upon the idealistic path, impelled him to look about everywhere for defence against idealism. Jacobi's writings directed his attention to Spinoza, and his *Abridgment of Academical Lectures* (1799), particularly his chief work, *Idea of an Apodictic* (2 vols., Halle, 1799), contained the attempt, later declared by him to be a failure, to perfect Criticism by the introduction of realistic elements. Later he united himself more and more with Jacobi. But the writings that he published in this later period have, with the exception of his *Philosophy of Religion* (1824), not found much consideration—his purely philosophical works, that is to say. On the contrary, his *Æsthetics* (2 Parts, Leipsic, 1806) has often been reprinted, and his twelve-volume *History of Poetry and Oratory* (1801–1819) has been highly praised. The *Æsthetics* occupies a more empirical standpoint. He does not please so much where he treats the subject philosophically, as in his *Metaphysics of the Beautiful* (1807). He died on the 8th of August, 1828, as a professor in Göttingen. The *Apodictic*, so called because it inquires after the ultimate demonstratively certain ground of all knowledge, undertakes to be a self-explanation of Criticism. Criticism needs such a thing, he maintains, because, though Kant pointed out the distinction between thought and knowledge, he repeatedly forgot it and put mere thought in place of knowledge. If, now, one separates the two, and considers first mere thought (Logical Apodictic), it is discovered that thought with its demonstrations

guarantees at most only the necessity of being thought, but never proves being, or objectivity, hence not certainty. The critique of thought, therefore, or logical apodictic, conducts to logical Pyrrhonism. Likewise the Transcendental Apodictic, the second part of the system, conducts to Spinozism. It is evident, that is to say, that for knowledge there is requisite the immediate, indemonstrable certainty of a being or absolute somewhat, a real principle (which Kant, also, smuggled in in his undeduced things-in-themselves), in which there lies no manifoldness (hence even Kant never proves that there are things-in-themselves); the *omne esse*, therefore, of Spinoza. But the Apodictic, in its third (practical) part, gets beyond logical Pyrrhonism and transcendental Spinozism. The experience, that is to say, of one's own self-activity and of the opposition it encounters proves that there is, in us and without us, a living force, a virtuality; hence refutes Pyrrhonism. Likewise, since ethical action is not conceivable without individuality, and this not without a plurality of individuals, Spinozism is refuted; and Practical Apodictic has to show how we come to posit many bodies offering resistance, and, among them, such as we have to regard as men. In connection with this last question the canon is laid down: A rational answer to a rational question is a guarantee of a rational nature; and hence so great stress is laid upon language. Bouterwek himself has proposed as the most suitable name for his theory "*Absolute Virtualism*," and against this there is nothing to say. Since the philosophy the first influences of which Bouterwek received, and from the effects of which he never wholly freed himself, was a syncretism composed of very different elements, it is comprehensible that he should add to his own doctrine this and that feature of every new doctrine that became known to him. Hence it may be true that many of his ideas were borrowed from Schelling, although any one who starts with Kant and studies Spinoza, in order to find means of defence against Fichte could, even without borrowing, arrive at points of contact with him. But it is clear that by this fusion of Kant's doctrines with the syncretism which Kant had left behind him, content and strict form in system must suffer.

3. The latter is not the case with the *Transcendental Synthetism* of Krug, because the form of the popular philosophy with which he adulterated Criticism had been in its origin a strictly reasoned system. Hence, here, the neat appearance,

affording a synoptical view by reason of the dichotomous division, and given a learned air by reason of its Greek terminology. WILHELM TRAUGOTT KRUG, born on the 22nd of January, 1770, in Radis, near Wittenberg, studied theology after 1788 in Wittenberg under Reinhard, and (Wolffian) philosophy under Jehnichen. After he had heard Reinhold for a short time in Jena, he published in Göttingen his *Letters on the Perfectibility of Revealed Religion* (1795), which, it is true, appeared anonymously, but made his name known. Already in Wittenberg he began his over-prolific literary activity, which he continued as professor in Frankfort-on-the-Oder, then (after 1805) in Königsberg, finally (after 1809) in Leipsic, until his death (on Jan. 13th, 1842). Besides larger works, he wrote a great number of *brochures* in the spirit of religious and political Liberalism, and, moreover, had a variety of learned disputes. The *Outline of a New Organon of Philosophy* (Meissen, 1801) contains the programme of his subsequent activity, to which he also strictly held himself. What is developed very much at length in: *The Fundamental Philosophy* (1803), *The System of Theoretical Philosophy* (3 vols., 1806–10), *The System of Practical Philosophy* (3 vols., 1817–19), all of which have often been reprinted, is all to be found in a much more concise and hence better form in his *Handbook of Philosophy* (2 vols., 1820), which has often been reprinted. The *Universal Handbook of the Philosophical Sciences* (5 vols., 1827 ff.) has likewise often been reprinted, just as many of his works have been translated into foreign languages.—Since philosophizing is, according to Krug, nothing other than, by an act of introversion, coming to understand one's self and arriving at peace with one's self, the first question that must be asked in a philosophical Problematic and answered in the philosophical Apodictic is, What are the real bases of all knowing? Krug finds these in the immediately certain facts of consciousness, which the healthy human understanding feels, but which the philosophizing reason does not so much deduce *out of* a single fundamental fact (as Reinhold and Fichte would have it) as reduce *to* one. This fundamental fact may be thus formulated: I am active and seek absolute harmony in all my activity. On this formula, therefore, we should base the highest principle of all philosophy. Since in every definite consciousness there is given a synthesis of being and know-

ledge, but this has for its presupposition that being and knowledge are originally (*a priori*) united in us, all empirical syntheses (facts of consciousness) point to an original fact or transcendental synthesis which, because it is the original synthesis, cannot be genetically explained nor comprehended. This transcendental synthesis which occurs in the Ego (Kant would have said, "Through which the Ego becomes") contains, as reflection upon it shows, the fact that reality is allowed to the Ego as well as to the opposite of it, hence the two one-sided views: realism leading to materialism, and idealism leading to nihilism,—one-sided views which the transcendental synthetism, which is perhaps not Kantism, but certainly is the true Criticism, leaves behind itself. This system recognises, in agreement with the healthy human understanding, the threefold conviction of one's own existence, of the being of other things, and of the reciprocity that finds place between the two, as incontestibly certain, although indemonstrable, fact. If one considers further the facts of consciousness, one finds certain conditions under which the received empirical content falls within consciousness, which are to be found with all men, and therefore constitute the essential fundamental character of man. These, the totality of which may be termed the pure Ego, are pre-eminently the subject of philosophy, which, therefore, considers not so much the individual differences as, rather, the faculties, laws, and limits common to all men. Of the faculties, there are, since feeling is the obscure beginning of theoretical and practical activity, two, the faculty of knowledge and the faculty of desire, each distinguishable into three stages; hence philosophy is divided into theoretical and practical, the former, however, into the theory of thought (*logica sive dianœologia*), theory of knowledge (*metaphysica sive gnoseologia*), theory of taste (*æsthetica sive callologia*), the latter into the theory of right (*jus naturæ sive dicæologia*), theory of virtue (*ethica sive aretologia*), theory of religion (*ethico-theologia sive eusebiologia*). In the content there presents itself little that is peculiar. In the theory of knowledge, since perception and conception belong to knowledge, the forms of the pure Ego, time, space and categories are treated of, but the difficult investigations relating to paralogisms and antinomies of the pure reason are omitted. In the theory of right, marriage, State, and Church are banished from the pure theory, where they have no place, to the applied. The original compact of the

State is treated as a fact. The theory of religion rests, as do all the individual parts of philosophy, upon the facts of consciousness, of which there are here two that constitute the content of religious consciousness, the belief in God, and the hope of an eternal life. Dogmas are objective expressions for the subjective states of religiosity, *i.e.* confidence that the end of humanity is realizing itself. Without optimism and perfectibilism, therefore, no religiosity is conceivable.

Cf. *Meine Lebensreise von Urceus* (*Autobiographie*). Leipzig, 1835.

4. Towards the fusion of Kantism with the Faith-Philosophy, a fusion, which, as was shown above, need not be a retrograde step, and which, just for that reason, the most important by far of the Semi-Kantians had taken as his problem, Kant himself had at least half completed a step in advance. Whoever completes this will have reason to say in reference to this matter that he has left Kant behind him. The assertion, so offensive to the Faith-Philosophers, that faith has to do only with practical postulates, was with Kant a consequence of the principle, accepted by the Faith-Philosophers, that the divine cannot be known, and of the position (not admitted by them) that, besides the sphere of knowledge, there is only that of volition, and hence what is not a conception of nature is necessarily a conception of freedom, what does not fall to physics must belong to ethics. But, now, Kant himself, in his *Critique of Judgment* (in which Fries recognised the central point of the entire Critical system), and in his philosophy of religion, had, properly speaking, broken the spell of this dilemma. What otherwise contains in itself opposition, manifestly falls into unity with itself when the beautiful is, not known (through conceptions), is not even willed (because of an interest), but is felt. And just so in religion, considered as hope, to which Kant expressly assigns happiness as object, is this otherwise wholly practical conception not an object of volition, but of an enduring (hence theoretical) expectation. A fusion of æsthetic and religious feeling, a union of the two with that faith which was, even by Jacobi, called feeling,—this it is that is sought by Fries, who was first stimulated by Herder, Schiller, and Jacobi, left unsatisfied by Reinhold and still more by Kant, disgusted by Fichte, finally moulded by intercourse with Jacobi. But quite apart from this fusion with the ideas of Jacobi, which may be termed accidental, Fries—and by this he is

once more distinguished to his advantage from the Semi-Kantians just named—has, by his conception of Criticism, determined more closely, though always one-sidedly, a point that was left undetermined in Kant. How the pure Ego is related to the empirical, what the state of the case is as regards consciousness *per se* as distinguished from *a* consciousness,—upon this point Kant had expressed himself so vaguely that he left his words open to different interpretations. But, at the same time, he demanded a more precise determination of this point; for the fact that both were designated by the same term (Ego, consciousness, etc.) did not permit of their being kept entirely separate. Whereas, now, the further development of Criticism by Fichte brought the pure or transcendental Ego into the forefront in such a manner that the empirical Ego receives the appearance of an accident or an effect of the other, the opposite way out of the difficulty was likewise possible. It was just this that Fries had recourse to. All that Kant says of the Ego he refers to the empirical Ego; a necessary consequence of this is, that all investigations relating to the Ego become questions of empirical psychology. The theme worked out by Fries in all his later activity, viz., that the critique of reason is a psychological, hence empirical, investigation into the question how we know *a priori*, had been already uttered by him when he settled at the university of Jena. It was first made public in the year 1798 in the third number of C. Chr. F. Schmid's *Psychological Journal*. The repellant influence which Fichte, whom he heard in Jena, exerted upon him, only strengthened him in his opinion, and must have drawn him ever nearer to him who placed the problem of philosophy in self-knowledge, but had understood by the self, similarly as did the Scottish School, merely Kant's empirical Ego—Jacobi. By their later personal intercourse they were mutually strengthened and furthered in their views.—Jacob Friedrich Fries, born at Barby, on the 23rd of August, 1773, and educated at that place in the communion of the Moravians, studied philosophy in Leipsic and Jena after the year 1795, habilitated himself, after he had been for one year family tutor in Switzerland, in Jena in 1801, and became, in 1806, after several years' travel, professor of philosophy and mathematics in Heidelberg, having published, besides some smaller things written in part anonymously, his *Philosophical Theory of Right* (1803), his *System*

of Philosophy as Evident Science (1804), and *Knowledge, Faith and Presentiment* (1805). During his Heidelberg professorship appeared his chief work, already outlined in greater part, in Switzerland: *New Critique of Reason* (3 vols., 1807; 2nd ed., 1828 ff.), also his *System of Logic* (1811). Called to Jena in the year 1816, he was obliged, on account of his participation in the Wartburg festival, to limit himself from the year 1824 onwards to lectures upon mathematics and physics. Not until later did he again lecture upon philosophical branches. He died on the 10th of August, 1843. The most important works published by him during his Jena period are: *Handbook of Practical Philosophy* (1st vol., 1818; 2nd [*Philosophy of Religion*], 1832), *Handbook of Psychical Anthropology* (2 vols., 1820), *Mathematical Philosophy of Nature* (1822), *System of Metaphysics* (1824), *History of Philosophy* (2 vols. 1840).

Cf. E. L. Th. Henke: *Jakob Friedrich Fries aus seinem handschriftlichen Nachlass dargestellt.* Leipzig, 1867.

5. Fries gives as the principal point of difference between himself and Kant the following, that he converted Kant's investigations into investigations in empirical psychology, or anthropological investigations, and thereby did away with that "prejudice of the transcendental," which in Reinhold, Fichte and Schelling (on whom in 1803 he had written a special work), had borne such evil fruits. He complains that Kant seeks to determine so much *a priori, e.g.*, what relates to pure apperception; and, instead of that, aims merely to tell what he discovers by self-observation. (Obviously he remains accountable for the justification of the presupposition that every one who observes himself will discover the same thing, a presupposition that Kant did not need, simply because his method of procedure was not psychological). With the exception of this defect, philosophy, by the subjective turn which Kant gave to it, enters upon a new era, and a multitude of questions never to be answered, *e.g.*, regarding the transcendental truth or agreement of ideas and objects, are, once for all, done away with, and room is made for those alone admissible according to the standard of subjective or psychological truth. The organ through which this self-observation is possible is the reflecting understanding, the function of which is analysis and hence judgment. The understanding, accordingly, really supplies no knowledge, but only classifies it, brings it to

consciousness. In justified opposition to Kant, who will have everything demonstrated, Jacobi has pointed out certain indemonstrable knowledge in us; but he borders very closely on not allowing that anything at all should be deduced, as a result of which all philosophy would cease to be, and mysticism would take its place. Whereas demonstration is an objective, deduction is a subjective, method of proof, which consists in the showing how original knowledge underlies an assertion. The being of God is not, it is true, proved, but deduced, when it is shown that every finite reason believes in a God. The faculty, now, of these indubitable, hence, true, principles is the reason, or the original self-activity which, together with the original power of having impressions, the sense-faculty, constitutes the essence of sensible-rational mind, or man, so that just on that account every function of mind, its knowing, willing, feeling, is subject to this form, can be sensible and rational. To bring the original principles of reason to consciousness, or, give them the form of judgments, is the business of the understanding, which thereby solves the problem of transcendental philosophy. Like Kant, Fries begins with sensation; like Reinhold, and still more like Maimon, he would here have regard paid only to the fact of sensations being given, not to a possible giver. But, then, more precisely than either, he considers the question how, by a mechanism, which he, with Platner, terms the course of thought that resembles memory, the productive imagination converts sensations, by giving them time and space determinations, into phenomena, which then, again, are by the logical understanding, converted, by means of the categories, into experiences, of the possible objects of which alone is there a true, hence also a mathematical knowledge.

6. Though thus far in entire agreement with Kant's Transcendental Æsthetic and Analytic, Fries believes that he discovers a lacuna here. Jacobi's sneer, that Kant had gotten the hypothesis of things-in-themselves merely out of the reflective-conception, phenomenon, appears to him not wholly unfounded. Since the objects of possible experience give only relations and never absoluteness, and it is, on the contrary, a fact already at hand and not further deducible, that reason postulates a being-in-itself, reason must transcend that which can never present such a being, and by virtue of this fact it enters into the sphere of Ideas or ends, that is, of that which

ought to be. As such problems, they are objects of faith, not objects of knowledge. Both, freedom and nature, are so distinct one from the other that Fries absolutely rejects all teleological consideration of nature, and censures Kant for conceiving organism as an end of nature. Rather, the conception of reciprocity and of periodicity suffices perfectly for this, as Schelling has shown in his Philosophy of Nature, which may, just because of this, be called the first great idea since Kant's *Critique*. Even the organism must be mathematically construed, for there is no other than a mathematical philosophy of nature, as was correctly asserted by Kant, who just as correctly has given the reason why the inner nature can be a subject only of a descriptive not of a properly philosophical treatment. In spite of this declaration against Kant's view of the organism, Fries yet calls the *Critique of Judgment* Kant's most important work, and does so because in it attention was for the first time directed to a sphere in which reason and understanding, thing-in-itself and phenomenon, Idea and experience meet. This is the sphere of the beautiful and the sublime. (Fries had already pointed out in the first of all his works, that the teleological judgment laid down laws which were too broad for a world of phenomena, and too narrow for a world of things-in-themselves, but hence justified the assumption that the world of phenomena is phenomenon of the world of things-in-themselves.) Here, and likewise in the religious sphere, we arrive at an apprehension of the presence in experience of that which transcends experience, of the eternal in the finite, which may most fittingly be called presentiment. Since religion does not give positive knowledge of its object, this object is mystery. The world, in the scientific contemplation of which Ideas cannot at all be introduced, not even for regulative use, as Kant says, is construed according to Ideas in æsthetico-religious contemplation. Fries often formulates the substance of his anthropologico-critical investigations, or his *anthropologism*, as follows: Of phenomena we have knowledge; we exercise belief as regards the true nature of things; presentiment gives us power to discern the latter by means of the former.

7. Fries is not alone as regards the way he took. In considerable independence of him stood Gottl. Benj. Jäsche, who was editor of Kant's Logic, author of an: *Architectonic of the Sciences* (1819), of an *Outlines of Ethics* (1824), and a

monograph on *Pantheism* (3 vols., 1826 ff.), and died as professor in Dorpat. In decided *rapport*, again, with Fries was Friedrich Calker (died the 4th of January, 1870, as professor in Bonn), author of *The Theory of the Original Law of the True, Good, and Beautiful* (1820), and of some other writings, having in view a similar fusion of the doctrines of Kant and Jacobi, this fusion being then carried by de Wette and others into theology. Also Christian Weiss (26th May, 1774 to Feb., 1853), author of many writings, among which *The Living God* (Leipsic, 1812), has attracted most attention, had adopted in large measure Fries' views. Fries' school appeared as a closed phalanx after the death of the master, and will again be spoken of among the phenomena following Hegel's death (*vid.* § 344, 2).

8. Born two years later than Fries, was a man whose chief significance, it is true, lies in the field of Catholic theology, into which, in part directly, by the founding of a numerous school, in part indirectly, by the calling out of a more powerful reaction, he brought a higher life. He cannot, however, be passed by in these *Outlines*, but must be given a place among the Semi-Kantians. This is GEORG HERMES, born April 22nd, 1775, who, educated at the gymnasium at Rheine and at the university at Münster, laboured very effectively at the latter place as teacher in the gymnasium and professor in the university, and from 1820 till his death (26th of May, 1831) as professor of theology in Bonn. Fitted by natural capacity and by education rather for an oral teacher, he was not a very prolific writer. His *Investigations relating to the Inner Truth of Christianity* (Münster, 1805) was followed by his chief work, *Introduction to Christian-Catholic Theology;* that is to say, the First Part (by far the most important), the Philosophical Introduction, in the year 1819 (2nd ed., 1831), the Second Part (incomplete), the Positive Introduction, in the year 1829 (2nd ed., 1834). This, as well as the *Christian-Catholic Dogmatic*, which appeared after his death, does not interest us here.

Cf. W. Esser: *Denkschrift auf Geog. Hermes.* Cologne, 1832.

9. Good mathematical training caused Hermes to seek in his philosophising for definite, clear conceptions before all things else, and to demand cool and unimpassioned, as distinguished from "vivacious," thinking. The direction, again, of his philosophy was determined by the circumstance that

empirical psychology was to him the entrance-door to philosophy. Very far-reaching religious doubts caused him to seek for intellectual rest at first in the older metaphysics, in the form it had taken under the hands of the Eclectic, Stattler, who had been educated in the doctrine of Wolff. He found it the less, because he at the same time studied Kant. The "subjective turn" which Fries so extolled in Kant's philosophy, pleased Hermes also, who on that account places Kant, and Fichte (only in his popular works), above all other modern philosophers; particularly above the philosophers of nature, who, according to him, philosophize merely with the imagination. But he did not find full satisfaction even in those two, because they appeared to him to start from certain undemonstrated presuppositions, which made impossible for them what becomes possible where there is a more far-reaching doubt, viz., to attain to a metaphysics, *i.e.*, to the discovery of reality by the method of reflection. If, as philosophical investigation must, we question all, even what hitherto has passed for self-evident, the Philosophical Introduction must, before all, inquire, Is it possible for us to decide regarding the truth in what ways it is attainable and whether any of these ways is applicable to the proof of Christianity? With this question, there is, next, connected as a second, Is there a God, and what is His nature? and as a third, Must a supernatural revelation of God to men be admitted as possible, and under what universal conditions must it be deemed actual? With the answering of these three questions the Philosophical Introduction terminates. (The Positive Introduction contains in the First Part, the only one that appeared, an investigation of the genuineness and trustworthiness of the Bible; the Second and Third Parts were to have treated Tradition and Oral Teaching.)

10. The *first* (in Kantian terminology, *transcendental*) investigation first defines truth as the agreement of knowledge with the object known or of our judgment with the relation presented in reality between the subject and the predicate, and shows that since a comparison with the unknown object is impossible, there remains for us merely the psychological investigation, whether and where we decide regarding such agreement, and, again, whether and where this decision is certain. These two questions coincide with the following: Upon what are we decided before all reflection? and What

remains even after reflection, as an unalterably firm decision? The fact presents itself, now, at the same time, that the decision which we find in ourselves is, at one time, thrust upon us, at another, freely adopted by us. In the first case, it is a holding-for-true (more concisely, holding), in the second, a taking-for-true (more concisely, assuming). The question to be answered contains, therefore, first, the question, Is there a sure belief [holding-for-true] existing before reflection? The fact presents itself that both the knowledge, *i.e.*, consciousness given by sense-perception, and the knowledge and comprehension derived from this by the understanding, through the application of its stem-conceptions, do not possess this certainty. That which must necessarily be thought by the understanding is not as such necessarily to be held as true: the philosophies of the understanding, which misunderstand this, are, therefore, even the Kantian, philosophies of appearance. The case is otherwise with reason than with the faculties of knowledge (sense) and of thought (the understanding), reason being the faculty of comprehension or proof, which applies a ground to what has been perceived and thought, in order to discover its possibility. The principle of the understanding, the law of identity, is for the reason only a principle of non-reality, *conditio sine qua non*. Reason first seeks a ground for what the understanding must think as *actual:* when it has found this, and its need of proving is satisfied, it must not only think, but must hold as true and real. The understanding is a mere thought-faculty; the reason is, besides, a faculty of truth and reality. If, now, we make reason a positive criterion and attempt to gainsay (to doubt) what we know and understand, it results that what we immediately find in ourselves as datum (*e.g.*, the fact that we have sensations) must be held true, and exists as such before all reflection; the first transcendental question, Is there a sure belief? is answered in the affirmative. How is it with the second, Is there a sure assumption based on practical ends? First it is shown that sensible ends justify no assumptions; hence assumption on the basis of inclination does not give certainty. It is otherwise with rational ends, *i.e.*, those which reason not only recommends but unconditionally prescribes, so that it proves itself to be here not only practical but obligatory. There may, of course, enter in the moral necessity for assuming what appears to the

theoretical reason as doubtful (never what appears to it impossible). In all cases, namely, where the highest command of duty, the exhibition and conservation of the dignity of man in ourselves and others, cannot be fulfilled without the assumption of this or that real thing, we are in the proper sense of the word *morally* certain of it. This certainty is, it is true, entirely different from the necessary holding-for-true, for in the latter it always happens that first the known object, and then the knowledge, is held as true; whereas in assumption the reverse is the case; also, the necessity of belief is one grounded in the nature of the reason, hence is physical, that of assumption depends upon an end, and hence is moral. Certainty is in both cases the same. The common result of the two is (rational) faith. This word is always properly employed wherever something is accepted as indubitable reality; improperly, whenever it is a matter of opinion.

11. The answer to the *second* main question requires, as Hermes himself says, a metaphysical investigation (no longer an investigation in the theory of knowledge, or a transcendental investigation), for the problem of all metaphysics is, at bottom, only to discover reality by the method of reflection. Indeed, since it appears in this investigation that the question whether there is a God can be answered only in proportion as the like question regarding the inner and outer world has been answered, there are here to be solved the highest psychological, cosmological, and theological problems. In the solution of all three, Hermes arrives at much more positive results than Kant in his Transcendental Dialectic (*vid.* § 300, 2–4). Applying the result reached above, that what is found as fact in immediate consciousness must, and hence may, be held as true, he starts, now, with the indubitable fact that we find in ourselves sensations, presentations, etc. If, now, the understanding is compelled to think of some of these mental states as not (longer) existing, of others as existing, it can do this only by thinking temporal change of a substance present throughout those states, *i.e.*, of the Ego. But this idea formed by the understanding must be realized (made unalterable) by reason, because otherwise reason would lack ground (the possibility) for that indubitable fact. Hence the critical (reflecting) reason must hold as true an Ego distinct from the non-Ego, *i.e.*, an inner world. But just so, if the indubitable fact that I find the idea of an external object

forced upon me be comprehended as possible, the reflecting reason, also, must, as every one does before reflection, hold sense-objects as limited to definite portions of space and as the bearers or rather causes of our sensations, *i.e.*, hold an external world as real. The answer to this (theological) main question, which is linked with those preliminary psychological and cosmological questions, is the more circumstantial that, as regards both the existence and the attributes of God, it is always inquired, first, whether the belief, then whether the assumption, of these is necessary. For the existence of God, we have the decisive ground of reason that the changes of things, particularly their origin and passing out of existence, can be comprehended only if an infinite series of created things or an uncreated thing be supplied in thought as cause of that change; the first, however, is untenable because in that case we have to do only with effects, never with a cause, hence there remains for us only to hold as real an uncreated thing or a cause. In opposition to Kant and Fichte, it is asserted that the certainty of the existence of God is not a moral certainty, but that it is a physical necessity for the theoretical reason to hold as real a certain, eternal, absolute, unchangeable, personal, creative first cause of the transitory world. It is otherwise as regards the attributes of God, where theoretical and practical reason, belief and assumption, unite in making us certain of the incomprehensible power, knowledge, and goodness, as well as of the holiness, freedom, and love of God, in virtue of which God wills our happiness, which, just because He wills it eternally, is therefore eternally willed and hence will endure eternally. In spite of this faith, rendered irrevocably certain through the theoretical and practical reason, it must not be misunderstood, that much that transcends the power of reason to conceive, as *e.g.*, the infinitude of the divine attributes, can become certain to us only by the way of experience; especially, that the real nature of God remains to us, even after actual revelation, uncognizable. A mistaking of the limits of our comprehension leads to anthropopathic ideas of God as they appear in the present errors, both where conceived analogy with a father has led to an over-mild, and where comparison to a judge, to a stern God. As regards the third question (the possibility of a supernatural revelation), it is merely to be remarked that, whereas the existence of God is securely established by the theoretical reason, the

above-mentioned attributes of God by the theoretical and practical reason, revelation in general, and a definite revelation in particular, is guaranteed only by the obligatory reason, so that, therefore, it remains a moral necessity.

Cf. Albert Kreuzhage: *Beurtheilung der Hermesischen Philosophie*, etc. Münster, 1838.—Bolzano: *Prüfung der Philosophie des seligen Georg Hermes*, etc. Sulzbach, 1840.

12. It may appear strange that we place with Hermes a man, whose work, just now mentioned, contains an expression of high regard for his personal character, but whose chief doctrines—thorough-going doubt, subjectivism, according to which necessity represents knowledge of the truth, finally, assumption based on postulates—he so severely criticises. And yet they belong together not only on account of the similar position which they took up in the Catholic Church and the Church took up towards them, but on account of their point of contact in science. Neither, it is true, had ever been a follower of Kant, but they owe to him even more than they themselves acknowledge; both feel themselves repelled by the consequences drawn from Kant's doctrines by those going beyond those doctrines, and incline rather towards such as he had gotten beyond; with both, clearness in conceptions takes precedence of everything else, and, with full adherence to Catholic dogmas, they always seek to fulfil the demands of the natural understanding; finally, alike distinguished by their talent for teaching, they both become the centres of circles of faithful disciples, only, that upon one the distrust of ecclesiastical superiors did not fall till after his death, so that his activity in the teacher's chair was never interrupted, whereas it early drove the other from that post, and compelled him to adopt instead of the occupation of stimulating men by personal contact, which was more in harmony with his natural aptitude, that of the prolific writer. Hence the more brilliant success of the one who was not the more significant. BERNHARD BOLZANO, born Oct. 5th, 1781, in Prague, zealously occupied with mathematics and philosophy from early youth, regarded it as his life-work in both to help, by illustrating their conceptions, to place them upon a firm foundation. In mathematics, where he is perhaps more important than in philosophy, he early appeared as a writer. His *Considerations relating to certain Subjects in Elementary*

Geometry (Prague, 1804), as well as the *Contributions towards a Fundamental Presentation of Mathematics* (Prague, 1810), attempt, by putting conceptions in the place of intuitive construction, to avoid the unmethodical procedure previously prevailing, in which, *e.g.*, in order to demonstrate something about lines one calls to his assistance principles taken from the theory of surfaces and requires a variety of undemonstrated presuppositions. Thus, by means of the conception of similarity rightly grasped, the definition, previously sought in vain, of the straight line, and likewise the foundation of the theory of parallels, are to be discovered. His *Binomial Theorem* (1816), as well as the *Three Problems of Rectification, Complanation, and Cubing* (Leipsic, 1817), and the later-published *Essays on the Composition of Forces* (1842), and the *Three Dimensions of Space* (1843) are connected with those works. The preference which he gave to the conceptional development over the perceptional caused him to meditate for a long time the writing of an anti-Euclid. Having been appointed professor of the philosophical theory of religion, he published, in the year 1813, *Edificatory Discourses to Academic Youths*, in two volumes. These, and still more the various rumours concerning the free-thinking of his discourses, provoked the distrust of his superiors, and as he refused to recall his heresies, he lost his office as teacher, in the year 1820. He withdrew to the country and there lived, closely occupied as a writer, until the year 1848. Only the *Athanasia* (1827) was published by this suspiciously-watched man himself and under his own name. All the rest his friends caused to be printed, or, if he himself did it, he kept his name concealed. Most important of all are the *Text-Book of the Science of Religion*, etc. (4 vols., Sulzbach, 1834); and *Science of Knowledge*, etc. (4 vols., Sulzbach, 1837). Of both together he himself published a *critical résumé* under the title: *Bolzano's Science of Knowledge and Science of Religion* (Sulzbach, 1841), these being related to his (often too) extended works, almost as Kant's *Prolegomena* were to his *Critique of Pure Reason.* All the works of Bolzano, including certain polemical works, the æsthetical treatises on the *Conception of the Beautiful* (1843), and the *Division of the Fine Arts* (1847), as well as the posthumous treatise, *What is Philosophy?* fill twenty-five volumes; and a complete list of the same is to be found in the First Part of the *Sitzungsberichte* of the Vienna

Academy for the year 1849, with grateful reminiscences of him by his oldest pupil, Professor Fest, and by Rob. Zimmerman.

Cf. *Lebensbeschreibung des Dr. Bolanzo*, etc. Sulzbach, 1846 (*Autobiographie*).

13. Bolzano's *Science of Knowledge* has in common with Fichte's only the name. It professes to be merely a logic,—one, of course, that aims to show, by a thorough critique of other treatises on the subject, that a new one is needed, and why. Since Bolzano understands by science the theory of truths of a certain kind that deserve to be brought together in a text-book, he embodies in the definition of the science of knowledge this reference to the mode of presentation, and defines it as the totality of rules in accordance with which we should treat the sciences in well-ordered text-books. Although it is the fundamental science, still it must receive into itself principles of various kinds, particularly psychological, though this fact does not justify us in making psychology the basis of philosophy, and thus really abandoning all objective knowledge. On the contrary, the first of the five Parts of the Logic, viz., the *Fundamental Theory* (§§ 17–45), is to furnish proof that there is objective truth and that a knowledge of the same is possible for us. Everything by virtue of which a thing has its rightness, whether one knows of it or not, is a truth-in-itself. Even if we admit that the all-wise God knows every truth, yet we must suppose that there are truths-in-themselves, since they are not true because He knows them, but He knows them because He is all-wise. Truths-in-themselves, accordingly, have not (as have the truths conceived in our thought) a place of existence; hence "reality" is in so far to be denied them; nor must we limit them to the sphere of the eternal, for, that it rains to-day, is just as much a truth as, that a triangle has three sides. Since, now, Bolzano, just as Aristotle and Kant before him, assumes truth and falsehood to be bound up with the proposition, he is compelled to speak of propositions-in-themselves; indeed, since propositions consist of ideas (not always of conceptions), even of ideas-in-themselves; and hence he declares it a defect of language that we are compelled to say "proposition," when no proposing, or idea, when no conceiving, should be thought of in that connection. The theory of ideas-in-themselves, their combination into propositions-in-themselves, further,

of true propositions-in-themselves, and finally of their combination into syllogisms, forms the subject-matter of the Second (most extended) Part, the *Theory of Elements* (§§ 46–268), which, therefore, nominally, treats of the same thing as formerly the theory of elements in other logics did; only, here things are separated that are there confounded, viz., the objective constituents of a proposition containing truth, and our thought of the same, *i.e.*, the idea-in-itself, and the conceived idea; and the view is limited entirely to the former. Without this separation we are involved in a multitude of false propositions; among which, Bolzano signalizes particularly the proposition that the parts of a conceived idea correspond to the parts or properties of the object. This proposition, he says, is incompatible with Kant's celebrated distinction of analytic and synthetic judgments; further, makes it impossible to conceive rightly the nature of the idea to which there is no corresponding object (*e.g.*, nothing); finally, is the root of other false propositions, *e.g.*, the familiar one, The extension and intention of conceptions stand in inverse ratio, etc. Also in the distinction between perceptions (particular presentations) and conceptions, Bolzano confesses himself a grateful pupil of Kant; only, he contests decidedly the way in which Kant makes use of this distinction in the theory of time and space. These two are not perceptions but conceptions, because they are nothing real, but characteristics of reality; a time, that is to say, is the condition under which a property may with truth be attributed to a real thing (only now or as present is a thing black, and so excludes the not-black), and the sum of all times is (infinite) time. Just so is a place or a space the characteristic which we have to add in thought to the forces of a real thing in order to conceive it as an efficient cause; but the sum of all places is infinite space. Kant's theory of the categories, as well as his theory of time and space, is subjected to an examination and, in particular, is charged with incompleteness. In passing from ideas-in-themselves to propositions-in-themselves, Bolzano lays the greatest stress upon the fact that all *propositions*, even the more complex ones, in which an entire proposition occupies the place of subject, are reducible to the formula: *A* has (the property) *b*. In this formula we have, in the first place, "has" put as the real copula, instead of "is." Further, it renders clear the meaning of propositions of existence in which objectivity forms the predicate. Finally, it enables

us to avoid a number of errors, *e.g.*, that in the negative judgment the negation, or that in every judgment the time-qualification, belongs to the copula. Rather does the former, —since the negative judgment has the form: *A* has want of *b*,—belong to the predicate. Just so does the second belong to the subject (the existing *A* has *b*); a fact the knowledge of which secures us against regarding change as a denial of the *principium contradictionis:* Those are really different subjects of which something different is predicated. Among the theories relating to *true* propositions-in-themselves, Bolzano signalizes the rule that in all truths the subject-idea must be objective. (Propositions, the grammatical subject of which is the word *nothing*, are only an apparent contradictory instance.) Further, the rule that the objective connection of ground and consequence finds place between truths, and on that account has meaning only in relation to propositions, whereas objects or real things are related to one another as cause and effect. The Fourth Part of the Theory of Elements is taken up with the consideration of the *syllogism.* Here Bolzano attempts to show that a number of deductions of one true proposition from another is overlooked in the hand-books on logic. So the syllogism of probability, the importance of which is proved by mathematics. Also here, for the rest, it is always insisted upon that the derivability of a proposition is an objective relation, that, just for that reason, the judgment (*i.e.*, the conceived proposition) is not to be included in the definition of the syllogism. After a precise discussion, in the Fifth Part, of the *linguistic expression* of propositions, the Theory of Elements closes with a critique of previous presentations of the subject. In hardly any part of the work are so brilliantly displayed, as in this main division, learning, and acuteness in castigating every inaccuracy. With the theory of principles and elements the consideration of ideas-in-themselves and propositions-in-themselves is concluded, and Bolzano passes to the consideration of their appearance in the mind. This is done first in the *Theory of Knowledge* (§§ 269–321). That the four parts of this, in which are treated our subjective ideas, our judgments, the relation of the same to truth, finally their certainty and probability, run parallel to the first four parts of the Theory of Elements cannot surprise us. Just as little can the fact that much that is of a psychological nature is mixed in here. The Fourth Part of the Science of

Knowledge treats the *Art of Inventing* (§§ 322–391) contains methodological and topical rules, and shows among other things, how to meet scepticism, sophistic fallacies, etc. Finally, in the Fifth Part, Bolzano comes to the *Science of Knowledge Proper* (§§ 392–718). Herein are discussed, in nine chapters, first, the conception of science, then of a text-book, further, the laying out of the first into separate sciences; then we pass to the various kinds of readers, since a book written for the learned differs from a book written for tradesmen or for any one else whatever; then the selection of the propositions to be taken up, their application, oral and written expression, are treated at greater length, even punctuation-marks not being left untouched. Reflections upon the proper conduct of the author, as well as upon books that are didactic in character without being properly text-books, form the close, to which there is a critical appendix, which criticizes the dialectical method, as everywhere there goes hand in hand with the development of his own doctrines the explanation of them with reference to those of others. Noteworthy is the fact that when Bolzano returns to the definition of science laid down at the very beginning, he adds to the reference previously made to a text-book that is to be edited the further qualification, that the mode of treatment must be of such a kind that the greatest possible sum of good may result. In his critical *résumé* he permits himself to reprehend, in a sarcastic vein, both the prosaic-technical filling of the text-book with the phrases that so glibly talk of the organism of science, and the utilitarian standpoint of those to whom barren subtleties mean profundity.

14. The Text-Book of the *Science of Religion*, likewise, defines science as the totality of all important assertions concerning a subject; but, instead of specifying the resulting text-book, he seeks here an order by which a conviction resting upon reasonable grounds may be produced. Then, after defining religion as the totality of doctrines that have an influence upon our virtue and happiness, he marks out the problem of the philosophical science of religion in such a way, that its subject-matter consists of those religions which appear to the writer as the most perfect. The ground for regarding the Christian religion, and, indeed, the Catholic conception of it, as such a religion, is that it is revealed, *i.e.*, attested or sanctioned, by God; for whether this be done in a natural or super-

natural way is entirely unessential as regards the conception of revelation. The criterion of the divine revelation is, whether it is morally beneficial, and whether there are connected with it certain extraordinary (although natural) occurrences, of which no other use can be conceived than that they serve to the attestation of this religion. After a discussion, in the first chapter (§§ 9–59), of the conception of religion in general, and of organized religion in particular, there is given in the second chapter (§§ 64–94) a brief characterization of natural religion, in which, among other things, God is defined as the unconditionally real, from which the "natural" attributes of God follow. Then in the third chapter (§§ 95–134), the necessity of a revelation is discussed, and in the fourth (§§ 135–177), its characteristics. With this second volume of the Text-Book Bolzano passes to the Second main part of his work, —to showing that the Christian-Catholic system possesses the highest moral usefulness, and that its origin and extension have the attestation of extraordinary occurrences. And, in fact, the second volume (and main part) is occupied only with the latter, whereas the former is first treated of in the third and fourth volume (as the third main part). The evidence of authority and miracles, as well as the genuineness of the sources, is discussed in the first three chapters of the Second Part (§§ 4–54), and in the fourth, the presence in Christianity of the external characteristic of revelation is pointed out. Much more extended is the proof of the inner characteristic, moral usefulness. The systematic presentation of the doctrine of Catholicism in its inner excellence is the subject of the Third main part, which begins with the third volume of the Text-Book. First is discussed (§§ 3–30) the Catholic doctrine of the sources of knowledge, then, in the second chapter (§§ 31–234), the Christian-Catholic Dogmatics, in six divisions of the work. Everywhere appears the effort to show how closely the healthy human understanding, with its postulates, borders upon what the Christian-Catholic doctrine promises and teaches. Of the doctrines relating to God, it may be mentioned that the doctrine of the three persons of the Divine nature is represented as wholly reasonable, and that the reference of the Father to the All, the Son to Humanity, and the Holy Ghost to the individual soul, is here especially emphasized. That the temporal character of Creation should be denied is consistent with Bolzano's conception of individual

substances, which furnishes him the data of his doctrine of immortality. The treatment of the dogmas and the elucidation of them does not suggest the later Schoolmen, but very often Raymond of Sabunde and Anselm. They here appear so clear and so readily intelligible, that it is almost incomprehensible why every one does not assent to them. The mystical element is entirely wanting in Bolzano. The third and last chapter (§§ 235–300) is concerned with the Christian-Catholic theory of morals. This contains, in the first division, the *Christian-Catholic Ethics* (§§ 236–271), in which are laid down not one, but eight most general laws of morals, among which every one will find that or those to which he attributes universal validity. In the discussion of revealed duties, only those duties are so classed the moral usefulness of which can be proved by reason also. In this section are also examined the conceptions of law, which are discussed more at length, in part in special (occasional) writings of Bolzano, to which he distinctly refers in his *Résumé*. Joining on to the Ethics in the second division is the *Christian Ascetics* (§ 292–300), which develops the means to virtue, the natural, as well also as those with which, in addition to the fact that they are serviceable in and of themselves, are united very special manifestations of grace, that is to say, the means of salvation. The standpoint of the healthy understanding is never denied, but there is always united with it a reference to ecclesiastical institutions. Often (*e.g.*, where pilgrimages are identified with journeys of recreation in the society of friends), this suggests Basedow's schemes of Enlightenment. All the particular sacraments are examined in turn, and through ordination the transition to primacy in the Church is made, and it is pointed out that it is perfectly legitimate if the primate takes now a submissive, now a dictatorial, position towards worldly institutions.

15. The foregoing account may serve to justify the placing of Bolzano with Hermes, and of both with the Semi-Kantians. In so doing, we should be obliged, as regards the doctrines of both, to place Hermes more with Fries, and Bolzano with Krug, whereas, as regards their intellectual importance, exactly the opposite relation might hold. The fact that the one treated rational theology almost solely, and the other with decided preference, has limited their influence to the members of their confession. In this is to be found the explanation of the fact that in the presentations of the history of philosophy given by

Protestants they are scarcely mentioned. It may, therefore, be pardoned as an attempt at compensation, if more space has been devoted here to both than to those who, because of their much more widely extended influence, are much better known, since those who once become known are of course treated by every new historian.

SECOND DIVISION.

The Elementary Philosophy and its Opponents.

§ 306.

1. Although, since the phases of the process of the development of German speculation were first compared with those of the revolutionary movement of the preceding century, such a comparison has lost the charm of novelty—a brilliant comedy, indeed, has given it the character of being merely an ingenious fancy—yet what has thus far been done in this history requires that it should also here be pointed out how the world-historical necessity of the resolution of Kant's system through others is recognisable in the fact that the world-event with which the revolution produced by it must be compared was not the last, but that, upon the commotions in America, followed times of unrest in Europe, the waves of which rose higher than those beyond the ocean. But entirely apart from that, it may be shown from Kant's doctrine itself that it could not possibly remain fixed at the point to which he had brought it. It was not first asserted by others, but was avowed by Kant himself, and put forth, with a just pride, in every leading section of his works, that he had reconciled what Leibnitz and Locke had taught. But that is scarcely a real reconciliation where the tree of knowledge grows from two stems, the crowns of which are so united by the intermingling of their branches that they appear to form only the one which is called natural science. The Faith-Philosophers were at one as regards this point—that this dualism must be overcome, and they all extolled speech as a point in which sense

and thought are more closely united than in that confused commingling of the branches of different stems; as if Kant himself had not indicated before them, in the schematism of pure reason, just such an inner reconciliation; as if he had not in this same place suggested that it might, indeed, be one and the same activity by which we give to sensations the unity of space and with which we think. But not only in this obscure corner of his philosophical system, which eludes many eyes because of its difficulty, but even at the beginning, where he speaks of the two stems of knowledge, he says (as if tantalizingly) that the two may perhaps have a common root. In fact, Kant had even told to him who had ears to hear *where* one must seek for this root. If, according to him, perceptions are immediate and individual, and conceptions mediate and universal, presentations, then *both* perception and thought are, obviously, faculties of presentation. When, therefore, Reinhold, who is presently to be considered, announced to the Kantians that he had found the common root of the faculties of perception and conception in the faculty of presentation, it was just as natural that all, or at least the most important thinkers, should side with him, as it was that the Cartesians should pass on to Occasionalism. The nature of the case made it impossible to do otherwise.

2. But with this getting back to the common root of the faculties of knowledge there results, at the same time, another advantage for the Kantian theory. That he is not indifferent to the form of the system, and that this depends upon the unity of the ruling idea, or, also, upon the end, Kant had declared in the Transcendental Theory of Method. How important with him, further, demonstration was, we would know even if we had only become aware of Jacobi's and Fries' objections thereto. But if we inquire how in both regards the two-stemmed tree appears, Kant leaves very much to be desired. Because of the two-fold beginning, having its character in the fact that, just as in the Æsthetic, so in the Analytic, the given matter and the superimposed form are at first separated, each being isolated; and, again, just as there the subjectivity of time and space was indirectly inferred from the fact that without it there could be no mathematics *a priori*, so here the justification for the application of the categories was inferred from the fact that without it there could be no real experience,—the transcendental deduction of

time and space is entirely without result for that of the categories. At least they are not in their union a solidarity, as Kant supposed, when he said, that Hume had either to declare mathematics an empirical science or attribute objective validity to the conception of cause. Against Hume—and him Kant meant nevertheless quite to refute—the transcendental deduction of the categories really has not the least demonstrative force; for, if one had said to him, Otherwise we have only subjective syntheses, or perceptions, not objective syntheses, or experiences, he would have answered, I assume the existence of the first alone, the last I deny entirely. But if, on the other hand, we ignore Hume, the two deductions suggest altogether too strongly Kästner's method of proving mathematical propositions, that one and another should not soon have wished to discover and substitute for that retrogressive, a *pro*gressive mode of procedure. If it should be possible to formulate in a principle raised above all question, the activity of that common root out of which by a progressive movement it could be deduced *that* and *why* the two modes of thought separate one from the other, that and why in each of the two there are an empirical and a pure element, passivity and activity, a material and a formal side, or whatever else the two may be termed, all grounds for hesitation would be done away with. But just this Reinhold desires to compass by his deeper foundation of Criticism.

§ 307.

A.—REINHOLD.

Ernst Reinhold: *K. L. Reinhold's Lehren and literarische Werke nebst einer Auswahl von Briefen*, etc. Jena, 1825.

1. KARL LEONHARD REINHOLD, who was born in Vienna on the 26th of October, 1758, and released by the suppression of the order of Jesuits from a novitiate with them, studied, after leaving his fatherland, in Leipsic under Platner, then went to Weimar and became a coadjutor of Wieland on the *Deutscher Mercur*, and later his son-in-law. The *Letters on the Kantian Philosophy*, which appeared in the *Mercur*, in which Reinhold shows that all oppositions that had until then divided philosophy were resolved in the Kantian system, won for him a friendly acknowledgment from Kant, and was the

occasion of his receiving a professorship at Jena, which he filled with remarkable success for seven years, and exchanged for the professorship in Kiel, where he was Teten's successor. In the year 1789 appeared in the *Deutscher Mercur* the essay on the *Past Fortunes of the Kantian Philosophy* with which Kant was entirely satisfied, which was not the case as regards the most important by far of Reinhold's works published in the same year: *Attempt at a New Theory of the Human Faculty of Presentation* (Prague and Jena, 1789), although Reinhold always announced the lectures which he gave in connection with this work as being on the *Critique of Pure Reason.* The *Contributions to the Correction of the Previous Misunderstandings of Philosophers* (2 vols. 1790-94), served further towards the founding of what he now designated by the very appropriate name: *Elementary Philosophy.* The work on the *Foundation of Philosophical Knowledge* (1791) also belongs here, and the presentation of the Elementary Philosophy is to be found in all these works, as if they had all appeared contemporaneously; but only in these, for with Reinhold's departure from Jena began his changes of view. His *Selection of Miscellaneous Writings* (1797), presents a confirmation of what Jacobi and Fichte had said, that the Elementary Philosophy is merely introductory to the Science of Knowledge (*vid.* §§ 311–313). But he does not stop even here. The writings of Chr. Gottfried Bardili (1761–1808), particularly the most important of these, *Outlines of Elementary Logic* (1800), corresponded, so it appeared to him, to the latent wish to remedy the idealism of the Science of Knowledge by supplementing it with realistic elements; and the union of logic and ontology pleased him so much better than the endeavours in Schelling's Philosophy of Nature towards the same end, that he for a long time regarded this as a caricature of the performances of Bardili. The *Contributions to the Easier Survey of the State of Modern Philosophy* (6 Parts, 1801) shows him to be in entire agreement with Bardili. He did not remain so long, for he says of his *Groundwork of a Synonymics for a Universal Linguistic Usage in the Philosophical Sciences* (1812), that it is a fifth standpoint which as a last result he lays before the world. As in Reinhold's dependence on Bardili we must recognise a sense for the demands which Schelling sought to meet, so in his *Synonymics* we must acknowledge a presentiment that there is needed a critical sifting of the thought-

forms and philosophical terminology as it was laid before the world, contemporaneously with that work, in Hegel's Logic. Some minor works which followed thereupon have remained unnoticed. Reinhold died on the 10th of August, 1823.

2. Almost in the same words in which was shown above the necessity of going beyond the *Critique of Pure Reason*, Reinhold formulates what the Elementary Philosophy aims to accomplish; viz., to present the two stems of knowledge as branches of one faculty of presentation; further, by fixing a firm indubitable first principle and deduction, actually to prove the two Kantian results, "that we do not know things-in-themselves, but bear within us the *a priori* principles of knowledge," instead of allowing merely that they are valid only for the case in which the fact of mathematics and experience is granted, hence only hypothetically valid. This it is that is the aim of the theory of the faculty of presentation, which, so far as it succeeds in it, places on a deeper foundation what Kant had taught, but thereby becomes also a foundation for all knowledge, a science of the sciences, the true *philosophia prima* and Elementary Philosophy, and at the same time receives the form of a system. Moreover, an obstacle standing in the way of the Kantian philosophy is therewith removed. For the embarrassing misconception that Kant's investigations, which differ from all previous ones in that they deal with knowing instead of known objects, were investigations relating to the knowing subject, he was not to blame. (Whoever considers sight considers something that is different both from the object seen and the seeing eye.) Another obstacle, however, was really called into existence by Kant himself. The knowing which he had in mind is a complicated act, concerning the peculiar character of which very diverse views prevail, the *possibility* of which, in fact, many deny (the Sceptics). A right understanding or a misunderstanding depends, therefore, upon the happy or unhappy accident of the reader's conceiving or not conceiving knowledge just as Kant himself did. We have therefore to discover the wholly simple activity underlying knowledge and never doubted by any one. But this is the activity of presentation; the fact of our having presentations, every one recognises, no one doubts. The characterization of this fact, now, gives Reinhold the desired first and only fundamental principle, that of consciousness, a principle that contains what takes place in *all* conscious-

ness, which, just for that reason, must recur, only in a different character, in sensuous, just as in intellectual consciousness. This principle he formulates as follows: The presentation is distinguished in consciousness from the presented (object) and the presenting (subject), and is related to both. (Since it is left wholly undecided here whether there are objects outside of consciousness or not, even the extreme idealist, the egoist, admits the principle under consideration.) The problem of the Elementary Philosophy is, now, to discover what is present*able* or falls in the presenta*tion*; hence it has to abstract from the conceived [object] and the conceiving [subject] (as was abstracted above from the object and the eye). The inner conditions of the reality of the mere presentation we call faculty of presentations. (Hence, according to the example above: the faculty of sight is neither object nor eye, but the inner condition of seeing.) Reinhold here gives emphatic warning against our confounding outer and inner conditions of reality; as the child has the first in its parents and the second in its component parts (body and soul), we have here to do not with the question how the idea arises, but with the question of what it consists. Hence Reinhold seeks only the inner ground of the presentation given as a fact. On account of the double relation in which, according to the highest principle, the presentation stands, it must contain two component parts or moments, the matter corresponding to the presented thing or the object, and the form corresponding to the presenting subject. (Whoever thinks the distinction between the matter or content of the presentation and its object an idle one, should reflect that even presentations of the non-existent have a matter, and that when we approach a tree our presentation continually gains a new content, which certainly the object of it does not.) The presentation is, just for that reason, neither received (Locke) nor generated (Leibnitz), but formed (out of matter). But from this it also immediately follows that nothing can ever be presented as it is before it has received the form of the presentation; hence never as it is in itself. Further, that it is nonsense to call presentations images of objects; at most could the matter of the same be so called, but not even that can be so called. If one compares the matter (stuff) and form of the presentation, the latter is seen to have been produced, but the former not, and hence we say that it is a "given" (not: it *is* given, for

this might easily be referred to an object outside of the act of presentation). If now we reason back to the inner ground of the presentation, we must distinguish in the faculty of presentations a faculty for the given, the matter, that is to say, receptivity, and likewise one for producing the form, that is to say, spontaneity. The former, since only what contains difference, that is to say, a manifold, can affect the mind, must be a faculty for receiving the manifold; the latter, a faculty for combining the manifold by an act of synthesis into a unity. There can, therefore, never be a presentation that would not present, as aspects, the manifoldness of the given, and the made unity.

3. Herewith are given the first data for a theory of sense and understanding. But only the first data, for many intermediate steps are necessary to reach the point at which Kant's Transcendental Æsthetic and Analytic had started. They serve at the same time to fix the relation of this theory to earlier standpoints. In the Leibnitzo-Wolffian school unconscious ideas (presentations) played a very important *rôle*; these, of course, Reinhold could not suppose to exist, since the matter of the presentation first receives form, and hence first becomes, in consciousness. But he borrows from Leibnitz the distinction between obscure, clear, and distinct ideas (presentations), and so brings it into combination with those three moments, that his investigation has to do with the question whether all presentations are accompanied by a clear consciousness. This, now, is not the case. The mere presence of a presentation in consciousness leaves it entirely undecided whether it is a repeated presentation, whether a mere presentation, etc., hence the consciousness accompanying it is obscure and relates it immediately, *i.e.*, without making that distinction, to something objective. Presentations thus immediately related to something objective are perceptions. From these are to be distinguished the presentations in which we are conscious of the presented *as* presented, and which, therefore, relate mediately to objects; namely, conceptions. The obscure consciousness which accompanies the first receives light and clearness through the latter. The faculty of the former is sense, of the latter, understanding. That is not mere receptivity, this not mere spontaneity, but in every consciousness these two are united, though of course in different degrees. Otherwise, in fact, neither sense nor understanding would be a faculty of presentation.

4. As regards, now, the *Theory of Sense* its chief deviation from Kant is a more precise terminology. Kant had called space and time now pure forms of perception, and now, again, pure perceptions. But Reinhold makes a distinction. Since with him, exactly as with Kant, a perception is a presentation, *i.e.*, a formed matter, he holds that the given sensations, constituting matter, are by the co-existence and succession lying in our presentations, and constituting form, converted into perception (phenomenon). But since this form itself, as the example of geometry teaches, can be made an object of perception, he makes a distinction, and holds that, for the geometer, co-existence is the matter and construction the form of the perception, which he calls *mere* space, or space *in general*. Just so will the form of succession become an object of perception and hence a perception of *mere* time. *Mere* space is here something different from empty space. Whereas, therefore, in the phenomenon perceived as succession the matter is empirical, though the form is *a priori*, and hence the perception is empirical, the perception of mere space is a pure *a priori* perception, because its matter also has this character. As regards the rest, Reinhold agrees with all that Kant's Transcendental Æsthetic had taught. Just so in his *Theory of the Understanding* he agrees with all that Kant taught in the Transcendental Analytic; only, he holds that not so much should be made to depend on Logic, which in fact itself must, properly, rest upon the Elementary Philosophy. After showing why the combination of perceptions into an objective unity is an act of judgment, he attempts to derive out of the nature of the judgment and the two elements of it, its matter and its form, the norms of its synthesis, *i.e.* the table of categories. The relation of the subject to its objective unity with the predicate conditions the quantity of the judgment; the relation of the predicate to its objective unity with the subject, the quality of the judgment. Again, as regards the form of the judgment, or the synthesis, this, according as the relation to the terms to be united, or to the one performing the act of judgment, who unites them, is taken into account, gives relation and modality. In each of these there should be—since, as we have seen, there are united in presentations generally manifoldness and unity—three categories, the third of which unites in itself the other two. As to the rest, the theory of the schemata of pure

reason, the pure first principles of the same, and the union of all in the one principle, that everything must be subject to the conditions of possible experience, Reinhold deviates from Kant just as little as in the principle that all knowledge is limited to phenomena. The *Theory of Reason*, which here takes the place of Kant's Transcendental Dialectic, depends, just as this does, upon the principle that as the understanding judges, so reason infers, and allies the three Ideas with the three syllogisms of the reason, an alliance that is called one of the greatest services of Kant. But it is peculiar to him that, similarly as in the Theory of Sense, he distinguishes what Kant had confounded. Kant had taken the two words, things-in-themselves and noumena as wholly synonymous, and accordingly had called on the one hand, duties things-in-themselves, and, on the other, the unknown cause of our sensations noumenon. Here, again, Reinhold distinguishes very exactly. Noumenon is never anything else to him than Idea of the reason, a demand. Hence it never signifies anything other than what always remains beyond experience: it is an eternal ought. If, then, we speak of its unknowability, this word has here only this import: There is no meaning in speaking of knowing or not-knowing when there is no being, but only mere problems. These are not things to be *known* but to be executed. But it is entirely different as regards unknowable things-in-themselves. These are objects independent of our mode of thought, and since in our presentations there is contained at least the matter corresponding to objects, they have much greater resemblance to phenomena than to noumena. To the latter, things-in-themselves (precisely like phenomena) constitute an opposite, and may therefore be called merely negative noumena. Noumena are neither conceived objects, as are phenomena, nor non-conceived objects, as are things-in-themselves; they are in fact, not objects, but mere laws, by which we have to govern ourselves in dealing with objects of experience. (What Reinhold says regarding the practical spirit, partly in his chief work, partly elsewhere, has little importance.)

§ 308.

B.—REINHOLD'S OPPONENTS.

1. Of the two ways in which a philosophical system may be given a further extension, deeper foundation and nearer

determination, the first requires a man who, as regards that which he established, sees further than his predecessor. This can hardly be denied of Reinhold as regards the reduction of the two stems; and hence even Kant himself was scarcely prepared to criticise adversely this "hypercritical" friend in any other way than to say that it was too early for a deeper establishment of his system. Likewise the opponents of Reinhold, who went beyond Kant in a different manner, did not belittle this service. This starting from a simple point, which was first made possible by that union, as well as the actual deduction of transcendentalism, which Kant, in reality, justified only by reduction (Reinhold says: induction), was conceded by his contemporaries and by those who came after him to be his own achievement, accomplished without assistance from others. It is different as regards the second mode of expanding a philosophical system. Nearer determinations, as the example of the Socratic School has shown (§§ 67–70), can be given to what as yet remains indeterminate, even by those who at no single point see more deeply than the master, but, because they direct their view wholly to one side of the system, see more acutely at one or another point. Hence it may also happen, as it did there, that the progress in question is made by several at the same time who together supplement the one-sidedness of each. As regards Reinhold, we find the peculiarity that criticism is expanded by him in the two ways at the same time, that is to say, as Plato and the Cyrenaics had developed the doctrine of Socrates. In one case he worked alone; in the other, he worked in conjunction with his opponents. One point, for example, which Kant had left so obviously vague that there was no possibility that it should remain so longer, was things-in-themselves. What are they? In spite of all protests of the elder Fichte to the contrary, which many, following him, have repeated with great assurance, it may be asserted that at least four different conceptions of Kant's things-in-themselves rest upon his express explanations. The Fichtean who says that things-in-themselves are whatever we make of them, may with justice appeal to the assertion that only the reason, *i.e.*, the faculty of problems, leads us to the hypothesis of things-in-themselves. The sceptic appeals to the fact that Kant left it undecided whether things-in-themselves are without us or within us; the idealist to the fact that Kant

regarded them as limiting conceptions which merely say, Here our knowledge ceases; he, again, who holds the opposite view, appeals to the fact that there are many passages in Kant into which the meaning can be read, that things-in-themselves are the causes, to us otherwise unknown, of our sensations, the objects from which we receive, not indeed sensations, as Fichte says in his protest, but impressions, out of which we ourselves then form perceptions or phenomena, *i.e.*, presentations. This last interpretation is that adopted by Reinhold; by means of the above-given separation of things-in-themselves and noumena he succeeds—to employ here words of his own with which, later, he characterized his earlier standpoints—in giving to Kant's doctrines as empirical an interpretation as the letter of them will suffer. In spite, therefore, of the fact that in his theory he gives warning against thinking as regards the "given" sensations, of something *by which* they are given to us, things-in-themselves are nevertheless to him nothing else than these givers; they are causes of the impressions we receive.

2. Now, that this is incompatible with the spirit of the Kantian philosophy, had long since been pointed out by F. H. Jacobi in his *David Hume*, when he showed that Kant's system was consistent only if it became actual idealism, *i.e.*, if by things-in-themselves be understood an x posited only by and in consciousness. At present the case stood thus,—there is no getting inside of Kant's system without the thing-in-itself, and no staying there with the thing-in-itself. But much more strikingly was this put in an anonymous work aimed directly at Reinhold, which appeared with the title: *Æ nesidemus, or On the Fundamental Principles of the Elementary Philosophy put forth by Professor Reinhold* (1792). (It soon became known that the author of this work was GOTTLOB ERNST SCHULZE [23rd of Aug., 1761 to 11th of Jan., 1833], professor in Helmstädt [later at Göttingen], who later gave up the sceptical standpoint, which he still occupied in his *Critique of Theoretical Philosophy* 2 vols. 1801, for one that takes as its principle the observation of the facts of consciousness, and in many respects approximates to Jacobi and Fries. See his *Encyclopædia of the Philosophical Sciences*, 1814; *Psychical Anthropology*, 1816; and, *On Human Knowledge*, 1832.) This work, which has been epoch-making in the development of Criticism, shows, now, in the most

striking way, that it is the most decided contradiction possible, if it be asserted, first, that categories apply only to phenomena, and then that things-in-themselves are *causes* of impressions, as if cause were not a category. Since the same holds true of the category of reality, Criticism would be consistent, according to Ænesidemus, only in not supposing, sceptically, the existence of things-in-themselves, but in asserting, apodictically, their impossibility. At the same time, Ænesidemus does not draw these consequences for himself. This the Kantian must do: *he* is no Kantian.

3. Though Ænesidemus-Schulze thus indulged in scoffing, as if no one among the Kantians would draw these bold conclusions, they had long since, and upon the very same grounds that he had adduced, been drawn by the very remarkable automath SALOMON MAIMON (1754 to 22nd Nov., 1800), who had stated his views in the work which sprang out of comments made when first reading the *Critique of Pure Reason:* viz. *Essay on the Transcendental Philosophy* (1790), better in the *Philosophical Dictionary* (1791), as well as in his *Ramblings in the Province of Philosophy* (1793), his *Attempt at a New Logic* (1794), and particularly well in the *Critical Investigations relating to the Human Mind* (1797). Agreeing with Kant that philosophy begins with transcendental investigations, *i.e.*, investigates that without which no real object can be thought, he nevertheless does not approve of the formula, How are synthetic judgments *a priori* possible? This, he thinks, rests upon the confusion of the analytical judgment with the identical proposition, and were better formulated, How can we make analytic, propositions which, because of our lack of knowledge, are synthetic? This, however, relates only to the expression. Agreeing with Reinhold that the two stems of knowledge must be given up, he is also at one with him in holding that all shall be deduced from consciousness. Only, Reinhold appears to him to have in view a particular kind of consciousness, the consciousness of a presentation, instead of consciousness in general, which lies still deeper, and possesses a different value in the different forms of consciousness. The consciousness that constitutes the universal form of the faculty of knowledge, without which no presentation, no conception, no Idea, can be thought, subsumption under which is termed "thought"—this should be made the starting-point.

4. As regards, now, first, the treatment of *Sense*, he regrets that many, *e.g.*, Reinhold, have been led by the Kantian expression, "Sensations are given to us," to assume things-in-themselves outside the faculty of knowledge. Since cause, reality, plurality, etc., are categories, a Kantian cannot speak of several things-in-themselves that produce impressions upon us. In general, objects outside of the faculty of knowledge are not things, and the Critical Dogmatism of Reinhold and others forgets that "given" means merely: presented without consciousness of our spontaneity. We may assume that there are in ourselves things-in-themselves in distinction from phenomena; and then they are the complete syntheses of the marks, Ideas, or limiting conceptions to which we gradually approach, as to the value of $\sqrt{2}$; whereas a thing-in-itself outside of consciousness is an imaginary quantity, like $\sqrt{-a}$, and hence can be employed by the transcendental philosopher only as this imaginary quantity is employed, to prove the absurdity of any assumption. The faculty, for having given knowledge, *i.e.*, knowledge the origin of which is unknown, is sense. If there is a knowledge that precedes and conditions others, it is given *a priori;* if it is not a condition of other knowledge, it is *a posteriori.* Thus not only is the sensation yellow a "given" something, but so also are time and space; the two latter are however given *a priori* because they are a condition of every body. Time and space are definite forms of bringing into unity the manifold; hence they have for their ground and their presupposition the identity and diversity by which *in general* manifoldness is reduced to unity. Time and space are sensuous presentations of diversity, or diversity presented as externality, as Leibnitz correctly teaches, and what is not true of an infinite understanding is true of us,—sense is imperfect understanding. With Reinhold, Maimon then distinguishes space as form of perceptions, and as itself the matter of a perception. Very precise investigations of the first elements (differentials) of sensations, which are here united with those relating to time and space, are particularly interesting because Fichte has often confessed his "boundless" respect for Maimon's genius, which gave the first impulse towards his theory of sensation.

5. In the discussion of the *Understanding* there are, particularly, two points in which Maimon appears on the side of Reinhold against Kant. In the first place, he will not tolerate

the idea that the transcendental logic is dependent upon the pure (or school) logic. Rather, must the opposite be true, as appears already from the fact that a multitude of logical rules are inexact, even false, if there be not taken in connection with them something that results purely from transcendental investigations. I can very well unite A and non-A in a consciousness; in fact, I always do it where I make the latter predicate in a negative judgment, but I cannot join them both in a real object; just so the *principium exclusi tertii* is entirely without meaning where neither of the two opposite predicates can ever be united with the subject in a real object, etc. We have, therefore, to inquire, What combination of thoughts gives a real object of thought? and here the rule is, that in which the one can be thought without the other, but not this without that. Since in this case the latter is a possible attribute of the former (right-angled of triangle), the *Law of Determinability* is made the principle of real thought, which explains, among other things, the difference between analytical and identical propositions, as well as that between negative and infinite judgments, etc. Real thought is thus distinguished from arbitrary thought, which combines things that can be thought one without the other (as circle and black); and from the formal thought which combines inseparable determinations of reflection (as cause and effect). Only real thought contains real synthetic judgments. These are, therefore, subject to the law of determinability. By means of this law the categories can be deduced, and that, too, not from the pre-existing and given judgments, but in such a way that it will now be shown, the rather, why the table of judgments is complete. Categories as ways of subsuming under the unity of consciousness, or, what means the same thing, as conditions of the possibility of a real object, must, of course, be contained in the fundamental law of this subsumption as a germ, and therefore be deduced therefrom. (How Maimon effects this is of little interest.) The second point in which Maimon is in entire agreement with Reinhold is that the transcendental deduction (through which we have experience, which, otherwise, would be impossible) remains, as against Hume, who denies experience in the Kantian sense, without effect. And all the more since, properly speaking, it appears from Kant's own words that Hume is quite right in his position. According to Kant, by the application of the categories the necessary con-

nection of experience in the proper sense of the word is to assume the place of the accidental connection of perception. This application is effected through the transcendental schemata, through time-relations. But since the schema of necessity had been "Always," I can say that fire necessarily produces warmth, or (not "will" but) *must* produce it, only if I have perceived that it *always* does so. But since "always" is an Idea, an approximation-value, which is never attained, there is, as regards objects of experience, no apodictical knowledge, but only probability, and Maimon is fond of calling himself a critical sceptic, as contradistinguished from the critical dogmatist Kant. Wholly different, however, is it as regards mathematical objects. As in the example given, I can with certainty apply to the *succession* of fire and warmth the category of causality, although that fire and warmth are always in a succession remains questionable; so, also, to other time and space relations this and every other category can be applied; and here Maimon opposes Reinhold, whom he criticizes as assuming the possibility of doubting mathematical propositions, and as having, as did Kant, treated the cases of mathematics and experience as the same. Hence he says that they are both empirical dogmatists and rational sceptics, he on the contrary being a rational dogmatist and empirical sceptic. The difference, that is to say, lies in this: that in mathematics we have to do solely with that which is made out of the *a priori* given matter of space, hence with real objects of thought, something absolutely certain.

6. In no part of his theory does Maimon differ so much from Kant as where he considers the *Reason*, and as regards the practical questions so closely connected therewith. Like Reinhold, he approves of conceiving reason as, in the first instance, the faculty of inference or, as he prefers to say, of drawing conclusions. From that he concludes that the reason only points out what we have to seek, hence lays down demands, which impel us ever further,—a thing which only the imagination, which conceives the *progressus in infinitum* as finite, converts into so-called Ideas or Ideals, which the Kantians so delight in because they have gotten, by means of them, at least a shadow of metaphysics. In his criticism of metaphysics, Kant has called illusions of reason what are illusions only of the imagination, which converts, not without detriment, perfection (among other things), towards which we

have to strive, into a totality of perfections, which is an object of thought. All Kant's antinomies are, therefore, to be solved by assigning one assertion to the reason, and the other to the imagination. In practical philosophy, he censures Kant for having supplanted the only motive to action, pleasure, by an unpractical principle. Pleasure is not to be taken as physical. The highest is that of knowledge, and because it recognises this fact, the Ethics of Aristotle is much more useful than the Kantian.

Cf. *Sal. Maimon's Lebensgeschichte, von ihm selbst geschrieben*, herausg. von K. P. Moritz., 2 Parts, 1792. [Eng. tr. by Murray, 1888, Ed.] Sabattia Joseph Wolff: *Maimoniana*, 1813. Dr. J. H. Witte: *Salomon Maimon*, Berlin, 1876. I can refer to my own account of Maimon's theory in my *Entwickelung der deutschen Speculation seit Kant* (§ 21), which appeared in the year 1848, as th most complete, although a reviewer in the Augsburg *Allgemeine Zeitung* would have it that Maimon was first made known by Kuno Fischer.

7. Decidedly the most important of the opponents of Reinhold, and in general one of the most important among those who called themselves Kantians, is JACOB SIGISMUND BECK. (Born in 1761 in Lissau, near Danzig; studied in Königsberg, read from 1791 to 1799 in Halle, and died on the 29th of August, 1840, as professor at Rostock.) As a pupil, who stood in very close proximity to Kant and to whom, indeed, Kant left the original introduction to the *Critique of Judgment* in manuscript, he was led to write an *Illustrative Abridgment of the Critical Writings of Professor Kant* (1793), the first two volumes of which Kant praised highly, and Kantians employed as a compendium. The third volume: *Only Possible Standpoint from which the Critical Philosophy must be Judged* (1796), was the occasion of Kant's beginning to reckon Beck also, as earlier Reinhold and Maimon, among his "hypercritical" friends, and of Beck's theory being, after the example of Reinhold's, designated as the *Standpoint-theory*. He developed it more concisely in his *Outlines of the Critical Philosophy* (1796), upon which he caused to follow his *Commentary on Kant's Metaphysics of Morals* (1798). In Rostock he first published the *Propædeutic to every Scientific Study* (1799), a work which, like his *Outlines*, has also been translated into English, and in which he, like Reinhold earlier, is fond of speaking of philosophy "without nickname," instead of, as earlier, of the Kantian, or Critical, Philosophy. He wrote, besides, *Principles of Legislation*

(1806), and text-books on *Logic*, and on *Natural Right* (both in 1820).

8. According to Beck, most of the Kantians, not excepting even Reinhold, who, however, came nearest to the true meaning of Criticism, agreed much more with the Leibnitzians and other dogmatists than they supposed. The difference is very slight between the unknown things-in-themselves of the Kantians, and the half-known things-in-themselves of the Leibnitzians. The Kantians, further, who think Kant's assertion that objects affect our senses has reference to things-in-themselves, make of him a dogmatist wholly of the traditional sort, as Locke was. Finally, there is scarcely any difference to be discovered between the way in which most of the Kantians conceive the categories immanent in the understanding, and the Leibnitzian theory of innate conceptions. The ground of this relationship, and at the same time of a number of contradictions in which Reinhold, like the Kantians, is involved, is that they attempt to answer a question, instead of exposing its absurdity. This is the question: How are our presentations related to things-in-themselves? Thus Reinhold himself destroys the desert which he had won for himself by showing that the matter of the presentation is something entirely different from its object, since he introduces the unintelligible expression, the matter of the presentation "corresponds" to the object, a relation which again points to such a bond of union between things-in-themselves and presentations. Here Berkeley saw much more clearly, for he explained it to be impossible that our presentations could be effects of things. Hume also all but showed that the question with which the Kantians were contending was absurd. These two prepared the way for what the *Critique of Pure Reason* accomplished in establishing the standpoint of the transcendental philosophy. That Kant was misunderstood by so many at this point was natural, because he had in view readers who still occupied the standpoint of dogmatism, and who were to be carried gradually to the middle point of the transcendental philosophy. Here the opposite way should be taken. That this is more correct, all attempts to give the *Critique* a deeper foundation have recognised, that of Reinhold taking the lead. With entire correctness Reinhold observed that we have to begin at a single point, and that this point is presentation. His error is that, in presupposing the fact of presentation, he begins with

the *conception* of presentation and not with presentation itself. This defect and all hypothesis are avoided, if at the beginning we take as postulate the bringing to pass the fact of presentation, hence "original presentation," not presentation in any particular manner. Since there is placed at the beginning no dogmatic principle but a postulate, we cannot start with a definition of the original presentation, but the reader must be led up to the fact of original presentation; then this presentation itself in which the use of the understanding consists (not possibly any single presentation) must be considered and made intelligible by the deduction of conceptions from it. The transcendental philosophy is, as regards this, the art of understanding self.

9. What makes the understanding of the transcendental philosophy much more difficult, is the continual confusion of the original presentation, in virtue of which there is objectivity in general, with the thinking or judging by which we unite an objective somewhat with definite marks of distinction, and thus place before ourselves definite objects. The first precedes, as the synthetic objective unity of consciousness, and is that synthesis (not of conceptions, but a synthesis making conceptions first possible) of which Kant says that it must be conceived as prior to all analysis. Although the original and the secondary (logical) use of the understanding are different, yet we can reason back to the former from the nature of the latter, and if we can distinguish in thought combination and recognition (the synthesis of the understanding, and the subsumption of the judgment), so also in the original presentation are to be distinguished transcendental understanding and transcendental judgment, which both together constitute the act by which we *generate* the presentation of object in general, but do not *have* that of any definite object, for this can happen only by our giving marks of distinction to an object already generated by us, or, thinking the same. This objective synthetic unity, or objectivity in general, belongs only to the product of the original presentation. All, therefore, that cannot be deduced from the original use of the understanding has for us no objectivity, nor meaning.

10. The analysis of the original presentation, which, therefore, is the highest problem of the transcendental philosophy, arrives now at the result, that the original presentation consists in the categories, which are not ready-made conceptions,

but ways of the understanding; likewise also in space and time, which are not at all distinguishable from the original presentation, but are pure perception itself, since space *is* only in my description, is, in fact, my description itself. What Kant has indicated in his profound theory of the schematism of the pure reason, what he still more clearly gives us to understand where he explains it as possible that the act which unites the sensations into a perception may be the same as that by which experiences are produced, is here held fast in the most decided manner by Beck, who attributes Kant's separation of Æsthetic and Logic merely to his regressive method of procedure. Hence, in fact, Kant referred also the categories to the understanding, the schemata to the transcendental judgment, but both are, in fact, the two sides of the original presentation. Just for this reason is substantiality not conceivable without spatiality, causality not without succession, etc. Time, space and categories, as the way of my positing object in general, are, consequently, of course, ways of the being of object in general, hence also, if I abstract from all more concrete determinations of an object, these, only, remain to me (spatiality, reality, substantiality, etc.). This objectivity in general is now what is called phenomenon; that, therefore, there are no other objects than phenomena is self-evident, and we do not know things-in-themselves, not at all because they always remain hidden from us as do the dwellers on the moon, but because it is absurd that the non-phenomenal should be, have effects, etc., *i.e.* appear. Objects are, as such, phenomena and not things-in-themselves.

11. It is intelligible why Beck designates this his standpoint as Critical *Idealism*, in contradistinction to the realism which he had charged against Reinhold. On the other hand, he is perfectly in the right when he emphasizes the great difference between his theory and Berkeley's, and asserts that he does not so offend the healthy human understanding as *empirical* idealism does. This knows no difference between dreaming and waking, and can give no reason why I now see a table and not a tree. It is otherwise with the *critical* idealist. Within the province of objects, of which he knows that they are phenomena, he makes, and properly, a distinction between presentations that are produced by the impression of objects and those that are not. Objects are in fact phenomena; that these can be causes, the *Critique* has not denied

but, the rather, proved, and the unheeded proposition of Kant: Phenomena are the *undetermined* objects of perception, states that to the phenomena produced by the original presentation, more proximate determinations are first given by the secondary presentation. (If, therefore, Berkeley conceives perception as the dream of a painting, Beck conceives it as the viewing of a painting that one has painted beforehand in a dream.) Against Berkeley it is, therefore, to be asserted that presentations are effects of real objects; against the dogmatic Kantians, that things-in-themselves are never causes, hence cannot be causes of presentations; against both, that in general we may not inquire after a bond of union between things and their presentations but between phenomena and their presentations, since this question has a meaning only in the empirical sphere.

12. As transcendental philosophy, rightly understood, is opposed to all dogmatism, so also is it to what may be termed speculation or speculative reason (Kant's Metaphysics of the Supersensible). The essence of this consists in that it applies conceptions that in general have meaning only where phenomena are concerned, outside of this realm. Hence Kant in the critique of psychology, cosmology, and theology, ought not to have opposed the previous metaphysics with the sceptical *non liquet*, as if it were *possible* that the soul were immortal, only that it was not to be proved, etc. But he should have shown that it is an absolute absurdity to apply to a non-spatial nature the category of permanence; that if spatiality be denied to the most perfect nature but reality be granted to it, this is a dogmatic trifling with conceptions. Faith is for Beck the confidence of the right-minded man that the goal, the best world or the highest good, will be attained. In the fact that man knows himself as *homo noumenon* consists the faith in immortality; in the fact that man obeys in himself the inner judge, consists religion. With Fichte's view that God must not be regarded as a given object, Beck declares himself to be in entire agreement. (I know of nothing more complete regarding Beck's theory than I gave in the year 1848, in the place cited, pp. 537–554.)

§ 309.

TRANSITION TO FICHTE.

1. Reinhold's assertion, made already in the *Letters on the Kantian Philosophy*, and often elsewhere, that in Criticism all views that had hitherto prevailed (that is to say, in the eighteenth century, of which, particularly, he was thinking) are reconciled, could hardly be more strikingly justified than it was by his own and his opponents' conception of the Kantian doctrines. That, of the three men who (if we except Schulze of Königsberg) had displayed the most striking evidence of their understanding of the author himself, one could give the system so dogmatic, another so sceptical, one so realistic, the third so idealistic, an interpretation, shows how much Criticism had adopted of Leibnitz and Hume, Locke and Berkeley. But, at the same time, that these elements became free upon the basis of the new system was a proof that they had not as yet been so united as it appeared to the eulogistic adherent, and that there is needed a new fusion, which, just because it has to overcome the new separation, will be more close, just as, after the elements of Socratism had become free in the minor schools, Platonism united them all the more closely. That, where this happens and, hence, the first problem of modern philosophy is completely solved, as by Kant, he who does it calls his theory not merely, as did Kant, realism *and* idealism, but real-idealism or ideal-realism, will, in accordance with what was said in § 293, 8, not necessarily be regarded as unjustifiable; nor as unessential, since the discovery of such a name fixes, in a manner never to be forgotten, the problem had in question. Where this Criticism which gets beyond the latest one-sided conceptions of it expresses itself concerning its relation to its predecessors, hence, above all, to Kant and to the hypercritical friends of Kant who have just been considered, it cannot fail to happen that, in spite of all recognition, it will conceive many things otherwise than they do, and will give to their words another meaning than they themselves joined to them. Even though this re-interpretation be always an improvement, that it should not always be accepted lies in the nature of the case. What has been merely fabled of Socrates, is, as regards Kant, literally correct: he bitterly complained that this disciple *lies* so much about him.

2. Not only did the opposed one-sided views of Reinhold and his critics demand a progressive movement; but the example set by the former in the deeper foundation of the system invited to an imitation, and all the more, of course, that Maimon and Beck had maintained that Reinhold, no doubt, had dug deeper, but had hardly reached the deepest point. As in Kant, sense and understanding had sprung up out of the soil beside one another, so likewise beside these rose the stem the crown of which, just as those two bore physics, had been ethics. With Kant, there stood opposed to the theoretical reason (if we understand by that, sense and understanding) the practical reason. As that tantalizing "perhaps" relating to these two, and, further, the hint that both have to do with presentations, made Reinhold's attempt one that could hardly miscarry, so had Kant, inasmuch as, besides the suggestion that lay in the common name reason, he had often repeated that the reason is only one, or, in the Introduction to the *Critique of Judgment*, he had spoken of a root (explained by him, of course, to be inscrutable) of the theoretical and the practical reason, given an exactly similar hint. What wonder if Fichte writes to Reinhold that the latter has given to Criticism the only basis that it needed, if Kant had written only a *Critique of Pure Reason*. But now that also a *Critique of Practical Reason* was in question, there was required a founding of the system by which even Reinhold's first fundamental principle would be made to appear as derivative and dependent. But how to think this unity of the theoretical and practical faculties, where the tap-root is to be sought to which the root discovered by Reinhold should be related as a branch-root, on this point Kant had left no one who had eyes, in the dark. The oft-repeated observation that the practical reason has the primacy over the theoretical, the entire theory of assumptions resting upon practical need, the acknowledgment, hardly to be withheld, that the unconditioned is thought, that the final end of the world as a whole is the fulfilment of the moral law,—all this pointed so plainly to a conception of the transcendental philosophy, according to which reason is *primo loco* practical, but in order to be so,—hence merely as a means,—is theoretical, that this conception had not to be long waited for. After the preparatory labours of Kant, Reinhold, Ænesidemus-Schulze and Maimon, to whom Fichte always recognised that he

owed an infinite debt, his practical idealism lay so near, that a philosopher who, like him, *was* so completely practical reason, *must* have maintained that theory. Fichte's theory is one of the many proofs of the principle enunciated by himself, that the philosophy of a man is always just what he himself is.

3. But such a philosophy as Fichte's Science of Knowledge was also the only possible formula for the universe for an age which was conscious of its freedom and independence, only when it regarded the existent, merely because it was there, as a limit that must be broken through. The overthrow of all that had had validity, merely because it had had validity, even though it were as simple as the week of seven days or the name of the month, is, practically, what Fichte stated theoretically in the following formula: The existing world is the worst conceivable. That the author of the *Science of Knowledge* sympathized with the Jacobins is as easy to understand as that his great antagonist was an enthusiast on the side of the French Emperor. It was with equal right that, quite independently of one another, the essence of the French Revolution was placed in the circumstance that men had attempted to construct a world merely out of thought and to abstract from all historical presuppositions, and, again, that it was said by Fichte that he was the first who had in earnest set before himself the task of constructing wholly *a priori* a wholly presuppositionless philosophy. To the hatred towards authority on the one hand, there corresponds on the other, an ethics that declares conduct resting on authority to be want of principle; to the fanaticism of liberty which gave birth to a committee of public safety before which every one trembled, there corresponds here an exclusive State and a school separate from all the world, in which men should become fortunate by the fact that they cannot breathe freely, and free by the fact that they grow up, live, and die in chains. Indeed, it is one and the same spirit which accounts it a fine thing to have put the decade [ten days] in place of the week, and which believes the human race in its majority to be interested in the question whether the traditional word "philosophy" shall be retained or be exchanged for a new, a rational word. Both are a breach with custom.

THIRD DIVISION.

The Science of Knowledge and its Offshoots.

A.—FICHTE AND THE SCIENCE OF KNOWLEDGE.

§ 310.

FICHTE'S LIFE AND WRITINGS.

Imm. Hermann Fichte: *Johann Gottlieb Fichte's Leben und literarischer Briefwechsel.* Sulzbach, 1830, 2 vols. (2nd ed., Leipz., 1862). Weinhold: *Acht und vierzig Briefe von J. G. Fichte und seinen Verwandten.* Leipz., 1862.

JOHANN GOTTLIEB FICHTE, born on the 19th of May, 1762, in Rammenau in Upper Lusatia, educated as a theologian in the schools of Meissen and Pforta and the universities of Jena and Leipsic, and, as it appears, greatly attracted by Spinozism, learned to know, after he had been for some years a family tutor in Switzerland, first Kant's philosophy and then Kant himself personally, and wrote, upon this occasion, his *Critique of All Revelation* (1792), which at once made him a famous man, extolled by the Kantians. In this work is developed the idea that the moral law that is sovereign in us is changed by an "alienation" which we (at least, the most of us) need, into a law-giver; and, through this ingredient of theology, loyalty to duty becomes religion. Revelation as sensible attestation of the truth is a need felt by weakness, which is of course very wide-spread. In Switzerland, whither Fichte again betook himself in the year 1793, to get married, he published anonymously a discourse: *Revendication of Freedom of Thought* (1793), and *Contributions towards the Rectification of the Judgments of the Public relative to the French Revolution* (2 Parts, 1793). In the latter, which was occasioned by Rehberg's diametrically opposite views, he defended (against Kant) the right of the people to alter its State-compact, and violently antagonized the nobility, the Church, and the toleration of the Jews. Criticisms in the *Allgemeine Literaturzeitung*, particularly of Schulze's *Ænesidemus* (1794), show how his views had already crystallized. In the same year he was called to Jena as successor

to Reinhold, and began his lectures there on the 26th of March, 1794. The little work, *On the Conception of the Science of Knowledge* (1794), may be regarded as the programme of these, and the following-named works which came out in sheets while the lectures were in progress may be regarded as syllabuses for them: *Basis of the Entire Science of Knowledge* (1794), and *Outlines of the Peculiarities of the Science of Knowledge* (1795), which connects itself with the preceding. Of more extended works, he published in Jena: *Basis of Natural Right according to the Principles of the Science of Knowledge* (1796), and *System of the Theory of Morals according to the Principles*, etc. (1798). The cry that was raised, particularly in the Electorate of Saxony, against certain would-be atheistical essays in his periodical, caused him to write his *Appeal to the Public* (1799), and was also the cause of his losing his professorship in Jena and withdrawing to Berlin, where he lived, first in a private capacity, then as professor in Erlangen, with permission to spend the winters in Berlin; and finally, from 1809 until his death (27th of Jan., 1814), as professor in the University. In Berlin he printed: *The Destination of Man* (1800); *The Exclusive Commercial State* (1800); *Sun-Clear Account for the Larger Public of the Essential Nature of the New Philosophy*, etc., (1801); *The Characteristics of the Present Age* (1806); *On the Nature of the Scholar* (1806); *Way to the Blessed Life* (1806); *Addresses to the German Nation* (1808). The last four works are public lectures which he delivered, partly in Erlangen, partly in Berlin in the Academy-Building. After his death, his son edited his *Posthumous Works* (3 vols., Bonn, 1834) containing, partly the lectures delivered in Berlin, partly smaller compositions, which were followed by the *Complete Works* in like style (8 vols., Berlin, 1845). If it becomes necessary to prepare a new edition, it were to be wished that the posthumous writings should be incorporated with the others, and all arranged in a strict chronological order. One who prefers the logical to the chronological order will find a much better one than that observed in the Complete Works, in the fifth volume of Kuno Fischer's works, pp. 338–346.

§ 311.

The Science of Knowledge.

Joh. Heinrich Löwe: *Die Philosophie Fichte's nach dem Gesammtergebniss ihrer Entwicklung.* Stuttg., 1862.

1. The same reason for which in § 307 we spoke only of Reinhold's *Elementary Philosophy*, although he declared the *Synonymics* to be a much riper work, holds here, if, as the basis of the following account, only those works of Fichte are taken which he wrote and published in the eighteenth century. Monographs upon Fichte and his theory can, it is true, appeal to his practice and his express explanations when they put aside the self-positing of the Ego, the being-posited of the non-Ego, the divisible Ego and non-Ego, the antitheses and syntheses, the undeducible opposition (*Anstoss*), etc., as something external and collateral, and, distinguishing between his system and the first presentation of it, hold, rather, to the lectures published after his death. But he whose aim is to exhibit the course of the history of modern philosophy must pursue a different method. The premises of that first presentation of his system were furnished particularly by Kant, then by Reinhold, Schulze's *Æenesidemus* and Maimon, and only in it is the connection of the system with its predecessors to be understood. And only in it, again, has that system had its lasting influence, by causing Schelling to commentate upon and, later, to supplement it, by calling out objections from the youthful Herbart and giving to him a tendency for life, by becoming for Hegel the subject of his first work, and for all who came later the teacher of method. If one compares the lasting influence that this first presentation of the system exerted upon Reinhold, Forberg, Schad, Schlegel, and others, with Fichte's activity in Berlin, though one place the latter ever so high as regards the diffusion of ideal, or, even, national, sentiment, then Fichte has not had a direct influence upon philosophy since he had left Jena. Very naturally. What he had printed of the lectures that he delivered was such as would not bear being measured by the standard of strict science, as Schleiermacher's verdict on the *Characteristics of the Present Age*, or as Hegel's on the *Addresses to the German Nation*, has proved. Again, the profound lectures on the Science of Knowledge, of the years 1801, 1804, 1813, on the Facts of

Consciousness and on Transcendental Logic, he did not have printed; and that these should have produced a greater effect upon any one at a single hearing than Director Bernhardi, who passed for a Fichtean, once confided to Benecke, is not to be believed. Before Fichte's son brought out, in the year 1834, his father's posthumous writings, he was perhaps the only one who could say that these had won him to philosophy. He is therefore in the wrong when, in the preface to Fichte's Complete Works, he is impatient because in the accounts of the history of philosophy much more stress is laid upon the most imperfect form of the *Science of Knowledge* than upon the later versions. In the former it at once kindled a flame, in the latter, it did not begin to have effect, if at all, until after Hegel's death. If, as regards the author of the present account, it happens that the expositions of Harms, the younger Fichte, and particularly of Löwe, have certainly led him to regard the chasm between the original and later *Science of Knowledge* as much narrower than formerly appeared to him, but as still apparent; this is to him a further reason for holding, in the exposition of the *Science of Knowledge*, only to that which Fichte had printed up to the year 1801.

2. Fichte considered the epoch-making achievement of Kant, whom he always, except in moments of displeasure, placed above all other philosophers together, to lie in the fact that he brought philosophy to transcendental investigations, so that, whereas all sciences are an apprehension or knowledge of the objects which they treat, philosophy, on the contrary, considers only apprehension and knowledge themselves. Hence, in order that it be not placed upon a level with the sciences, it should be called the science of the sciences, the science of knowledge, a name which Reinhold already had suggested. But just because it occupies itself only with knowledge, or apprehension, there exists for the philosopher nothing whatever objective, no thing-in-itself, and it is the great merit of Maimon and Beck that they have rid philosophy of this ghost. In this they understood Kant better than Reinhold did. Similarly as to the sciences, is philosophy related to practical life. These two do not cross one another, for science has to deduce, to comprehend the standpoint of life, hence begins where life ends, *i.e.* rises above this as biology rises above life. Compared with the standpoint of practical life and of the sciences, the philosophical standpoint may

be designated as counter-natural or artistic. Just as little as the philosopher has to do with apprehended objects, so little has he to observe the apprehending subject, as those do who put psychology in the place of philosophy. The Science of Knowledge has for its aim to comprehend, not the knowing mind but knowledge, not an active somewhat, but an act. This it aims to do, however, in a scientific manner, and hence the Transcendental Philosophy or Science of Knowledge must, as has been shown by Reinhold, who, after Kant, has thereby won for himself the greatest desert as regards philosophy, be deduced from a single first principle. The fault to be found with Reinhold is that he, just as if Kant had written no *Critique of Practical Reason*, laid down a first principle which serves as a basis for theoretical philosophy only. For that reason he contents himself with theoretically establishing the fact of presentation, whereas if one goes still deeper and seeks the common origin of the theoretical as well as the practical activity, one discovers this only in activity in general, and then will lay down a first principle that formulates a fact-*act*. In this, Beck saw more acutely than Reinhold, who, because he did not get beyond the fact of presentation, in which the Ego is limited, is not rid of the mischievous prejudice of the "given stuff." If we could succeed in deriving from a primal fact-act all others, even that of presentation with which Reinhold begins, and hence to explain how and why knowing is a perceiving, understanding, etc., then the Science of Knowledge would have solved its problem. Since among the activities to be explained consciousness also is to be found, it is self-evident that the acts to be unfolded by the Science of Knowledge do not fall within consciousness. But, for that reason, the Science of Knowledge has not to do with inventions, but its problem is to draw forth into the light the concealed mechanism by means of which consciousness is realized, that is to say, to bring into consciousness what does not fall within consciousness, because it is a *conditio sine qua non* of consciousness (hence it is called *a priori*). Since this never occurs to the ordinary consciousness, the standpoint of the Science of Knowledge is an artistic one. It is with these unconscious acts as it is in mathematics, where the mathematician considers the figure without knowing that he he has to do with his own space-limits. It will have to be

required of the Science of Knowledge as the basis of all sciences, that it contain the principles of all sciences and establish their scientific form. (Even logic constitutes no exception here.) As a science, again, it must be a system. For this, it is, in the first place, requisite, as was remarked, that it rest upon a first principle in which the matter and the form of knowledge so condition one another that that principle requires no other that conditions it as regards form and content. (With this it is quite compatible that there be joined with it two others, one of which is conditioned as regards form, the other as regards content.) Secondly, it is requisite that if everything be deduced from this first principle, that which is deduced forms a closed circle. Where, therefore, from that primitive fact-act the principles and presuppositions of the practical life and of the sciences (experience) are explained, and the starting-point is again reached in a methodical progression, there the Science of Knowledge has solved its problem.

3. With these discussions, which have all been taken from the work, *On the Conception of the Science of Knowledge*, connects itself the laying down of the principles of all the sciences, which Fichte develops first in the *Basis of the Whole Science of Knowledge* (Wks. pp. 83–328), in its First Part. The most primitive act he assumes to be that by which the unity of the subjective and objective is posited, and he describes this in his first First Principle as follows: The Ego posits absolutely its own being. The descriptive form of this proposition, and the fact that the discussion of it is bound up with the law of thought A=A have caused many to suppose, erroneously, that it was to be demonstrated. Of that there is no intention whatever; but Fichte's aim is to show to those who regard the proposition A=A as an unalterable principle, that this proposition holds only for the case where A is posited, hence presupposes the positing in which that act consists; in fact, that the Law of Identity is only a form abstracted from the self-positing of the self. Hence is it an explanation of its own proper meaning, and therefore an improvement, when, later, instead of describing, he, the rather, makes the requirement that a conception be thought, and then that it be observed not what one *does* when one thinks, but what one *must* do: here it will be discovered that what is contained in thought, or, rather, pre-

cedes it as a *conditio sine qua non*, is a self-positing of self. This improved statement does not do away with, but strengthens, still another misunderstanding, produced by the term *Ego*, by which many understand the individual. But Fichte opposes this most vigorously. He cannot understand by the Ego the individual, because individual is a very complex conception, not deduced till much later. Since, that is to say, the individual Ego can be thought only by means of a *thou*, and a *thou* is an *it*, which is an *Ego*, the individual is the unity of the Ego and the it, *i.e.* the non-Ego. But by *Ego* he understands what Kant probably had in mind when he opposed to the empirical Ego the pure Ego, the pure consciousness, which is in all empirical consciousness that which speaks to us in the moral law. If one remembers that this was with Kant called the practical reason, and that *what* the practical reason demands was nothing else than reason, it may be comprehended at once why Fichte says instead of *Ego* also *reason*, and again why he places the nature of it in the positing (obligating) of self or reflectivity. The essential thing is that that absolute, not individual, Ego be conceived as pure act (not as something active), as pure or absolute knowledge (neither as a knowing nor as a known somewhat), as the self-penetration, for which there is no other word than Ego-hood. To bring to consciousness this Ego-hood underlying every Ego is therefore something entirely different from mere self-observation; it is rather an intellectual intuition before which one's own being vanishes, and which makes its appearance, which is no kind of being, but an act. To surrender one's self to this act (reason) is what is required by the Science of Knowledge, which, accordingly, instead of being egoism, as has been said, the rather drives out all egoism. But now it is to be comprehended how Fichte comes to be so ready to leave the requirement to bring that action-in-self to consciousness, to the conscience of him upon whom it is laid. That the fact-act described in this Principle really explains all facts of consciousness, further development must show. But even here can be deduced by reflection upon the form of this action, what otherwise is in logic usually merely described, namely, the Law of Identity and the category of reality. If, that is to say, in employing this Principle, which may also be formulated thus: Because the Ego is posited by itself, it therefore is, we abstract from the circumstance that we have to do with the Ego, there remains

only the connection between being-posited and being, and this constitutes the content of that law of thought. Just so, since categories are laws of the Ego only as they may be applied to objects, reality is given to an object only by its being posited by the Ego. That categories do not have application to what lies beyond the Ego has been demonstrated by Maimon.

4. The Second Principle is introduced in a manner entirely similar to that in which the First was introduced, that is to say, originally in a descriptive form, later in the form of a postulate. In the first form it runs, To the Ego is opposed the non-Ego; in the second it is required to bring the original opposition into consciousness. Since, as regards *what* takes place by this act, nothing new enters (it is posited), but there does as regards the *way* in which it takes place, Fichte calls the act itself, and likewise the principle that formulates it, conditioned as regards matter, and unconditioned as regards form. Just for that reason, also, is the product of this act designated by the expression non-Ego, which indicates a relation. That by abstraction from the content of this act we arrive at the formal law of thought, A is not B, as also to the stem-form of thought, negation, cannot but seem natural.

5. If these two postulates are granted, the Third, since these are opposed to one another, follows of itself, that is to say, the combination of the two, without, however, the identity of consciousness being lost sight of. Since these two annul one another, the act which shall combine the positing of the Ego and its opposite can consist in a reciprocal partial negation or limitation (determination) of these. If, therefore, the postulate of this partial negation be carried into effect, there results an act which Fichte describes thus: the Ego opposes to the divisible Ego a divisible non-Ego. Since this Principle presents nothing new as regards form, inasmuch as positing and opposing were already given, but the conception of limitation is a new one, not to be derived from those by analysis, Fichte calls this Principle unconditioned as regards matter; and with it the circle of possible Principles is exhausted. Reflection upon the form of this Principle should yield first the law of thought of the Ground, because *Ground* (of relation and distinction) lies only in the partial coincidence and falling asunder. (Already Wolff [*vid.* § 290, 4] had affirmed that which determines to be one with the ground.)

There results, further, from this Principle the third qualitative category: Determination (with Kant, Limitation). But, at the same time, because "partial" is a quantitative conception, the categories of quantity are therewith known in their proper source.

6. The consideration of the three Principles, which are related to each other as thesis, antithesis, and synthesis, has established the foundation of the entire investigation, has expressed the totality of these. Since, that is to say, in this primitive synthesis, as will be shown, are contained all other syntheses that we have to make when we think, whereas the entire problem which Kant had placed before the Transcendental Philosophy (Science of Knowledge) was none other than that relating to synthetic judgments (syntheses) *a priori*, there is contained in this Principle the whole of the Science of Knowledge in a nut-shell. We shall develop it out of this implicit form by observing whether in this synthesis there appears a new antithesis, which then is resolved in a second synthesis. In the search for antitheses (analysis) and the uniting into syntheses consists philosophic method. This would continue to infinity if the thesis which stands above all antitheses and syntheses did not afford a goal. Where absolute unity, that Ego-ego with which we began, is again reached, even if only as an Idea, *i.e.* as an ideal never to be completely attained, there the circle is closed. Between the point of beginning and that of ending, will the individual, the finite (limited, divisible) Ego fall, so that the former is not yet, the latter no longer, an individual. Since the principle (the Third Principle) which contains the entire Science of Knowledge and which can be more concisely formulated thus: Ego posits Ego and non-Ego as mutually determining themselves, contains two principles, that is to say, (*a*) Ego posits itself as determined by the non-Ego, and, (*b*) Ego posits itself as determining the non-Ego, the Science of Knowledge falls into two parts, the theoretical and the practical. The first has to solve the problem which Kant had proposed for the Æsthetic and Analytic, namely, to answer the question: How does the Ego (the reason) come to assume anything objective? The second takes the place of Kant's Transcendental Dialectic and *Critique of Practical Reason*, and answers the question, How comes the Ego (the reason) to ascribe to itself causality?

§ 312.

THEORETICAL SCIENCE OF KNOWLEDGE.

1. The starting-point in the investigation is, the first of the two principles last laid down; the method, that just described; the goal, to lead the reader to the point where Kant and Reinhold take him up, so that for their assertions, The Ego *has* perceptions, conceptions, consciousness, etc., is supplied the proof, which shows how the having of all these comes about. If the answer to this question really consists in that principle, it is at once clear, that two opposite answers can be given to it. In that principle, that is to say, are contained two others, opposed to one another. In other words, there lies, first, in the principle that the Ego posits itself as determined, the principle, plainly discernible, the Ego *is* determined. If we rest with that, the Ego is conceived, manifestly, as suffering, and accordingly one view asserts that the Ego gets its presentations in a passive manner, it receives them as effects of things. This view may be termed *realism;* it explains ideation, experience, etc., by the category of causality, and leads, if consistently carried out, to attributing to the Thing sole activity and existence, and denying to the Ego both these. Hence Spinoza is to be regarded as the most consistent realist. Instead of the term "realism," "empiricism" is also often employed, and hence it comes about—what has alienated many—that Fichte speaks of Spinoza as of a representative of empiricism. (Had he known Hume's views of the Ego he would perhaps have cited them. But then also every ground of estrangement would have fallen away.)

2. But with equal right can the opposite answer be read out of the principle. For, since there is manifestly contained therein that the Ego *posits* itself as determined, this may be urged, and presentations accordingly be deduced from its activity, be explained as its creation, as accidents of its nature as dreams are, so that we can say that, underlying this view, *idealism*, is the category of substantiality. Berkeley, before all others (but Leibnitz also), may be called a representative of this view. Kant has quite correctly perceived that it has the same justification as the view above cited, and for this reason places the two side by side. He is, as he himself says, an (empirical) realist, and also a (transcendental) idealist. But

such an idealism, on equal footing with realism, cannot satisfy, for, that those two principles upon which they rest should be derived from a single one demands a real reconciliation. If there were any, this theory of the origin of presentations of the objective should be called *ideal-realism*, or, also, *real-idealism*.

3. Fichte reaches this result by the application of the conception, first introduced by Kant, of the productive imagination, by which he understands the activity of the Ego which has power to limit itself, so that it may be considered as composed of two opposite elements, a centrifugal, infinite subjective, and a centripetal, finite objective. If we suppose, now, that objects presented to the Ego arise by the limitation of the Ego's own activity (somewhat as waves arise upon level water because of an arresting of its flow, or as visions do because of stagnation of the blood), idealism is as much wrong in representing them as originating *through* the activity of the Ego as realism in representing them as originating entirely *without* the activity of the Ego. (The category of ideal-realism would then be neither causality nor substantiality, but reciprocity.) Since presentations arise to the Ego because the Ego arrests its activity, they appear to it as an arresting obstacle, hence as a foreign object. One may call this illusion, but it is not a groundless illusion. Objects are, therefore, creations of the imagination; not of a conscious imagination, for mechanism lies behind the productive imagination, or, if one will, before consciousness. Through its operation consciousness, also, originates. The presented objects, therefore, would be arresting obstacles which the Ego, unconsciously of course, puts in the way. (The repulsiveness which this development has had for many and still has, would be lessened if, where Fichte says, "*posit* objects," they should say, instead, *affirms*, or if they should put to themselves the question, whether they really mean that an impression produced by things could alone cause us to mentally *place* them before us.)

4. But in order that this may be something more than a hypothetical view it is necessary to show how, by the assumption of that capacity of self-limitation, the origin of presentations and of all phenomena of consciousness, from which as admitted facts Kant and Reinhold start, can be explained. The deduction of presentations is given, now, in a *pragmatical history* of intelligence or of human knowledge, which pursues a method that is, in a certain measure, opposite to the one

hitherto followed, and not so much inquires after the primal fact that is possible to thought, as, the rather, shows by this forward movement the well-known facts to be forms and stages of the productive imagination. For this pragmatical history, now, Fichte has given in the *Basis*, etc., only brief hints. These are fully supplemented in the *Outlines of the Peculiarities of the Science of Knowledge* (vol. i., pp. 331–416); at the same time, however, must be combined therewith what he says, partly in the two *Introductions* and the *New Exposition of the Science of Knowledge* (Wks., i., pp. 417–534), partly in the Introductions to the *Natural Right* and to the *Theory of Morals*. The guiding thread of this development is, that since there can be nothing in the Ego except what it itself posits, it also again posits this its positing, and makes this an object; so that,—to employ here a term current later, which, moreover, Fichte himself uses,—it also becomes for itself that which it had been at first in itself, or, for us. By the fact that the Ego reflects the stages of the Ego, or makes them an object it transcends them. The development begins with the very lowest step of that unconscious act of creation, that state in which intelligence first *discovers* what is already, it is true, *in-itself*, viz., *sensation*. This is taken as the state in which no distinction is as yet made between external and internal sensation, and just as little between that which feels sensation and that which is felt as such. Inasmuch as the (centrifugal) Ego transcends sensation, it distinguishes itself from it, and the latter thereby acquires a reference to something beyond itself. This looking-*beyond* converts sensations first into observed points the mutual dependence of which gives co-existence, space, and the one-sided dependence of which gives succession, time. With this passage, in which Fichte appears as the faithful disciple of Maimon, the *Outlines* suddenly breaks off with the explanation, The reader is here brought to the point where Kant's Transcendental Æsthetic takes him up. The further presentation of the pragmatical history must be gathered from more isolated hints to be found strewn throughout the work just mentioned, and, besides, in the works of Fichte first published after his death. Exactly as sensation becomes perception through limitation, so is the undetermined, vagrant perception brought to a stand and fixed by the understanding, which, since it gives rise to fast limits to activity, is quite pro-

perly the faculty of the real, so that all finite being is properly only in the understanding. The transition from perception to understanding is made by the (*re*productive) imagination, to which Kant rightly assigns the mediating schemata, and of which Fichte says that all that enters the understanding enters it only through the imagination. What this gives order to (thinks) are, therefore, merely fancies, presentations, which through it become fixed. The matter obtained by looking inward and outward is as yet in a rude, chaotic state (Kant's world of sense); by the understanding or thought it is first rendered something definite and so known (with Kant, nature). The laws of this determination are the categories, just as space and time had been modes or laws of perception. By the categories, therefore, are not to be understood ready-made empty pigeon holes; but they arise, with objects, out of the ground of the imagination (hence at the same time with the schemata). That, therefore, the known, the real, is subject to the categories, or is phenomenon, lies in the nature of the case. A deduction of the categories is, of course, here no longer required, since this had already been given in the consideration of the Principles and the analysis of the Third Principle. But Fichte was right in saying here, exactly as he had said above, that the reader is now brought to the point where Kant's Transcendental Analytic takes him up. But, finally, he attempts to show that if the (centrifugal) transcending of the limits set by the understanding be continued, intelligence becomes reflecting and abstracting judgment. If, now, this, again, be made object, there arises the consciousness of the power of abstraction generally, *i.e.*, the consciousness of *pure* reason (devoid of all imagination) or self-consciousness proper. Here a twofold result is reached. First, knowledge arrives at a doubling of the object, in which it distinguishes from it its presentation (more precisely: from the presentation, the presentation of the same). In this distinction, properly speaking, consists that act which Reinhold had placed at the beginning as an act of consciousness, so that the reader now is brought to the beginning of the Elementary Philosophy. But a second, more important result is this: In the deduced (rational) consciousness intelligence has reached the point at which there is for the Ego itself what we had recognised as the sum and substance of the Theoretical Science of Knowledge, viz., that the Ego posits itself as determined. But having reached the

starting-point, the Ego positing itself as determined by the non-Ego, the Theoretical Science of Knowledge contains neither too many nor too few principles; it is a circle returning into itself, a closed system.

5. The Theoretical Science of Knowledge has therewith accomplished what, according to what was said at the very beginning of this section, it set out to accomplish. A single point, obviously a cardinal one, remains undiscussed. What cause has the Ego, or what gives it occasion, for arresting or diminishing its activity? Since it has been established that the Theoretical Science of Knowledge will consist merely in the analysis of the above-stated principle, but this principle contains and pre-supposes self-limitation, obviously the citing of such a ground would be to establish that principle, hence, to transcend it, *i.e.*, to step outside the Theoretical Science of Knowledge. This cannot explain what occasion the Ego has; it only establishes the fact that such an "opposition" exists, just as also Kant had declared it inexplicable for the theoretical reason that it assumes things-in-themselves. But Fichte here goes further. He knows that these so-called things are illusions, fancies. But what causes intelligence to impose upon itself with these cannot be deduced; that is to say, not at this point.

§ 313.

Practical Science of Knowledge.

1. As the Theoretical Science of Knowledge had to answer only the question, How comes the Ego to affirm objective existence? so the Practical Science of Knowledge has to answer only the question, How comes the Ego to be conscious of its own activity in the external world? The answer must be contained in the principle, The Ego posits itself as determining the non-Ego. Here, also, may this principle be designated as the starting-point; and as the goal, may be designated the perception of why, as Kant has said, the practical reason has primacy over the theoretical. Now symmetry would have demanded just such an analytico-synthetic treatment of the second principle. But Fichte, who is afraid of nothing more than of a spiritless calculation instead of a self-active creation, takes another way; being all the more justified in so doing by the fact that he knows (beforehand) that the case with the

practical activity of the Ego is different from that with the theoretical activity. Accordingly he starts with the result deduced in the Theoretical Science of Knowledge, that the Ego is limited, finite, objective, *i.e.*, is occupied with the objective. But now it was said, nevertheless, in the First Principle that the Ego posits absolutely only its own being, and there arises then the question, Is, and how is, the limited objective activity which has been deduced, to be combined with the infinite unlimited or pure activity which has been recognised as the essential nature of the Ego? In only one way: When the finite activity is conceived as subordinated to the pure activity as means to end. But this actually takes place when we conceive the Ego as striving towards the infinite, or when we conceive it as practical, *i.e.*, as knowing itself as causality, as activity. It can do this only by overcoming resistance; to do this it must meet with resistance; that therefore it should have something objective (resistance [*Widerstand*]=object [*Gegenstand*]) is necessary for it in order that it be practical. It must affirm something objective not in order that it may respect it, but that, on the contrary, it may annul it. The real *why* or, rather, *whereto* of the affirming the objective or of existent intelligence lies for the Ego in the fact that it cannot otherwise be practical or will. The opposition, therefore, which the Theoretical Science of Knowledge could not deduce is here deduced. It lies in the practical being of the Ego, of which, for the rest, one may convince himself also by the fact that nothing makes us certain of the existence of things so much as the resistance they offer, *i.e.*, our (arrested) action upon them. For the rest, we may also here recall to mind Kant, who likewise maintains that it is from practical need that we come to affirm things. Of course there makes its appearance here the great distinction that, according to Kant, these things were things-in-themselves, which, as unknowable, remain opposed to the Ego, as impenetrable limit, whereas, according to Fichte, they are nothing in themselves, but only for us, and thus present to us a material to which we give form, and hence are not impenetrable (unknowable), so that he answers the question as to what things-in-themselves are, not with a *Nescio*, but with, They are what we shall make out of them. Here, therefore, is it asserted, with Reinhold, The thing-in-itself is entirely absorbed by the noumenon, whereas with Kant the

opposite often seems to be threatened. (It was so when he called duties things-in-themselves.) The question, therefore, concerning the origin of presentations is now completely answered; the Theoretical Science has shown how, the Practical, why, the Ego gets them. If, now, the view that places the source of presentations merely in the Ego must be called idealism, so must the Science of Knowledge be so called. But since it does not discover the source in the theoretical Ego but in the practical, it is *Practical* Idealism. It is this because it has been in earnest with the primacy of the practical reason, and understands this to mean that the reason, which is pre-eminently practical, makes itself, in order to be this, theoretical reason, as the only means by which it can fulfil its true destination. As regards the content of the Practical Science of Knowledge there is given here, exactly as in the theory of intelligence, a series of steps the principle of which is, likewise, that what the Ego is, must become *for* it. To the imagination, in the theoretical Ego, there corresponds as fundamental form the striving of the practical Ego. The further-going reflection converts it into impulse, which, at first the impulse to presentations, becomes the impulse of creation and satisfaction, and finally culminates in the impulse which is self-end, the ethical impulse.

2. The transcendental investigations of Kant relating to knowledge had been carried back by Reinhold to the common starting-point; these and those relating to will had been carried back by Fichte to the common starting-point, and thus had the transcendental philosophy been presented as a real system. But, now, the Transcendental Philosophy was not yet in Kant the whole of philosophy; but after it had shown that the faculty of knowledge and likewise the faculty of problems contained within itself the matter for synthetic judgments *a priori, i.e.*, of a metaphysics, this last (metaphysics) itself was given. Out of the two-stemmed faculty of knowledge had grown, to repeat the expression employed earlier, the "crown" of the Philosophy of Nature, out of the one-stemmed faculty of willing the crown of the Metaphysics of Morals. There had not, of course, taken place the slightest change in these two as a result of Reinhold's union of the stems of knowledge. The case is otherwise with Fichte. Here the crown of the Philosophy of Nature necessarily vanishes. If we understand by nature, as all are accustomed to do, the complex of existence in so far as it con-

tains reason, Fichte denies nature. For, since he conceives the objective as non-Ego, the Ego coinciding with reason, there remains for that only the predicate unreason. Hence his indignation at all optimism, his assertion, that the world is, rather, the very worst, because the farthest removed from that which we have to make out of it, etc. Further, since a scientific consideration of nature is barely possible, when it is treated as a self-end, whereas Fichte sees in things only a means for the realization of our (moral) ends, he acknowledges no other mode of viewing nature than the teleological, which, however, must be of such a character that morality is acknowledged by it as the end. In his moral theology Kant maintains theology only in so far as it rests upon morals; just so does Fichte as regards physics. It may be said that he maintains only a moral physics. He says expressly: Our duty is the only thing-in-itself and is converted by the laws of the sensuous idea into a world of sense. That light and air have in themselves a necessity does not occur to him, but he believes, in all seriousness, that he has "deduced" both when he directs attention to the fact that, without them, men could neither see nor hear one another; without this, could not understand one another; without this, could not enter into moral community. This viewing, now, of nature from the point of view of the highest moral end makes it clear why Fichte, who has not attempted to give a deeper basis to Kant's *Critique of Judgment*, and has adopted from none of Kant's works so little as from this, yet sometimes praises it above all the rest and asserts that nowhere has Kant come nearer the truth than in it. It is the ethico-theological conclusion of the work, as well as the assertion that nature has man for its end only in so far as he is a moral being, that so appealed to Fichte. The affectionate sinking of himself in the contemplation of living being as the end of nature must have repelled him. He even expressly antagonizes this conception. Like Fries (*vid.* § 305–6), he supposes that the organism can be explained by mere reciprocity. To see ends in nature means to him to overvalue nature, and this is for him the worst thing possible. Never has a system breathed such hatred of nature as that of Fichte.

3. But there is also implied at the same time, that in the same measure the other crown, Ethics, must remain. In fact so much is this the leading feature in his system that his *Science of Knowledge* can be understood only through his Theory of

Right and of Morals. His *Basis of Natural Right* (Wks., vol. iii.) and his *System of the Theory of Morals*, particularly, are here to be discussed. Just as does Kant, indeed even more than he does, Fichte separates the spheres of Right (legality) and Ethics (morals). Hence he will not allow any relation of right to be morally established (*e.g.* the keeping of one's word from mere obligation), and he requires of the Theory of Right that it adduce the means by which legality shall remain secure, even though honesty and faith should have altogether vanished. Hence right ignores morality, and morality, indeed, does away with (legal) right, because there is for the wholly moral person no law that could constrain him. Because of this independence of the two, the beginning of the *Theory of Morals* does not join itself on to the *Theory of Right*, nor *vice versa*, but both to the discussions of the *Science of Knowledge*. Much is to be found both at the opening of the *Natural Right* and at the beginning of the *Theory of Morals:* for example, one of the most important points, the transition from the Ego that coincides with the universal impersonal reason, the rationality that ought to be, to the many individual Egos or Ego-individuals. The deduction of this reason is exactly similar to that which was given of the "opposition," as are all further deductions in the *Natural Right* and the *Theory of Morals:* by it is given not so much the *why* as the *whereto*. The goal has been fixed: The Ego must know itself as activity. All that is recognised as a means to, and *conditio sine qua non* of, this goal is said to be deduced. It had been shown that, in order to have a matter to "break through," the Ego affirmed objects. It posited them, they are merely its presentations, for there is no other being than being in the Ego. But they offer resistance merely when the Ego is necessitated to the positing of them, when it must posit them. These two conditions are reconciled when the Ego is stimulated by the Ego, caused to posit the objective, *i.e.*, where the Ego multiplies (at least doubles) itself and each affirms the objective upon the corroborative witness of the other. Only of that of which others testify to me do I know that it is not merely my (dream-) world, but is the real world. The Ego which is to be conceived as prior to all consciousness, the infinite subject-object must therefore exist as a plurality of Egos or individuals, outside of which, obviously, it does not subsist as a particular being, but to which it is

related as man to men, as substance to its modes, as Fichte expressly says. To each of these Egos, now, is allotted a part of the common world as its exclusive sphere of freedom, and the limits of this sphere are precisely the *rights* of the individual, which the individual, if he existed alone (which is obviously an absurd supposition), would not, of course, possess. Within this sphere the Ego, or, as we must now say, every Ego, rightly ascribes to itself causality; for, since the world of sense is merely a being that is posited by me to explain my limits, I never get out of myself, even where I change these limits. "I change the external world" means, transcendentally expressed, I change my external condition. Those external conditions, now, which must necessarily be changed before others can be changed, or, what means just the same thing, that part of my sphere of freedom which contains the beginning-point of all the changes produced by me in the world of sense, is my body. It is, in the most eminent sense, mine; indeed, for all others it is I, and it must be regarded as the subject of right. Such, that is to say, do individuals become in limiting their freedom by the conception of the possibility of the freedom of the rest. Since only thereby do obligations originate, there can, of course, be no such thing as an obligation to enter the legal condition. But if one has entered it, the logical consequence is that he respect the legal condition; if he does not, he is treated as being without right. Thus is the right of compulsion given by the practical power of the syllogism. Nevertheless, since the validity of right depends upon empirical conditions, the actual, legal conditions, we cannot attribute to it unconditional validity as to the moral law. The former possesses necessity because it is; the latter the force of obligation, because it should be. Fichte, like Kant, sees in the State merely the institution which by physical power lends sanction to the law, so that it is, therefore, the pre-supposition for the reality of right, since without it neither right of compulsion nor of property is conceivable. The latter, which Fichte would have conceived as not so much the right to a thing as rather the right to exercise activity with reference to the thing, is to him the first consequence of the inalienable original right to be a personality, and, properly speaking, the only one for the protection of which the State exists. He does not vindicate higher than material interests to the State, which he conceives, therefore, as wholly

a relation of compact. It has nothing to do with disposition, piety, confidence; rather, it proceeds from a want of confidence. And in fact there is to be distinguished in it a three-fold compact; a property, defence, and union compact. Whereas the two first are concluded between individuals as such, in the third is concluded a compact with all, as the abstract conception of a *compositum* was changed by the imagination into a *totum*, a whole. Thereby the State becomes the sovereign. As regards the maintenance of its sovereignty, the so-called *pouvoirs*, Fichte will hear absolutely nothing of a separation of the judicial and executive powers, but unites the two in the one executive power; nor does he lay very great stress upon their being separate from the legislative, but all the more upon there being a supervising authority, an ephoralty, to which belongs the right to introduce, in case of need, a State-interdict, *i.e.*, to suspend the constitution of the State. Thereby will be avoided the chief defect of all modern theories, the non-responsibility of the ruler. Originally greatly attracted by the democratic form of constitution, but brought by the later course of the French Revolution to distrust it, he sees in monarchy the best constitution for the present. Since the State is only an institution of safety and welfare, the citizen may demand both from it; hence the right to labour and the means of subsistence. From this Fichte has, next, drawn all the socialistic conclusions, in which his *Exclusive Commercial State* has anticipated modern phalansteries and national workshops. The State as an institution for the protection of right is necessary only so long as right is in danger. The means of preventing such imperilment is punishment, which Fichte does not, with Kant, conceive as retribution, but which he justifies by its end, which should lie in the prevention of transgression and the reform of the transgressor. Only the murderer is fully *ex lege*, and is to be put to death by anyone; but since no private citizen will lend himself to this, by the State (secretly, since it is not an honourable business). The State is not eternal. As morality increases, it becomes superfluous, and since it can and should contribute towards this morality, it makes itself so. This transition from the present State (based on need) to the rational State, a transition which (among other things) he pictures in his *Theory of the State* of 1813, is accomplished by education. Since this pre-supposes a distinction of teachers and learners, and since the development of man can be con-

ceived only as education, and hence always consists therein, this distinction must be conceived as original, and hence the primitive condition of man must be so conceived that there appear as opposed two races, that of revelation and faith, and that of freedom and the understanding. The conflict of the two, in which, first one and then the other, takes the *rôle* of the teacher and leader, forms history, to the last phase of which the theory of knowledge begun by Kant is an introduction, since, denying authority as such, it itself produces that which is given by authority. At present we have to do with communicating to all the spirit of freedom, this conquest of the Science of Knowledge. This is done by popularizing education, the importance of which Pestalozzi, above all others, foresaw. If the people, accordingly, become so educated that the individual ceases to belong to a family or to have a separate possession, the race approaches a time when there need no longer be courts of justice, nor wars, and the last sovereign, having become useless, will surrender himself to the *Volks-Schule*, *i.e.*, to the profession of teachers, that it may assign to him his proper place. (It is shown in *The Addresses to the German Nation*, which carry this out in detail, as well as in *The Exclusive Commercial State*, to what despotism the fanaticism of liberty conducts.)

4. Far more than in the *Theory of Right*, where, in addition to the pure Ought, to be determined *a priori*, there enters the empirical moment, is Fichte in his proper element in the *Theory of Morals* (Wks., vol. iv.). Like the *Natural Right* it subdivides into three principal parts, of which the first (pp. 13–62) contains the deduction of the Principle of Morality; the second (pp. 63–155) deduces its Reality and Applicability; the third (pp. 157–365) develops the System of Duties. The first deduction, which may also be called the Theory of the Moral Nature, has to explain scientifically the inner necessity which the moral man experiences in himself to act according to a certain norm, even without having in view an end to be attained thereby; and it does this by showing that true self-consciousness is conceivable only under the condition that the Ego determines its freedom, without exception, by the conception of independence. Here also the question how the Ego comes to know itself as free, *i.e.*, to know changes in the world of sense as effects of a conception (thought), to know thought, therefore, as causality, is first

reduced to the correct (from the standpoint of the transcendental philosophy) formula. There, it runs, How do those changes in the Ego occur with which, at the same time, the view of our world is changed? Then it is shown how the tendency to these changes, the original impulse, is, by means of those initial points which formed the body, affected with limits not further deducible which constitute what is usually termed the nature of the individual. Here the original impulse appears broken, as it were, into two, the sensuous and the pure, impulse. The union of the two gives the moral impulse, which the real theory of morals as science has to consider; whereas regard merely to the sensuous impulse would lead to a theory of happiness, and regard merely to the pure impulse to an abstract metaphysics of morals. The moral impulse conducts to that satisfaction concerning which conscience decides, hence to peace of conscience; but this is attained when enjoyment, this goal of the merely sensuous impulse, which never makes its appearance when sought, is taken solely as a gratuity. Whoever calls it an austere and hard ethics that says, Thou shouldst eat and drink only for the sake of duty (the kingdom of God), forgets that there is no other. To act always according to conscience, for duty's sake, is the principle we seek, of a real theory of morals. Opposed to Right, which leaves the disposition wholly untouched, here stands a theory of morals which has so exclusive regard *only* to the disposition that an erring conscience is explained by it as impossible. Just so does the most admirable action lose its worth if done, not as a matter of conscience, but with regard to some authority. A history of the moral consciousness gives, as the stages of freedom through which the really moral man passes: formal freedom, which is to be found wherever one is conscious only of his impulse; willing in accordance with maxims abstracted from our impulses, in which man may be compared with an intelligent animal, and where everything aims at happiness; the heroic mode of thought, in which blind enthusiasm for the good makes men magnanimous but not just; finally, the stage in which man acts from duty and does not delight in his deed, but coldly approves it. Since the passing through these stages is not a necessity, but depends upon freedom, and indolence, this radical evil in human nature, hinders man in his passing through them, there is required a miracle, one, of course, which he himself

must perform, in order that he may attain to the highest stage. This is facilitated by the contemplation of exemplars, and to have been such is the merit of the founders of religion, the men of ethical genius. Although, now, the formula, "Follow conscience," suffices for life, science must nevertheless give material distinctions regarding the content of the moral law. Since complete independence, which is the highest goal, has as its condition the fact that I am an organized body, an intelligence, and one among many, there result the rules, first, to permit one's self to care for the body only as a means to duty-governed conduct; second, to pursue knowledge only from duty, not from idle curiosity; finally, to enter into association, in which the highest end, the subjection of all natural impulses to the law of morals, is most surely attained. The institution for mutual improvement through influence upon conviction is the Church. The formulary, as the sum of present convictions, is the starting-point for mutual understanding. To fix it as absolute is to forget that as the State is based on need, so also is the Church, which is but a means of transition to the absolutely moral human society, or community of perfect men. The chief means to the accomplishment of this transition is unrestricted interchange of opinion, which, with the Church-official, moves within certain limits set by his profession; with the author, must be free from all limits.

5. In speaking of Kant (§ 300, 9), it was pointed out that in spite of his asserted separation of the moral and legal, his ethnological and historical sense led him, in treating the history of the world, to combine the two points of view. For a similar reason, Fichte, an ideal husband, disputes Kant's assertion that marriage is only an institution of law, since it has a natural and moral character. Accordingly he treats it in the *Theory of Morals*. But the feeling that here, where the conscience is that alone which decides, a marriage of conscience may be construed as the highest of all, leads him to treat it in an appendix, apart from duties of vocation and all other duties. In fact, when, in the Third Part of his *Theory of Morals*, he divides duties as a whole, first, into conditioned or mediate, and unconditioned or immediate, and each of these classes, according as they are transferable or not, into particular and universal, he could not bring the duties of husbands under any of the four heads in such a way that at least supplementary considerations would not be required. These

have reference to the points in which most strikingly appears what a later system of ethics has emphasized, viz., that there are moral institutions which would be spoiled if the uniting element in them were conceived merely as legal or merely as moral. As regards the State, of which the same holds true, Fichte feels no need of separating it from the remaining merely legal relations; it remains with him, as with Kant, an institution of right and compulsion, with which moral disposition has nothing to do, and which, with Fichte as its spokesman, calls out to its citizens, "Love yourselves above all else, and your fellow-citizens for yourselves' sake."

6. As in most of the points hitherto considered Fichte had logically carried out what had been begun by Kant, so is it with regard to the way in which he conceived religion. The treatise, *On the Ground of our Faith in the Divine Government of the World* (Wks., vol. v. pp. 177–189), which drew upon him the charge of atheism, his *Appeal to the Public* (Wks., vol. v. pp. 193–238), finally, his *Destination of Man* (Wks., vol. ii. pp. 167–319), serve here as authorities. If we understand by *being* what is object for me, since every one calls the complex of all that is objective the world, to conceive God as being, is, properly speaking, a converting of the world into God, or of God into the world, *i.e.*, Atheism. All who regard the absolute as a being, have extirpated it from themselves; one cannot know the absolute by looking outside himself. One must be it and live it in his own person. Just so can God be as little conceived as substance as being; for this means to conceive him as spatial, hence to be idolatrous. Whoever, finally, attributes personality to God makes of Him a finite limited being. The Science of Knowledge frees from such idolatry; it recognises as the absolute, *i.e.* as the highest, or the end of moral action, the moral order of the world; this is the only God. It asks after a ground of the moral order of the world as little as do its opponents after a ground of God. God is, therefore, the order of events; He is the established order, to fulfil duty in accordance with which makes blessed. To rest upon this order and to further it is religion. If our finite understanding converts this order or this law which rules us, into an existing being, it does exactly what we do when we call our sensation of cold coldness (which is independent of us). Existence is a sensible conception; just for that reason philosophy does not demonstrate the existence of God.

Its problem as regards religion is, a deduction of the religious consciousness. It recognises true religion—the religion of right-doing—but it is so much more certain of God (that law, or that order of events, this Ought) than of all being, that it must much rather be called Acosmism than Atheism. Persistent and firm adherence to the final end to be realized is faith; therefore, I believe because I will. My will coincides with that law, which may be called rational will. It is this law that announces to us that the sensible world is a material condition for the fulfilling of our duty; it, therefore, calls forth in us that world and may in so far be called the creator of the world. Hence moral conviction, or faith, is security for every other; the given world was the visible existence of the moral. Our life is the life of this law, hence it is itself eternal. I am immortal by the determination to live the law of reason, even though I should never actually so live. That life I already have in this. Fichte's *Destination of Man*, from which these last propositions are borrowed, falls into three parts, the first of which is entitled *Doubt*, because the ordinary consciousness, which finds itself, as a part of the world, dominated by the law of causality, is not able to extricate itself from the contradiction of constraint and the feeling of freedom. In the Second Part (*Knowledge*) he shows that the Science of Knowledge rescues freedom by teaching us to recognise the present objectivity as the deed of the Ego, but of course also changes it into a world of mere presentations, a dream-world, in which we have to do with copies, and (hence mere) pictures of the real. To this we attain (in the Third Part) by *Faith*, which guarantees the reality of that wherein and whereby we are to realize our ends. To call the doctrines developed in this work "Ethical Pantheism," was all the more justifiable that its agreement with Spinoza and Malebranche is almost literal. Only, there is great danger of forgetting that where two do the same thing it is not the same thing. Pantheism, *i.e.*, Spinoza, teaches the existence of a God who is a being without will, an eternal order of grounds and consequences in which ends and freedom have no place. The *Destination of Man*, on the contrary, teaches that of an absolute will which never is, a world only of ends, the activity solely of freedom. That he calls this "superterrestrial" world which (only) *should* be and grow, the best, does not conflict with, but rather supports, the earlier assertion, "The (earthly, present) world is the worst."

7. But with the moral order of the world, not only the highest, but also the terminal point, of the system is reached. This, it was stated, lies where the end of the thread returns to the beginning, and the circle closes. Now, the system started with the unity of subjective and objective, Ego-hood or the absolute Ego, as it was before it became finite, limited,—before it posited itself solely. It was then further shown how the finite consciousness arose by the fact that the subjective entered into opposition with the objective, and this limited Ego at the same time divided into a plurality of Egos. This individualization lost itself in the State, where the many formed a whole which existed, rather, as a mere *compositum;* still more in the Church as the ethical community, where, through an ever-widening subjugation of the natural impulses, the natural man more and more ceased to exist. But now, where it has been shown that all life is, properly speaking, the life of the moral order of the world, of the one humanity ever more and more realizing its end, and that, moreover, this end is, that all that is merely objective is subordinate to and serves the subjective—this goal is, again, what was the starting-point, the unity of the subjective and objective, infinite Ego, reason seeking, requiring, realizing itself. The circle of the system is closed. But here, where it has been shown that the Ego, the development of which is the subject of consideration in the *Science of Knowledge*, is, at the last, the moral order of the world, is it also possible to understand why Fichte could say above, that he speaks of the Ego, the voice of which we perceive as the categorical imperative, or also of that which men call God, and why he speaks with a certain moral disgust of those who are not able to make the infinite Ego, the absolute, live in themselves, to be it and live it. Where the moral law is concerned, "I cannot" coincides with "I will not."

B.—RECEPTION OF THE SCIENCE OF KNOWLEDGE.

§ 314.

1. As was to be expected, a system that broke with the already existing philosophy found many *opponents*. There were, indeed, still, representatives of the pre-Kantian views, but they had gradually become somewhat disheartened. Only the intrepid Nicolai and his *Allgemeine deutsche Bibliothek*

antagonized Fichte, as they had Kant; indeed, they even began at last to cry up Kant, as against Fichte, as an altogether sensible man. When, now, Fichte's arrogant work, *Fr. Nicolai's Life*, etc., appeared in print (against his will), Nicolai published first a very warm reply to it, and then a protest, just as warm and energetic, against Fichte's reception into the Academy. The expressions which became loud against Fichte from the Göttingen circle betrayed the feeling that they emanated from the rear-guard. Those who, when Fichte appeared, spoke with authority in philosophy, called themselves Kantians. Following Kant's own example, they had at first looked upon Fichte as a promising comrade, and C. Chr. F. Schmid's attack upon him, shortly before he came to Jena, appeared to be a case of personal irritation. But when the treatises on the Science of Knowledge threw down the gauntlet before all the Kantians except Reinhold, Maimon and Beck, who treated the master himself merely as a forerunner, this must, of course, produce bitterness of feeling. With the exception of Maimon, who remained silent, all those named declared against him, and at last Kant himself, in a very acrimonious way. The *Allgemeine Literaturzeitung*, which had gone with Fichte a little way, expressed itself against him; so also did Jakob's *Annalen*, in connection with which Beck, particularly, was active. That the Faith-Philosophy, which had already declared against Kant, should also declare against Fichte, was natural; and the fact that Fichte actually drew the consequences that Jacobi had declared beforehand to be inevitable deductions must have prepossessed the latter, in spite of the fact that he had a horror of them, in favour of the consistent thinker. Hence the respectful, even friendly relations between the two men. A view that had been attacked by the Pre-Kantians, the Kantians, and the Faith-Philosophers, must necessarily have the Semi-Kantians also, for opponents. Accordingly, Bouterwek, Krug, Fries repeatedly appeared on the scene of action to cast into the teeth of the *Science of Knowledge* its extravagant *a priorism*, or its "prejudice of transcendentalism." After these opponents, who rejected the whole problem that Fichte had raised, came, besides, the legion of those who adhered to individual parts of it. The expression *Ego*, by which, in spite of all protests to the contrary, was understood the individual, made the *Science of Knowledge* an easy prey for those who asserted that Professor Fichte regarded himself,

in all seriousness, as the Creator of the World. His doctrine of religion, and the disputes connecting themselves with that, regarding his atheism, brought religious interest into play, and the air swarmed with writings, serious and playful, religiously and anti-religiously coloured, personal and factual, which took the field against the "terrorism" emanating from Jena. In fact, the expression was not unfittingly chosen, if one pay regard to the manner in which the *adherents* of the new doctrine defended it.

2. The author of this doctrine had, in the manner in which he announced—*e.g.*, to C. Chr. Ehrh. Schmid—that he (Schmid) was "annihilated" and would henceforth be no longer regarded as existent, given an example of polemic which did not remain without imitators. One who before all others had avowed adherence to the *Science of Knowledge*, and penetrated so deeply into the meaning of it, that Reinhold and others were in the habit of characterizing him as the second author of it, was SCHELLING (*vid.* § 317 ff.). Like Fichte, he was rendered dissatisfied by Reinhold with Kant's achievements, and by Schulze's *Ænesidemus* and Maimon with Reinhold's, and was so influenced by Fichte's review of *Ænesidemus* as well as his programme, that in his work, *On the Possibility of a Form of Philosophy* (1794), he attempts, in a manner similar to Fichte's, a deduction of the three principles with which the categories of quality, quantity, and modality, and the laws of analytical, synthetical and analytico-synthetical thought (principle of identity, of ground, and of disjunction) are said to be given. Much more important is his second work: *On the Ego as the Principle of Philosophy* (1795), in which the Ego that is not to be confounded with self-consciousness or the empirical Ego, and which stands above the opposition of the subjective and the objective, viz., the absolute Ego, which speaks to the empirical Ego, as an unconditional law, the command, "Be absolutely identical with thyself," is assigned all the predicates that consistent dogmatism (Spinoza) attributes to things; and in which it is shown that by this theory all oppositions of freedom and necessity, perfection and happiness, teleology and mechanism, are overcome. At the same time he here vindicates to the philosopher that intuitive understanding, of which Kant (*vid.* § 301, 8) had spoken only problematically, and in which Fichte placed himself in immediate alliance with him. But above all are to be mentioned

the *Letters on Dogmatism and Criticism* (1796), in which, in opposition to those who sought to establish a dogmatism wholly of the traditional sort, and particularly a theology on the basis of Criticism, it is shown that, according to Kant, God is only an object of conduct, and that Kant had failed to get beyond the indemonstrability of an objective God, instead of showing the incompatibility of such a nature with ours, because he examined critically only the faculty of knowledge and had not gone deeper. His question, *How* are synthetic judgments *a priori* possible? proves, in fact, quite clearly that he placed himself in the sphere of syntheses, *i.e.*, of the opposition of the subjective and the objective (hence makes Fichte's *Third* Principle the point of beginning). It therefore only remains for him to say that as the reason (viewed as practical) proceeds to posit the unity of the two, so also (theoretically regarded) it presupposes this unity. Since now this contradiction ceases as well where the object is posited as thing-in-itself, as absolute, and the subject vanishes as knowing, as also where, conversely, the object vanishes as something counterposed, the *Critique of Pure Reason* presents a choice between two equally possible but irreconcilable standpoints, objective and subjective realism, the first of which, Dogmatism (Spinoza), requires that the subject lose itself in the absolute, and teaches that the Ego is a mere modification of the infinite, the other, Criticism (Fichte), gives the command, Be! and teaches the absorption of the object by the subject, not, indeed, as being (for then it would itself be Dogmatism), but as the obligation to be. The goal is not attained, for blessedness is tedium, as Lessing rightly says. Criticism, therefore, does not teach a drawing near to the Divinity, but, rather, the drawing near of the Divinity, by man's becoming of himself more and more free from himself, instead of trembling before an avenging judge. Choice must be made between these two standpoints, which alone are consistent. (Then would be enunciated, therefore, that dilemma to which, earlier (§ 269, 2), reference was made.) The *New Deduction of Natural Right* (1796), which followed the *Letters*, can therefore not be cited here, because Fichte was dissatisfied with it, and because, also, it contains a thought which transcends Fichte, namely, that the State lies in a sphere that stands above the moral and the legal. Still more does Schelling appear in agreement with Fichte in the *Universal Survey*

of the latest Philosophical Literature (1797), which was reprinted later (1809) as: *Dissertations in Explanation of the Science of Knowledge.* These contain, besides extended critiques of the standpoints of Kant, Beck, and Reinhold, exact discussions on theoretical and practical reason, on reason and will; and it cannot be called self-deception, if Schelling and Fichte regarded themselves as in entire agreement with one another. On the contrary, self-deception begins on both sides when the *Ideas for a Philosophy of Nature* appeared, which is not to be mentioned further here, just as, after its appearance, Schelling is no longer to be mentioned among the Fichteans. Schelling was won to Fichte's idea only by his writings (he had seen Fichte in the chair only once); after that, personal intercourse may have united the two still more. It was otherwise as regards FRIEDRICH CARL FORBERG (1770–1848), who was one of the most apt of the pupils of Reinhold, and was, when Fichte came to Jena, *Docent* there, but was his eager hearer, and became the first occasion of the dispute regarding Atheism. Also FRIEDRICH IMMANUEL NIETHAMMER (24th March, 1766 to 1848), having come into contact with Fichte through a very creditable notice of his first work, was *Docent* in Jena when Fichte came there. He allied himself very closely with the new-comer, and soon became an open contributor to the journal founded by him, which was not only *called*, but *was*, the Fichtean journal. His works relate mostly to religion. Having gone later to Bavaria, his activity was devoted particularly to the school system. Of great importance it must of course have been for the Science of Knowledge, that Reinhold had decidedly gone over to it and publicly supported it—the Elementary Philosophy had been only an introduction to it. Fichte's rejoicing over that did not, of course, last long. Reinhold's inclining to Bardili caused Fichte, first, then Schelling and Hegel, to express themselves in a reckless manner concerning Reinhold, which his merits as a philosopher forbade. One of the most faithful of the followers of Fichte, after escaping by flight from the constraint of the cloister, was JOHANNES BAPTISTA SCHAD, who taught a long time in Jena, then a long time as professor in Charkow, and after he was emerited there, again lived in Jena, where he died in the forties [1834.—Ed.]. His first writings were recognised by Fichte as good commentaries on his own. Later he approached Schelling more. Such was the case in his:

System of the Philosophy of Nature and Transcendental Philosophy (2 vols., Landshut, 1803). Allying themselves decidedly with Fichte, were Schumann and, in an almost slavish way, Michaelis, both active particularly in the province of political philosophy. Unmistakable approximations to Fichte are to be found in Mehmel, who died as professor in Erlangen. In the wider dissemination of the ideas of Fichte and Schelling, the *Philosophische Journal* was principally instrumental. That a notice so favourable as that of Schlegel could appear in the *Allgemeine Literaturzeitung*, corroborates what was said above—that this was for a long time favourably inclined towards Fichte. The *Erlangen Literaturzeitung*, edited by Meusel, was for a long time accounted the warmest friend of the Science of Knowledge.

3. With Fichte's removal to Berlin, the culmination-point of his reputation was, properly speaking, passed. But just at this moment was presented a phenomenon which is to be comprehended only in connection with the Science of Knowledge, to which it stands related similarly as the Semi-Kantians do to Kant. This phenomenon may be compared with the modification of Kantism made by Fries, all the more that there are demonstrable in its appearance the influence of ideas of Jacobi. We speak here of that *Stand-point of Irony*, which, because the school of poets acknowledging its adherence to it had called itself the Romantic School, it is the habit of some to characterize as the Philosophy of Romanticism. The founder of this tendency, and at the same time its most important representative, is FRIEDRICH SCHLEGEL (born on the 10th of March, 1772, the youngest of five distinguished brothers, and died on the 11th of January, 1829), whose epoch-making works in the History of Art, Æsthetics, and Philology, must be passed over in these *Outlines*, and whose later philosophical achievements must be omitted in this section, since they will be spoken of in what follows. Having become acquainted with the Kantian philosophy at a time when Reinhold and Fichte had already gotten beyond it, he sees in it from the beginning only half-truth, and requires that idealism be logically carried out. This leads him to Fichte, whose *Science of Knowledge* he places with the French Revolution and Goethe's Wilhelm Meister as the three greatest tendencies of the century. And yet he was, from the very beginning, repelled by an unsurmounted dualism in the *Science of*

Knowledge. The separation of the absolute Ego from the empirical has as its consequence the separation of speculation from life, a separation which Schlegel declares to be as abstract as that of faith and knowledge, which is connected with it. Fichte had said of the philosopher, that in him the absolute, or infinite, Ego rules and speaks. But, besides the fact that Fichte insists that no one should be a mere philosopher, the absolute Ego, since complete freedom remains an eternal ideal, is never attained to, even in the moments of philosophic thinking, and, in reality, Fichte does not get beyond the Kantian ethics, that jurisprudence "struck in" upon the inner members. Hence is it, also, no wonder that the transcendental philosophers, in spite of their extolled blessedness in the pure æther of thought, appear so disgusted and vexed, and do not rise to the licenses of high poetry, as distinguished from the grammar, of virtue. (As this last proposition is borrowed *verbatim* from Jacobi, so the dulness of the Critical moral philosophers suggests the circumstance that Jacobi had called life under the moral law, "life in a crane.") But Schlegel found among the so acrimoniously condemned transcendental philosophers of the Kantian, as well as the Fichtean school, a suggestion as to how and where the overcoming of such a division was to be discovered. Schiller had pointed out that in art man does not torment himself with labour, but has enjoyment, and plays, and had called the poet the true man. In fact, not only may there be found in Fichte himself a likening of the capacity for philosophic thinking to poetic talent, but there occurs in his *Theory of Morals* the proposition (regarding which, to be sure, many would suppose that it did not originate in the mind of Fichte), that art makes the transcendental point of view the common one, and that æsthetic contemplation finds in everything, even the moral law, not an absolute command but itself, and hence is related to the moral law as a free being, not as a slave. These thoughts, long since expressed by Jacobi, Schiller, and Fichte, Schlegel, now, adopts, in such fashion that he at the same time denies the distinction between the philosophical and poetical standpoints, and requires that every one be truly a philosopher, *i.e.*, a poet. Whoever is not a poet is not a whole, a fully-formed, man; he belongs among the uncultivated, the shallow, the common. This life in true poetry is true religiosity. It consists in the giving of free play to genius; hence there is no other

virtue than that of genius; and, conversely, genius, which must, of course, appear paradoxical to those who are common, ennobles everything. The criterion of genius is that disregard of limits which rests upon the feeling of infinite creative power. Whereas the shallow person, the ordinary consciousness, sees in all surrounding it, already established limits, which must be respected, the transcendental, and hence the poetic and original, Ego sees therein only something posited by itself, therefore subject to being, as it were, revoked. Hence it is not in earnest as regards what it allows to be valid; it sports where the ordinary person seriously plods and labours. As the Grecian gods are idle, so genius rejoices in freedom from care and in inactivity, is not yet shut out from Paradise by industry, that death-angel with the fiery sword. This mode of thought, in contradistinction to the prosaic seriousness of common life, is called, now, sometimes genius, sometimes wit and humour, but particularly irony; and of it is said that whoever has risen to it offers sacrifice to the Graces. Whereas the spiritless man gives himself up entirely to his aim, and puts the law above everything else, the man of true intelligence acknowledges no law and knows that all aims are idle. In the ironical disregarding of the existence of law consists real morality, the first impulse of which is opposition to law and conventional legality. The rabble, therefore, often see transgressors and examples of immorality in those who, for the truly moral man, are precisely beings of his own class, fellow-citizens of his own world. The so-much decried romance of Schlegel, *Lucinde*, attempts a critical examination of marriage, as it presents itself in reality, from this standpoint; and in doing so makes war, in a manner exceeding what is permitted by the limits of the æsthetic, against the separation of the spiritual and the sensuous in the love of the sexes, as also against all that is conventional and traditional. Whereas the spiritless person, in part fears custom, and in part breaks it in the moment of appetite, the person of genius is once for all free from it. Since marriage is not to him a sacred institution, he disregards it, and is for that reason capable of true love, and natural marriage, in which no God nor superstition separates the lovers. Inasmuch as in the gratification of this impulse the subject, negatively considered, attains, through exaltation above the limits of marriage, custom, etc., to certainty of his infinitude,—positively considered, to the enjoyment

of the gratification of his spiritual as well as his sensible side, we have here the highest enjoyment of one's own freedom and hence religion. What the moralists reprove in egoism is, properly speaking, religion; for what God can be worthy of honour to the man who would not be his own God? In the earnest play of individuality the nameless, unknown Divinity is present.

4. All the foregoing statements have been taken from the *Athenæum*, a journal edited by the two Schlegels (1798–1800), the *Lucinde* (1799), and the *Characterizations and Critiques* (1801), because only in these writings does Fr. Schlegel occupy this standpoint. How different was his position, some years later, is shown by the lectures of the years 1803–6, edited by Windischmann (1837), still more by the *Philosophy of Life*, the *Philosophy of History*, as well as by the (Dresden) *Philosophical Lectures*, especially on the *Philosophy of Language*, while giving which he died. These may, therefore, be first discussed in the following section. The collection of his works, which he himself prepared (Vienna, 1822 ff., 10 vols.), does not contain all these, but they are to be found in the editions prepared later, *e.g.*, in the fifteen-volume Vienna edition of the year 1846. (In this are wanting only the *Lucinde* and the lectures edited by Windischmann.) As Schlegel's later writings have been here ignored, so also have the men who, together with him, represent the view of life and the world just now characterized. Since polite literature is not a subject treated in this account, only Novalis and Schleiermacher, the two men who stood nearest Schlegel personally, could be discussed here. But since both so early supplement the subjectivism held fast to by Irony, by the introduction of objective moments, that the point at which this had not already taken place is scarcely to be fixed, they would, more appropriately, be treated where, not uninfluenced by both, Schlegel himself abandoned that standpoint. However transient had been the sway of this, we could hardly regard it, after the preceding course of philosophy, as one to be passed by. Further, it gives the formula for something which, as a phase of the great Revolution, was experienced and done by the people beyond the Rhine. To the folly which there decreed the existence of a being compared with which one is powerless, or that the maid-servants of vice should be goddesses of reason, there corresponds here a

wisdom that consists in the knowledge that all that man honours is his own work, all that has worth is mere inclination. As there the Age of Terror marks the turning-point to the rule of legal union, so the orgies of subjectivism, which philosophy celebrates in irony, ripen the need for a philosophy that is related to that extravagance almost as the stern discipline of the Empire to the Age of Terror. In both spheres there have been intermediate phenomena, and these transition stages between the Science of Knowledge and the System of Identity, which therefore, to employ the parallel once drawn, would correspond to the new political phenomena which fell between the rule of Robespierre and Bonaparte, are next to be considered.

C.—OFFSHOOTS OF THE SCIENCE OF KNOWLEDGE.

R. Haym: *Die romantische Schule, ein Beitrag zur Geschichte des deutschen Geistes.* Berlin, 1870.

§ 315.

1. It needs neither reflection on the spirit which world-historical events evince, nor a comparison with what appears to those who have been born later as the real problem to be solved, but only a recalling to mind of what, according to Fichte's own explanation, the *Science of Knowledge* was intended to be, in order to see that it stopped midway towards its goal. Repeatedly he reminds the reader that the true system is not mere realism, as was Spinozism, nor mere idealism, as were the doctrines of Berkeley and Leibnitz, but ideal-realism or real-idealism. That both names may be employed for the organic union of the sides of that opposition, plainly points to the fact that neither of the two sides can have the priority, neither of the two elements can have preponderance; that the system, therefore, must contain in itself both Spinozism and Leibnitzianism, alike surmounted. But that this is not accomplished, that the idealistic element is much the more conspicuous, we infer not only from the fact that Fichte expressly designates his system as practical idealism; it appears very plainly from his hatred towards the conception to which Spinoza had sacrificed the Ought, namely Being, and from his hatred toward nature which coincides with that. Still another thing supports this view: the defect (criticised

on every hand) as regards the sense of beauty, in the *Science of Knowledge*, and in its author, which, as was noted above, gave reason for doubting that the apotheosis of the artist in the *Theory of Morals* was Fichte's own idea. In fact, when one observes Fichte elsewhere placing the meaning of art particularly in the circumstance that by it our dwellings are made comfortable and pleasant, he appears to overlook, as was remarked in speaking of Leibnitz (§ 288, 6), the difference between materially useful skill and the activity of the artist, the aim of which is the beautiful. But not only from all this may it be concluded that the *Science of Knowledge* concedes too little to realistic interests. Fichte himself avows it. In verbal agreement with what Schelling had said in the *Letters on Dogmatism and Criticism*, Fichte repeats very frequently that there are only two consistent systems, which are in diametrical opposition one to the other, the Science of Knowledge and Spinozism. But with this explanation it is also admitted that the Science of Knowledge is no longer on a higher level than Spinozism (considered as an element of it), but stands in opposition to it, is not supra-realism but anti-realism, hence one-sided. At first, he finds comfort chiefly in the idea that Spinoza was hardly convinced of the truth of his own system. He must express this doubt, because the consciousness of duty, of the ideal, was to him so firm, whereas according to Spinozism this was inexplicable, indeed, impossible. But what if a time should come for Fichte when, what according to the principles of the *Science of Knowledge* is contemptible, idle, comes to have a value for him? What if a time should come when the titanic feeling of power which causes him, with Lessing, to compare the enjoyment of blessedness with tedium, should yield to a recognition of the power of being, or the thought should more and more force itself upon his mind that the external world is not merely a limit, that it is a rational order, and so, as Nature in the proper sense of the word, something having authority for thought? Such a time comes. It is hardly worth while that we should consider in how far his destiny brought him to see that the will alone is not sufficient; it is of little importance whether it was the study of Schelling's writings that brought him to conceive an interest in nature, so that he began to study natural science. It suffices that it was so; and this, indeed, but, more than all else, the experience that

in him, who had bewailed the fact that there are natural impulses, there entered into the place of the earlier abstract cosmopolitanism a very clearly-marked feeling of nationality, must have reacted upon his entire previous view of the universe. To require of Fichte that he should give up the principles of this view, or that he should even only very essentially modify them, means to ignore the essential mark of distinction between him and Reinhold. It could hardly happen otherwise than it did. He seeks to remedy the defect of extreme idealism by supplementing it with doctrines of extreme realism, an attempt that might appear to him whom Spinoza had held in bonds before Kant, much less strange, perhaps, than to many others. Although, to employ Herbart's very apposite expression, he carries this added ingredient over to the idealistic element of his philosophy, it still remains an added ingredient, which, because of this external relation, allows that to which it is added of course to remain, but acquires in connection with it somewhat of the character of a mosaic.

2. Because of this superficial union, it has become a disputed question, and may almost be called a standing puzzle, whether we can speak of a *modified Fichtean doctrine.* Those who deny that we can, may properly appeal to the fact that if the reader of the *Science of Knowledge* of the year 1801 is required to raise himself to a point or view from which he perceives the absolute knowledge which is not present in the ordinary consciousness, but makes all consciousness possible, which can be thought only in the form of being-for-self (as pure *for*), and contains, as totality of knowledge, individual knowledge, and as the point of concentration of all individuals, the sum of all Egos, and the universe, which, properly speaking, acts in me, etc.,—he then develops Fichte's doctrine more clearly than ever before, and, particularly, prevents the confounding of the absolute and the individual, by avoiding the word *Ego.* Just so they can cite from the *Science of Knowledge* of 1804 the passages in which pure knowledge is defined as the bond of union between thought (subject) and being (object), but later, instead of *pure knowledge,* the term *light* is employed, which becomes *intuition* or *reason,* which we know by inner life as subject-object, when our reason contemplates reason; and they can maintain that by these and similar statements the original meaning of the *Science of Knowledge* is not at all altered, and is withal more easily

grasped than in the *Science of Knowledge* of 1794. Finally, there could hardly be one of the later writings of Fichte which so agreed with the earlier and yet at the same time so surpassed them in clearness and definiteness as do the lectures on the *Facts of Consciousness* of the year 1810, from which statements might be taken at random in which Fichte repels the charge of individualism,—which might, perhaps, be true of Kant, who really deduced much out of *his* consciousness, and thereby remains responsible for the proof that it holds true of *the*, or of all, consciousness. It is otherwise with the *Science of Knowledge*. This seeks to show how the life embracing all individuals comes to consciousness in the individual, how the universal thought produces Egos, and among them even me, so that it presents itself not so much as an Ego as a community of individuals that can be deduced as these definite beings from the fact that each shall do what only he can do. Just so does the *Science of Knowledge* lead to the becoming (theoretically) conscious of the one life and rising (practically) to the common end, to living for the species. As, for the individual person, the objective which he opposes to himself is merely a limit to be transcended, *i.e.*, a means, so-called Nature also has merely the character of the end-governed. It is nothing absolute, nothing real, in fact, for only individuals are real; the world of sense arises for them by the fact that they see their power, and find limits, in breaking through which consists the ethical problem. When this is solved, the sensible world falls away, etc. Here, as was said, the doctrine is not changed; the presentation has improved. But here also are discussed only the points which, in spite of the supplementary addition, may remain unchanged: the relation of the pure Ego to the empirical Egos, the meaning of objects, which even here remain a correlate and a limit to the subject, what justifies Fichte in repelling the charge that his idealism is a subjective idealism, etc. It is otherwise as regards another point, namely, the theory of being, in its later form. Originally, being was with Fichte only a means to the ideal, there was no other than the relative, sensible; and the highest conceivable was the ideal (law, moral order of the world, God). But now, *en rapport* with Spinoza, he adds to his previous theories an absolute being. Thus arises a subordinating of also the ideal to being. Thereby he has two sorts of being, but also two sorts of ideals. Always,

after either of the two is considered, the other pushes in before it as its truth, and the two become, to adopt here an expression of Löwe's concerning the ideal, something protean. In consequence of this pushing in of a new object there now makes its appearance behind the actual, the super-actual; knowledge, which had itself thus far been the absolute, becomes an image or phenomenon of the absolute, in short, being and the ideal duplicate themselves in this course of the world in a manner that recalls the expression about the "super-existent" unities of Jamblichus (§ 129, 2). Nowhere more than here does Fichte require that we yield to his peculiarity, which he had formerly contrasted as follows with Reinhold's: One can express the thoughts of the latter only in his own words, whereas as regards himself (Fichte) one must forget the words and look for a view of the whole, which is entirely independent of the words. As his hearers in Berlin were accustomed to wait for the "breaking through," so also should his reader wait; and for that reason Fichte permits himself a freedom as regards terminology which very much increases the difficulty of understanding him. But even those who have most shown forbearance in this regard have nevertheless been obliged to confess that both being and the ideal have been "shoved out" of their original place; a displacement which, besides other things, has as a consequence a modification of his theory of immortality. So long as the ideal is the highest, so long is it here as in the case of Kant: ceaseless labour is a guarantee of the working-time. But so soon as the absolute being appears in the fore-ground, he inclines to the Spinozistic view that immortality consists in the possession of the truth, or rather is compensated for by that. In no work is this recognition of, and respect towards, being, which contrasts so strangely with the earlier contempt for it, so conspicuous as in the *Way to the Blessed Life*, and in the *Characteristics of the Present Age*. If here, in opposition to moralism, the standpoint of religion is celebrated as that where pleasure and enjoyment supplement serious duty, and which, in so far, displays the greatest analogy with art-enjoyment; if a standpoint is rated high which stands related to that of pure morality as being to the ideal, and by occupying which, man, having been penetrated by morality, does not *strive* for happiness but *is* happy,—where religion is not action but being, etc.,—the *in verbis*

simus faciles must be pushed very far in order for us to be able to say, That is, indeed, precisely the original religion of right-doing. Likewise, it might become difficult to bring the noble national pride and national hatred which the *Addresses to the German Nation* evince, the monstrous importance that is attached to the sentiment that the German language is not a mixed (*i.e.*, an artificial) language, the regard for climatic conditions, etc., into agreement with Fichte's earlier cosmopolitanism, with his theory of the State, which assumes no other bond of union than the artificial one of the compact, etc. The feeling that he has not entirely succeeded in fusing views so heterogeneous, appears to be the reason why he snatches at ever new, always metaphorical, expressions, and is always promising that now complete clearness will be attained. That, at the same time, Schelling calls out to him that the System of Identity has found what he seeks, could not affect him agreeably. Hence, the ever greater estrangement of the two men, who only by a strange providence could ever have believed that they could, as regards their characters, remain friends. How they thought of one another in the year 1806 is shown by Schelling's public disavowal of Fichte, printed in this year, and his essay, first printed after his death: *On the Fortunes of the Science of Knowledge.*

3. More natural and easier than for the author of the *Science of Knowledge* was it for those to get beyond its standpoint who had carried the *Science of Knowledge* to its sharpest extreme in the subjectivism of irony. It was more natural; for the consequences of this doctrine are such that it can hardly seek elsewhere for its devotees than where the levity of youth still sparkles, wholly apart from the fact that the Ego, which allows validity to what it, nevertheless, recognises as vain, makes the discovery of its own vanity, and passes from the ironical playing with things to self-ironizing. It was easier also, since the principles that one did not himself discover are not usually held with such tenacity by him as by one who has himself laid them down, that one being, in the present case, Fichte. As regards Schlegel, in particular, it could not but make easier the transition to another view, that the two men who stood nearest him,—Novalis and Schleiermacher, and together with whom he could do to the fullest extent, what he so loved, viz., "symphilosophize," had, from the beginning, through their deep piety and moral earnest-

ness, hence resignation to objective powers, counterbalanced the subjectivism of the standpoint. The first-mentioned was taken from him by an early death; for Friedrich von Hardenberg—much better known by his *nom de plume* Novalis—born on the 2nd of May, 1772, died in his thirtieth year, in Schlegel's arms. From the second he was separated by changing his country and his confession; and, in his further development he was thrown completely upon himself, although it cannot be denied that in the fragments which were left behind by Novalis are many points that play an important part in the *later doctrine of Schlegel.* In this later doctrine it is, first of all, characteristic that instead of assertions of genius we find an attempt at a strict method. From a logic which does not, of course, rest upon the principle of non-contradiction, since life and, in general, everything, rests upon contradictions; which, further, lays down rules not merely for feeling one's way among things already given, but also for genetic thought, the forms of which are at the same time forms of being, and which, therefore, coincides with metaphysics, Schlegel, already in the year 1804, expected the salvation of philosophy. As regards this, he insists that the method should move in triads, and promises constructions in which every member in turn contains several trinities. By means of this logical basis and method he seeks to solve the main problem of all philosophy, the relation of the infinite and the finite, by conceiving neither of the two as being, but both as becoming; hence he assumes a becoming divinity, an infinite world-Ego: as parts of this primal Ego we exist. Resignation to this is the destination of man, who falls short of it by clinging to individual personality. Hence the anti-revolutionary tendency of Schlegel in politics as in the Church. He spent more than twenty years in giving form to his changed doctrine, then he published in quick succession the lectures delivered in Vienna, in which he defined as the most immediate subject and first problem of philosophy the restoration of the lost divine image. The progress of the individual towards divinity is treated by the lectures on the *Philosophy of Life;* that of the race by the lectures on the *Philosophy of History.* The first were delivered in 1827, and appeared in 1829; the second were delivered in 1828, and appeared in 1829. With these are connected the lectures on the *Philosophy of Language and of Words,* while giving which he died in Dresden. These ap-

peared in print in 1830. Compared with these three lectures those of the years 1804-6 are very pantheistic. These present the opposite extreme to the standpoint of Irony; to this extreme this standpoint was necessarily carried by the inevitable giddiness of self-ironizing. Hence afterwards, in his latest works, in which he had found the mean between them, Schlegel speaks of two standpoints that were defective because of fragmentary presentations, through which he had passed in the course of nine and thirty years. Although, now, the views which he had published in the years 1827–29 are much more mature than those expressed more than a quarter of a century earlier, yet because of the fact that, when they appeared, the System of Identity had already culminated, and Hegel stood at the summit of his fame, they have not commanded so much attention as would otherwise have been the case, not even in the Catholic world, in which Baader's most important writings had already at that time appeared. If it had been different,—had these lectures exerted upon the development of philosophy an assignable influence which could not have been derived from other sources than they, their content would have to be given, in part, in treating of Solger and Steffens, and, in part, in connection with the phenomena that followed the reign of the Hegelian system. As it is, it appears more suitable to treat Schlegel, whose later performances could by no means be passed over, here, instead of in various places. He designates his later doctrines as the *Philosophy of Life*, partly in order to contrast them with the wisdom of the schools, and partly because he proposes to himself the problem of the determination, by a consideration of the inner life, of the destined goal of the same. It is in accordance with the latter point of view that he decidedly emphasized the point that his philosophy is the science of experience. The course pursued by Schlegel in the fifteen lectures on the Philosophy of Life is essentially as follows: The first five lectures contain what he himself has called his Psychology, in which he begins with the investigations relating to the soul, as the middle point between sense and spirit, and defines the soul in general as the principle of all life, and the thinking soul as the central point of the human consciousness, and attributes to it reason and phantasy, whereas understanding and will are said to belong to the mind. From these four principal branches of the human consciousness all

others are said to issue as branches; so that to reason are assigned memory and conscience, to phantasy, sense and the impulses, which, all four, co-operate in the highest manifestation of the soul, love; but they also co-operate in knowledge, particularly in so far as language comes into play. In considering knowledge, now, we must not neglect the difference between reason and understanding; of which, the latter, but never the former, may be attributed to God. Reason is a perception and union of distinctions, the understanding a penetration and, in the highest dgree, a looking-through. Hence our knowledge of God is an understanding, or an experience-knowledge, that is referred to the revelation of God, which is announced to us in conscience, nature, the Book, and the history of the world. Still more than the understanding, is the will the organ through which we receive the revelation. It is, now, a dangerous error of all philosophy that overvalues the reason, *i.e.*, rationalism, that it regards the present condition of consciousness as the normal one, whereas the inner discordance among the powers of the soul, further the relation of the soul to nature and to God, which are discussed in the fourth and fifth lectures, show visibly that this world is a bridge spanning the abyss of eternal death, a house of corruption, destined to become, through a higher power, a ladder to the resurrection. The ground of this discordance is that the understanding found pleasure in dead conceptions, the reason in dialectical play, the phantasy in subjective creations, the will in absolute (formal) volition. Only faith, love, and hope can prevent that. Here we have a way paved for the transition to the three following lectures (6–8), which Schlegel himself characterizes as a kind of Natural Theology, because in them are treated the divine order in nature, the relation of nature to that life and to the invisible world, the divine order in the realm of truth, and the battle of the age with error, finally the divine order in human history and in the State. The three following lectures (9–11), which contain what Schlegel himself calls his Logic or Ontology, but which may equally well be called Applied Theology, discuss the peculiar function of philosophy, as well as the apparent discordance and the real unity of right faith and the highest knowledge; further, the two-fold spirit of truth and of error in science; finally, the relation of truth and science to life; and they here show how the conflict of know-

ledge and faith, faith and unbelief, united faith and knowledge with faith, subsides. The conclusion is contained in the last four lectures, on the Metaphysics of Life as the theory of that which transcends nature, which may, if one pleases, be called also Cosmology, because it exhibits the supernatural principles in the actual. Art, and ecclesiastical and political life are considered, and, in conclusion, the, properly speaking, theocratic position of science. Islamism is cited as the type of the absolute or despotic State, the English constitution as the type of the dynamic State, which rests upon the discord of parties and religions, just as ethical and historical monarchy do upon the peace of religion and of God.

4. Besides the *Philosophy of Life* as pure philosophy, there is, as applied philosophy, the *Philosophy of History*, which will exhibit historically the restoration of the divine image in the various periods of the world, as the *Philosophy of Life* exhibited it in the inner consciousness. Here the first two lectures embrace, besides the general Introduction, the question of the relation of man to the earth, the primitive and uncivilized condition, the contrast between the two classes of men represented in Cain and Seth, those beginners of the world's history, and finally, the division of the human race into various nations. The seven following lectures (3–9), show *how* the separation of reason, phantasy, understanding and will again makes its appearance in the Chinese, Hindoos, Egyptians, and Hebrews, and then give a characterization of those peoples, which, because they rise above these practical limits, have had a world-historical influence and great historical power,—the Persians, the Grecians, and the Romans. The peculiarity of these nations is formulated not so much by an *a priori* construction as rather by a steady regard to the principal turning-points of their history, and, in connection particularly with the Romans, the deification of the State is emphasized. With the tenth lecture, which, with the following eight, forms the second volume of lectures, Schlegel passes to Christianity, and considers, in connection with that, its historical beginning as regards external political relations, as also the decay of the Roman spirit; then treats of the early Germans and the migration of nations, as also the corruption of the world preceding the appearance of Mohammed; gives a characterization of Mohammed and the Arabian domination of the world, as also the reorganization of the European

Occident, and the restoration of the Ecclesiastical Empire; pictures the first formation and further founding of the Christian State connected therewith; characterizes, finally, the Ghibelline time-spirit and party disputes, as also the condition of art and science, which accompanies the anarchic condition of the Occident, with the delineation of which the five lectures (1–14) covering the Middle Ages close. The three next following lectures (15–17) treat of the religious wars, of the epoch of the Enlightenment and the age of the Revolution; the eighteenth and last, of the ruling time-spirit and the universal restoration. Here, now, he speaks more definitely and extendedly of the problem and method of a philosophy of history, which not merely must consider world-events as natural occurrences, but, at the same time, has to take into account the might of the free will, the power of evil and the guiding providence of God; and should, just for that reason, deduce the understanding of history, the knowledge of the leading ideas or the signature of every age, out of history itself, not out of a preformed system. Schlegel has himself followed this rule; hence his careful scrutiny of the grounds for such theories as are opposed to his own. His estimate of the Reformation is, thus, such a one as is rarely given by a convert to the Romish Church. True, the Reformation was not to him that which the Church, as regards that opposition (which appeared at the end of the Middle Ages) between the romantic-scholastic and the antiquarian-pagan enthusiasm, needed; and the polemical zeal which called it into life is to him a proof that it is a work of human origin. But this does not prevent him from recognising the greatness of Luther, nor even from admitting that when the Reformation was suppressed, the consequence was a worse one than when it was allowed to pursue its own course. As the chief consequences of the Reformation are mentioned, the religious peace which Germany enjoyed, the dynamical theory of the balance of power in political life, represented particularly by England, and finally, the Enlightenment and its attendant, the Revolution, which had for its chief instrument secret societies. Salvation must be looked for from science, which must abandon the delusion of the Absolute, whether this be placed in Ego-hood, in Nature, or the Idea of Reason, and come to the recognition of the living God; and should be a true philosophy of revelation.

5. It is interesting, now, to see how Schlegel, in what he

last put before the world, the Dresden lectures on the *Philosophy of Language*, returns to the expression so celebrated in his youth, *Irony;* of course, in such a way that this word now takes on a meaning entirely different from—one might almost say, opposite to—the earlier. After the assumption that the present condition of man is the normal one, has here, again, been condemned as the false presupposition of modern philosophy, it is demanded of philosophy, not that it assume, at the beginning, anything such as a paradise made known to us only by revelation and history, but that it recognise the undeniable fact that reason, phantasy, understanding and will, are not in accord, and that our consciousness is a discordant, indeed, a fourfold consciousness; and that it attempt to return from that point to inner unity. Here, now, it is evident that a means to this finding a home for self is presented in language, the common product of those four cardinal powers; inasmuch as all speaking, and hence also the inner speaking, thought, indeed even prayer, is a dialogue, and exhibits a resolution of opposition and, hence, in its highest products (in Socrates and Plato), that brighter irony which arises out of the feeling of finitude and the apparent contradiction of this feeling with the idea of the infinite, and meets us in, for example, the roguish raillery of the loved one. The inquiries relating to the origin of language, with which the third lecture is occupied, declare against the common theories, especially because, according to them, language has grown mosaically, whereas, like every great work of art, it must, the rather, have come into existence, in its first outlines, suddenly. The analogy with the primitive and tertiary rocks serves in distinguishing original and mixed languages, as regards which Schlegel gives a caution against over-valuing the latter, and draws a parallel between what is Persian and what is English. Then language is again dropped, and, after defining it as the memory of the human race, the author passes to a critique of views that have prevailed with regard to the essential thought-forms. The fourth lecture corrects the doctrine of innate ideas and declares in favour of the Platonic doctrine of recollection, with which the false doctrine of pre-existence has become connected only because the relation of time and eternity is not rightly conceived. If one regard the former as eternity put out of joint, the latter as true and complete time, or if one distinguish two sorts of time and two sorts of eternity, the theory of

recollection gains an entirely different meaning, just as that death is called a return acquires a meaning. We might employ here the expression "Transcendental Memory." Only a correct theory of time and its dimensions yields the distinction also of the three stages of memory,—eternal love, hopeful longing after the infinite, and living, active faith. But in order to conceive it perfectly we must go down more deeply than has hitherto been done, to the primary elements of consciousness. The following three lectures give, accordingly, a supplement to what had been said in the *Philosophy of Life*. Between each two of the four primary powers that have been mentioned, there were assumed four derived or intermediate powers,—conscience, memory, impulse, and sense. To these is now added, as a ninth, feeling, which contains them all, as germ, and, as a goal again uniting them all, the Idea of God. Here now is the point at which a choice is offered between the systems of the absolute, the various forms of pantheism, and the doctrine of a living God, the philosophy of religion and philosophy of revelation. "Feeling is everything"; with this word of *Faust* Schlegel introduces the seventh lecture, in which he declares war against all strict school-terminology, and states the real problem of his philosophical expositions to be to call forth that primal feeling which reveals itself in the harmonic triad of faith, love, and hope, and makes accessible to men the fourfold revelation through the written Word, nature, ethical feeling, and devotion, which correspond to the four subordinate powers: memory, sense, conscience, impulse. In the lectures following thereupon the principal forms of scientific error are gone over, among them, and most at length, Spinozism. This is looked upon as the purest type of error, which consists in a one-sided deification of reason. As pantheism is related to reason, so is materialistic atomism to the phantasy, idealistic Ego-theory to the will, and scepticism to the understanding. But to these stands opposed true knowledge, which consists in the living thought of the actual and hence is an experience-knowledge, the true nature of which can be perceived only by an exact investigation of its elements, perception and understanding, judgment and conception, apprehension and recognition. Just at the beginning of this analysis, in the middle of the paragraph that should have treated of perfect understanding, Schlegel was stricken with apoplexy.

6. Though the performances of FRIEDRICH DANIEL ERNST SCHLEIERMACHER in the philosophical sphere have not been up to the present time of such lasting effect as those in the sphere of theology, he might nevertheless have succeeded more than Schlegel, even more than the altered doctrine of Fichte, in fusing the two elements whose interpenetration is here in question, since the subjectivism emanating from Fichte requires to be supplemented by the principle opposed to it. With this is connected his leaning towards the System of Identity, a leaning greater in him than in any other of those treated of in this section. Born on the 21st of November, 1768, in Breslau, educated first in the schools of the Moravian Communion, then at the University of Halle, after 1796 Charity-Preacher in Berlin, he published while in this position the *Discourses on Religion* (1799); *Monologues* (1800); *Confidential Letters on Lucinde* (1800), in which he gives dignity to the subjectivism of the ironical standpoint by a religious and ethical spirit, delineates virtuosos in religion, morals, and love; and, by way of supplementing and toning down "Fichte's completed, rounded idealism," would oppose to it "the highest expression of the speculation of our day," "another realism" than that which Fichte's doctrine had refuted. If, on this occasion, Schleiermacher, in inspired discourse, recalls Spinoza, whom (as it appears to us, in spite of Dilthey's denial) he then knew only from Jacobi's representation of him, it cannot be overlooked that he, like Novalis, whom he also expressly compares with Spinoza, though having an enthusiasm for the whole, expresses like enthusiasm for every peculiarity, of which Spinoza has no presentiment. That self-resignation which is at the same time self-affirmation, and which is equally widely removed from the individualising tendency of sensible natures and the universalizing deification of conceptions, is, according to him, the essence of religion or piety, in which he who resigns himself to the All has at the same the enjoyment of this resignation. Hence religion is neither knowledge nor action, but feeling, a feeling of the common life, of the All and the Ego. By reflection upon the pious feelings are produced descriptions of these, which constitute religious first-principles and dogmas. If a mistake is made here, if it be supposed that in dogmas we have an extension of knowledge, mythology results, in which God is rendered finite, a personal nature, and the enjoyment of infinity is stunted into a hoped-for im-

mortality. The like obtains if religion be thought of as giving prescripts. Every religious action is, as such, superstitious; everything should be done with religion as an accompaniment not as a cause. He in whom pious tendencies of a new order have first arisen is the religious hero; by the communication of the same he becomes a founder of a religion; hence there are no other religions than historical, positive religions. Among these, the Christian religion has the peculiarity that in it there is reconciliation with the Infinite, hence the essence of religion itself, matter and content; it is, therefore, religion in a higher potency. The changing of pious emotions into dogmas, of these into symbols and compulsory statutes, which they have become particularly through the State, through the deplorable fact that the "purple has kissed the steps of the altar," gives rise to the Church, an institution of force, against which the truly educated, *i.e.*, the free, man fights, in order to further religion. He sees a future in which religious communities will be represented in pious domestic life. As the *Discourses* delineate the religion of the educated and free man, so the *Monologues* picture the man who, really free, opposes custom, steps in advance of the age in which there is for him a law that requires uniformity of action among all and a restless striving and working, and now revels in the proving of his own peculiarity and the recognition of that of others. The truly free man sees in all limits only his own deed, hence can anticipate by means of the phantasy even relations into which he has not yet entered, for they can bring to light nothing but new sides of his own nature. Also in the *Letters*, finally, is it particularly the thought of the justification of one's peculiarity which runs as a guiding thread through this glorification of true love, which, a love out of one mould, does not forbid the sensuous side. All that is peculiar demands reverence, hence there is really only one rule for what is proper: Let no one interfere with any emotional state. The relationship of these thoughts to those expressed by Fr. Schlegel is, notwithstanding all diversity, not to be mistaken. It explains also the many points of contact with Jacobi, in whom also, in fact, appeared that superior subjectivity, which the subject, feeling himself free in every relation, exhibits in Schleiermacher's delineation. The separation from this near friend was followed by Schleiermacher's change of residence to Stolpe, where by the *Outlines of a Critique of Previous Ethics*,

(Berlin, 1803), as also by beginning a translation of Plato (first volume, 1804), he showed to the world that he had trodden a new way. In the year 1804 he came to Halle as extraordinary Professor of Theology, and University Preacher, but at the same time lectured on the History of Greek Philosophy, Ethics, and the Theory of Fundamentals. His intercourse with Steffens resulted in mutual influence. In Halle the *Celebration of Christmas* and the dissertation on the *First Epistle to Timothy* were written. Preacher in the Church of Trinity in Berlin after 1809, professor in Berlin University after 1810, and Secretary of the Academy after 1814, he developed an activity without parallel in all his offices and also as an author, until his death (12th of Feb., 1834). As the most important writings in the province of philosophy, are to be mentioned his dissertations: *On Universities*, *On Heraclitus*, his academical dissertations, his epoch-making works for theology, *Theological Encyclopædia* (1811), and the *Christian Faith* (1822); to which may be added the Lectures on the History of Philosophy, Dialectic, Psychology, Ethics, Politics, Pedagogics, which appeared after his death. The complete edition of his works (Berlin, 1835 ff.), is, unfortunately, because of the division into three series of works, and of the twofold title resulting, very inconveniently arranged for making citations, and does not even contain everything that had already been printed.

Cf. *Aus Schleiermacher's Leben. In Briefen.* Berlin, 1858 ff. 4 vols. W. Dilthey: *Leben Schleiermacher's.* 1st vol. Berlin, 1870.

7. According to the views of Schleiermacher which, as it appears, had already been completely fixed in Halle, and in which it is not difficult to make perceptible points of agreement with the previously developed theories of Kant and Fichte as also with the System of Identity soon to be considered, science is organized as follows: In order that they have not merely the value of views and opinions, the special sciences must depend upon the highest or absolute science, which, if it were complete, would be a central science, transcendental philosophy, theory of science as science, and would have to treat of, and present, that which is exalted above all opposition, particularly that of the real and the ideal, viz., the absolute. But since such an absolute knowledge as an acknowledged system does not yet exist, there must appear, in place of the exposi-

tion of the absolute, the search for it, in place of the (transcendental) philosophy, philosophizing, in place of the fundamental science, the art of foundation. It is most fittingly termed *Dialectic*, and develops as mere *theory* of science (not science) the principles of philosophizing, which, because knowledge is a thought that is common to all, are at the same time the principles of dialogical speech. (Schlegel's "symphilosophizing.") The chief sources for an account of this are the *Dialectic*, edited by Jonas (1839), and the Introduction to the *System of the Theory of Morals*, which is to be had in the two editions of Schweizer (1835) and Twesten (1841). Since the dialectician does not set forth the absolute as object but is led by the idea of it, is it itself in a certain measure, it furnishes the criteria not so much of truth as of being scientific, that by which knowledge is distinguished from opinion. The previous separation of logic and metaphysics, the untenability of which from the side of metaphysics Kant has shown, but which is just as demonstrable for logic, is in dialectic done away with, but dialectic in the form of logic, because it must be a theory of an art, not (as with Hegel) in the form of metaphysics, for then it would have to be a science. Knowledge, the possibility of which self-consciousness, as the unity of the thinker and that which is thought, proves, is the agreement of thought and being. Their relation, which, if thought as well as being were undivided, would present no difficulty, is now less clear, since an individual consciousness proves the possibility of the correspondence of a divided thought with a divided being, though, on the other hand, every error shows that to no thought can there correspond a being. The annulling of the division of thought, agreement in understanding with other thinking beings, gives us the assurance that our knowledge is not merely opinion (even though a correct one) as the agreement with being gives us the assurance that it is not an (even though universal) error. Dialectic will therefore lay down the principles, by following which thought ceases to be merely individual and merely subjective. Considering thought more closely, we find in it the organic function through which we have sensations as necessarily as the activity of reason, which gives them unity. Chaos (of sensations), or matter, is therefore just as little a really realizable thought as a highest reason without organic activity. If we call that which corresponds to the organic function the real, that which corresponds to the activity of reason the ideal,

there is given in the thinking self-consciousness the identity of both. The preponderance of one or the other element in thought makes it either thought proper or sense-perception, between which stands as the higher mean pure perception, in which real knowledge is first given. Whereas absolute being, which stands above the opposition of the real and ideal, lies outside of pure perception and hence of knowledge, knowledge ever approaches the goal where it embraces all being, and is, therefore, philosophy. At the goal (which is never attained) there is no longer anything chaotic. The approach towards this goal may be made either in such a manner that in knowledge thought preponderates, hence also the form of conception and predilection for Being, which the subject constructs in the cognitive propositions by which it becomes speculative; or, on the other hand, in such a manner that perception, the form of judgment, the activities which are predicates of being, are made prominent, whereby knowledge, to which as speculative the exertions of substantial force in being correspond, becomes the copy of the causal-nexus and so, empirical, or historical. As this does not extend down to chaos, so that does not extend up to the identity of being and thought, which is the tacit presupposition of all knowledge as the unity of *a* being and *a* thought, and hence of that ground of all certainty which dwells in us. (Hence oath-taking.) Of all certainty; hence not so much the certainty that our thought is correct as of the certainty that our will has a validity by virtue of which we have in us that transcendental ground of all certainty in the relative identity of thought and will, *i.e.*, in feeling, the ground being neither object of knowledge nor of volition, as Kant has made it. If the idea of God as the impulse of all knowing is the *terminus a quo* equally near which we ever remain, although the nearness can be more intensively felt, so, on the other hand, the idea of the world is the *terminus ad quem* to which we ever come nearer. In opposition to pantheism and dualism it must be asserted that those two ideas belong together; by means of which we have power to know of the being of God only in ourselves and in things, never as separated from the world, or in themselves. Of the methodological rules treated by Schleiermacher in the Technical part of the *Dialectic*, which forms the Second Part, the Transcendental being the first, the most important is that there is opposition only between such things as contain like elements but with a

different preponderance of one or the other of these; so that every opposition is (quantitatively considered) fluctuating. From that is then concluded that the sphere of knowledge subdivides into the two spheres of the unity of the real and ideal, with an ever preponderating reality and ideality. The former is nature, the latter reason. The meeting-point of these two is man, whether he be considered as the flowering-point of the earthly, or as the conversion of reason into nature. If now, we reflect that knowledge may be either speculative or historical, science, like everything systematically ordered, presents a fourfold nature: natural science, ethics, theory of nature, and history. All four belong together and are always involved in like progress. As dialectic is to the speculative sciences, so is mathematics to the empirical; so that there is in the empirical sciences only so much of science,—science is only in so far complete in them,—as they contain mathematics.

8. Of these four sciences into which philosophy is said to be divided, Schleiermacher has treated only *Ethics*, which is contained in the Schweizer edition of the transcribed parts in the Complete Works. (The Twesten edition makes many deviations, and has an admirable Introduction by the editor.) Ethics, as a speculative science, agrees with natural science as regards form in the circumstance that both treat of the laws which, on the one hand human conduct, on the other nature, observe. Actually observe; hence it is false to oppose to one another the laws of nature and of morals, as if the former had to do with mere being, the latter with the mere ideal. (An academical dissertation of 1825 treats of this opposition.) From this agreement, the fact that Schleiermacher institutes a parallel between the mechanical, dynamical and organic views of nature and his treatment of ethics as the theory of duties, virtues, and goods, are explicable. By its content, again, ethics corresponds with history, inasmuch as it lays down as fixed norms what the latter exhibits in action, so that ethics is never better than history. But this does not justify mixtures of the two, like the so-called philosophies of history and applied theories of morals. At most history can be critically considered from the standpoint of ethics, and experience give to the ethical philosopher technical hints. But criticism and technism are not science, but art; hence politics and pedagogics are arts. Ethics, since it considers the action of reason upon nature, presupposes and hence treats as falling without

nature, that potential being of reason in nature which is given before all action of reason, *i.e.*, its being in the human organism, which natural science, or perhaps even a discipline (Anthropology) lying between it and ethics has to deduce. Likewise, the last goal of all action, the blessed life, lies outside of ethics, which has to do only with what lies between those two points, with the earthly (resistant) life. Although the thought carried out in the Critique of the Theory of Morals is strictly adhered to by Schleiermacher, viz., that ethics may, indeed if it would be complete, must, be treated as a theory of duties as well as in the form of a theory of virtue, and as a theory of the highest good (theory of goods), and that to none of these modes of treatment is due preference over the others, inasmuch as the advantages of one are counterbalanced by other advantages of others—(as the theory of duties, ethics has the greatest technical usefulness on account of its dependence on history; as the theory of virtue it depends in the highest degree on speculative natural science; as the theory of goods it connects itself in the closest manner with the highest knowledge, the speculative theory of reason, and hence has in the highest degree a philosophical character). A predilection for the conception of goods is not to be mistaken, and the *Theory of the Highest Good* finds in Schleiermacher's *Ethics* a larger place than the other two parts taken together. This is divided into three parts. In the first (§§ 145–197) the *Outlines* are developed, an inquiry being made (according to the rule given in the *Dialectic*) after a double opposition in the conception of the good, which is in every union of nature and reason. Here it is shown that the action that produces this union does so in such a way that either the action accustoms itself to nature or makes and uses it as an instrument, since it may be called an organizing action; it embraces all forms of form-imparting, from the (formative) impulse that organizes the body, up to every kind of will that produces and transforms any instrument. Opposed to it is the action that results in changing everything into a symbol of the reason, which may therefore be called symbolizing or significative, and the first traces of which appear in the making of things perceptible, and the highest step in making things intelligible; so that sense and understanding, on the one hand, correspond to impulse and will on the other. This distinction which, like every distinction, is a fluctuating one, since every organ of

reason is also a symbol, every act of symbolizing is also the employment of something as a symbol, is joined with a second, so that by a crossing of the two arises the fourfold division required in the technical part of the *Dialectic*. The activity of reason is, that is to say, one that is identical, common to all, or it is peculiar; of course, again, in such a manner that in the former, identity, in the latter, peculiarity (only), prevails. If, now, one combines these two distinctions, the organizing activity gives, under the head of community, a sphere of common usage, or *Intercourse*. Under the head of peculiarity, the organizing activity gives *Property*. Between the extreme of community, the earth as the dwelling-place of all, and the maximum of untransferableness, one's life as the exclusive possession of one's own body, there present themselves the two relations of *Right* and *Free Sociability*. The former conditions acquisition by community and *vice versa*, while wrong seeks gain without community; the latter recognises the peculiarity of others in order to disclose it, and discloses its own in order to become recognised. In the third place, the symbolizing activity yields, under the head of community, the sphere of *Knowledge*, the communication of which has for its condition *Faith*, confidence in the teacher. In the fourth place, the same activity, under the head of peculiarity, presents the proper and independent symbol-sphere of excitation and *Feeling*, in which communication is effected not by teaching but by *revelation* of what is felt. The Second Part of the *Theory of the Highest Good*, which Schleiermacher calls the *Elementary Part* (§§ 198–256), treats of ethical culture. First the formative (organizing) activity, then significative (symbolizing) activity, is treated; each, universally, first, and then under its opposed characteristics (of identity and individuality). In mutually-corresponding formulas that often suggest the trigonometrical formulas for sine and cosine it is shown that the formative activity, according as one's own sense and talent, or inorganic nature, or organic nature, is made the instrument of reason, we have Gymnastics, Mechanics or Agriculture, with which there is connected a fourth science, the Collection of Apparatus as instruments of knowledge, the formative activity here bordering upon the significative. As regards, now, this latter, there falls within the circle of moralized significative action the correctness of knowledge, both the transcendental and mathematical, which accompany all other

kinds, and the speculative and empirical, which are accompanied by the former. The avoidance of all one-sidedness, by combining certainty with the accompanying doubt, by turning away from what is one-sidedly *a priori* and *a posteriori*, prevents error, which has meaning only in relation to truth and consists only in precipitation. Moral culture embraces all this and avoids the one-sidednesses that arise from the fact that the formative and significative activities come into opposition, and the former is (economically) promoted without the latter, or the latter (cynically) without the former; knowledge is assumed to be only for culture's sake, as the one kind of one-sidedness assumes; or men content themselves with a minimum of instrumentalities in order to remain in contemplation, as the second kind of one-sidedness assumes. Likewise are thereby overcome those kinds of one-sidedness which arise when (athletically) development [*Ausbildung*] is sought at the expense of information [*Anbilding*], or the latter in opposition to the former (as in the seeking of unbounded wealth of knowledge). Neither productivity without possession, nor pleasure without activity, is right. What has so far been developed relates to the two activities wholly in their universal character. If, now, these activities be considered with reference to the common and the individual, intercourse develops into *Division of Labour* and *Exchange of Products* effected through money; and by means of these there is brought about a common usage, which does not endanger morality. Both are, as regards gymnastics, at the weakest; as regards production, at the strongest. Only the transcending of possession by means of exchange is moral; hence common charity is at most to be excused. If we call the complex of the most peculiar instrumentalities a House, ethical culture presents itself in this sphere as *Domestic Authority* and *Hospitality*, which will always differ in the different spheres, inasmuch as, in the gymnastic sphere, exclusiveness must be at the greatest, in that of apparatus, hospitality. The one-sided existence of the one without the other, as, for example, in slavery, is immoral, at most to be excused as a transition stage. Just so, as regards community of goods, knowledge is moral by virtue of the identity of *Discovery* and *Communication*, a distinction with which is joined that of Virtuosity and Common Property, the former corresponding to division of labour, the latter to exchange.

The culminating point of discovery is the ripeness of youth, that of communication the youth of age. The means of transfer is, in case of spatial separation, language; in case of temporal separation, tradition; confidence is related to these as credit is to money. As regards, finally, feeling, or immediate self-consciousness, since it contains, besides the knowledge of self as distinct, also the knowledge of self as bound to others, it is the feeling of dependence, or religion. A moral condition exists only when there is feeling not without representation, representation not without feeling. The means of representation is expression, which is a sign for the perceiving subject. Since this expression contains at the same time relation to the universe and is synthetic, phantasy co-operates, and *Art* is the language of religion, and the peculiar means of revelation in which enthusiasm has to unite itself with discretion, the spontaneity of genius with correctness. The fundamental inquiries of the First and Second Parts place us in a position to lay down in the Third, the *Constructive Part*, of the Theory of the Highest Good (§§ 247–251), the *System of Goods*. Since the positing of reason in a natural whole having the power to impart form and to use symbols, and not only constituting the middle point of its own sphere but also bound up with the community, gives the conception of a person, all goods are moral persons, *i.e.*, moral communities, and only the totality of those organic masses, *i.e.*, the person of humanity, the earth-spirit, of which every individual good is an image, is the highest good. The family, the original image of the highest good, which, since the thought of a first man is not tenable, constitutes the presupposition of the individual man, contains as germ the four kinds of moral communities in which the modes of action above considered are by nationality, which depends upon the family, formed into natural wholes. These are, first, the *State*, in which right in a plurality of connections that are limited by nationality becomes a good, and which has its subsistence in the distinction of ruler and subjects, which through the conception of civil freedom becomes relative, and in the constitution has its kind and manner. (Schleiermacher's views on this subject are given *in extenso* in his *Theory of the State*, which was printed in the year 1845, from an outline prepared, probably, in 1829, and from copied notes of lectures of the years 1817 and 1829, besides aphorisms of the years

1807 and 1808. Wks., Third Division, eighth volume.) The second form of moral community is the *School* as national community of knowledge, in which, corresponding to the opposition of ruler and subject, there is that of the learned and the public, which receives different forms in the School, the University, and the Academy (earlier conceived as a republic of the learned); which is treated at length in the brilliant work, *On Universities*. The third form of community, that of *Free Sociability*, is conditioned by the various ranks in society or grades of culture, is dependent upon the family, in which the opposition of host and guests is constitutive, and is conditioned by, and conditions, friendship, which must be contemned by all schools that exclude the element of peculiarity. (This appears to be aimed at Hegel.) The last community, the *Church*, rests upon the various schematisms of feeling given by nature, consists in the organic combination of the (relatively) opposed clergy and laity, and realizes itself in art, in which the religious style is the highest. With these positions regarding the Church are connected Schleiermacher's extended expositions of the *Christian Faith* and *Christian Ethics*, *i.e.*, his Dogmatics and Morals, both of which he assigns to historical theology, because the one has to present the theory that obtained in an ecclesiastical community at a definite time, the other the prevailing morals corresponding to that. The first, Schleiermacher himself has developed in his book of world-wide fame, the second was edited by Jonas in 1843 according to the lecture-notes above referred to. (Wks., First Division, twelfth volume.) For the rest, the moral communities stand related to one another in the following way: the State transcends the ecclesiastical, social, and school communities; the Church the social, political, and school communities, etc.

9. The two other parts of the *Ethics*, *i.e.*, the *Theory of Virtue* (§§ 292–317) and the *Theory of Duty* (§§ 318–346), have neither the completeness nor the nice elaboration of the Theory of the Highest Good. If the Theory of Goods had considered the totality of reason as opposed to that of nature, the Theory of Virtue considers reason in the individual man, hence the wise man as the personification of virtue. The relation of the latter to the highest good may be so formulated that every sphere of the highest good requires all virtues, and every virtue runs through all spheres of the highest good. If

we designate the individual's sharing in the highest good as happiness, virtue would have to be called worthiness to be happy. According as, in considering the personal unification of reason and nature (sense), regard is had more to what is contained in the former or the latter, the ideal content or the time-form, virtue is *Disposition* or *Skill*, which are, of course, never separated from one another but are distinguished by the fact that disposition awakes (*erwacht*) and skill grows (*wächst*). If this distinction be crossed with that of *Knowledge* and *Representation*, there result four virtues: disposition in knowledge and representation, *i.e.*, *Wisdom and Love*, skill in both, *Discretion* and *Perseverance*. Every individual virtue is again viewed with reference to the crossing distinctions, and accordingly in wisdom there occur as dividing distinctions Contemplation and Intuition, Imagination and Speculation; in love, Likeness and Unlikeness, Freedom and Constraint; in discretion and perseverance, the Combinatory and the Disjunctive, the Universal and the Individual. Hereby result in all sixteen modifications, the names of which are in part arbitrarily chosen. As regards the Theory of Duties, the *Critique of Previous Ethics*, but particularly the academical dissertation on the conception of duty, contain much that supplements and rectifies the account in the lectures. Since duty was defined as the moral in reference to the law, it is concluded that in every act conformable with duty all virtues must be united, and hence the conception of duty is exactly as justifiable as the two other formal conceptions. The formula, "Act in every moment with thy whole moral power (with all virtues), and having in view the entire moral problem (all goods)," makes apparent the connection of this Part with the other two. The two following: "Act always for that end towards which thou feelest thyself vitally moved," and "Act for that end towards which thou art required from without," become, since they form an opposition, although a collision of rules of duty cannot be assumed, united in a third, "Do always that which can be most furthered by you"; according to which conformity to duty rests upon the subjective connection of the greatest advantage for the whole moral sphere. But since in this is contained, at the same time, that the moral problem can be perfectly solved only in society, there results from the twofold opposition of relation to society and to self, and to the universal and individual, a fourfold sphere of duty:

the universal relation to society gives the duty of *right*, the individual the duty of *love*; universal relation to self the duty of *vocation*, the individual, the duty of *conscience*. Each of these duties is developed in four formulas; the duty of right in the formula, Enter into association, but in such a manner that thy acquisition shall be conditioned by a reservation of thy individuality, that thy participation in social life and realization of self, that inner prompting and outer demand, shall coincide. Quite analogous are the three other duties. The presentation in the *Ethics* furnishes the practical proof for the opinion expressed in the *Critique* that ethics must be treated with regard to all three formal conceptions, and shows at the same time that, since all three observe entirely different grounds of division, the individual duties can correspond to the individual virtues and goods just as little as segments to the zones of a circle. Schleiermacher places the three modes of treatment in such relation to each other that they may be compared with the formula of a curve, the curve itself, and the instrument that describes it.

10. In the face of Schleiermacher's often-expressed assertion, that there is no knowledge of the Divine nature, there can be no talk of a *Theology* in the proper sense of the word. What he calls such should, properly, be called Pisteology; it consists, that is to say, in scientific reflections on pious emotions,—is the theory of piety, or has religion as its object. The best name would, therefore, be Philosophy of Religion, if Schleiermacher did not employ this term for a single portion of the problem of the theologian, *i.e.*, for the critical comparison of the various religions. If with this knowledge on the subject of religion is combined the practical work of leading the Church, the theologian becomes a clergyman. Whoever were both in the highest degree might be termed an ecclesiastical Leader. What Schleiermacher says on religion in general in the Introduction to his *Theory of Faith*, which is here to be regarded as the chief source of information, is in entire agreement with what he has in part said, in part suggested, on that subject in the *Dialectic* and the *Ethics*. It is not nearly so much in conflict with what his early *Discourses on Religion* had developed, as some suppose. And yet his arguments have not quite reached complete agreement. As already in the *Discourses*, so throughout his whole life, Schleiermacher held that religion was neither knowledge nor action, but

feeling, *i.e.*, not an objective, but an immediate consciousness, or state of the same. In the *Ethics* the further qualification is added that it is the feeling of dependence; finally, in the *Theory of Faith*, that this feeling of dependence is absolute, *i.e.*, that it excludes all feeling of freedom or the feeling of self-determination. That upon which we feel ourselves so absolutely dependent is God, who is exalted above all distinctions, whereas in relation to the world, the totality of all distinctions, we feel ourselves in reciprocity, *i.e.*, free and independent. The consciousness of God is never presented in its purity; it always exists in combination, only, with the consciousness of the world. (Many differences between the *Theory of Faith* and the *Discourses* disappear, or at least diminish, when one reflects that the former speaks merely of pure [ideal] piety, the latter, on the other hand, have in view the piety that is exhibited in reality.) That fusion of the pure feeling of dependence with the sensible consciousness (consciousness of the world), as a result of which the former appears in the form of pleasure and of pain, has as its consequence the fact that in the reflections upon that feeling of dependence the anthropomorphic element is not wanting. To such reflections we are forced because, as the *Ethics* has shown, feeling must lead to society, and this is conditioned by linguistic expression. Many such religious societies have appeared in the course of history; and they stand related to each other, partly as stages (Fetichism, Polytheism, and Monotheism), partly as classes (thus in Monotheism are included Judaism, Christianity, Islam). Since our consciousness of the world is divided into Physics and Ethics, the monotheistic religions standing at any given stage present an opposition, in that Islam has, by reason of the preponderance of the element of nature, an æsthetical character, whereas Christianity (and in a less degree also Judaism) has an ethical character. As regards, now, the latter, Schleiermacher places its essence in the fact that in the Christian religion everything has reference to the redemption brought about by Jesus of Nazareth, a peculiarity, which, at the best, can be construed in so far *a priori* as the philosophy of religion shows the possibility of a mode of belief in which an exculpating fact does away with impiety. According as the consciousness of connection with the Church is conditioned by that of unity with Christ or *vice versa*, the Christian consciousness is Evangelical or Catholic. As in all religions, so in the Christian religion,

all theories and dogmas have their origin in reflections upon pious emotions, are therefore descriptions of the pious state of mind. Hence there can be no question of a conflict, and, as little, of an agreement, between tenets of faith and of knowledge; and the connection between philosophy and dogmatics is limited to the circumstance that the former rules the dialectical use of language and systematic order generally, hence even in dogmatics. Hence the fact of dogmatics variously coloured according to the domination of philosophic systems. Dogmatic tenets are characterized not only by the fact that their primary form lies in their being descriptions of pious conditions of life, but also by the fact that they can be employed as expressions of conceptions of divine attributes, or as statements of the nature of the world, although it must never be forgotten here that the former do not touch metaphysics nor the latter natural science, nor at all put a higher objective theory in the place of speculative or empirical science. To give the further content of the *Theory of Faith*, the First Part of which treats of the pious self-consciousness as it takes form in every excitation of the mind, the Second Part, as it takes form in that excitation which is characterized by the opposition of sin and grace, is a matter for the history of dogmatics, which will have to recognise the epoch-making importance of Schleiermacher as a theologian. His philosophical importance is not so far-reaching, although even it must not be underestimated.

Cf. Braniss: *Ueber Schleiermacher's Glaubenslehre.* Berlin, 1824. J. Schaller: *Vorlesungen über Schleiermacher*, Halle. 1844. G. Weissenborn: *Vorlesungen über Schleiermacher's Dialektik und Dogmatik.* 2 vols., Leipzig, 1847–49. P. Schmidt: *Spinoza und Schleiermacher.* Berlin, 1808.

§ 316.

Transition to the System of Identity.

1. The necessity of the advance to a higher step must be exhibited in the original Science of Knowledge and not in its off-shoots, all the more because the system that forms this higher step precedes those off-shoots in time, and has had a demonstrable influence upon them. But they must nevertheless be treated first, since this influence does not extend so

far as to draw them entirely over to itself. If, for example, Schleiermacher who borrows so much (not merely in terminology) from Schelling, charges against him his pantheism, he does so not as one who has put pantheism behind him, but the unattainability of the absolute, to which he holds, causes him to appear as one who has not yet arrived at pantheism (exactly the same holds true of Fichte's altered, and of Schlegel's later, doctrine). The same point in which the Science of Knowledge transcends Kant's Criticism is also that in which it places itself in contradiction with what it would be and accomplish. The advance as regards Kant has been often formulated thus: Fichte put self-consciousness in the place of the Kantian consciousness; a form of statement that one may adopt if one understand by the latter the Ego (so-called in Fichte's terminology; in Kant's, reason) as passive with reference to the non-Ego, and by the former the Ego as entirely determining the non-Ego. Precisely on account of this conception does it become impossible to Fichte to fulfil the requirements which he himself lays down in the *Science of Knowledge*. One of these is that which was cited above (§ 315, 1). Where the real standing over against the Ego has the meaning of a limit to be broken through, there the ideal (Ego), only, can be the starting-point, and in any sort of union the starting-point must have a decided preponderance; hence ideal-realism at most, but not real-idealism, is here possible; and yet, according to Fichte, true philosophy should be both. But Fichte has laid down still another requirement in the *Science of Knowledge* which, if the former relates to its content, is of a more formal kind. Since the beginning and the end coincided, the Science of Knowledge was to have been a closed circle. The beginning was with Ego=Ego as principle, the end is at Ego=Ego as Idea. But since this latter is never reached, Fichte confesses that a difference must be made between the two, hence that it has happened with him, as with many a boy who, while attempting to draw a circle, has moved the points of the compasses nearer to one another and so, instead of a circle, has described a spiral. This defect also is a necessary consequence of the way in which Fichte has conceived his principle. Since there is placed over against the Ego its contradictory opposite, a real union is out of the question. Since, again, this opposite of the Ego is necessary that the Ego may be practical, it can never be annihilated, since otherwise tedium would result,

the goal having been attained. There remains, therefore, only the infinite approximation, *i.e.*, the spiral instead of a circle. Besides these two requirements which relate to the content and the form of the Science of Knowledge, Fichte had promised the fulfilment of a third, which may be called the historical problem of the Science of Knowledge. A deeper basis was to have been provided not merely for one part, as the Elementary Philosophy did, of what Kant had taught, but for Criticism as a whole. Now Fichte himself had repeatedly called attention to the fact that there are in Kant really three different beginnings, as also three different absolutes, and had always said with reference to this, that the conception of the absolute as given in the *Critique of Judgment* was the most perfect and the highest to which Kant had risen. Nevertheless Fichte ignores this work almost wholly, declares the Introduction to be the best part of the work, and really assents to the doctrines of this work only as regards the ethico-theological conclusion. And yet the incorporation of what was there taught would have obviated the material as well as the formal defect of the *Science of Knowledge*. For where not only the question, How does freedom become nature? but also the question, Where is the transition from nature to freedom to be found? is answered, there is given, along with ideal-realism, a complementary real-idealism. And again, where there is given to the real the preference of beginning with it in that deduction, there the investigation reaches a real conclusion, instead of striving ceaselessly towards such a conclusion. Obviously, in order to be able to do this, Fichte ought, as did Kant, to have seized two conceptions which remain foreign to him,—that of organism and that of a work of art. In the former (*vid.* above § 313, 2), he had seen only reciprocity, not immanent end; while the latter is to him scarcely anything more than an accessory, serving to the decoration of the house. And again, in order rightly to estimate the organism and fine art, the sensible, as well as being in general, would have to be thought not merely as in opposition to the Ego, not merely as object devoid of all force, the meaning of which lies in its being a mere limit,—merely a thing posited.

2. All the three requirements for the fulfilling of which the Science of Knowledge stood responsible, point to the fact that another meaning is assigned to the real than that of being

merely a thing posited, a mere object, or thing offering resistance. Then, too, since correlates cannot be changed one without the other, the ideal also cannot retain the meaning of being exclusively that which posits. However justifiable Fichte may be in protesting against the charge that his Ego is only subject, he can make no objection to the charge that, according to him, only it is subject, that to the non-Ego all subjectivity (capacity as originator) is lacking. But the non-Ego ceases to be, of course, if what was hitherto mere object is conceived as a thing to which the capacity for positing (subjectivity) belongs. Only for what is exclusively a subject is the name Ego suitable; only for that which excludes all subjectivity is that of non-Ego suitable. Instead of the latter term, since by it is suggested generative (originative, *i.e.* subjective) activity, may properly be employed the name *nature;* and again, where the negative relation towards objectivity ceases, scarcely any other name is eligible for that which has hitherto been called Ego than that of *reason* or *intelligence*, since by both, when, for example, one speaks of reason or intelligence in all tendencies of nature, also what is objective is designated. Whatever names may be chosen for the two sides, the essential thing will be this, that upon both sides, what is subjective as well as what is objective, hence what was above called subject-object, must be found. On account of this relation, viz., that the same moments are to be found on both sides, the most suitable name is that of the *System of Identity.* This is so plainly suggested by the *Science of Knowledge* that, when it was stated, a reactionary effect upon those who held to that could not fail to take place. It is possible that Schelling has overrated the effect it had upon the originator of the former, and that some of what he and others after him called the influence of the System of Identity is to be explained by Fichte's earlier relation to Spinoza. But whoever supposes that it does honour to Fichte to have learned nothing from Schelling forgets that to learn nothing is never honourable, and that here a borrowing is all the more readily to be acknowledged since not only does Schelling confess having been in the beginning of his career merely a co-worker with Fichte, but it may be shown that his contests with the Science of Knowledge have contributed essentially to his later progress beyond the System of Identity. These two

men, therefore, who paid dearly for their attempt to be friends, exactly in the same manner and for the same reason that Hume and Rousseau earlier paid dearly for a similar attempt, stand thus related one to the other: Schelling gave the impulse to Fichte to give up his original stand-point, and Fichte to Schelling to give up his. Schelling, the old man, more correctly estimated the importance of Fichte's "Promethean deed" than Schelling, the young man, who saw in it only a "fall of man."

FOURTH DIVISION.

The System of Identity.

A.—SCHELLING AND THE SYSTEM OF IDENTITY.

§ 317.

SCHELLING'S LIFE AND WRITINGS.

1. FRIEDRICH WILHELM JOSEPH SCHELLING (later raised to the nobility) was born on the 27th of January, 1775, at Leonberg in Würtemberg, became, as early as his seventeenth year, *magister* in Tübingen and showed in his Thesis as well as in a dissertation on Myths, that he had industriously studied Herder. The study of the *Critique of Pure Reason*, with which was immediately joined that of Reinhold, Schulze's *Æ nesidemus* and Maimon, but particularly Fichte's earliest writings, so strongly impressed him that because of the above-mentioned writings (§ 314, 2) he could be counted as the truest adherent of the Science of Knowledge. In the year 1796, Schelling left Tübingen to study in Leipsic, besides philosophy, physics and mathematics particularly, but also philology. Here he put forth the work in which, without either of them having suspected it, he separates from Fichte: the *Ideas for a Philosophy of Nature* (First [only] Part, Leipsic, 1797), with which is connected as a supplèment, *The World-Soul* (Hamburg, 1798). In these two works Schelling supposes himself, and Fichte confirms him in this view, to be entirely in agreement with the latter in holding that the Science of Knowledge is the fundamental philosophy, upon which all other disciplines are based. But when Fichte had linked

with this fundamental science his Theory of Right and of Morals, in which, more completely and deeply established, that was to be given which Kant had attempted in his *Metaphysics of Morals*, Schelling decides to issue as a counterpart to that a Philosophy of Nature which, providing a deeper basis for Kant's Metaphysics of Nature, given partly in his *Metaphysical Foundations* and partly in his *Critique of* (*Teleological*) *Judgment*, should supplant it; hence a Physics based on the principles of the *Science of Knowledge* corresponding to the Ethics issued by Fichte. Obviously neither of the two men reflected that this was a self-contradiction, since as was shown above (§ 313, 2), the *Science of Knowledge* denied nature, and obliged natural science to go begging. Hence also is it Kant more than Fichte that Schelling allies himself with in the *Ideas* as well as in the *World-Soul*. In the former, it is particularly the thought maintained by Kant in his Dynamic (§ 299, 5), that the quantitative distinctions of matter are not to be deduced from the difference in the number of parts but from the different relation of the forces of repulsion and attraction, which Schelling greets as the dawn of the true natural science. What he finds fault with here is that in Kant there is the appearance of putting one hypothesis in the place of another, whereas a transcendental investigation of perception, as instituted by the *Science of Knowledge*, shows that perception *must* conceive all its objects as the unity of two opposing forces, as well as spatial and temporal, so that matter, therefore, has not those two forces for its properties, but is nothing else than these forces, the exact relation of which to space and time is especially emphasized. In addition to the task of establishing Kant's dynamical view of matter, Schelling placed before himself in his *Ideas* still another: to show regarding the opposed theories which at that time confronted one another in almost every chapter of physics, that his frequently enunciated principle that opposites are everywhere united to form a third somewhat, which is the truth, was correct. Upon this principle all those phenomena must, naturally, have been welcome to him which, particularly since his time, are designated polaric, because they are, properly speaking, merely the embodiment of that very principle. Hence Schelling's inclination to maintain that the law of polarity is the highest, and everywhere to recognise opposition in unity, and in turn unity in opposition, an inclination

which, it is very easy to understand, leads to triple articulation in every investigation. By the aid of this law he seeks to show that with Lavoisier's theory of combustion a modification of the phlogistic theory may be united, and thus he approximates to the attempts of Cavendish and Kirwan to set free phlogiston in hydrogen. In the theory of light, he seeks to establish, besides the theory of emanation, then almost the only prevailing theory, the undulatory theory likewise, represented almost solely by Euler. In the theory of electricity, he attempts to reconcile Franklin and Symmer by the assumption of only one kind of electricity, which, however, divided by us, seeks itself. Exactly similar is his method as regards Aepinus and Hauy, in the theory of magnetism. What was to have been treated in the Second Part of the *Ideas*, viz. the theory of heat and life, forms the content of the work on the *World-Soul*, a word by which Schelling designates the common medium of the continuity of all natural causes, so that it nearly coincides with the universal reciprocity which Kant had asserted in the Third Analogy of Experience, as well as in the Mechanics connected therewith. In it also, are, of course, two opposed tendencies assumed; properly, it coincides with the law of polarity. As regards the theory of heat, it is to be remarked that Schelling expected that the laws of the capacity for heat, which were then first discovered, would, when united with those of the conduction of heat, some day become the central point of the theory of heat, and that he declares against the heat-stuff, and calls heat a modification of light, but does not go so far as likewise to assert the reverse. In the theory of organism and life, which holds the same position with reference to Kant's *Critique of Judgment* as the investigations thus far considered do to Kant's *Metaphysical Foundations of Natural Science*, Schelling declares with equal decision against the iatrochemists of his time, who saw in life only a chemical process, and (what the empiricists of to-day, when they complain about the mischief which the Schellingian Philosophy of Nature has wrought, not only forget but precisely reverse) against the defenders of a special vital force. Rather does life consist in the fact that the realization of the chemical process is constantly hindered, for which the union of positive and negative conditions of life is required; the permanence of the vital is different from that of the material; it is, namely, that of the self-preserving form, in which the whole

conditions the parts, and everything is as well cause as effect. The process of crystallization is only a suggestion of life, not life itself. The life-process is not an effect, but a cause, of composition and form. Haller's theory of irritability is an anticipation of the fact that a stimulus coming from without (just that arresting stimulus) is required; Blumenbach, in his theory of a formative impulse, rightly perceives that form depends upon function.

2. Immediately after the work on the *World-Soul* had appeared, Schelling came to Jena as an academical instructor, and now allied himself personally with Fichte, particularly, however, with A. W. Schlegel, later also with his brother Friedrich. Fichte and Schelling lectured as colleagues only one semester; Fichte then went to Berlin. If they had remained together longer, the breach between them would have occurred even earlier than it did, for the lectures which Schelling delivered in the winter of the year 1798–99, from which the works, *First Sketch of a System of the Philosophy of Nature* (1799), and *System of Transcendental Idealism* (1800) grew, prove that the Science of Knowledge had already ceased to be for Schelling more than a co-ordinate part of the philosophy of nature, that, therefore, the System of Identity was in its main features complete. The *Zeitschrift für speculativ Physik*, which Schelling had edited since the year 1800, contains in the first volume the *Universal Deduction of the Dynamical Process*, in the second, the *Exposition of the System as a Whole*, which was always designated by him as the only authentic exposition, and which unfortunately remains incomplete. Besides the Essays in the *Neue Zeitschrift für speculativ Physik* (one volume, 1804), and the *Kritische Journal für Philosophie* (six numbers, 1802), edited with Hegel, he published during his stay at Jena the *Bruno, or, On the Natural and Divine Principle of Things* (Berlin, 1802), and the *Lectures on Academical Study* (Stuttg. and Tübingen, 1803). Called in the year 1804 to Würzburg, he published his work—occasioned by one of Eschenmayer's works—*Philosophy and Religion* (Tübingen, 1804), in which the first traces of having outgrown the System of Identity would appear to have shown themselves. The treatise, *On the Relation of the Real and the Ideal in Nature* (Hamburg, 1806), which was written as an appendix to the second edition of the *World-Soul*, as well as the very angry public disavowal of Fichte:

Statement of the True Relation of the Philosophy of Nature to the Altered Doctrine of Fichte (Tübingen, 1806), and finally the dissertations which Schelling furnished to the *Jahrbücher der Medicin als Wissenschaft* (3 vols., 1806–8), which he edited in conjunction with Marcus, are the last writings of Schelling on natural science. With the *Aphorisms by way of Introduction to the Philosophy of Nature*, and the *Aphorisms for the Philosophy of Nature*, he appears to have taken leave of all studies relating to it, and likewise also to have given up his close following of Spinoza.

3. When Schelling published the essay last named he was already in Munich as a Member of the Academy, and soon after publishing the Festival Address, *On the Relation of Plastic Art to Nature* (Munich, 1807), as its General Secretary. While occupying this position he had printed, in the first (only) part of his *Philosophical Works* (Landshut, 1809), the celebrated *Philosophical Investigations on the Nature of Human Freedom*, in which the step indicated in the *Philosophy and Religion* is really taken. Jacobi's not quite unimpeachable expressions concerning the Festival Address included in this collection, in his work on Divine Things, as also Eschenmayer's Reflections upon the Dissertation concerning Freedom, caused Schelling to publish in answer to the first his merciless *Memorial of the Work on Divine Things*, etc. (Tübingen, 1812); in answer to the second, his very measured *Answer to Eschenmayer* in his *Allgemeine Zeitschrift von Deutschen für Deutsche* (First, and only, year, Nürnberg, 1813). When Schelling wrote the latter he had for years been busied with a greater work, which should have appeared under the title, *The Ages of the World*, the printing of which, though begun, was again and again inhibited by him, and, instead of it, an academical lecture, *On the Divinities of Samothrace*, designated as a supplement to the *Ages of the World*, appeared (Tübingen, 1815). The First Book of the *Ages of the World*, in the same form which it received in 1815, appeared after Schelling's death, in the Collected Works. In the year 1820 Schelling, because of long-continued ill-health, obtained the grant of the privilege of residing in Erlangen and giving lectures, and availed himself of this right until the year 1826. When the University of Landshut was transferred to Munich, Schelling received the professorship of philosophy in it, and began his series of lectures with those on the Ages of the

World, which were followed by the *Universal Philosophy*, *Historico-Critical Introduction to Philosophy*, *Philosophy of Mythology*, finally, the *Philosophy of Revelation*. The *Mythological Lectures*, the appearance of which was announced by the list of new publications for 1830, had reached the sixteenth sheet when the printing was inhibited by Schelling. (A copy that has been preserved, I myself possess.) In North Germany attention was first directed to Schelling's activity in Munich after the death of Hegel, after Stahl and Sengler had given an account of his altered teaching, but particularly after Schelling himself had, in his *Critical Preface* to a translation of a work of Cousin, made by Hubert Becker, expressed himself so acrimoniously concerning Hegel (Tübingen, 1834). Having been called to Berlin in 1841, he availed himself of the right of Members of the Academy to give lectures in the University and began, on the 15th of November, the lectures on the Philosophy of Revelation before a very large audience, composed in part of students. The inaugural lecture he himself published. It is the last that he had printed. His vexation at the fact that when his old enemy Dr. Paulus caused to be struck off (Darmstadt, 1843) notes of his own of the *Philosophy of Revelation* which had been copied for this purpose, his (Schelling's) complaint regarding the impression was disregarded, disgusted him with the lectures. On the other hand, he read many dissertations in the Academy, which, as it has transpired, are all fragments of his *Introduction to the Philosophy of Mythology*.

4. While occupied in arranging his earlier works and elaborating those parts of his system to which the lectures of his last years had been devoted, Schelling, almost an octogenarian and yet wonderfully vigorous, was suddenly overtaken by death, on the 20th of August, 1854, at the baths of Ragatz. Never perhaps has any philosopher been so variously judged in his life as Schelling. By one, almost deified, by others (Paulus, Kopp, Salat and others) regarded almost as an incarnation of evil, he suggests in this regard the man who appeared to him, while he was working out his System of Identity, to be the world-hero of more than human dignity, viz., Bonaparte. This sympathy is just as little an accident as that Fichte sided with the Jacobins. The account of the System of Identity will show how this Spinozism of the nineteenth century entered into conflict with the subjec-

tivism that sprang from its mother, the Science of Knowledge, as he whom the Revolution had raised to such a height, did with the anarchy that sprang from it. This analogy proves the world-historic necessity of this system, as the defects of the *Science of Knowledge*, commented upon in § 316, had shown the necessity of the same in the history of philosophy. After Schelling's death two of his sons united in editing his Complete Works. These appeared in the years 1856–1861, in fourteen volumes, from the house of Cotta, in such a form that in the first division (vols. 1–10) occurs, chronologically arranged, everything that had been printed before, what had remained unprinted being inserted in the proper place; and in the second division (vols. 11–14) are placed, in accordance with Schelling's own wish, the *Introduction to Mythology*, the *Philosophy of Mythology*, the *Philosophy of Revelation*. Unfortunately, death has prevented one of the editors from completing the biography of his father that had been begun by him. So far as carried out, this has been printed, supplemented by a selection of letters written to and by Schelling.

Cf.: *Aus Schelling's Leben. In Briefen.* 1st vol., 1775–1803, Leipzig, 1869; 2nd vol., 1803–1820, Leipzig, 1870; 3rd vol., 1821–1854, Leipzig, 1870.

§ 318.

Schelling's Original System of Identity.

1. The *System of Transcendental Idealism* (Works, iii. pp. 327–634), perhaps the most finished of Schelling's writings, as regards form, starts with the supposition, as a self-evident one, that philosophy has to do with the explanation of knowledge. But since knowledge consists in the agreement of subject and object, its problem at once falls into two: First, How comes the objective, the inner totality of which we call nature, to become known to the subject? Second, How does the inner totality of the subjective, intelligence, arrive at objects and at a Nature? The first problem has to be solved by the Philosophy of Nature, the second by the Transcendental Philosophy. To the Transcendental Philosophy the work just mentioned is devoted; and although it is too much to say, as the preface avows, that there is contained in this work nothing that the earliest writings of Fichte and

Schelling had not already taught, the relationship of this work with the *Science of Knowledge* is still very close. The problem is, to deduce as necessary, our assumption that things are; which is possible only if the act, which common consciousness always forgets in thinking of its creations, be itself made an object of thought. This, now, is obviously not within the power of every one, but there is required for it, as for being a poet, an inborn talent—inner perception; only by it are we enabled to win the principle of all knowledge that is not itself dependent upon any other. This principle is the Ego that is realized by the act of self-consciousness, and consists purely in it; which *is* not an object (for another), but *becomes* by its own activity, and *makes* itself its own object. This is not to be conceived as an individual, which accompanies ideas as an "I think" subjected to time, but as what is pure, which produces itself by intellectual intuition, and stands wholly out of time, because it first gives time reality. This act which, because there is for the Ego no other being than it itself, is an absolutely free act, must, by an arbitrary act without which there is no philosophizing, be made an object, which, since it also is impossible without intellectual intuition, makes this last necessary, as it were, in a higher potency. In the first part of the Transcendental Philosophy, the system of *Theoretical Philosophy* (pp. 388–531), Schelling begins with that first act, which constitutes absolute self-consciousness, and advances to the point at which experience is explained, *i.e.*, at which is deduced why certain ideas are accompanied by the feeling that we are compelled to have them. As Fichte speaks of a pragmatical history, so Schelling also speaks here always of a history of self-consciousness, in which the series of self-limitations of the real and ideal activities to be distinguished in the absolute self-consciousness, give the particular acts of the same. If they were all deduced, every particular sensation would be deduced. Only the cardinal ones are here to be considered. By them the course is divided into three periods (Schelling ineptly calls them "epochs"), the first of which extends from original sensation to productive perception. Sensation, regarded as the finding its negative in self, or finding self limited without its co-operation, has its ground in a precedent act which, however, because sensation is the first consciousness, does not lie within consciousness. The progress from this stage to the

following and from this, again, forward, is, now, made in such a way that there is made to appear how by the infinite ideal activity's transcending the previous point of self-limitation, that which we had thus far recognised consciousness to be becomes conscious of itself ("what it had been for us it becomes for itself"), so that it gradually grows from a thing felt to a thing felt and a thing feeling; finally, to a thing perceiving itself as feeling. Here it is shown why that which is perceived must appear as spatial in three dimensions, *i.e.*, as matter. At this point the second period begins; which extends from productive perception to reflection. Here also the progress consists in the fact that it is shown how perception comes to be for itself what it had been for the philosopher contemplating it. In this period falls the entire manifoldness of the objective world, *i.e.*, the unconscious creations of the Ego. The most interesting point here is the deduction of time and space, connected with the distinction of outer and inner sense in consciousness, and the combination of time and space with the categories, first of substance and accident. This combination, in the execution of which Schelling appeals expressly to Kant's transcendental schematism, shows how attentively he had studied Beck's theories. In this operation the table of categories is very much reduced, inasmuch as the Categories of Relation are given as those from which all others are deduced; they themselves, however, or rather two of them, causality and reciprocity, are given with the first-mentioned, substantiality. Since reciprocity in spatial phenomena gives what is called organism, the universe is deduced in what precedes as total-organism, but thereby is also explained how the Ego which had thus far limited itself by objectivity, in general, attains, in a second limitation, to the perception of the universe from certain points of view, *i.e.*, to becoming a plurality of Egos that find their present condition a fate or destiny, although they are bound by their own foregoing deed. A third limitation, finally, as a result of which each of these Egos regards a part of the universe as its exclusive possession, is deduced in the third period, which extends from reflection to the absolute act of the will. It is clear that the question why I regard only a part of the universe as my organism, coincides with the question how I come to regard the rest of the universe as things outside of me (which means something wholly different from "in space"). The result

of this very extended investigation is that this takes place through an act of the will, a result corresponding completely, therefore, with Fichte's declaration that there can be no theoretical ground given for it, that this impulse is not to be theoretically deduced. Just as with Fichte, the transition is here made to the :

2. System of *Practical Philosophy* (pp. 532–611), in which there appears, particularly, the agreement with what Fichte had said in his Introductions to the *Theory of Right* and the *Theory of Morals;* but at the same time, also, the theories of Right, the State, and of History, are treated in the form of appendices. What Fichte had called the deduction of the "opposition" forms here the starting-point. That act of the will is to be explained. The difficulty contained in the fact that this is to be thought as free and yet as necessary is solved by saying, that that act is called forth by the action of intelligences outside of one's own Ego. By this co-operation of many intelligences there arises a common world, for which, therefore, there is no need of the unintelligible conception of a contriver. Through the existence and the influence of other intelligences (education), as also through one's own activity (one's talent), reacting against these, arises the third limitation, or individuality, which coincides with the need of seeing self as an organic individual. In this common world, *i.e.*, this world assumed by all, we have the theatre of our conscious action, *i.e.*, the sphere in which we know ourselves as causality. Possibility consists in the fact that our perception of this world itself is only our (unconscious) action; hence what we are accustomed to term action can be called merely a continued and modified perception. Since it is at bottom only one and the same action by which we posit a nature and which proves to us our causality, nothing that contradicts the laws of nature can ever be regarded as the product of free action, nor, again, can free action ever be regarded as not mediated by the body. Even impulse, which my volition shows itself, primarily, to be, must be regarded as a natural impulse. If, now, the contradiction that lies in the fact that freedom itself is thus to be possible according to the laws of nature, becomes known to the subject involved in the contradiction, *i.e.*, if there enter into his consciousness what the contemplating philosopher sees or what was for us, then arises the perceived contradiction between the moral law and natural impulse, in

consequence of which the absolute will appears as caprice. (This distinction between absolute and empirical [transcendental] freedom justifies Kant's distinction of intelligible and empirical character.) These investigations having led to the explanation of how the Ego comes to ascribe to itself objective occurrences, Schelling, as has just been remarked, adds, as appendices, further considerations of an ethical character. First is set forth as the highest good the pure will ruling in the external world, and then is shown that in order that the attainment of this goal shall not depend upon accident, an adjustment must be found which shall compel even self-seeking natural impulse to act contrary to itself. This is found in the law of right, an inexorable order of nature, the conversion of which into a moral order leads to the most fearful despotism. In the State, which is merely an institution of right, not the envy of the strong, but the power of the executive, should rule, possible oversteppings of which are prevented by the intercourse of nations, which carries itself out in history, that great drama, which has no composer (for then we were not, who play it), but is produced by us, who as co-operating authors and our own devisers of *rôles* represent Him, God, the Spirit of History. That this being is not to be conceived as substantial, personal, is self-evident. There have been two periods of history: the Past, in which God was known as Fate, or Providence, the tragical in which splendid empires fell; and the Present, in which, instead of fate, there enters in the Plan of Nature, and mechanical law curbs wanton caprice. In the third, the Future, God will *be*.

3. In the addition to the Theoretical and Practical Transcendental Philosophy, of the Outlines of a *Philosophy of Art* (pp. 612–629), as a Third Part, there is presented very distinctly what had not shown itself in the Transcendental Philosophy, viz., a deviation from the *Science of Knowledge*. By it is solved, at the same time, that historical problem which Fichte (*vid.* § 316) had been able only to state, not to solve. The opposition of the unconscious production by which we know of nature, and the conscious by which we know of freedom, would have demanded a solution even though Kant had not shown that the work of art is raised above the opposition of the product of nature and that of freedom. What unartistic Fichte failed to catch a suggestion from, must have been a fruitful hint to Schelling, who was æsthetically

cultivated and in close friendship with the circle of Schlegel. In the work of art brought forth by conscious-unconscious enthusiasm there appears as attained and as a fortunate gift, what praxis can only *strive* to attain. In this regard every work of art contains the adjustment of an infinite opposition, namely, beauty, this incomprehensible miracle in which idea becomes matter, freedom nature. But in the work of art is also attained the point towards which, as towards its goal, Transcendental Philosophy strives. To the question which it had to answer, how intelligence comes to nature—is here provided the answer, By art; in the work of fine art. But since artistic activity occupies here the highest place, just as practical (moral) activity does in the *Science of Knowledge*, it is clear why Schelling does not, as does Fichte, put forward the requirement to raise self to intellectual perception, in the form of an appeal to conscience, but represents it as attainable only by the select few, and always compares it to poetic endowment. Æsthetic perception is transcendental perception become objective; it is the true organ and instrument of philosophy, which constantly deposes anew what philosophy is not able externally to show: the unconscious in action and production, and its original identity with the conscious. For art, the view which the philosopher, in the manner of an artist, makes for himself of nature, is the original and natural one; to the artist as to the philosopher, it is a reflection of the world which is in him. But it is certain that with the *Philosophy of Art* the Transcendental Philosophy becomes a closed circle, inasmuch as it returns to the point which it had first proposed to reach. Intellectual perception forms the beginning-point of the system; æsthetical perception its terminal point. What the former is for the philosopher, the latter is for his object. The former is never present in consciousness, the latter may be present in every consciousness. Hence philosophy *as* philosophy is never universally valid. *The General Observation upon the Whole System* (pp. 629–664) recapitulates the course passed over and sets forth, in a synoptical manner, the most important steps in the continued involution of self-perception, again compares art and philosophy, and closes with the thought that, as originally philosophy and poetry were one in mythology, so perhaps a new mythology which, of course, not one man but the race would have to create, might again unite the two.

4. Even if Schelling's Transcendental Philosophy had not added to what Fichte had said in the Theoretical and Practical Science of Knowledge, the Third Part, on æsthetics, we could no longer speak of an agreement of the two after Schelling had, in the introductory words of the *System of Transcendental Idealism*, placed the *Philosophy of Nature* beside the Transcendental Philosophy as a co-ordinate part with it, and had thereby converted the Fundamental Philosophy into a collateral discipline. He had been far from doing that when he wrote the *Ideas* and the *World-Soul;* but he did so and was compelled to do so because he no longer, as in those two works, analytically sought for the ground postulated by reason for what is given in experience, but, on the contrary, set out to construe nature synthetically or, to employ his own daring expression, to create it. (Kant, who affirmed that matter was given, had felt at liberty only to say *to make.* It is otherwise with the philosophy that boasts of having freed itself from the given thing-in-itself.) This is first done in the *First Sketch*, etc., and the Introduction to it (Works, iii. pp. 1–268, 269–326). Here the difference between natural history and natural science, or speculative physics, is placed in the circumstance that the former treats nature as a product, the latter, on the other hand, as productive (as *natura naturans*), and just for that reason has for its organ not dismembering reflection, but the perception that grasps firmly the Whole. Since no production is conceivable without a product, and in the product production is extinct, nature (just as the Ego, above) must be conceived as containing in itself a self-limiting production, or as two opposed activities. By means of this opposition, now, it is possible that nature assert its infinitude, although it continually gives forth finite (illusory) creations, in which, however, because of the opposition lying in them the impulse of infinite development dwells. (Species thus preserve themselves through the sexual particularity of individuals.) As the vortex in the stream remains unchanged in spite of the constant flowing of the individual particles of water, so also does it in the stream of infinitely productive nature, where the points of arrest are qualities or even natural monads; hence the philosophy of nature may be called a qualitative Atomism. Later, there is employed, instead of these two expressions, the term *Categories of Nature.* Because of this opposition, nature

appears to be a conflict of the universalizing and the individualizing principles,—a conflict that presents the most varied attempts to bring about absolute equilibrium. In these attempts we meet a dynamical succession of steps, which in the *First Sketch* is presented in a descending order, but in the *Universal Deduction of the Dynamic Process* (Works, iv. pp. 1–70), and later, always in ascending order. The first arrangement, which, entirely in opposition to the spirit of the system, gives to it almost the appearance of a theory of emanation, is of course chosen especially because it is in the organic world, particularly in the process of the species, most clearly visible how nature, by a battle against permanence, promotes permanence. Hence it came about that Schelling's belief in the possibility of rescuing the higher dignity of the organic was of such a character that he assumed that life was extinct in the dead. Later it appeared that the difference was not so great whether one said, in the earlier manner, the higher loses itself in the lower or it raises itself out of it. An essential difference between the assertions of the *First Sketch* and later presentations relates to the three physiological functions. Kielmeyer, who had been stimulated by Herder, not only by his well-known address, but also by unprinted works that circulated in transcriptions in the Schellingian circle (I myself possess one in Steffens's hand) had operated just as powerfully upon Schelling as upon the later opponent of the Philosophy of Nature, Cuvier. With him sensibility was always put before irritability and reproduction. This order Schelling retains, and since the organic merely repeats in a higher potency what the inorganic (for a long time Schelling wrote *inorgic* [*anorgische*]) displays, he institutes a parallel between them and magnetism, electricity, and the chemical process, giving to magnetism the highest place. This, now, he withdrew later; and his intercourse with Steffens may well have contributed to this and other modifications. In the deduction of the Categories of Nature we have to do with three points: First, the construction of matter out of that original act of production. Here it is shown that the centrifugal activity gives the first dimension and the force of repulsion of Kant; the centripetal individualizing activity, on the other hand, Kant's force of attraction and the second dimension; the union of these being the third dimension, matter or gravity, so that gravity is not attraction (alone), and

is not a property, but the real essence, of matter. The second point here is, the repetition of this same construction as self-construction of matter in the dynamical categories, magnetism (linear force), electricity (surface force), chemical process (reciprocal space-filling), which may be called gravity in the second potency, just as magnetism is a higher potency of linear activity, which, being the condition of all phenomena, never enters into phenomena. Besides these involutions of those three primitive categories, however, there must be a phenomenon of the involution and construction conditioning all the three, and this, which is, as it were, a tendency to being reflected and to thought,—is light. Whereas the construction of a first potency can at most deduce distinctions of weight and density, the construction of a second potency, or reconstruction, forms the basis for what Kant calls qualities: magnetism for the state of cohesion; electricity for sensibly felt qualities,—colour, etc.; the chemical process for chemical properties (which, for that reason, display themselves mostly in the condition of fluidity, *i.e.*, of the not being defined alone by length and breadth). The chemical process contains magnetism and electricity in itself, but in its aspect of elements, the former, according to Steffens, in carbon and nitrogen, the latter in oxygen and hydrogen. All the three processes are held to be united in galvanism, which Schelling, since he declares for Galvani as against Volta, regards as the threshold of the *third stage*, at which magnetism involves into sensibility, electricity into irritability, the chemical process into reproduction, which latter shows itself, where difference in sex is in question, as sexual impulse, and where it is not, as artistic impulse. But the question which the Philosophy of Nature has to answer, How does nature come to intelligence? is here answered as follows: It comes to it in the organism, that is to say, in the highest organism, *i.e.*, man, in which intelligence awakes. There needs no special reference to Kant's Critique of the Teleological Judgment in order to see how Schelling makes use of the result reached by that.

5. In the decided parallelism between the Transcendental, and the Natural, Philosophy, which the express references in each to the corresponding steps of the other caused to stand out still more clearly, so that almost spontaneously there forces itself upon every one the schema of two currents moving in opposite directions, there was suggested so strongly

the thought of giving to the system, by the union of the two, a formal conclusion, that Schelling was obliged to attempt such a union. Everything seemed to urge it, he rightly says. That he gave this to the world "earlier than he himself would have done," in what is always designated by him as the only *Authentic Exposition of his System* (Wks., iv. pp. 105–212)—to this he was forced by the entirely opposite and false judgments upon his system: first, of those who called it philosophy of nature, to whom he would here again show that the philosophy of nature is only a part of the system; second, of those who, with Reinhold, identified his system with the Science of Knowledge, and to whom he would show not only that transcendental philosophy is only a part of philosophy, but that Fichte, in making it the whole of philosophy, did not get beyond the standpoint of reflection and a mere subjective idealism, whereas his own system is productive in its procedure, and is objective idealism. He calls it, therefore, the System of Absolute Identity, and explains its similarity to the form of the Spinozistic philosophizing by the relationship of the content of the two theories. He begins this *Exposition* with the definition of reason as the total indifference of subject and object (subject-object), a conception which we get if we abstract in thought from the thinker. The reason is the true in itself; hence to know things in themselves is to know them as they are in reason. It is the absolute, outside which is nothing. Since it is absolute identity, the law of identity is the law of all being. Since it is absolute being, all that is, is, in its essence or absolutely considered, absolute identity itself. Until the present time Spinoza alone has perceived that there can be no such thing as the absolute coming outside of itself, but that everything is the infinite, the absolute, the all itself. (The expression "God," upon which Schelling laid so much stress later, does not occur as a name for the absolute in this *Authentic Exposition.*) But if there is nothing besides the absolute, it follows that even the real and true knowledge of this as presented by philosophy can be only the self-knowledge of the absolute, so that in order to know it one must immerse one's self in this self-knowing, must be the absolute itself. But if there is self-knowledge only where subject and object make themselves one, the absolute must also enter into this opposition, and we have therefore identity (the subject-object) *as* subjective and

as objective, *i.e.*, with the quantitative difference that here subjectivity, there objectivity, preponderates. Reason, as the former, is spirit; as the latter, nature; in both, which, considered from the standpoint of reason, are the same, the absolute is posited *actu*. Within each of these, the various relations of subjectivity and objectivity give the definite expressions or potencies of the absolute, of which those with preponderating objectivity belong to nature, those with preponderating subjectivity to spirit, the former being considered in the real, the latter in the ideal, part of philosophy. The whole system may, therefore, be well represented in a schema, by a large magnet in which the indifference point may be designated by $A=A$, the poles at the two ends of it, on the other hand, by ${}^{+}A=B$ or $A=B^{+}$, between which lie, then, the correlate or opposite stages of preponderating subjectivity. The question whether this system is realism *or* idealism has no meaning, since it assumes only the unity of the real and ideal: indeed, every individual *is* for it only in so far as it is an expression of this unity. The *Exposition*, now—to conform to the schema employed by it—places itself at the pole of preponderating objectivity, hence at that of the potency of nature in which subjectivity is the less potent, and is, therefore, designated as the first (A^1). As this *primum existens*, *matter* is designated, in which the two moments as forces of expansion and attraction are united in the force of gravity, the latter having to be regarded as the ground upon which, as that which remains undiscovered, the existing matter rests. Because of the importance given to *light* in the following stage in the dynamical processes, this whole stage (A^2) is designated by its name. As in the *Universal Deduction*, so here magnetism is defined as the repetition of the linear function, and cohesion as its phenomenon. But there is added Steffens's theory of a cohesion-series of bodies in which carbon and nitrogen form the poles, iron the indifference-point (*vid.* § 322, 5). The statements made earlier relating to electricity, according to which oxygen and hydrogen are poles, water their indifference-point, are united with that theory, a ridiculous meaning is given to both laws, and then a north and south, as well as an east and west, polarity are talked about. Water gives the resolution of the two latter, prevents the opposition of east and west from becoming fixed. (The same is true as regards the moon.) New in this part are the statements con-

cerning light and colours, in which Schelling allies himself with Goethe. New is it, further, that the chemical process, which is here treated after magnetism and electricity, since it is of higher order than they, is treated as identical with galvanism. The union of gravity, and light, in which the former exists as mere potency, is the *organism* (A^3), in which the form is preserved by the processes treated under A^2, but upon which, as was shown earlier, there supervenes a hindering factor. As A^2 rests upon A^1 as its basis, so the two form the basis of A^3. The organism exhibits absolute identity as existent; it is the sole end. Hence even inorganic nature is organized, namely, for organization, as distinct from, and opposed to which we have, after it has ceased to be, a worthless residuum as an inorganic mass. The earth does not produce animals and plants, but becomes them: what cannot be either of these we call inanimate. After some antithetical observations upon plants and animlas, which may be put into the same class with those already mentioned (of north and south, water and iron, etc.), the treatise breaks off and promises in the future an exposition "in which I may lead the reader from one stage of organic nature to another up to the highest expressions of activity in the same; from these to the construction of the absolute indifference, or to the point where absolute identity is posited under completely equal potencies; where I invite him from this point to the construction of the ideal series, and so, again, lead him, through the three potencies which, as regards the ideal factor, are positive, as now through the three, which, as regards the same factor, are negative—to the construction of the absolute centre of gravity, in which as the two highest expressions of indifference lie truth and beauty."

6. Properly speaking, it is somewhat strange that in the concluding words just cited only truth and beauty are mentioned, since, on the other hand, in the *Lectures on the Philosophy of Art* (Wks., v. pp. 353–736), which Schelling delivered at about the same time at which he wrote his *Authentic Exposition*, he gives a *conspectus* of the entire system, which fully agrees with the synoptical table given in the year 1806 in his *Aphorisms by way of Introduction to the Philosophy of Nature* (Wks., vii. pp. 140–197). According to this, however, God manifests himself as the All: to be specific, —on the one hand, in the three potencies of the relatively

real All,—gravity (matter), light (motion), organism (life),—which together give the world-structure that culminates in man; on the other hand, in the three potencies of the relatively ideal All,—truth (science), goodness (religion), beauty (art),—which together form history, with its apex, the State. Both series, however, are embraced by philosophy, which is not only science, but also virtue and beauty, and restores absolute identity. That goodness is omitted in the concluding words of the *Authentic Exposition* must therefore be regarded as merely an oversight. Had Schelling, whose *First Sketch* and *Transcendental Idealism*, as well as the *Lectures on Academical Study*, which are presently to be discussed, had gradually spread the expectation that he would have every one of his lectures printed, and of whom, in fact, because of the many new investigations constantly set on foot, it had begun to be believed that he carried on his studies only before the public, —had Schelling himself published the just-mentioned *Lectures on the Philosophy of Art*, as well as the extended work, *System of the Whole of Philosophy and of the Philosophy of Nature in Particular* (Wks., vi. pp. 131–576), (which was edited in the year 1806, in part from the Jena lecture-notes) which were both first printed after his death from manuscript remains, it would not have been repeated until to-day, with apparent justice, that what Schelling had performed was only fragmentary and that he always remained entangled in the beginnings of his undertakings. The two works just named treat, with a greater degree of completeness, the closing chapters,—the former that of the science of mind or of history, the latter that of the philosophy of nature. In their influence, of course, the works that have really remained fragments have surpassed the complete works, which were known merely to those who heard them; for the reason, it may be, that great importance would be attached to the fact that among those who heard them Hegel is thought to have been one. The *Philosophy of Art* from which, for the rest, individual parts had been early printed, *e.g.* the part that relates to Christianity, in the *Lectures on Academical Study*, the *Essay on Dante*, in the *Critical Journal*, etc., is based on Kant's Critique of the Æsthetical Judgment, as Schelling's works on the philosophy of nature had been based on Kant's Metaphysics of Nature and Critique of the Teleological Judgment. Schelling repeatedly confesses that Kant had here laid the foundation;

which was, he thought, doubly remarkable, since his own view of works of art had entirely miscarried. Besides Kant, it is Winckelmann especially, "the unsurpassed and unsurpassable," on whom he leans; after him, Schiller, whose æsthetic dissertations are frequently cited; finally, the two Schlegels; as well Friedrich, whose original study of the history of art had led to results that border upon what Schiller had discovered by an examination of its nature, as August Wilhelm, whose Berlin lectures of the year 1801 had been known to Schiller before they were yet published. That the merits of both men are not made more conspicuous by him has, no doubt, personal grounds. Characteristic, in this connection, of this entire lecture, is the enthusiasm for antiquity. As compared with the Greeks, the Romans occupy an inferior position; besides these two peoples only the Italians are, properly speaking, taken into consideration; in other nations only Calderon, Shakespeare, and Goethe. Of these three, the second-named almost occupies the lowest place, although Schelling confesses to knowing only a single piece of Calderon's. The lectures are divided into a General Part (pp. 373–487), which construes art in general, its matter, finally its form, and a Special Part (pp. 488–736), which construes the particular forms of art. But to these discussions on the philosophy of art there are prefixed others of a more general sort, which are distinguished from the opening paragraphs of the *Authentic Exposition* by their greater completeness, but further by the fact that here, instead of the Absolute, God is always spoken of. The like holds true of the unpublished *System of the Whole of Philosophy.* Thus he can connect with the word *reason* the more definite meaning, the reflection of God, in which are comprised the potencies of the real and ideal All, and which is related to God as copy to type, or as indifference to identity. In both expositions, for the rest, he opposes a number of misunderstandings which his system had experienced. Particularly he cannot insist strongly enough that for philosophers, whose first and only presupposition is that it is one and the same thing that knows and is known, hence that there is no such thing as the finite; that the finite, hence also the quantitative distinctions of potencies, arises for us only by the fact that we turn away from the absolute, hence conceive the All to be just what it is *not—i.e.*, if it is considered from the standpoint of

the absolute. But from the standpoint of reflection, on the contrary, it is. From both together, it is mere phenomenon. No one should allow himself to be terrified at this, the only true theory, by the charge of pantheism. Just so should no one regard the absolute as the unity of both, imitating, as it were, the opposition of the subjective and objective. Rather, must the indifference of the subjective and objective, the affirming and affirmed, in which the affirmed is always also the affirming, be conceived as the absolute *prius*. In the General Part of the *Philosophy of Art* is to be mentioned the statement that since things as they are in God, *i.e.* eternal archetypes or divine forms, constitute the matter of art, and Ideas conceived as real are gods, mythology is the proper matter of art. The opposition of ancient and modern, which otherwise, also, pervades art, here appears in such sort that the mythology of the ancients is made by the race (which produces it as a swarm of bees produces the honey-comb), that of the moderns by the individual. The investigations relating to the sublime and beautiful, the naïve and sentimental, and to style and manner, form the transition to the Particular Part and the System of Individual Arts. The distinction, construed in the General Philosophy, of the relatively real and ideal, forms the basis of the distinction of formative arts and poetry. The former has, as branches, music, painting, plastic art. In each of these, however, the three arts themselves, properly speaking, repeat their three moments, inasmuch as what is musical, pictorial, and plastic are repeated :—in rhythm, melody, and harmony, in music ; in clare-obscure, drawing, and colouring, in painting ; and in architecture, bas-relief, and sculpture, in plastic art. Just so are all three repeated in the art of poetry as the lyric, the epic, and the dramatic. As in epic poetry Dante's great poem forms a species by itself, so in the drama does Goethe's Faust. An exact discussion of individual works of art makes these lectures, concerning which it must always be remembered that they were written in the year 1802, in the highest degree charming. It can hardly be called an accident that Schelling passes over lyric poetry most rapidly.

7. In the *Lectures on the Methods of Academical Study* (Wks., v. pp. 207 ff.) Schelling develops his system as a whole, not in a mathematical form, always recalling Spinoza, but in the way of suggestive reflections. They begin by fixing the

conception of absolute science or first knowledge, upon which, as the immediate unity of the ideal and the real, all other knowledge rests. In this knowledge the universe, or God, appears exactly as it appears in nature, only as self-knowledge. In the second lecture, it is shown that science is not an affair of the individual but of the species, hence is a witnessing tradition for a more perfect past, of which institutions of learning have to show, by constantly going back to the first knowledge, that it does not have value merely through tradition and authority. In the third lecture, the preconditions of science,—what is learned and the means by which it is learned, memory,—are considered and extolled, not without glancing aside at modern pedagogics, which slights both. With the fourth lecture, begins the encyclopædic survey of the sciences, commencing with the pure science of reason. Here the mathematics of the ancients is held up as a pattern before the modern, as being more full of ideas, whereas the latter clings merely to the symbols of ideas; and then philosophy is taken up, and in the fifth lecture its alleged danger for the State and religion is illustrated. Only where the common understanding, which even in science leads to ochlocracy, calls itself philosophy, as in France, *i.e.*, where want of ideas gives itself this name, does it lead to mob-rule; for, with the common understanding, Spanish sheep-farming stands higher than the transformation of a world by the almost divine powers of a conqueror, and utility and plain morals, with their first burghers instead of kings, higher than, to the through-and-through aristocratical philosophy, the Absolute and Ideas stand, which to it are exalted above individual things as the monarch and freemen are above serfs. Then, in the sixth lecture, is more closely considered the study of philosophy; and the fact-philosophy, the dogmatism of the understanding, the rule of a logic resting wholly upon an empirical basis, which has validity only for the finite; and finally, dualism, which forbids regarding psychology as a branch of physics, are given as the chief obstacles to true philosophy. The seventh lecture, which compares philosophy with the positive sciences, forms the transition to the faculties; the eighth contains the celebrated historical construction of Christianity, which defines Christianity, particularly in its opposition to the Grecian world as the culminating point of natural religion, as follows: the Christian religion has not

symbols, in gods, of the infinite but refers immediately to the infinite; does not base religion upon mythology but mythology upon religion; of course also, sees in nature a mystery (whereas to the heathens nature stood revealed), and hence needs miracles. The reconciliation of the infinite and finite is the real content of the doctrine of the trinity, and that Lessing has divined in the most speculative of all his writings. Theology, indeed, has, as the ninth lecture complains, mistaken the depth of that theory and conceived the eternal incarnation as having taken place but once, so that in this regard the inhabitants of India, with their many incarnations, show more understanding than their missionaries. Theology came into such a condition of stuntedness by the deification of the Bible, which cannot sustain even a superficial comparison with the religious books of India, and out of the sterile matter of which only the philosophical culture of the Church Fathers could draw so much that is speculative. The Bible has thus been the real obstacle to the perfection of the church; a dead letter has assumed the place of the earlier, at least living, authority, and now, after theology has been converted into philology, men busy themselves with explaining Jewish fables, which were invented under the guidance of the Messianic prophecies of the Old Testament. The true eternal Idea of Christianity is attested in philosophy and poetry more than in such theology. The eleventh lecture considers history and jurisprudence, and characterizes the various forms of historiography. The State is defined as the objective organism of freedom; the ancient State is preferred to the modern with its so-called civil freedom, with which only too much of slavery is mingled, because it appears more as a self-end. This does not forbid the accomplishment by it of collateral ends also, *e.g.*, security. In the eleventh lecture natural science is treated, and it is shown how the immanent application of the absolute in the special forms gives the eternal Ideas of nature which the philosophy of nature has to exhibit. Physics and chemistry are treated in the twelfth lecture; medicine in the thirteenth. In the last-named lecture Brown is not unqualifiedly praised, but is recognised; disease is conceived as organism, pathology as the natural history of these organisms, and the hope is expressed that comparative anatomy will lead to a real history of productive nature. The conclusion of this interesting work, the complete contents

of which have been given here because Schelling has in this work expressed himself upon subjects concerning which he had never, up to this time, addressed the public, is formed, in the fourteenth lecture, by the Philosophy of Art, which takes much from the lectures characterized above on this subject. Here the connection between art and the life of the State is made more prominent than it was there. This connection appears particularly in antiquity, which, with its festivals and memorials, presents a great work of art.

8. The expression, "Ideas," for the Absolute manifesting itself in special forms, which appears first in the Lectures, was a consequence of Platonic studies, to which at this time Schelling devoted himself. It was they that caused him also to employ in the exposition of his *Bruno, or On the Natural and Divine Principle in Things* (1802), the form of the scientific dialogue, instead of mathematical construction, which in its turn had altered itself from the antithetico-synthetic method of the first works. It is remarkable that here the original opposition is conceived as that of the infinite and finite, which are held to have their identity in the eternal, which is not at all affected with opposition, is in its ideal being real, in its thought being, etc. This trinity, the manifestation of which is given in the universe, in which the stars, for whose laws of motion discovered by Kepler Hegel's dissertation is affirmed to have provided the speculative ground, live as blessed gods, is revealed, likewise, in speculative apprehension, in which it is, in perception, subordinated to the finite, in thought, to the infinite, in reason, to the eternal. Thought is treated with greatest completeness, and it is shown, in this connection, that conception, judgment and the syllogism are not to be empirically assumed, but result from the including of the infinite, finite, and eternal under the infinite as necessary thought-forms. Obviously, as such, they do not suffice for the reason, because the unjustified domination of logic in the sphere of reason has had as a consequence the fact that the absolute has been divided into the soul, the world and God in a manner corresponding with the three syllogisms. The characteristics of the four one-sided conceptions of the Absolute (materialism, intellectualism, realism, idealism), which are compared with the four quarters of the world, and in opposition to them the delineation of true philosophy with its eternal God-becoming-man, and man-becoming-God, closes the exposition. With

the *Bruno* is connected as a supplement, *The Further Expositions from the System of Philosophy* in the *Neue Zeitschrift für speculativ Physik*, which discusses at length the absolute mode of knowledge, and, with continual polemic against Fichte, who had not sufficiently risen above the empirical Ego, and hence, also, not to intellectual perception, extols this last. Nothing makes it obligatory to render this perception accessible to the weak: it consists in the placing of one's self completely at one with the absolute, becoming the absolute, and thereby possessing a wholly immediate knowledge of the absolute. It is, therefore, far removed from that which Fichte discovers by the observation of his own inner action. Here, rather, one's own action ceases. Hence also is Spinoza extolled, in opposition to Fichte, because he comes much nearer to apprehending the absolute as real unity, not as mere union, or synthesis. In the absolute everything is absolute, perfect, eternal; exists in it as Idea. Hence is it also a misapprehension to suppose that philosophy has to deduce the particular, to construe the animal, the plant, etc.; rather does it show that, and why, the universe must be thought in the form of the plant, in the form of the animal, etc. So little does philosophy construe the particular, that for it what is called particular has, rather, no existence. What is called the real world must, in the construction of the universe, be given up; so far is philosophy removed from construing the real. As regards terminology it is noteworthy that here, similarly as in Spinoza (*vid.* 272), the word *God* is not used to designate the entire absolute, but the one phenomenal form of it, so that the construing of the infinite into the finite gives nature, of the finite into the infinite, God. The copies of the two are, then, phenomenal nature and the Ideas; but nature and God are absoluteness of form and of essence in eternal interpenetration. The dissertations in the *Neue Zeitschrift* are, apart from the critical reflections on the world-structure, also interesting because they show how far modifications of his philosophy of nature in individual points permit of the retention of the standpoint as a whole. Where he has abandoned this itself—on this point Schelling has expressed himself in the supplementary paragraphs to the second edition of the *Ideas* (1803). With the *Bruno* connects itself, not as a supplement, but as a justification, the work: *Philosophy and Religion* (1804), occasioned by the

fact that Eschenmayer, in a work to be mentioned later (*vid.* § 319, 3) would allow the System of Identity, the most perfect exposition of which he saw in the *Bruno*, to be regarded as only a part of the knowledge of truth, and, further, missed in it the proof of why the particular potencies acquired reality, the potencies now having the appearance of mere accidentality. Schelling, now, attempts in this work chiefly to overthrow these two positions, and hence, in the first place, to show that the holy does not transcend the eternal, nor religion philosophy, nor God the absolute, which must of course so appear to those who know no other philosophy than the dogmatic or critical, of which the former (categorically) conceives the absolute as the *neither-nor* of oppositions, the latter (hypothetically) only as the combination of them. True philosophy (Spinoza and the System of Identity), on the other hand, which is in this regard analogous to the disjunctive syllogism, wholly denies this opposition, conceives the absolute as being ideal by its real-being and *vice versa*, hence also is an immediate apprehension, intellectual intuition, from which Fichte's mediated apprehension is far removed. More important, because here are recognisable the first traces of the later doctrine of Schelling, is the treatment of the second problem set before himself by Schelling, the derivation of finite things from the absolute. Both dualism and emanationism are rejected, and it is laid down as the only possible view, that the things contained in the absolute only as a possibility come into existence by an act of self-realization not to be explained by means of that, but only by means of themselves; hence by a falling-away or estrangement from the absolute which is connected with the highest problems of practical philosophy. This act of freedom, upon the meaning of which no one has thrown a clearer light than Fichte, realizes what, regarded as a separation from the only true being, nothing is, and hence produces only what is null, which stands in the infinite series of finite causes and effects. To make, with Fichte, this nothing, converted into Egohood, the principle of philosophy, means to found philosophy upon the Fall of man, whereas true philosophy sees in that fall only the, no doubt, inevitable, falling-away, which in itself is nothing, and hence lapses into the null, the non-absolute. When Leibnitz conceived the sensible world as confused idea, he had indeed a certain presentiment of the truth; but he did

not perceive that there is a point here which has the closest relation with the question concerning evil. The restored unity of freedom and necessity, reconciliation, is the goal in the epos of the history of the world, which presents an Iliad and an Odyssey of manhood. This epos begins with the higher natures, gods and heroes, who were the first educators of men, and vanished from the earth with its growing deterioration. But since sensible existence, like finite existence in general, is the counterpart of true being, the longing for an individual immortality is a desire after that from which the wise man, of course, seeks to be free. It might, accordingly, be said that the more worthless a man is the more he deserves continued existence; the more perfect he is, the sooner will he, as pure Idea, without any other accessory, be eternal. If in the reconciliation the falling-away is annulled, the result is not the mere point of departure, but the falling-away has become the means of the perfected revelation of God, inasmuch as the Ideas which were, as it were, sacrificed in the intuited object that has become personality, come to be again in absoluteness, as occurs in perfected morality. Since, as will be shown later, the altered doctrine of Schelling had overcome the opposition between the Science of Knowledge and the System of Identity, it is conceivable that Fichte, in the time of his greatest anger towards the latter, should find this work the most tolerable. What he did not openly acknowledge and what, on the other hand, Schelling, often going too far, pointed out in his controversial work against Fichte, is, that much of this work of Schelling passed over into Fichte's later doctrines. Schelling was in the habit of remarking, with pride, that the title *Way to the Blessed Life*, was not invented by Fichte himself.

9. At the same time at which the *Bruno* and the *Philosophy and Religion* were written, there was in process of execution another work, which received its final completion in the year 1805; it is the *System of the Whole of Philosophy and the Philosophy of Nature in Particular*, which remained unprinted and first appeared in the complete edition (Works, vi. pp. 131–576). If Schelling himself had published it, the charge that he had nowhere given the concluding chapters would have been refuted by it still more than by the *Philosophy of Art*. Perhaps he regarded it as useless, because Klein's *Contributions to the Study of Philosophy as the Science of*

the All (Würzburg, 1805), which Schelling had praised as a good exposition of his own doctrines, gives, in its second section, (the first, which is historico-critical, is Klein's own work), with tolerable completeness, what is to be found in this division of his Würzburg lectures (for that is the System of the Whole of Philosophy). The General Philosophy (pp. 137–214) is therein first treated, and it is here shown more at length and in part more clearly than in the *Authentic Exposition*, that the absolute, here always called God, is not at all affected with the opposition of subjective and objective, affirming and being affirmed, and that rational knowledge is distinguished from reflection by the circumstance that the latter always starts with opposition as the *prius*, and at most only attains to syntheses of differences; whereas, for the former, opposition does not exist, the affirmed is, as such, affirming. Reason, as the self-knowledge of God, has, therefore, God as its only immediate object. But this must not be understood in the sense of Dogmatism, for which God becomes, by the application of finite forms of thought a mere highest, an object beside which there exist other objects; whereas for rational knowledge God is the One, out of which no other springs but which is the affirmative of itself. Besides the absolute as the sole being there can as little be assumed another being, as it can be doubted that it, being, is. What is, is, in so far as it *is*, the absolute; so far as it is *finite*, it is not. Reason, therefore, for which there is no finite being, does not inquire after the origin of the absolute. As there is no finite being, so also is there for rational knowledge no opposition, hence also, in the self-knowing of the absolute, there is not on the one side mere subject, on the other mere object, but on each entire identity; and quantitative difference of the individual stages (potencies) exists only when one of these is isolated. In the whole there is no difference; hence, also, no quantitative difference. The standpoint of philosophy, therefore, is that of the Unity of the All; philosophy assumes only the being of the one distinctionless eternal All, which appears to the finite mode of thinking simply as everything, as the infinite number of things. This definition must yield a variety of points of contact with Spinoza. In scarcely any work of Schelling's are there to be found so many propositions that are borrowed verbally from Spinoza's *Ethics*, as in this. (If I said this

earlier—*Entwickelung der deutschen Speculation*, ii. p. 193,—of the *Aphorisms* in the *Jahrbücher für Medicin*, the two statements are easily reconciled: the *Aphorisms* are extracts from this work.) For the rest, it must not be supposed that the dependence upon Plato, as shown by the *Bruno*, had vanished, leaving no trace, and that Schelling had returned to Spinoza pure and simple. As we know otherwise also, Plato *and* Spinoza were to him at this period by far the greatest philosophers, and, accordingly, he joins immediately with the purely Spinozistic propositions just now referred to, those which relate to the Ideas as the eternal essences of things in God, and warns us against conceiving, with Spinoza, the Ideas as mere modes of thought. Between the latter, which would be subjective only, and things, which would be only objective, or, rather, above them as their identity—must stand the Ideas, the primary forms of things, the heart, as it were, of them. As the Ideas are above the opposition of the subjective and objective, the opposition, also, of universal and particular has as regards them no meaning—by it they would be converted into mere thought-things. Rather, they are, *i.e.*, the being of things in the All is, the only truth of things, and mere particularity and finitude are the non-being of things. The latter is what is called their phenomenon. Phenomenon is what is called concrete reality; concrete because being and non-being are united in it; reality in the ordinary sense of the word. In it fall simplicity and the being conditioned by another concrete; taken all together, as totality, phenomena form the reflection of the All, *natura naturata*, in which (not in the *natura naturans*) falls the opposition of the real and ideal All, each of which must necessarily appear as a totality of finite things. In reason the two are united again, so that it is related to the absolute as indifference to identity, or the image to the archetype. The second, or Special, Part (pp. 215–576) falls into three subordinate parts, the first two of which cover the philosophy of nature, inasmuch as there is first given in the General Philosophy of Nature the construction of the real All (pp. 215–277), then in the Particular Philosophy of Nature the construction of the individual potencies of the same (pp. 278–494). After it has been concluded, here, from the identity of affirming and being affirmed, that there is in nature nothing absolutely without soul, time and space, as forms of the being-in-self or particularity of things in general, thereby,

however, of nothingness also, are deduced, in a similar manner as in earlier works on the philosophy of nature, only more at length and in part more clearly; then matter is deduced, with its two attributes of rest and motion, which, since it is related to real substance as mere ground, as a maternal principle, is gravity. Opposed to it as essence, as paternal principle, stands light, which is active in motion, or, rather, is motion itself, only without anything movable. In it the proper life of things is active, as in gravity their being held together by the All, for by this they tend to fall towards each other. The various relations of the two give the quantitatively different potencies of nature, which, now, are taken into consideration in detail. First, are laid down twelve highest principles or axioms of the philosophy of nature, which sum up the previous speculations, and then is first considered, similarly as in the *Universal Deduction of the Dynamic Process*, the formative or dimensional process, in connection with which the law of polarity, as also that of triplicity as the type of all differences in nature, is discussed. Steffens's investigations concerning absolute and relative cohesion, as also concerning the cohesion-series of bodies, are here variously used. If motion (form of the particular life) had here appeared subordinated to being, the opposite is the case in the second potency. Magnetism, electricity, and the chemical process, to which sound, light and heat are said to correspond, are gone over, fire is briefly discussed as the solvent of all forms, and then the third potency, or organic nature, is taken up. Of this Part, now, in particular, what was said above holds true, viz. that Schelling's philosophy of nature is not so much a torso as many suppose. After the deduction of the organism in general comes that of the opposition of the kingdoms of plants and animals, as also of their point of indifference and of the world of infusoria, and then are taken up the functions common to them all, it being shown, first, that the first dimension and magnetism are repeated at a higher potency in reproduction, the second, as also electricity, in irritability, the third dimension and the chemical process in sensibility. (Earlier, Schelling had given a different parallelism.) In each of these three functions, however, all the three are repeated, so that resorption, secretion, and assimilation exhibit the same trinity in reproduction, and circulation, respiration, and voluntary motion in irritability. In sensibility, as the synthetic unity

of both, Schelling shows that all earlier forms are repeated in the senses in clarified form. Hence even the animals stand higher or lower in their series of stages according as they display a small or great degree of the sense-faculty. (The completed systematic on the basis of the senses is borrowed from Oken.) Whereas the animal in its highest life-phenomena borders on the potenceless, *i.e.*, on what is above the limit of all potencies, this latter appears first in the heavenly bodies, and then also in man. In the latter, the soul rises to consciousness and to reason, by means of which it can surrender itself to the All and can here sacrifice that which the sensuous-minded would still have after death, memory of past experience, selfhood, etc. At this culminating point of the philosophy of nature there begins, as a continuation,—so that it could in so far be said that philosophy is merely the philosophy of nature,—the third section of the Second Part, the Construction of the Ideal World and its Potencies (pp. 495-576). The three potencies here are knowledge, action, art. In the first are distinguished (self-consciousness, sensation, and perception,) corresponding to the dimensions in the real, and then are discussed at great length the forms of reflected knowledge which the ordinary logic empirically assumes and teaches us to extend beyond the sphere in which they have validity. Absolute knowledge is placed in opposition to this. Under the head of Action, freedom is extendedly discussed, and is stated to consist in conscious necessity; arbitrary choice is declared to be a mere delusion and the worst kind of volition. The ordinary view of religion and of immortality is sharply criticised, and the pagans are held up as patterns, because they would have simply drunk of Lethe. The eternal life is life in the Ideas. In treating of art, Schelling refers to his *Lectures on Æsthetics.*

10. The altered doctrine of Fichte was presented in the *Chief Characteristics of the Present Age of the World*, and in it a sharp polemic against Schelling's philosophy of nature, which, of course, was preceded by an equally sharp one on Schelling's part. At the same time Schelling had been apprised of the manner in which Fichte expressed himself in his lectures on the philosophy of nature, and subjective and objective grounds thus combined to make Schelling's public disavowal of Fichte so bitter in its tone as it is. The *Statement of the true Relation of the Philosophy of Nature to the Altered Doctrine of*

Fichte (Tübingen, 1806), set forth the point of difference between the Science of Knowledge and the System of Identity in such a manner that the latter, which had hitherto occupied the chief place by reason of the fact that the entire Science of Knowledge (as Transcendental Philosophy) was contained in it as a half, forfeits this position and sinks to the level of a diametrical opposite to it, exactly in the same way as, in antiquity, the higher theory of Heraclitus sank, by its polemic against Eleaticism, to the level of a correlate to it (*vid.* § 44). This controversial work very frequently mentions the speculations in *Philosophy and Religion*, and charges Fichte with having borrowed much from these and other writings of Schelling. Right and wrong are blended at this point, which, for the rest, has little positive interest. Much more important, on the contrary, is the way in which Schelling formulates the opposition of the original Science of Knowledge to the System of Identity. Fichte is held not to have the true conception of knowledge (which is rightly conceived only as the self-affirmation of God), as he regards it only as *our* knowledge of the absolute; hence he never gets beyond his own consciousness, admits only facts of his own consciousness, whereas the philosophy of nature to which he is inimical, proves the self-affirmation of God also in the facts of consciousness, not, however, in them alone, but everywhere, even in nature. Further, Fichte, like our whole culture, is ruled by a self-imposed un-nature which opposes subject and object, one and many, even declares thought, which, arbitrarily, ignores true reality, to be a necessary limit. Accordingly, he has no presentiment of the truth that, according to Schelling, things which as individuals exist only through this thought, exist neither in nor out of thought, but are merely the product of a corrupted reflection; just as little, that the one apart from the many, likewise, exists only for the arbitrary reflecting thought, whereas reason, which is distinguished from the understanding not as a wholly different faculty, but merely by the fact that the understanding views everything in non-totality, the reason in totality, recognises the truth only in the union of unity and plurality; in the vital unity, as which, God, like the plant, which is one by the fact that it combines in itself many things, is the copula of the one and the many. If God be so conceived, it is also recognised that His being consists in His revealing Himself in the real, and being real activity. Philo-

sophy is consequently the philosophy of nature, since God is essentially nature. If, *per impossibile*, there were no nature, and I thought God clearly, the real world would be fulfilled for me, which is just the meaning of the so frequently misconceived unity of the ideal and real, which asserts that for true knowledge the world of thought has become that of nature. The true knowledge of God is, therefore, a viewing, a seeing; but when we *will* to descend from this seeing, then we do so, and the seeing of that union is changed into the reflected thought of the many on the one hand, and unity on the other. The problem is, to have one's self freed from this pictorial thought (imagination), and to return to the simplicity of seeing and meditating, in order to see things as eternal, instead of, as we now do, thinking them as temporal and spatial, *i.e.*, as nothings.

B.—RECEPTION OF THE SYSTEM OF IDENTITY.

§ 319.

1. The more rapidly philosophical systems succeeded one another after Kant, the more numerous were the standpoints from which Schelling would have been attacked, even if—a circumstance now added—he had not by his arrogant tone called forth such a state of things. That those who looked upon the Kantian philosophy as an error regarded the System of Identity also as one was natural. In their attacks upon this system the contributors to Nicolai's *Neue Allgemeine Deutsche Bibliothek*, and the theologians Franz Berg, in his *Sextus* (Würzburg, 1801), and Jenisch, in his *Critique of the Idealistic System of Religion and Morals* (Leipsic, 1804), met upon common ground. The school of Jacobi followed its master in his polemic against Schelling's Pantheism, and Köpper, von Weiller, and particularly Salat, were pre-eminent in the violence of their attacks upon it. With the Kantians and Semi-Kantians, who antagonized the System of Identity still more than the Science of Knowledge—with C. Chr. Ehrh. Schmid, Bouterwek, Krug,—Fries associated himself, then Reinhold, and not less his opponents Ænesidemus-Schulze and Beck, as well as Mackensen, who in many respects suggests Beck. These opponents, however, who had, more or less, combated also the Science of Knowledge, were finally joined by the author of the latter, Fichte, who expressed

himself with an unparalleled asperity concerning his earlier associate, whom he naturally counted among the realists and empiricists, whereas Reinhold and others had charged against him simply a one-sided idealism and his *a priori* constructions. While all those named combated the System of Identity in the name of another philosophy, there grew up another opponent of this system in the form of the empirical natural sciences. The chief representatives of these declared against Schelling's philosophy of nature, partly because they had foisted upon it an entirely different meaning from its true one, partly because a variety of circumstances, among which the respect for Goethe was not the least important, had made Schelling and his friends unjust despisers of Newton. Lichtenberg was loud in his expressions against the Philosophy of Nature. Gilbert's *Annalen* became the organ for a number of attacks. Cuvier, in spite of the fact that he, like Schelling, was indebted to Kielmeyer for a number of ideas, came to the front of the opponents of the German philosophy of nature in France. In Germany, among the most solid of the attacks against that philosophy were those of Link, who criticised in it particularly the fact that it did not respect the limits within which the law of polarity has validity.

2. As regards the *adherents* of Schelling, the conditions for forming a closed phalanx of followers were not given when method and terminology so often changed, and the most of the writings of the master remained fragments. As a Schellingian of entirely strict observance is to be named, properly, only the above-mentioned GEORG MICHAEL KLEIN (8th of April, 1776 to 19th of March, 1820), whose chief work, the *Contributions to the Study of Philosophy* (1805) is really what JOH. JOSUA STUTZMANN'S (1777–1816) *Philosophy of the Universe* was falsely alleged by his opponents to be,—a Schellingian note-book. Klein appears more independent in his *Theory of the Understanding* (1810), his *Attempt to Establish Ethics as a Science* (1811), and the *Exposition of the Philosophical Theory of Right and Morals* (1818); but these writings altogether have not the interest of his chief work. Stutzmann, also, did not arouse such attention with his later works: *The Philosophy of the History of Humanity* (1805); *Chief Features of the Standpoint, Spirit, and Law of Universal Philosophy* (1811), also his pseudonymous *Monument erected to the Year* 1813, *by Machiavelli the Younger*

(1814). To a certain extent may be placed with Klein and Stutzmann GEORG ANTON FRIEDRICH AST (1778–1841), whose *Handbook of Æsthetics* (1805), and *Outlines of Philosophy* (1809) have found much less favour than his *Outlines of the History of Philosophy* (1807), in which a construction of the same is attempted. The monograph on Plato (1816), occasioned by Schleiermacher's work, is lacking in judicious criticism. Finally, there belongs here a man who gave a popular expression to the pantheism of the System of Identity and thereby extended it to a wider circle, BERNHARD HEINRICH BLASCHE (1776–1832), whose *Evil in the Harmony of the World-Order* (1827); *Philosophy of Revelation* (1829); *The Divine Attributes* (1831), and *Philosophical Theory of Immortality* (1831), are to be mentioned. If we designate by the name of adherents of Schelling, or of Schellingians, all who were stimulated by his ideas and elaborated these in a particular way, the system of which it was just now said that it counted only a few adherents is one of the richest in that regard. Above all was it the natural sciences in which the influence of these ideas may be pointed out, and when, as is common, this is complained of at the present day, it is forgotten that, even supposing that the anti-philosophic natural science of the present day should be a higher step, it could not possibly have become so without that lower one. It borders on blindness to regard the works of an Autenrieth, Döllinger, Carus, Nees von Esenbeck, Treviranus, Burdach and others as valueless, or to say that they would have value in spite of their being coloured by the Philosophy of Nature. Less numerous are the works in which ideas of Schelling have been applied to the sphere of the theory of mind, of ethics and history, and here are prominent the names of S. Ehrhardt, Thanner, Fessler and others. Finally, in the works of Görres and others the sciences of nature and of mind are combined. More complete accounts, and particularly a list, of the works of these men are to be found in § 36 of my larger work, which has been frequently mentioned.

3. Between the adherents and opponents stand the *emendators* of the System of Identity, as regards whom reference is to be made to § 38 of my work just now named. These are divided into two groups, one group modifying the System of Identity as the Semi-Kantians (*vid.* § 305) had modified Criticism, by an amalgamation with other elements, whereas

the work of the other may be compared with that of Reinhold and his opponents (§§ 307 and 308), who undertook to make a change in Criticism by working from within outward. Of the former are to be mentioned here, first, Eschenmayer and Schubert. ADAM CARL AUGUST ESCHENMAYER (4th of Jan., 1771 to 17th of Nov., 1852), stimulated first by Kielmeyer's lectures and the Kantian philosophy of nature, the influence of which is recognisable in his Doctor's Dissertation (1796), as also in his *Theorems from the Metaphysics of Nature* (1797), came in consequence of this into correspondence with Schelling, a correspondence by which they were mutually benefited. Entirely in agreement with Schelling and his friends in the philosophy of nature, Eschenmayer early believed he had found out that there must be assumed outside of and above the All a Master of it, which philosophy does not know. Hence the title of his work, *Philosophy in its Transition to Not-Philosophy* (1803), which Schelling called a noteworthy production, and which, as was above stated (§ 318, 8), occasioned the composition of his work, *Philosophy and Religion.* The same thoughts were developed in a popular dress in *The Hermit and the Stranger* (1805), as also in the *Introduction to Nature and History* (1806), and again, as in the first-named work, happiness was set above finitude, infinitude, and eternity, the soul above sense, understanding, and reason, conscience above thought, imagination, and intellectual perception,—belief, in short, above speculation, though it does not do away with that, inasmuch as it has to do with the sphere between which and speculation the absolute forms the limit. After 1811, he was professor of medicine and philosophy in Tübingen, where he was deeply interested particularly in the phenomena of animal magnetism, and, again incited by a work of Schelling's, the treatise on Freedom, he published his *Letter to Schelling* (1813), which Schelling answered in the same journal. In the year 1817 appeared his *Psychology*, in three parts, which, in the year 1822, went through a second edition. Connected with this, as its foundation, is the *System of Moral Philosophy* (1818), and the *Normal Right* (2 vols., 1818–19), and finally, at the apex of the system, the *Philosophy of Religion* (3 vols., 1818–24), which sets supernaturalism above rationalism (Kant's, Fichte's, Schelling's, Chr. Weiss's) and mysticism (Swedenborg's and Böhme's). In the last period of his life it was his blind fondness for spiritualistic manifestations, and the not less blind

hatred toward the Hegelian philosophy, that made his writings rather insipid. The *Outlines of the Philosophy of Nature* (1832), the *Hegelian Philosophy of Religion* (1834), the *Iscariotism of our Day* (1835; against Strauss), the *Characteristic of Disbelief*, etc. (1838), the *Main Features of a Christian Philosophy* (1838), exhibit him in this stadium of his development.

4. In many respects suggesting Eschenmayer, though differing widely from him in others, is GOTTHILF HEINRICH SCHUBERT (26th April, 1780 to 1st July, 1860), who, as a pupil, was personally stimulated by Herder in Weimar, and as a student in Jena by Schelling, and whose first works are wholly in the philosophy of nature, *e.g.*: *The Presentiments of a Universal History of Life* (Leips., 1806–21); the often-reprinted *Views of the Dark Side of Natural Science* (1808); *On the Quantitative Relations and Eccentricities of the Universe* (1808), which were later described by him as works that in the thought of the mirror (Nature) forget the visage (God). Even in the *Handbook of Natural History* (1813), still more in *Old and New in the Sphere of the Inner Knowledge of the Soul* (1817), and in the *Universal Natural History* (1826), which was later worked-over into the *History of Nature* (3 vols. 1835–37), the religious element is very conspicuous. *The Primeval World and the Fixed Stars* (1823), as also *On the Unity in the Structural Plan of the Earth-mass* (1835), are the last works of Schubert's that relate to nature below man. After the appearance of his often-reprinted work, *History of the Soul* (1830), from which the *Text-Book of the Science of Man and the Soul* (1838) gives only an extract, he occupied himself almost exclusively with psychology. The *Diseases and Perturbations of the Human Soul* (1845) treat of a single topic in this branch, and present, particularly in the way in which somnambulism is treated, a much more judicious view than that of Eschenmayer. The religiosity, also, that animates Schubert is much more healthy than that of Eschenmayer. But, finally, he is distinguished from Eschenmayer by a modification of what he drew from Schelling, a modification that places him, much more than Eschenmayer, in close relation with those who advance beyond the System of Identity (*vid.* §§ 322, 323). According to him, that is to say, opposition exists only between separate steps, *i.e.*, real opposition, which requires the same level for the things

opposed, does not exist. Hence as male stands opposed to female only as it is above it, so also spirit is not so much opposed to, as, rather, above, nature. As this fundamental principle secures Schubert against the pantheistic co-ordination of God and the World, so does it determine the position which, in spite of the fact that he delights in the saying of Oetinger, "Corporeality is the end of the way of God," he assigns to the soul, a position far higher than to the body. Not only does this make it difficult for him to show clearly how the third principle in man, the spirit, is related to these two, but he often thereby incurs the danger of falling into the errors of those whom he himself severely criticises, who regard the body of man as an outer vesture, the soul alone as the whole man. The various relations in which Schubert lived, as practising physician, miner, school-director, tutor of a prince, and professor of natural history, and the journeys he made, give to the otherwise very attractive personality a variety of interests which made it doubly amiable; hence the extended circle of acquaintances, friends, and admirers in all ranks, confessions, sexes, ages, for whom his warm love-craving heart beat.

Cf. G. H. Schubert: *Der Erwerb aus einem vergangenen und die Erwartungen von einem künftigen Leben, eine Selbstbiographie.* 2 vols. Erlangen, 1854–55.

5. Where a system is modified by the incorporation of theories of religion, even he who would forbid in a history of philosophy all confessional considerations must admit that this modification takes on a different form when the reviser is a Protestant from that taken on when he is a Catholic. Hence the efforts of Eschenmayer and Schubert are to be distinguished from, in fact to a certain extent to be opposed to, the labours of the elder Windischmann and Molitor. CARL HIERONYMUS WINDISCHMANN, born on the 24th of Aug., 1775, at Mainz, passed over, from the study (in Würzburg) of philosophy to that of medicine, which he continued in Vienna under P. Frank, and lived, next, as court-physician in Aschaffenburg, at the same time, however, occupying himself with philosophy, in lectures and writings. In this he allied himself so closely with Schelling that the latter received his performances into his *Zeitschrift, e.g.*, the dissertation on the *Conception of Physics* (1802), and commended them, whereas others charged him with "apish repetition." Besides a

translation of the Platonic *Timæus* (1804), which is dedicated to Schelling, and the annotations upon which are filled with an enthusiasm for the ἓν καὶ πᾶν, the correspondence with Schelling respecting which was for a long time very angry, Windischmann published *Ideas for Physics* (Würzburg, 1805), which was followed by the work, *The Self-Annihilation of Time* (Heidelberg, 1807), in which subjective idealism is antagonized and the thoughts suggested already in the *Timæus*, concerning time and eternity, are carried out. The *Investigations relating to Astrology, Alchemy, and Magic* (Frankfort, 1813) evince something of the fondness, then prevailing with many Schellingians, for magnetic and visionary states. Very important was it for Windischmann's development and activity that in the year 1818 he went to Bonn as Professor of Medicine and Philosophy. Here he soon became the centre of the circle of intellectual men, particularly the Catholics, in the Rhine province and its vicinity. At the same time his own antagonism and that of his friends to the Hermesians, became conspicuous (*vid.* § 305, 8–11). In what Windischmann wrote in Bonn there is plainly perceptible the influence of Hegel, whose opposition to the philosophy of reflection (*vid.* § 329, 1) he had earlier severely criticised, but who had greatly influenced him by his *Phenomenology*, and still more by the *Logic*, and the oral conversation relating to it. Appearing first as a supplement to the *Evening Hours* of the Count of Maistre, but afterwards published as a special work, was the *Critical Considerations regarding the Fortunes of Philosophy in Modern Times* (Frankfort, 1828). Here the dependence upon Hegel proceeds so far in individual passages that the latter himself complained about it. Perhaps this would not have occurred, if the work which had previously appeared: *A Desideratum in the Art of Medicine* (Leips., 1824), had not, by its strict Catholic standpoint's having close affinity with Hegel, prejuduced Goethe, for example, against Windischmann. When this essay appeared, Windischmann had been labouring for thirty years upon his extensive work: *Philosophy in the Progress of the World's History* (4 vols., Bonn, 1827–1834). In the literary disputes beginning after the death of Hermes, Windischmann did not take part, although he is accused of having caused the condemnation of the doctrines of Hermes at Rome. Certain is it that these disputes drove him more and more into an extreme position, which did not really accord

with his nature. When he died, on the 23rd of April, 1839, he was to many the head of the Rhenish Ultramontanes. —The two-fold character of Windischmann's calling made it easy for him to combine the pathologico-therapeutic standpoint with the philosophico-historical, and he accordingly sees in the movements of philosophy a process, often interrupted by arresting crises, of fallen humanity. To him one of the most significant of the phenomena of modern times is Hegel's *Logic*, because it has taken a great step toward the knowledge that only by surrendering to the Eternal Logos, whose movement the *Logic* is, is philosophy to be rescued. He will not dispute with Hegel when the latter particularly urges that, in order to attain that end, man must toil hard and subject himself to the strictest discipline. He hopes, especially after his *viva voce* conversations with Hegel, that even Hegel may see that toiling is only the first step, and the fulfilled perfection lies in the knowledge that our apprehension of the Logos is only its spontaneous revelation in us. Without this fulfilment more mischievous errors than all that have hitherto existed connect themselves with Hegel's *Logic*. Add to this, that in this as in his other works Windischmann espouses mysticism as against the understanding imprisoned in the finite, and one may wonder that he did not adopt rather the views of Franz von Baader (*vid.* § 325), who, for his part, was prepared to praise Windischmann highly. One reason, among others, was that the Mystics in whom Baader delighted were particularly Master Eckhart, prior to the Reformation, and the Protestant Böhme, whereas Windischmann, when he celebrated the Mystics, had in mind particularly Malebranche—circumstances that explain why Windischmann appears the more orthodox and Baader the more liberal. The chief work of Windischmann aimed so to present the history of philosophy that in it the history of intelligence in the progress of the world's history might be recognised. The faith in truth which was divined by the believers in innate ideas and which is ineradicable from the human mind, develops into the knowledge of the same, so that the history of philosophy is the history of the conception of truth in the human species. According to the plan of the work, the First Part was to have presented the foundation of philosophy in the Orient, the Second the completed structure of philosophy in classical antiquity, the Third the

full content, the critique and scientific extension of philosophy in the Christian periods of the world. The First Part was not completed, since its four divisions, in as many volumes, treat only of China and India; but of the Russians and Egyptians, with whom the transition to Greek philosophy was to have been made, nothing was written. What we have, does not, indeed, evince the intemperate over-estimation of Hindoo wisdom which prevailed among some when that wisdom first became known, but constantly idealizes too much, if not the present, at least the original, condition among the Chinese and Hindoos. The Introduction discusses the relation of philosophy to the history of the world, and repeatedly arrives at the result that the attainment of wisdom and growth in it are not to be conceived as the work of man, but as the self-revelation of the highest wisdom.

6. Like Windischmann, whom he highly respects, FRANZ JOSEPH MOLITOR (1799–1860) was first stimulated by Schelling. As such he appears in his *Journal for a Science of Right to be Established in the Future*, which he edited with Kollmann (Frankfort-on-the-Main, 1802). So also in his *Ideas for a Future Dynamic of History* (Frankfort-on-the-Main, 1805), only that in this he requires that Schelling's ideas be supplemented by the theories announced by Fr. v. Schlegel and Görres. Next is very conspicuous the influence of Baader's works. This appears already in the *Turning-point of the Ancient and Modern* (Frankfort-on-the-Main, 1805), but still more in his letter to Sinclair, *On the Philosophy of the Modern World* (1806). But it makes itself much more perceptible in his chief work, which remained incomplete: *Philosophy and History, or On Tradition* (1st vol., Frankfort-on-the-Main, 1827; wholly re-written in 1855; 2nd vol., Münster, 1834; 3rd, Münster, 1839; 4th, Münster, 1853 [First Part]). The chief impulse to this noteworthy book was given by the earnest studies relating to Judaism and particularly the Cabala, to which Metz had incited him. But at the same time, Molitor recognises the great merits of the later Schellingian writings of Schubert, Eschenmayer, Baader, Günther and others. Since among these are to be found some who will be treated only in the third volume of this work, the doubt might arise whether Molitor also ought not to be assigned to it. This was not done, however, because the influence that he exerted as the intellectual centre

of a wide circle, which was greater, almost, than that of his works, was at its height thirty years ago, and his views were at that time already fully developed. — Since there intervenes between the publication of his first and that of the fourth volume a quarter of a century, it is explicable that what is mentioned at an earlier point is discussed later more in detail; hence the repetitions and sudden transitions that increase the difficulty of reading the work. In the *first volume*, in ten sections, the history of oral tradition among the Jews is narrated, the importance of the same for Christianity is discussed, investigations relating to speech and writing and to M'sorah and tradition of law are instituted. The *second volume* abandons historical ground; discussing the speculative knowledge of God, in the first section; attempting, in the second, to develop the universal principles of theosophy; considering, finally, in the third, the necessity of a divine revelation and the relation of knowledge to faith. The *third volume*, on the other hand, returns again to historical investigations, the first of its three sections discussing Paganism, Judaism, and Christianity, in general; the second, giving a special account of Judaism, particularly the Jewish doctrine of impurity; the third, closely connected with the foregoing, treating of purity and reconciliation. The *fourth Part* is announced in its first section as a supplement to the fifth and sixth sections of the first Part, inasmuch as, like that Part, it shows the importance of the Cabala to Christianity, whereas its second section, which treats of Christian philosophy, connects itself with what was developed in the second Part. The exposition of Molitor's doctrines will have to confine itself particularly to these two volumes. Since the human mind bears within itself only the germ of knowledge, it requires on account of this femininely-receptive nature, a fructifying influence from without; this is exerted upon it, on the one hand by the world, on the other by the self-revealing Godhead, so that all knowledge, without exception, begins with the *a posteriori*, which is elevated by the self-activity of the mind to a higher *a priori* state. As regards, now, divine revelation, there has always been, besides the written revelation, which, being sententious, requires explanation, the explanatory one, which is transmitted orally only; to the former as body the latter constitutes the soul. Since only a small portion of mankind, in the transition of mankind from the period of

childhood to that of youth, preserves the immediate intuition of God, the immediate feeling and experience of God, akin to somnambulism, whereas the rest of mankind fall away wholly into reflection and even idolatry—for this reason, that small remnant (the Jews) have remained in exclusive possession of writing and tradition. (That the latter also was later written, happened only because the living spirit that was its bearer became lost.) As the written law within Judaism is related to mystical tradition, so is Judaism itself related to Christianity. The latter is only the completion and fulfilment of Judaism; and, as in the law and the history of the patriarchs the entire future of the Church of Christ lies concealed in a figurative form, the new covenant of grace is thus united in the typical covenant of the law, and in such a manner that it lacks, properly speaking, the Thorah, is only oral tradition, mystically transformed Judaism. Here also, for the rest, appears an age in which this mystically ideal condition yields to the realism of a Church with dogmas and statutes. That the ideal does not lose itself in these, is the care of a higher mysticism, which, because it occupies the same position towards the Church-doctrine as tradition and Cabala do towards the Thorah, must present relationship with that; and again, since in it the unity of the ideal and real is attained, has for its basis modern speculation, which is real-idealism. It is thus clear why Molitor in developing this higher mysticism always employs the formulas: Under the guidance of the Cabala a deduction is here made from the principles of modern speculation, or, What the Cabala teaches dogmatically is here speculatively construed, and the like. The erroneous extremes which this higher mystic, *i.e.*, the Christian philosophy, has to avoid are given as pantheism, atheistic atomism, likewise spiritualism and materialism. Whereas deism does not get beyond an inconsistent halfness, the theory of the personal (triune) God is just as consistent and not so one-sided as pantheism. Particularly, it alone is able to supply a living knowledge of nature, a knowledge embracing even magic, and to conduct to an ethics which teaches true purity and sincerity, which consists in the being permeated by God, the "deification" of the older Mystics. Finally, it alone enables us to estimate rightly the meaning of evil, and to perceive that the being permeated by God, not in the quietistic, but in an active manner, in the three stages of sanctification, illu-

mination, and transfiguration, is a real God-service. The self-active sacrificing of one's own personality to God is neither a (pantheistic) being-absorbed, nor an (atheistic) assertion of the same.

7. In a manner altogether different from that of Eschenmayer and Schubert or of Windischmann and Molitor, Wagner and Troxler attempt, nearly contemporaneously with those men, but with a very different result, to improve the System of Identity. What leads them to a modification of the system is not a religious interest, to say nothing, therefore, of a confessional interest, but the knowledge that the system falls behind its own requirements. For this reason it would be improper here, as it was necessary in dealing with the aforenamed, to lay stress upon the fact that both belong to different confessions. It has its ground, not in the fact that they present a sharper contrast than the two Protestants and the two Catholics, but in a suggestion that may be found in the author of the System of Identity itself. Since Schelling had himself distinguished in many passages indifference of opposites from identity, but in both the opposition is negatived, though in an opposite way, the indifference-point, in the schema of the System, is, exactly taken, extended to a line and consists in the crossing of two opposites, and the rhythmus of the system is not triplicity but quadruplicity. This fact was perceived by the acute JOHANN JACOB WAGNER (21st Jan., 1775 to 22nd Nov., 1821)—who in his *Theory of Heat and Light* (1802), and his *Nature of Things* (1803), as also in the work *On the Principle of Life* (1803), had shown himself to be a pure Schellingian—at about the same time that he recognised that Schelling was on the point of abandoning his System of Identity. In his, *System of Ideal Philosophy* (1804), and in the works: *On the Nature of Philosophy* (1804); *Outlines of the Science of Politics* (1805), the principle of method: To construe is to cross, is, in part, merely advocated, in part, carried out. To it Wagner remained true in all his works. So in the works, *Philosophy and Medicine* (1805), and *Ideas for a Mythology of the Ancient World* (1808), which more than any other work maintains the pantheism of the System of Identity, whereas the originator of that system had already pushed beyond that; so, above all, in his *Mathematical Philosophy* (1811) and his *State* (1815), as also in the work, *Religion, Science, Art and State Considered in their Mutual*

Relations (1819), and the *Organon of Human Knowledge* (1830). As, according to Wagner, Schelling had not done in regard to form, what, properly, he should have done, so he had not at all, or at least not sufficiently, in regard to matter. The parallelism of the ideal and the real, to which Schelling had rightly drawn attention, demands that the agreement between the laws of knowledge and of the world, which is the most decided of all, be demonstrated. Since, now, the former are mathematical, mathematics and knowledge coincide, thought is calculation, words are fractions, even and odd are the same as masculine and feminine, chemical analysis is a division, in which the reagent employed functions as a divisor, etc. Wagner was so convinced of the necessity of viewing everything methodically, that he not only, in his *System of Private Economy*, treated every detail tetradically, but he greeted with pleasure the fact that another pursued an exactly similar course with the implements of a distillery. Conscious, tetradic method was so much the alpha and omega of thinking, that he asserted that the period in which genius was required in a poet had departed with Goethe. His *School of Poets* (2nd ed., 1850) gave a method by which entirely without genius one might produce works of art of the highest order, particularly mythological works of art.

8. In agreement with Wagner as regards quadruplicity of members in the correct method, is IGNAZ PAUL VITAL TROXLER (17th August, 1780 to 6th March, 1866). He also had shown himself in his first works: *Ideas for the Foundation of Nosology and Therapy* (1803); *Essays in Organic Physics* (1804); *Outlines of a Theory of Medicine* (1805), and the works: *On Life and its Problem* (1807); and *Elements of Biosophy* (1807), so faithful an adherent of Schelling that his opponents called him a plagiarist of his master, who gave to him, apropos of this, a very commendatory testimonial. The *Glances into the Nature of Man* (1812) is his public disavowal of the Philosophy of Nature. In this he first states the requirement that the governing method should everywhere be that of fourfold division through mutually crossing opposites; then it is also brought to light, how, nevertheless, from a presupposition entirely similar to that of Wagner he draws an entirely opposite consequence. Since the laws of the (real) All can be no other than those of the (ideal) emotional nature, this middle-point of the mutually

crossing opposites body and spirit, body and soul, Troxler, in order to comprehend the former, buries himself in the study of the latter, bases philosophy on anthropology, converts it, to employ his terminology, into anthroposophy. Hence also his most important works are: *The Natural Theory of Human Knowledge, or Metaphysics* (1828), and *Logic* (3 vols., 1830). Regarding his relation to Schelling on the one hand, and Jacobi on the other, he has expressed himself in his Basle inaugural programme, *On Philosophy*, etc. (1830). While professor in Bern he published his lectures on Philosophy as *Encyclopædia and Methodology of the Philosophical Sciences* (1835). The full agreement, often reaching literalness, between Wagner's and Troxler's theories does not preclude, in fact alone renders possible, their diametrical opposition. This opposition begins with their theory of knowledge, in which Troxler lays the greatest stress upon instinctive immediate knowledge, whereas Wagner makes even the poem proceed from cool reflection. It continues through their political and ethical views, when Wagner concedes to the total-organism decided preponderance, says a word first for the absolutism of the monarch, then of the State, whereas Troxler is a republican, who honours Milton, Buchanan, and Rousseau as his teachers. It shows itself, finally, in the highest of all regions. Wagner, being a pantheist, never feels the longing to know his individual existence as immortal, whereas, according to Troxler, personal immortality is the real question of the day. It accords, finally, with these contrasts, that Wagner accepts only the earliest, Troxler, on the contrary, particularly the latest, of Schelling's writings.

§ 320.

Concluding Remark upon the System of Identity.

1. The requirement stated by Fichte, and already adopted by us, that philosophy should be ideal-realism or real-idealism, has obviously been more fully met by the System of Identity than by the Science of Knowledge, and Schelling can, in the consciousness of its superior position, incorporate the Science of Knowledge into his system as one part, and complain if that system is called the Philosophy of Nature, as if it contained only the second part. Just so has

he satisfied more fully than Fichte the problem stated by Fichte, and likewise adopted by us, that Kant's theories should not be rejected, but should be more deeply founded; inasmuch as he takes the *Critique of Judgment* as the basis of his system. Were these, therefore, the only problems put before the most modern philosophy, the System of Identity would be the last fruit of this philosophy. But besides that first Fichtean requirement, there was given (*vid.* § 296, 2) above as the second, that the opposition of the pantheistic philosophy of the seventeenth, and the atheistic philosophy of the eighteenth century, be reconciled in a higher unity. And, again, there lay contained in the Fichtean historical requirement, also the requirement that the fourth of Kant's masterpieces: *Religion within the Limits of Mere Reason*, be wrought into the texture of philosophy. Schelling, as thus far expounded, had not performed either of these tasks, but he had prepared the way for them; for the first, that is to say, by the System of Identity itself, for the second, as will be shown, by the fact that he outgrew it.

2. It has been remarked above (*vid.* § 318, 10) that, as in antiquity Heraclitus, by his polemic against the Eleatics, came, in spite of his higher standpoint, into opposition to them, and hence sank to the same level with them, so a somewhat similar experience befell the System of Identity, because of the polemic of its author against the Science of Knowledge. This polemic, in so far as the severe criticisms made upon the Science of Knowledge really affect it, is of minor importance. Decisive, on the other hand, is what Schelling regards here as an objection, for in so doing he declares the opposite of that to be the truth. Just the same holds true of the not less severe criticisms which Fichte pours out upon the System of Identity. If, therefore, Fichte charges Schelling with returning to Spinoza, or places him wholly with Locke, on the ground that he raises questions in which, since Leibnitz, there could be no meaning, it is clear how fully he places himself upon the side of the latter, of whom he says, accordingly, that Leibnitz had been perhaps one of the few philosophers who were convinced by their doctrines, which had been impossible with Spinoza. When, on the other hand, Schelling in a posthumous essay constantly places Fichte and Leibnitz together as representatives of the philosophy of reflection; when he calls the philosophy of the first a philosophy of the

Fall of man, because it sets the individual Ego above everything else; when he brings the charge, that it is really only a plagiarism of Rousseau (*Pygmalion*), or also, that it is at bottom only psychology, there may be read out of these, in part unjustifiable, objections, what he also expresses in this period, that the only true philosopher is Spinoza, who denies individuality. Thus have these two philosophers, who began with Kant and went beyond him, again revived, upon a Critical basis,—as Reinhold and his opponents called back to life the opposition that divided the eighteenth century, and which, as it appeared, Kant had resolved,—the opposition of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries in such a manner that, whereas Kant had given it a provisional solution, it reaches now a definitive one. The Science of Knowledge exhibits the Enlightenment of the eighteenth century transformed by Criticism, with its view of nature as merely a means to the (according to Fichte, moral) ends of man, with its interest for the individual personality and its immortality, with its atomistico-revolutionary politics, its plans of education aiming at the regeneration of the race, its prosaic view of a work of art, and its religion of right-doing, which, if taken seriously, must reduce God to a mere moral postulate. (At this point may be entirely omitted the many points of contact between Leibnitz's monad and Fichte's Ego, between Leibnitz's corporeal world, which is only a confused idea, and that of Fichte, which is produced unconsciously, between the pre-established harmony of the former and the moral order of the world of the latter). Just so in Schelling, not only innumerable thoughts but the whole spirit of Spinoza, only as permeated by Criticism, celebrate their resurrection. Nature is here the absolute, even is, in unguarded moments, called God, and, in the heat of the battle against the *enemy* of nature, there happens to Schelling what he constantly forbids in his opponents: he calls his (whole) system the Philosophy of Nature. Individual being as such is nothing true, but is a creation of our isolating mode of thought. Personal immortality appears as the wish, and perhaps as the punishment, of miserable egoists, surrender to the absolute as eternal life. In politics it is the total-organism, as opposed to which the individual is as nothing; and the French Emperor, who tramples revolution to the earth, is explained to be almost a superhuman nature. In

the place of ceaseless labour, there appears here a contemplativeness rising even to quietism; opposed to the atheism of Fichte, who conceived God not as being but as Ought, there appears a pantheism to which God is the only being, a being unaffected by manifoldness and change.

3. As, by the advent of Reinhold and his opponents, the problem was more fully propounded than it had been by Kant, of reconciling Locke with Leibnitz, Berkeley and Wolff with Hume and Condillac, so, by the conflict between the Science of Knowledge and the System of Identity, there is more completely stated than had previously been done, the requirement of resolving the dispute between the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. In the solving of this problem, Kant, as was above (*vid.* § 301, 1) remarked, remains much further from a true solution than in the case of the first; hence the two members of the opposition to be resolved must show themselves much freer from what had already been accomplished by him. If he regarded Fichte not as a hypercritical friend, as he did Reinhold, Maimon, and Beck, but as a blundering corrupter of his doctrine, his judgment concerning Schelling would, had Schelling's works been known to him, hardly have sounded milder. Here those who kept nearer to him, have, instead of him, been those who complained.

FIFTH DIVISION.

Pantheism, Individualism, and their Mediation upon a Critical Basis.

A.—HERBART AND SCHOPENHAUER.

§ 321.

Critical Reaction against the System of Identity and the Science of Knowledge.

1. What, already, the common father of the two conflicting systems had maintained, had been constantly insisted upon by both of these systems, viz., that true philosophy must transcend all partial views, reconcile all oppositions. But that they themselves formed an opposition in which each represented only one side, is so obviously in conflict with this

requirement, that the philosophic spirit could not but strive to get beyond them. In this transcendence are to be distinguished a negative and a positive moment. The first is the explanation that these two systems are untrue, that they fall short of what Kant had begun. The second recognises in each of these a half-truth. Since this latter is equivalent to recognising truth and untruth at the same time, he who maintains the positive moment allows the negative at the same time, and therefore has more to offer than he who merely asserts the negative moment. Herein lies the reason why, when systems make their appearance simultaneously, of which, the one, in the name of rightly understood Kantism, rejects the Science of Knowledge and the System of Identity, while the other seeks to unite both in a higher system, the former must be unable to get a hearing, and the latter alone is heeded. The time when those will be remembered who combated each of the component elements, will have come only when men become doubtful as to the truth of these mediating doctrines. Thus is explained how Herbart and Schopenhauer, who are filled with equal reverence for Kant and contempt for the "fashionable philosophy," *i.e.* the Science of Knowledge and the System of Identity, remain so long unnoticed, and why the period of deserved recognition could first come to the two only a short time before their death. But that the two form between them an opposition which is almost as sharp as that between the systems combated by them, has its ground in the fact that Criticism had reduced to unity a variety of oppositions the members of which could, when they once became free, enter into a variety of combinations with each other, inasmuch as it was not impossible that the first member of the one should combine with the second of the other, etc., and that, demonstrably, the Science of Knowledge, the System of Identity, Herbart's and Schopenhauer's doctrines present four separate combinations. By its antagonism to the one-sided idealism of the Science of Knowledge, the System of Identity had acquired a prevailingly realistic, as the Science of Knowledge had acquired, through Fichte's antagonism to Schelling's pantheism, a one-sidedly individualistic, character. Herbart, overlooking these special one-sidednesses as such, censures the former for his pantheism, the latter for his idealism, and himself advocates an individualistic realism. Schopenhauer does the reverse: to

him idealism is the only true philosophy. But he equally maintains the complete nullity of the individual, and his doctrine is, consequently, pantheistic idealism. Each, of course, criticises in Fichte and Schelling and commends in Kant exactly the opposite of that which the other criticises and commends. And, equally of course, the one would leave out of the Kantian doctrine all that must lead to idealism and pantheism, whereas the other rejects, as Kantian weaknesses, what might become the germ of realism and atomism.

2. JOHANN FRIEDRICH HERBART (4th May, 1776 to 24th August, 1841) often called himself a Kantian, but then added that he was a Kantian of the year 1828, who rejected Kant's idealistic theories of time, space, and the categories, and his *Critique of Judgment.* This is all literally correct: he really took his starting-point with Kant, but at the same time waived what had led Kant's followers to idealism and pantheism. Among his works, which his pupil Hartenstein has published in twelve volumes (Leipsic, L. Voss, 1850–52), that which gives the best *conspectus* of the whole system is the *Text-Book for Introduction to Philosophy* (first appeared 1813, Wks., i. pp. 1 ff.). For the theoretical philosophy the most important works are: *Chief Points in Metaphysics* (1808, Wks., iii., pp. 1 ff.); *Universal Metaphysics, together with Elements of the Philosophical Theory of Nature* (1829, Wks., iii. and iv.); *Psychological Investigations upon the Strength of a Presentation* (1812, Wks., vii. pp. 29 ff.); *On the Possibility and Necessity of applying Mathematics to Psychology* (1822, Wks., vii. pp. 129 ff.), and particularly: *Psychology as a Science* (1824–25, Wks., v. and vi.). Finally, for practical philosophy: *Universal Practical Philosophy* (1808, Wks., viii. pp. 1 ff.) and *Analytical Examination of Natural Right and Morals* (1836, Wks., viii. p. 213).

3. In opposition to the polemic against the philosophy of reflection, which had become the fashion, particularly among the Schellingians, Herbart emphasizes the thought that all philosophy springs from attention to conceptions, hence from reflection, and, precisely viewed, consists only in the elaboration of conceptions. This elaboration, however, is different in the different parts, and upon this fact depends a difference of method in the individual parts. Thus in *Logic*, with which, just for this reason, the beginning must be made, this elaboration has to do solely with rendering conceptions clear

and distinct, which happens particularly through the judgment,—the first through the negative, the second through the positive judgment. Depending upon this is the syllogism, the first two figures of which correspond to the positive and negative judgment, and are classed together under the name of the syllogism of subsumption; whereas the third, which, however, has only four valid moods, is termed by Herbart the syllogism of substitution, because it has validity only in case a certain substitution (of the minor) is admissible. Logic supplies, as an unalterable result, to all parts of philosophy the *principium identitatis* and the *principium exclusi tertii* (which coincides with the other), according to which, whenever conceptions are self-contradictory, they must be rejected and their contradictory opposite assumed. If, now, we pass from the merely logical, formal aspect of conceptions to their content, we find them divided into two leading classes. There are, that is to say, conceptions by means of which we apprehend the given, *i.e.*, what passes as real for us, or what we call the world; in other words, conceptions by means of which we have a physics. The elaboration of these is, hence, appropriately termed Meta*physics*. But, further, there are conceptions that have nothing whatever to do with the reality of the conceived, being applied equally to the obviously supposititious case, and these are the conceptions that are accompanied by approval and disapproval, and which are treated of by *Æsthetics*, of which practical philosophy forms a part. These two classes of conceptions are to be strictly distinguished from each other, which Kant, who has, nevertheless, the great merit of having opposed to one another theoretical and practical reason, Being and Ought, has not sufficiently done; hence he bases his practical philosophy upon the theoretical conception of freedom,—has, in fact, introduced the absurd expression "metaphysics of morals." In order not to violate "cleanness of conceptions," upon which Herbart constantly insists, and to facilitate the forgetting of all theoretical views in the consideration of what should be, he places in his *Text-Book for Introduction to Philosophy* practical philosophy before metaphysics, in which my complete exposition of the system of Herbart follows him. If the opposite is done here, it is to make more apparent the connection of Herbart with Kant and his relation to Fichte and Schelling.

4. By *metaphysics* Herbart understands, as does Wolff, whom, among all the philosophers, he had first learned to know, the entire theoretical philosophy. In this, according to him, Kant has happily gotten us out of the mire, by showing (in opposition to the earlier dogmatism) that the complex of all that is given, which we call Nature, as also all that we know, contains only phenomena, but at the same time (in opposition to idealism), distinguished things-in-themselves from phenomena, and so recognised the principle, which must not be given up, that as the smoke implies a fire, so does appearance being, so that as much manifestation of being is given as there is appearance given. All theoretical philosophy must start with the given (the phenomenon), but not stop there (in that case it would be mere physics), but must inquire after the being manifested by the phenomenal, and thus become *meta*physics. The necessity for that lies in the fact that the given, *i.e.*, that which we cannot help perceiving (to which belong not only sensations but whatever else is connected with them,—forms, which Herbart calls experience-conceptions), shows itself, upon closer attention, to be self-contradictory, and hence, according to the prime law of logic, requires an elaboration of these conceptions, which may be described as the making of experience-conceptions conceivable. If, for example, change is given in the world of phenomena, change being a self-contradictory conception, there arises, since the real cannot be self-contradictory, the problem of explaining under what conditions the appearance of changes can arise. (That every one in thought *adds* to change a cause, is a proof that the unchanged thought of change is unbearable.) Metaphysics therefore, should not, as the Kantians would have it, be repudiated but reformed; it should not be converted into psychology, as it was by Fries, but into an integration of the experience-conceptions, since it passes from the self-contradictory appearance to the real underlying it. The division of Metaphysics follows the Wolffian, but in such a manner that the first part is termed *Universal Metaphysics*, in which ontology would be only a part; the particular or *Applied Metaphysics* is divided into the Philosophy of Nature (for the expression Cosmology is too lofty), Psychology, and Rational Theology. (That the last forms no integral portion of the theoretical philosophy, is evident from the little that Herbart says concerning it. He is unable to get a foundation for it

without practical points of view.) The first part of the universal metaphysics, the *Methodology*, is so connected with the logic that it might just as well be regarded as a part of it. A contradiction in the given occurs wherever conceivability and validity do not coincide, hence wherever two members (M and N) are only separately conceivable, their combination, on the other hand, being given and hence valid; as, for example, in the combination of ground and consequence, where the ground must be thought as preceding the consequence but not like it, and as containing it and not like it. This contradiction is solved by thinking M as the plurality of such as, not being individually like N, the consequence, produce the consequence when taken together. Since the being-taken-together is a relation, this method, which consists in following the rule, What must be thought but cannot be thought as one, we should think as many, is called the method of relations. Herbart compares this procedure with the analysis of a tendency into several as its components, and, since this analysis of the one tendency is accidental, he calls the method also the method of accidental views, a fact that has given occasion for misconceptions. For the rest, he here appeals to the ordinary consciousness, which regards a concurrence of conditions as necessary to inference. Following, now, the Methodology as the second part of the Universal Metaphysics is the *Ontology*, which,—again, with a laudatory recognition of Kant because in his refutation of the ontological proof it is implied that the conception of being contains no What, is mere position,—analyzes the conception of the existent into Being *and* What or quality, which latter, in conjunction with being, may be termed essence, apart from it, an image (like Plato's Ideas). Since only what is positive is compatible with being as mere position, the quality of the existent excludes all negation, but therewith also all gradual differences and all becoming; it is absolutely simple and unchangeable. The Eleatics have the merit, in their polemic against the Many in One, this bane of all metaphysics, which coincides with the absurdity of immature being, of having first rightly grasped the conception of the existent. The Atomists, who taught that the existent is to be thought as manifold, are their complement. Hence: many real beings of absolutely simple but different quality, which are sometimes, though seldom, called also monads, which are non-spatial, non-temporal, and exist in extremely great numbers, and among

which the best known to us are our souls. Only by the assumption of many real beings or a "qualitative atomism," can the contradictory but given conception of an inherence of many properties in one substance be explained by a reduction to causality, without which there is no substantiality, but which is not to be conceived as *causa transiens;* just so, the equally absurd conception of change, which for the rest, as has already been remarked above, even the ordinary consciousness integrates by the assumption of a cause. In this explanation we cannot confine ourselves to what appears, but must descend to that which takes place in the existent (hence what really takes place). There it is discovered that because of the absolute simplicity of that, nothing takes place in the isolated individual nature, but it is conceivable that the meeting of two or more produces in each of them a disturbance and, in consequence of this, a resistance, or a self-conservation as we experience it, for example, in our souls (the only nature the inner occurrences of which are accessible to us) in its ideas, or even, approximately where we observe contrasts in colours or tones. By these disturbances and self-conservations, now, all the phenomena given in experience, of physics and empirical psychology should permit of being explained, so that they, therefore, form the basis of the philosophy of nature and (rational) psychology. But between them and these two parts of Applied Metaphysics are inserted the third and fourth parts of the Universal Metaphysics, so that Synechology forms the transition to the philosophy of nature, Idolology, on the other hand, the transition to psychology. They can therefore be expounded together with these.

5. *Synechology*, so called because the *continuum* is its most important problem, seeks to show that the space-relation is, indeed, mere appearance, but not, as Kant maintains, a subjective, but an objective, appearance, inasmuch as wherever there is objectively given many, not united but capable of being united, there the form of externality must be assumed for *every* intelligence, not only, as with Kant, for man. This space, which is valid for every intelligence and hence intelligible, is not to be conceived as continuous, but each of its dimensions is a fixed (discrete), and, according to the amount of the contiguity (which is the greatest proximity of simple beings), a different, line. If, now, points of two such fixed lines (extremi-

ties of two catheti of equal length) be united by a third (hypothenuse), this appears, on account of its incommensurability, as exceeding the definite number of the contiguity by no integer, and, since there is no reason for assuming this excess between two definite elements of the line, it is assumed between any and every two, and the contiguity becomes the over-plus; hence also pure or independent lines are never thought as *continua*, though dependent lines are so thought, such as those of the geometricians, which are limits of surfaces. The most important conception in this construction is, therefore, that of the imperfect contiguity, according to which conception the points lie thicker than points lying contiguously together. As space, so also time, which is the number of change, is a sum of (time) points, the contiguity of which is here a succession, and which, therefore, would not exist, either if there were only a single being, or if there were no observer. Exactly as space, it, also, is no *continuum*, though it appears so because, besides a series of changes, there begin others, the starting-point of which (like that of the hypothenuse) does not coincide with a time-point of the first line. By the combination of the causality deduced in the Ontology with time and space the data are given for explaining matter, inasmuch as now can be explained the apparent attraction and the just as apparent repulsion, which, therefore, are not to be regarded as primary forces of being but of matter, *i.e.*, of what appears to be concurrence of existent things. Just because space is accidental to being, the fact must also become apparent, that essences lie outside this relation, hence motion cannot—much the rather might rest, *i.e.*, the case, among the numberless ones, in which the velocity equals zero—appear wonderful and requiring explanation. Without an observer there would, of course, as little be motion as time and space, one factor of motion being time, the other velocity: $m=ct$. The *Outlines of the Philosophy of Nature*, which is connected with the synechological investigations, seeks to show how the four cases—that in which the opposition of the elements is strong and nearly equal on both sides, that in which it is strong and very unequal, that in which it is weak and almost equal, that in which it is weak and very unequal,—suffice to explain the most important chemical phenomena, with which, as the most elementary, the philosophy of nature has to begin, viz. caloric, or heat-stuff (non-matter), the motion of which gives the phenomena of heat, electricum and its phe-

nomena in electricity and magnetism, finally, in the fourth case, the phenomena of gravity and light,—without taking refuge in such absurd assumptions as that of effects produced at a distance.

6. As Synechology is related to the Philosophy of Nature, so is Idolology to Psychology, the name *idolology* implying that this branch aims to explain the εἴδωλα contained in our souls. Here, now, is first recognised as a merit of the Science of Knowledge that it begins with the Ego. This is really, though of course in another sense than Fichte had supposed, the starting-point,—the only one, as inherence and change had been for ontology. The Ego is, that is to say, a contradiction; a material contradiction, because the knowledge of knowledge presupposes again a knowledge of this, etc., hence never arrives at a full realization; a formal contradiction, because it is absurd that a presented object should be identical with its subject. The appearance of such identity must, therefore, be explained. The soul, which is, like all that is real, absolutely simple and consequently indestructible, cannot, as ontology has shown, be the substratum of various so-called faculties. Its quality also is, like that of every other real, unknown; it, on the contrary, is the only real as regards which what really occurs in it, its acts of self-conservation against disturbances, is known to us. These are the occurrences that begin with sensations and, for want of another term, may be called presentations, which, as idealism has rightly shown, can be neither the images of things nor effects of them, but are produced by the soul, wherever there is a meeting of it with other (disturbing) beings. Only then does it become a power that produces them. A fundamental investigation necessarily begins with the simplest and most primitive presentations, as sound, colour, etc. Even the circumstance that these are qualitatively different, then, too, the further circumstance, that acts of self-conservation, being positive, cannot annihilate, but only arrest one another, a fact confirmed by every felt contrast, and that, as regards any such kind of arrestings and contrasts, *e.g.*, the harmony of musical tones, it is established that they are subject to mathematical conformity to law, recommends the application of mathematics to these investigations. (If one recalls what Kant [*vid.* § 299, 5] had said regarding the minimum of such application, and combines with that hints contained in his work on Negative Quantity, this innovation does not appear so strange.) As the basis of

the investigation may be taken the proposition, Every arrested presentation remains in the soul as tendency to presentation. This proposition, which follows from the fact that in all changes of what is presented the quantity of the presentation remains the same, justifies the comparison with elastic bodies, and the presupposing, so long as other grounds do not forbid, that as regards presentations arresting each other the same laws hold as those to which (wholly) elastic bodies are subject. Accordingly we have first, a *Statics of the Mind*, which treats of the equilibrium of presentations, and, first of all, fixes the conceptions of the sum of arrest and of the relation of arrest. By the former is understood the quantum of the presentation that is arrested in two meeting presentations; by the latter the relation (corresponding of course to their strength) in which the loss is distributed between the two. What is not arrested but converted into tendency is called the residuum of presentation. If the numerical values of their strength be given, the calculation proves that one presentation only, even though ever so strong, does not suffice wholly to suppress another, though two can do so. The point that forms the limit between existence as tendency and as unconscious presentation is the (statical) threshold of consciousness, and a calculation of the same proves that the possibility of more than three presentations subsisting in consciousness at the same time is comprised within very narrow limits. Besides the mutual conflict among presentations, there follows from the fact that they exist in one soul, also the further fact that they combine: these combinations, when they occur between presentations of different groups (*e.g.*, sound and meaning) are complications: where the presentations belong to one and the same continuum, they are fusions. Of the first are to be distinguished perfect and imperfect complications, according as the combining presentations are not arrested or are mere residua. The fusions, again, are divided into those which follow the arrest, where residua combine, and those which precede the arrest and which appear as the tendency to fusion (the formulæ discovered by calculation are then also given as laws expressed in words). Much more difficult than the Statics is the *Mechanics of the Mind*, in which the motion of presentations, their falling and rising, is treated, and the revival of presentations, their association, as well as the susceptibility for them and their renewal, are subjected to calculation; but

the mathematical formulæ are always translated again into words. What was won in the Statics and Mechanics of Mind by the synthetic method, receives, in the *Analytical Part* (the second) *of Psychology*, such an application as shows how, without the absurd supposition of various faculties of the soul, all phenomena given in experience can be explained by the formulæ developed. So in particular the problem that led to Idolology. The Ego, which, when subject and object are conceived as one, is an absurdity, is, on the other hand, entirely comprehensible when, according to the method of relations, the presented is conceived as manifold. Of course it is only the empirical Ego that is explained; there is no Kantian-Fichtean pure Ego (this position is characteristic of the anti-pantheists. Cf. *supra*, § 301, 1). Not only this, however, but the foregoing development puts us in a position to explain how the human mind comes by the conceptions first to be considered in the Logic and the earlier part of the Metaphysics, as also in the Practical Philosophy. This explanation is without any value for logic, metaphysics and practical philosophy, and it is a great and, unfortunately, wide-spread error when those sciences are founded upon psychology, in fact, perhaps entirely converted into psychology. Only for the sake of its own completeness does psychology inquire (not what the conception *is*, for to answer this question is the business of logic, but) how we come to form conceptions, to judge, etc. Exactly so is space an important psychological problem, the solution of which, however, does not at all enlighten us regarding the nature of space; this the Synechology has to develop. The confounding of psychological space, which is a continuum, with the intelligible, which is not, is one of the greatest errors that Kant committed. What is true of space is true of time; and just so of the categories, which, when rightly treated, coincide with the forms of language, and the system of which is, therefore, impossible, so long as we have no universal grammar. Exactly so, finally, psychology must and can explain how the soul comes to be displeased or pleased by anything, although this is a matter that is entirely irrelevant to æsthetics.

7. As regards, now, *Æsthetics* and the *Practical Philosophy* coinciding with it,—just as holding fast to the Kantian thing-in-itself would have saved philosophy from becoming idealistic, so the complete separation of theoretical and practical philo-

sophy will prevent philosophy from conducting, as with Fichte, to mere praxis. Æsthetics, as the science of that which pleases as being beautiful, and that, too, without cause, involuntarily for us, has first to distinguish this from that which is desired, which is something incomplete, and from the agreeable, which is related only to a subjective condition, and then to analyze it into its simplest elements, *i.e.*, since only relations please, to establish the simplest relations that produce a pleasure devoid of desire. Only in *one* application of Æsthetics, or *one* branch of the theory of art, has this been done, viz., in music; and what thorough-bass does for this, the other branches of the theory of art have likewise striven to do for themselves. Among these there is, now, one that concerns the art that is required by every one, namely, the theory of virtue, or Practical Philosophy. This will have first to establish the simplest relations of will, that please as being (morally) beautiful, to inquire Why regarding which would be just as foolish as to inquire why the [musical] third or fifth pleases. That these relations, which may be called pattern-conceptions, or Ideas, are unconditionally valid, tell what should be, Kant has felt; he is, on the contrary, very much to be censured for having debased this character of the should-be by combining it with metaphysical conceptions; for example, with the conception of being, when he reasoned from the should-be to the can-be, *i.e.*, to the being possible; but particularly with a conception to the denial of which, properly speaking, metaphysics leads, and which only the assumption of a chimerical intelligible character rescues, viz., with transcendental freedom, from the assumption of which neither punishment nor education is explicable, since both presuppose that acts are the fruit (*i.e.*, necessary consequences) of character. With that confusion Kant's expression "metaphysics of morals," and the conversion of ethics into mere physics by his followers are in harmony. Again, the theory of freedom has led to the conceiving of ethics only as a theory of duties, *i.e.*, to considering only arrested morality, so that it is explicable why Kant arrives at the revolting theory of radical evil. Of such Ideas, now, Herbart enumerates, from the beginning of his activity as an author, five: the two more formal ones of inner freedom (agreement with one's own judgment) and perfection (magnitude), then those of well-wishing, right, and equity, with which complicated relations immediately connect themselves, where several beings

become one through a mutual understanding, hence where the Ideas become social. Civil society, which hinders strife, the system of rewards, with which the idea of equity is connected, the system of administration, which corresponds to well-wishing, the system of culture, to which the idea of perfection leads, finally, the idea of spiritual society, which corresponds to inner freedom, are the five derived ideas in ascending series. If, now, to the totality of ideas there be joined the unity of the person, there results the conception of virtue, which as opposed to the natural limits (which do not at all secure against blame) becomes duty and the imperative. Duties are divided into those towards self (self-education), towards society, and, finally, duties lying in and relating to the future of both, for which the home-life as well as public-life labours. As in psychology the analytical part follows the synthetical, so a critical comparison of the principles here developed follows, as the test does the calculation, what, according to recognised authorities, is established in natural right and morals. For the former, Grotius is cited as an example; for the latter, Plato and Cicero, Wolff and Schleiermacher, and it is shown that each of these had held primarily one or another of these ten ideas.

8. In all separation of the theoretical and practical philosophy there are, notwithstanding the separation, two points of contact between them, in the treatment of which an acquaintance with both is presupposed. From the union of practical philosophy with the philosophy of nature there results the *Theory of Religion;* from its union with psychology pedagogics. The former, Herbart has not specially treated of; occasional expressions show that to him belief belongs entirely to the practical sphere, that the (according to his system) absurd conception of a ground of all reality has no practical consequence, whereas that of a highest wisdom (to which physico-ethical teleology points), which takes advantage of the flexibility of the elements, appears compatible with that of the most excellent nature. All metaphysical knowledge of a God would endanger humility. In this metaphysical indefiniteness there can be found room for the play of tradition, even of phantasy, if it only does not conceive God's well-wishing as nepotism, and His participation in the world as egoism. (Herbart's system is a new proof that in individualistic systems there is no place for that which the religious man, because he sees in it [also] the ground of all reality, calls

God). With all the greater partiality has he occupied himself with *Pedagogics*. Of this, the end is the development of the moral character or of virtue. Hence, it is possible neither under the theory of freedom, nor under the fatalistic view that makes man come forth as a flower out of the seed. The practical Ideas and the psychological knowledge of the fact that, and the conditions under which, certain numbers of ideas, become so firm that they re-act against newly introduced ideas are the guides for the educationalist. Government and instruction should unite to bring forth many-sidedness of interest. With both is connected discipline, which has for its end to give to morality strength of character, and to lead the educated to undertake self-education. Herbart sees what is in a certain respect an enlarged pedagogics, in statesmanship, which, according to him, must rest much less upon the forms of State than, the rather, upon custom. The parallel between the State and the individual subject in the Second Part of the Psychology is ingenious, in many places very witty.

9. A not less negative position towards the Science of Knowledge and the System of Identity than that of Herbart is taken by ARTHUR SCHOPENHAUER (22nd Feb., 1788 to 21st Sept., 1860), whose works: *On the Fourfold Root of the Principle of Sufficient Reason* (1813, 2nd ed., 1847); *On Sight and Colour* (1816); *The World as Will and Idea* (his *chef d'œuvre;* first appeared in 1819, 2nd ed. in 2 vols., 1844); *On Will in Nature* (1836, 2nd ed., 1854); *The Two Fundamental Problems of Ethics* (1841); and *Parerga and Paralipomena* (2 vols., 1851), for a long time unheeded, first became known in their true significance in the last ten years of his life, a significance that, perhaps, lies midway between that claimed in the over-estimate of Frauenstädt (*vid.* among other works: *Arthur Schopenhauer. Vohn ihm, Ueber ihm*, 1863. *Aus Schopenhauer's handschriftlichem Nachlass*, 1864), of Gwinner *Arthur Schopenhauer aus persönlichem Umgange dargestellt*, 1862. *Schopenhauer und seine Freunde*, 1864) and others, who see in him the Messiah of speculation; and the under-estimate of Haym (*Arthur Schopenhauer*, in the fourteenth volume of the *Preussische Jahrbücher*), who sees in him not really a philosopher, but merely a brilliant writer.

10. The subjective turn, to have given which to philosophy is, according to Schopenhauer, Descartes' greatest merit, is carried further by the fact that Locke has shown regarding

a number of qualities of things, that they lie only in the soul. Berkeley went still further, and Kant furthest of all, who applied Locke's assertion also to his primary qualities, *e.g.*, extension, and whose doctrine that time, space and the categories lie merely in us, is among the greatest discoveries that have ever been made. Hence he has succeeded, also, by a consistent course of argument in converting all objects of our knowledge into phenomena, *i.e.*, mere presentations, and has in the first, which is the better, edition of the *Critique of Pure Reason*, expressly said that if the reflecting subject be abstracted from, there is neither world of sense nor nature. What is to be censured in Kant is that he assumes twelve categories, among them even a monstrosity like reciprocity, whereas by the fact that he constantly gives preference in thought to causality, he betrays the feeling that a reduction to this one is necessary. By such a reduction of all radical relations to that of ground and consequence, of all laws of thought to the principle of ground, still a second defect of Kant's is remedied—his too great separation of perception and thought, for even time and space, succession and co-existence show themselves to be one of the four forms of the ground, viz., *ratio essendi*, besides which are three others, *ratio fiendi, agendi, cognoscendi.* By the supervention of the *ratio fiendi*, *i.e.* causality, upon the wholly subjective sensations, the object arises. Not that we infer an object from the sensations, but the transition takes place, immediately, the understanding here acts intuitively, the perception is intellectual. Through the supervention of causality the object becomes; so that, therefore, an object that was not subject to the law of causality, *e.g.*, a last cause, would be just as great an absurdity as one that were neither temporal nor spatial. For every condition of change the understanding must think a cause,—which is its function, as it is that of the stomach to digest; since, now, a condition of change presupposes a permanent somewhat, causality cannot be thought without substance, but this is limited to what is temporal and spatial, and there is nothing actual that is not material. All theistic ideas are, therefore, old wives' philosophy, "material substance" is a pleonastic expression, creation of matter an absurdity. As the investigations relating to the *ratio essendi*, or time and space, coincide with those relating to sense-perception, so those relating to the *ratio fiendi*, or causality, coincide with those relating to reason, which is not the

creative, but the receptive, feminine faculty of abstract presentation, and whose discursive thought is wrongly placed above the intuitive understanding, from which it receives all content. The fourth form of consequence or effect, finally, is that based on the *ratio agendi*, or the motive. Motivation is causality become inward, hence is necessity as much as it, and to assume freedom in the world of phenomena is an absurdity. The result of the entire investigation is: The principle of Ground rules the world; but since it is only a law of our thought, the world is only idea (presentation),—the whole world, hence also the part of the world which is my immediate object, my own body, which may be termed the microcosm, just as the world may be termed the macranthropos. This is what we have in mind when we pronounce the word *I*; the Ego is therefore phenomenon, and has, just for that reason, the form of individuality, for temporality and spatiality are the real *principium individuitatis*.

11. All the foregoing propositions are held and declared by Schopenhauer to be purely Kantian. But now presents itself a point in which, though adopting Kant, he yet separates from him. That there is in philosophy no other starting-point than consciousness, had been accepted since Descartes. In this, now, there lies, first, that we find ourselves to be beings of time and space, subject to the principle of Ground, *i.e.*, to be phenomena. At the same time, however, we have of ourselves a consciousness that we are something different, and this our-in-ourselves lies in the will, of which I am conscious, therefore, not in an objective manner, but immediately. Kant himself appears to have had a presentiment of the fact that where the subject is conscious of its own willing it perceives more than merely its phenomenon, for when he speaks of things-in-themselves he always has in mind practical, that is, volitional, determinations. (If Schopenhauer had not been full of a so blind animosity towards Fichte, he would have confessed how much he here owes to the author of the *Science of Knowledge*.) As our phenomenal Ego is related to the phenomenal world, just so must our in-ourselves be related to that which the world-in-itself is; and hence there is to be added, as complement, to the first, chief principle of Schopenhauer's doctrine: The world is idea, the second: It is will. By this word, that is to say, is to be understood the stress pervading all phenomena, which impels

the heavy body to the centre, the iron to the magnet, plants to grow, man to action. To the will as the in-itself of the world must, of course, be attributed the opposites of the predicates that belong to the phenomenal world. It works without ground, it is only One, it is that ἓν καὶ πᾶν which the oldest and hence the truest theory has proclaimed. The merit must be allowed Schelling, that he has spread it again to wider circles. Although Schopenhauer does not fear the name pantheism, he yet forbids himself the use of it; he has never said πᾶν θεός; rather, he denies what the religious man calls God. As man's character consists in his will, just so also does the quality of things which constitutes their character, consist in the stages that the will has attained in them. These eternal stages of the will are the unchangeable species, which one may, with Plato, call Ideas, which alone endure, whereas individuals pass away. To this, human individuals form no exception. Everything individual is mere appearance, *Maia*, illusion. Nature, which is bountiful of individuals, forms them to preserve the species at their cost; even human community of sexes has for its end the production of a being in which the emotional qualities of the father, and the intellect of the mother, shall be united. Whereas the Hindoo theory asserts the nullity of the individual, Judaism introduced the delusion of an immortality. Christianity, descending from both, vacillates between them. The origin of this delusion is, for the rest, explicable partly by the egoism of man, partly by the impossibility of thinking the world without us. (Impossibility, for the world exists only in us.) Hence not I, but Man, is immortal. The eternal species form a series of stadia in which the higher, by reason of their overpowering assimilation of the lower, stand above these (*serpens serpentem comedens fit draco*), spending, of course, in such overpowering, force, on account of which every individual stands a stadium behind its Idea. On the lowest stadium appears mere matter as the product of forces (*i.e.*, blind willing); the will rises much higher where an activity follows upon a stimulus. Finally, the will objectifies itself in organisms that do not have to wait for the stimulus, but are motived by thought-objects; and seek for nourishment that is to be assimilated, and therefore require the knowledge through (which) stimuli become motives. To this end the organism requires a brain, in which, therefore, the highest objectification of the will presents

itself. But with this organ is given, once for all, the world with all its forms, subject and object, time, space, plurality, causality. The brain with all its ideas is, primarily, merely an instrument of the will, which has to serve the will and preserve the life of the individual. Since cognition, or the functioning of the brain, appears first upon the highest stadium, we cannot speak of an end of the will. It is without knowledge, blind, mere will to live, impulse to objectify itself. As it has no motive, there do not apply to the one will, as the in-itself, the other forms of ground; and the question as regards the why of willing has no meaning, and is the limit of philosophy, as the irrational is the limit of reason. The question, so much discussed, regarding the relation of the real and the ideal is therefore to be answered as follows: Philosophy has an ideal, transcendental, or ideological side, and a real, materialistic, physiological side, and we have to pass from each to the other; so that we have to do here, properly speaking, with two identities. If we pursue the idealistic method, we begin with perception, discover *a priori* space, time, and all other relations, and hence do not get beyond phenomena, *i.e.* presentations. At last we discover that we ourselves also have to be regarded as mere phenomena, but, at the same time (as in the grotto of Posilippo, where it is darkest, there the light of day begins), it is evident that we ourselves are also something in-itself, *i.e.*, will; hence, also, the world has reality, inasmuch as the will, in the highest place in the brain, objectifies itself in it. Hence it is now immaterial whether one says, idealistically, The world is idea, or, realistically, It is functioning of the brain, whether one says, idealistically, Locke treated sense, Kant the understanding, or, realistically, The former the sense-organs, the latter the brain. As the body, therefore, is on the one hand, my idea, so is it, on the other, my will; brain is cognition of willing, the genitals are the will to procreate, etc.

12. The subsidiary position, which, therefore, primarily, the intellect occupies towards the will, namely, that it exists only in order that life may be preserved, is the permanent and only one in the case of animals and of the ordinary, brutish-minded man. It is otherwise as regards artistic and philosophic genius. This rises to a disinterested knowledge, a knowledge not merely subservient to the end of living, but one in which the brain becomes a parasite of the

body, which preys upon it, and is not an advantage to it but, the rather, endangers its well-being. In art and philosophy genius rises to the perception of the pure *What*, does not inquire after the Why of phenomena: just so does it rise above the individual to the perception of the Idea. Where art and philosophy are subservient to the end of living they become degraded. (Hence Schopenhauer's antipathy towards "the professors of philosophy," who, according to his view, do not live to philosophize, but *vice versa*.) Because genius transcends the principle of Ground, we often find among men of genius an aversion to mathematics; because it transcends the end of preserving life, it creates nothing that is useful: that is its patent of nobility. The power of art as well as of philosophy to bless and to comfort lies in the fact that they so represent life, which is, in part, pitiable, in part, terrible, that it becomes a significant drama, and because they lift it to a standpoint where interest and will cease, and the world remains and is known only as an idea. From this it follows that there is no practical philosophy; all philosophy is theoretical. But art and philosophy are not the only means by which man rises to the standpoint of Ideas. This also takes place in a way that is not merely momentary and dependent upon the contingency of genius, *i.e.*, in holy living, to the consideration of which are devoted partly the Fourth Book of his principal work (the Third had treated of art) and partly the ethical work: *The Fundamental Problems of Ethics*. If the individual so yields to the will to live, which objectifies itself in him as in all others, as that will expresses itself in the iron command to nourish the body, to multiply, etc., that this will fills his whole life without being destroyed by knowledge, this is affirmation of the will, or egoism, in which man as this individual regards himself as the in-itself, or the absolute. In greater measure does this appear in optimism, the wicked spirit of realistic Judaism, and of the newest, hence the worst, religion of Islam, to which phenomena are the truth. In opposition to this the oldest religion, which forms the kernel even of Christianity, teaches that all existence is an evil and a sin, and this pessimism is avowed even by the profoundest Christian dogma, the dogma of hereditary sin, as also by the fact that *world* and *evil* are synonymous. What mockery, to speak of a best world where the most fortunate knows no better moment than that of sleep, the most

unfortunate no worse than that of waking. The spectacle of suffering in the world, in which there is no one who is fortunate, brings us, like that of every tragedy, to the perception of eternal justice, before which every individual thing is nothing, and which, therefore, punishes the man who violates it. The Vedas say, Thou thyself art all. The knowledge of absolute nothingness makes all distinction between self and others vanish, capacitates us, therefore, for sympathy, the only moral motive-force, and makes even the highest act of morality possible, that negation of the will which is called resignation, abnegation, absence of will, in which, as in the enjoyment of art, felicity, since unwilled knowledge is present, finds place; so man with will ceases to will, makes the will the quieter of willing,—a contradiction in will, which is called self-denial. If in the works of genius the opposition of the real and the ideal, the Idea and the individual, is resolved, so, here, is that between freedom and necessity. To the right conception of the relation of the two, Kant led by his distinction (coinciding with the distinction of thing-in-itself and phenomenon) of intelligible and empirical character, one of the greatest discoveries that man has ever made. The unchangeable character, the necessary fruits of which our actions are, is rightly called empirical, since we learn to know it after it comes into *existence* for us. It is the spatial and temporal phenomenon of the intelligible character, or of that non-temporal indivisible act of will, for which, in the pangs of conscience, I accuse myself, not because I act *so* but because I am so, and *must*, therefore, act so. The condition of the holy one, in which the cloak of the individualizing *Maia* was rent, and the knowledge that between me and others there is no difference whatever, became a quieter of the (individual) will, does not obtain as an (impossible) change of the character, but as the birth of a new character, which, like the origin of genius, is a work of grace, and can only come to be where the emptiness of individual existence becomes perfectly clear to us, hence, often in the case of condemned criminals, shortly before death. The so-called working of grace is the only immediate expression of transcendental freedom, an entering of freedom into necessity, *i.e.* of grace into nature. Suppose that the will to live ceased to exist in all, then all individuals, hence also their ideas, the world, would vanish, a result which, to him who is full of will, appears to be nothing, but for which, nevertheless,

as after the Nirvana of the Buddhists, all those long who deny the will in themselves, and perceive the nothingness of the world.

13. The parallel which I drew years ago in my larger work (§ 41), and in the *Zeitschrift für Philosophie und philosophische Kritik*, I hold at present to be correct, and cannot admit what Schopenhauer has said in opposition to it, viz., that his philosophy stands related to Herbart's as the true to the false. Rather is this relation something entirely special, inasmuch as in the manner of their philosophizing, the content of their metaphysics and ethics, the manner and way in which, now positively, now negatively, they connect themselves with other philosophers, etc., they are diametrically opposed. It is evident from this fact that I must also disagree with those who charge me with having thereby placed upon a level a philosopher of great importance with one who is of no significance whatever. As regards the genesis of Schopenhauer's system, particularly the debts, not acknowledged by him, to philosophers whom he treated so contemptuously, very learned and pertinent remarks are to be found in the above-cited dissertation of Haym, which appeared in a special reprint in the year 1864 (Reimer, Berlin).

B.—VON BERGER, SOLGER, STEFFENS.

§ 322.

Reconciliations of Pantheism and Subjectivism.

1. In part contemporaneously with the reaction, just described, against the System of Identity and the Science of Knowledge, in part before and after it, attempts were made to get free from them in a positive manner, by transcending their opposition. The latter attempts,—which, because they had been in some measure related to the last-named systems as Empiricism was to the Sceptics and Mystics (§§ 277, 278), made the former attempts appear, in the eyes of the authors of the latter, and in the eyes of the public, as unimportant,—are distinguished from one another by the fact that, in the one case, the point of departure was a standpoint which coincided with, or at least lay close to, that of the Science of Knowledge, in the other, just such a one as coincided with, or lay close to, that of the System of Identity, so that, on the one hand, sub-

jectivism, and, on the other, the opposite of that, were later supplemented with the other moment, which, naturally, since warp and woof are not of equal importance for the web, will present a different appearance. But to this is to be added, that subjectivism itself had received a different form, according as it appeared as ethical subjectivism, as with Kant and Fichte, or, as æsthetic and emotional subjectivism, as among the Romanticists, or, finally, as in the religious peculiarity of Schleiermacher. By both these circumstances the performances of von Berger, Solger and Steffens were modified, which in many respects are in close agreement, and which may here be placed together as has been done in my extended presentation of them (*Entw. d. deutsch. Spec. seit Kant*, § 42).

2. JOHANN ERICH VON BERGER (born Sept. 1st, 1772; died Feb. 23rd, 1833, as professor of philosophy in Kiel, where for a long time he had in vain looked forward to the professorship of astronomy), introduced by Reinhold's works to Kant, then by these, but particularly by Fichte's, carried beyond Criticism, became later a disciple of Schelling, although he always preserved a reverence for Fichte, so that his chief aim was to put an end to the discord between the two masters. Among his works are especially to be named: *Philosophical Exposition of the All* (1808), and (his *chef d'œuvre*) *Outlines of Science*, 4 vols. (1817–27). The first-named work, left incomplete, developed, in a manner which did not long satisfy the author himself, the parallelism between the laws of the All and those of the perceiving mind, assigning, at the same time, to the latter so much autonomy that Fichte, recognising the fact, says that Berger does not here lapse into the philosophy of nature hated by himself, and its denial of idealism. As regards his chief work, the date of the first volume, and still more, consequently, of the tardily appearing later volumes, leads to the expectation that notice will be taken of phenomena such as the writings of Hegel. Perhaps from this fact a number of points of agreement are explicable. Since the principle and method of science cannot be laid down before science itself, but both rule not only the course of our thoughts but also of things, the first part of the system (and the first volume of the work) is devoted to the consideration of knowledge, to *Logic*, which closes with the proposition that by means of reason the mind knows that all which it fundamentally (*divinitus*) perceives also is, and appears to

the finite mind as external, whereas to the highest mind (even in us) it appears as transparent. Again to recognise in it spiritual relations is the problem of the second Part of the system, the *Physics* (2nd vol.: *The Philosophical Knowledge of Nature*, 1821). A recapitulation of the Logic, in part modificatory, forms the entrance to the philosophy of nature, which begins with the opposition of light and gravity, requires an inner union of mathematics and physics, treats, in the first Book, of the physical universe as a whole, in the second, of the Earth, and first of inorganic and then of organic nature, and, in the systematic account of plants and animals, rests upon Cuvier, Goldfuss, and, particularly, upon Oken. Man as the highest animal, perhaps descended from the ape, forms the mediation between physics and *Ethics*, and is treated in the third volume of the *Outlines* (*Anthropology and Psychology*, 1824), whereas the fourth and last volume (1827) contains the Outlines of Morals, Right and the State, as also of Religion. Though giving full recognition to Spinoza and Fichte, von Berger sees in both partial views that have to be mediated; just so he requires that Kant's separation of the legal and the moral be done away with. Although the conception of a moral organism is not wanting to him, yet he maintains with emphasis that the State is a compact, and, accordingly, antagonizes distinctions of class. Monarchy should be limited by a written fundamental law of the State. In the philosophy of religion he emphasizes the practical moment, often expresses himself regarding dogmas with a certain tone of depreciation. He is prejudiced against all mysticism. Hence evil is conceived by him as the victory of sense, and he declares not only against the doctrine of Satan but also against that of radical evil and intelligible freedom.

3. Karl Wilhelm Ferdinand Solger (born Nov. 28th, 1780; died as professor of philosophy in Berlin on the 25th of Oct., 1819), to whose *Erwin* (1815), which was published by himself, and *Philosophical Dialogues* (1817), are to be added his *Posthumous Works and Correspondence* (2 vols., 1826) and his *Lectures on Æsthetics* (1829), passed over from philological and æsthetical to philosophical studies, in Jena, with the assistance of the lectures of Schelling, and of intercourse with the two Schlegels and other Romanticists. From the lectures of Schelling, now first before the public, on the philosophy of art, it may be seen how much Solger owes to

him as regards æsthetic theories. He first heard Fichte later, in Berlin, on the Science of Knowledge. There was thus very naturally developed a standpoint from which he sees in Fichte and Schelling the greatest philosophers, indeed, but one-sided philosophers, and from which he avoids pantheism in that he places in God the moment of negation by means of which He can enter into nullity, and in the individual being, the power by means of which it can give up its nullity, can sacrifice itself. This reciprocal surrender and self-negation appears to him to be most fitly designated by the expression Irony, which plays a great part, particularly in his æsthetical speculations, which remain his favourite ones. That in this position neither the monological exposition of the subjectivists nor the mathematical one of pantheism, which denies Egos, satisfied him, but that he gives preference to the form of the dialogue, must be termed characteristic. *Dialectics*, which, according to Solger, has to provide the foundation for the system, reaches, by a comparison of the ordinary with the philosophical consciousness, the result, that in the latter not relations but essence itself, the absolute, God, presents itself in us; which may be termed the rule of the Idea in us. By this relation to ordinary thought, which moves in the distinctions universal and particular, the Idea embracing these sides of the opposition is sundered into the idea of the True and of the Good; philosophy becomes *theoretical and practical*, Physics and Ethics. Above these, resolving their opposition, stands the Idea not only of the beautiful, but also of the divine, the former having a theoretical, the latter a more practical, character; and besides those two parts of philosophy, we have also *Æsthetics* and the *Philosophy of Religion*. On the subject of physics there are in Solger merely suggestions, which agree essentially with Schelling. In the Ethics it is shown that, as the two sides of man, nature (instinct) and understanding, give the system of the (four Platonic) virtues, so also in the State nature (necessity) leads to Rights and understanding to Politics. The right of punishment, which is grounded on the principle that evil as a nullity must experience the fate of nullity, leads from the former to the latter. The State presents to us individuals not as a totality but as an individual, as a people. To classes, particularly to the nobility, Solger attaches great importance. He does not enter into the closer consideration of classes.

Solger's speculations have value chiefly as regards the beautiful. *Æsthetics* is his proper sphere, and he appeared all the more original in that by the fact that Schelling's Jena lectures had not been printed. The distinction of symbol and allegory, and the distinction, parallel with that, between the antique and the Christian; further, the distinction between poetry and art had been maintained by Schelling. Peculiar to Solger is the emphasising of irony, as the certainty that it is the fate of the beautiful to become extinct, because even what is most admirable in the actual is nothing in comparison with the Idea. The system of arts is developed, and it is pointed out how all arts at last become religious, how into the place of the drama in the antique world there has entered in the Christian world the worship of God, in which all arts are united. On the subject of the *Philosophy of Religion* only fragmentary expositions are to be found, in the *Posthumous Works and Letters*. What is said exhibits many points of agreement with the *Æsthetics*. To the antithesis of symbolical and allegorical in the latter, correspond in the former that of the mythical and the mystical. The theory of evil is the central point in the throughout mystical Christian religion. The annulling, by God, of that which is in itself nullity, the love in which God annihilates His nothingness and has slain death, mediates the return of God to Himself. What in Christ, the pivotal point of history, was done for the race, is repeated subjectively in every believer.

4. With von Berger and Solger is associated HEINRICH STEFFENS, though he is to be rated higher than both, partly because the subjectivism by which he surmounts pantheism is a higher subjectivism than that of his two companions, partly because he has developed his views more completely than they theirs. Steffens was born in Norway on the 2nd of May, 1773, was educated at Copenhagen, Jena and Freiberg, and was, after 1804, an incorporated citizen of Germany and particularly of Prussia, which he served as professor in Halle, Breslau and Berlin, and died on the 13th of February, 1845. His autobiography in ten volumes (*Was ich erlebte*, 1840–45) shows that he has a very clear consciousness of his position, and also of how he attained to it. It merely confirms what an attentive study of his writings shows, that the point of departure was with him the Spinozistic-Schellingian doctrine of the All-One, but that by his own branch of study, mineralogy

and crystallography, he was early made aware of the peculiarity of natural existence, and by geognosy, again, of the succession of periods through which the earth has passed. Hence the two leading thoughts of his works in the philosophy of nature, the historical view of nature and the recognition of peculiarity in nature, clearly stand forth already in his first, and, in many respects, his most original work, the *Contributions to the Inner Natural History of the Earth* (1801), a work that introduced to the public for the first time a natural philosopher richly equipped with empirical knowledge, and hence made a great reputation. By a combination of the results of chemical investigations relating to earths as well as to organic bodies, with what Werner had said about schist and lime formations, Steffens here comes to the result that the same opposition that appears within the sphere of animal life as that of sensibility and irritability is to be perceived again, in another form, in the opposition of animals and plants, but just so also in the geological opposition of lime and silex formations, and finally, in the chemical opposition of nitrogen and carbon; and that we have to do with the theoretical, *i.e.*, genetic, deduction of this opposition. This deduction begins, now, with the metals, the quantitatively and qualitatively different cohesion of which necessitates the assumption of two different series, which have their common point of intersection and centre in the heaviest; so that these radical metals, since they exhibit the least individual formation, exhibit the lowest stage of corporeal existence, which, therefore, also forms the core of the earth. From this point, now, there is assumed, to start with, a double cohesion-series, according as the cohesion presents itself as ductility or hardness; and if the metals are arranged according to this principle, the central position among them would, in one series belong to iron, in which ductility and hardness stand in inverse relation, because the harder it is the more brittle it is; in the other series, the central position would perhaps belong to zinc. By classing the earths among the metals, Steffens arrives at the conclusion that at the extreme end of the one (the silex) series pure carbon presents the maximum of contraction, and may have its antipode in nitrogen in the other (the lime) series, so that if metals were at all analyzable, they would consist of these. Not to be compared with these but to be regarded as active principles working upon the series of the passive, are the two elements

which stand opposed to one another, oxygen and hydrogen, which are at the same time representatives of electricity, as in the former cohesion-series we have magnetism, which, in the one nodal point, iron, emerges free. This opposition, and hence the activity of magnetism, is, now, shown to be the active principle in earth-formation, and is confirmed by the different character of the two hemispheres, by the different proximity to the equator in which the different metals are deposited, etc. In brief, the opposed activity, which appears on the earth in vegetation and animalization is, like the opposition of repulsion (expansion) and attraction (contraction), contained in it, and is efficient in its own formation. But the principle of this formation and, particularly, of organization is, that nature seeks the most individual formation, hence also, as Kielmeyer first showed, the gradual descent, in the animal series, of reproduction towards irritability, of the latter towards sensibility, presents a series of stages in which animals attain only to reproduction of the species, whereas in man, where reason is reached, the tendency of that reproduction coincides with that of the reproduction of nature. The most individual formation presents the truest manhood.

5. Less originality, a quality, however, that cannot be required in a compendium for academical lectures, is shown by Steffens in: *The Outlines of the Philosophical Natural Sciences* (1806), published during his professorship in Halle. Familiar intercourse with Schleiermacher, in which neither of the two held himself merely in a receptive attitude, and the high respect that both had always paid to individuality explain why, although, particularly at the beginning of the work, agreement with Schelling's *Authentic Exposition* is very perceptible, there are here so many points of contact with Schleiermacher, which the latter always recognised. For example, there is instanced as a cardinal problem of natural science the knowledge that all opposites are relative, and that, accordingly, quadruplicity must everywhere prevail. (How natural this was for a Schellingian, Wagner and Troxler had already shown.) The demonstration of the presence of quadruplicity everywhere contributes greatly to synoptical clearness of arrangement, but often wrongly leads Steffens to emphasize parallelism in such a manner that he applies expressions that are correct only as applied to one stage, to another, a fact that has given him as well as many Schellingians, particularly Oken,

the character of one who puts ingenious analogies in the place of real thought-determinations. The central point of all organization is defined, at the close of the *Outlines*, to be man; so that the individual spheres of organization are to be regarded as *disjecta membra* of the human organization, and man is to be regarded as the microcosm in which, for that reason, the quadruplicity ruling in nature is repeated in ages, temperaments, etc. This last thought, now, forms the theme of the *Anthropology*, which, though written much earlier in separate parts, was not published until 1822 (Breslau, 2 vols.). Steffens here puts before himself the problem of presenting man in his continuity with the whole of nature, a line of thought which only he can decry as materialistic, to whom, because he has turned away from nature, the living All becomes a plurality of isolated things. The *Anthropology* considers man as the key-stone of an infinite past, as the middle-point of an infinite present, as the beginning-point of an infinite future. Since the first portion of the treatise relates to occurrences prior to man, which geological investigations have brought to light, the First Part is entitled, *Geological Anthropology*. It fills the entire first volume. The first dissertation proves that the core of the earth is metallic, and connects itself closely with the *Contributions to the Inner Natural History of the Earth*, inasmuch as it at the same time takes into account what had been discovered in twenty years for its confirmation or refutation. In that, particularly Oerstedt's discoveries are reckoned, because they prove magnetism to be a property of the whole metal series. The second dissertation, the History of the Development of the Earth has, because of the fact that Steffens identifies the individual periods with the six days of Moses, called out expressions of hostility and eulogies, of which it is difficult to say which did him the more credit. He seeks to show that as everything pertaining to animate being (*e.g.* a peculiar talent) develops through six stadia, so also in the development of the earth must be distinguished six periods, in the first of which its embryonic life is such that our system of planets is, we may say, related to a distant central body, as now the planet is to the sun. In a second period, in which the primal metal remains enveloped and air and earth separate, the earth is not endowed with motion on its axis nor with fixed east and west polarity, hence is like a moon. Following this is a third, a

transition period, in which the earth circles comet-like about its own central body and about a foreign sun, under the influence of which the tropical vegetation arises which is exhibited in our fossilizations. This (schist and vegetation) period is followed by a fourth, in which takes place, together with animalization, the breaking away of the earth from the foreign sun, hence its becoming a planet, and hence also the conversion of its central body into a sun. This period is, at the same time, that of porphyry. The lime formation and the lower animals belong to the fifth period. Finally, to the sixth belong the higher animals and man, who, not only "in his kind," as a being of class and species, but as an eternal personality, is an image of God. The transition to the *Physiological Anthropology*, which forms the Second Part of the work, is made by Steffens by means of the following consideration: If we maintain the unity of human nature with that outside of man, we must suppose that with the innocence of man, the condition in which the demonic powers lying in him are united, there runs parallel that condition in which self-will, the dark principle in nature, was ruled by the universal ordering power. But, now, geognostic facts teach that a destroying catastrophe, which was accompanied by a very sudden change of climate, took place, and that, too, when men were already in existence. Both necessitate the hypothesis, confirmed also by revelation, that at a period in which there prevailed in the north-west portion of the earth the most luxuriant vegetation, an animal world of monsters, and every fiendish violence of human life, the sea flooded the now naked land and buried the insolent world. At the same time volcanic fires might have subverted the continent in the south-west, the remains of which now form the fifth of the grand divisions of the world. *How* the appetite of man could penetrate and taint the whole of nature can of course be shown only by a complete physiological anthropology, which, just on that account, would have to consider the meaning of all life, even the sub-human, in order to show how all forms of that finally culminate in man, who, in the two sexes, repeats the opposition of animals and plants, and in whom the eternal personality manifests itself in what may be called one's endowment (his "talent" in the Holy Scriptures), which makes him the central point of an infinite present, the beginning-point of an infinite future. The Third and last Part, the *Psychological Anthropology*, considers the human race as regards the destiny

it has, to bring to an end, by the appropriation of grace, the conflict set loose by it. The conflict of the races with historical peoples forms the beginning-point of this development. In the former, the germs contained in man have been only partially developed by external circumstances; in the latter, the Good remains, *i.e.*, the whole man, is still potent. The goal is, that the love that appeared in Christ be confirmed in every one by the eternal personality.

6. The conclusion of the *Anthropology* forms the transition from Steffens's Physics to the second main division of the system, which in the *Outlines* he has called Natural Right, later *Ethics*, often also Science of History. He has treated ethical questions at length only in his work: *The Present Age and How it has Become* (2 vols., 1817), and the *Caricatures of the Holiest* (2 vols. 1819–21). The title of the latter work is explained by the fact that he first lays down the Idea of the State as the manifestation of freedom and morality, the end of which is to protect individuality (hence property also), and then shows how, through sin, this peculiar principle of the phenomenal in its opposition to its Idea, the individual moments of the Idea become isolated and give caricatures, the complete sum of which makes perceptible the Idea, though, of course, dismembered. The construction of the classes of society, and the characterization of them,—the brilliant portion of the work,—are based on the opposition of being and knowledge, nature and mind, which pervades the All; and show how this opposition is, in man, resolved in innocence, on the one hand, and in wisdom, on the other; both of which stand opposite to us as lost and never attained, but which approach us in the State, in the working classes and the profession of teachers. In the former are distinguished peasant, burgher, and noble, to which three correspond in the latter, the learned man, the talented man, and the genius. The profession of teachers performs its civil functions in education and lawgiving; the chief instrument of both is literary activity, the press. The errors of the present in its demands regarding the peasant, burgher, etc., are discussed in a manner that resulted in Steffens's offending all parties. His citing gymnastic exercises among the caricatures of education estranged his best friends. The ethical speculations are followed in the Second Part of the *Caricatures* by those in the philosophy of religion. Moreover, certain works are

devoted to these solely, of which are to be mentioned particularly an essay of the year 1821 : *Relation of Philosophy and Religion* (in Works, Old and New), and *The Philosophy of the Christian Religion*, published in 1839 in two volumes; since the two works, *On False Theology*, and *How I became a Lutheran*, do not pretend to be so much scientific investigations as confessions. As, almost always in his later lectures, Steffens bases his investigations in the philosophy of religion on Hume and Kant. The first had, according to Steffens, guaranteed by faith the reality of that which religious belief declared to be worthless; the second had assigned to faith the law, from which it is precisely faith that sets us free. Further, Kant is to be regarded as the Copernicus of German speculation, because he has directed thought to the fact that there is something higher than finite phenomena. But since he has assumed a threefold fact beyond phenomena, it was possible that wholly different views should be based on him, and, accordingly, Fichte took as the absolute the moral, and hence action; the System of Identity the beautiful, and hence intuition; Hegel, finally, the conception of organism, and therewith thought. All these three one-sided views have been transcended by Schelling's later doctrine (*vid.* § 323), with which Steffens professes himself to be in entire agreement in all essential points. Here the main thing is that philosophy takes as its leading idea personality, so that speculation becomes the personal comprehension of the personal God. But to this elevation neither pantheism (not even the Hegelian), which sees in personality only sickly subjectivity, individualization, nor Fichte, who really puts the latter in the place of personality, attains. Neither can comprehend that, in the mutual surrender of the Christian to God and *vice versa*, I am of as much consequence to God as He is to me. This strengthening of our personality by the divine is love, and in it consists religion as well as speculation. Their difference consists in the fact that the former does not suffer itself to be perturbed by finite thought, and that the latter, on the other hand, by exhibiting its nullity, overthrows it, and so reproduces faith, but at the same time makes possible the tolerance that does not rest upon indifference. Personality has for its natural foundation, natural peculiarity, talent, which is the culminating point of nature; so that the philosophy of nature becomes teleology, and shows how in man, in his talent, not the species

(as in instinct) but individuality, is the governing force, is the centre of all and conditions the position of all, such that his inner conflicts are mirrored in the revolutions of the earth. Hence the parallelism between geology and mythology. As humanity is related to the All, so is the Saviour to humanity; so that there must be assumed three moments in creation: a cosmical, as the planets arranged themselves about the sun; a telluric, as the earth found its central point in man; a historical, when the Saviour appeared as the Sun of humanity. The development of His kingdom, the appearance of which the monster of the Roman empire preceded, as animal monsters preceded the appearance of man, makes distinguishable three periods, the expired Petrine, the begun Pauline, the future Johannine. With teleology connects itself, as second part of the philosophy of religion, (religious) Ethics, the chief subject of which is Evil, which has its ground in the will, hence in a personality, not, indeed, an actual, but always merely an ideal, one. The possibility of evil belongs to the full human personality; hence the fact that Christ could be tempted. Realized, evil suffers its annihilation, which, according as the sinner will, is felt as punishment or pardon. Salvation and damnation are correlates, redemption is a non-Christian error; whoever predestinates himself to the damnation that grace does not will, is damned. To decide whether one will or not were impious. As the first Paradise passed away and the second appeared in Christ, so also the latter vanished with his death, and the third appeared in the Church, which, resting upon the revelation given in the Bible, is preserved by faith, sacrament, and preaching. Inasmuch as, according to the idea of the preacher, the preacher is he who has overcome the opposition of the worldly and the divine consciousness, and this, according to the first definition of the philosophy of religion, was *its* nature, the philosophy of religion returns, with this its self-justification, to its beginning.

7. Similarly to von Berger and Solger, so also Steffens proves that an incorporation of subjectivism into the System of Identity not only neutralizes the pantheism of the latter, but also has, as a necessary consequence, a changed arrangement of the individual parts of philosophy. Since, that is to say, subjectivism (in its most logical form the Science of Knowledge) can see in nature only limits or unreason, nature, wherever a right is conceded to subjectivism, must descend from its

high position of being a co-ordinate of the mind. Even though it remain a phenomenon of reason, it can be so only in the form of inferiority to mind. Both, the worship of nature in the System of Identity, and the contempt of it in the Science of Knowledge, are avoided and yet receive their proper dues, in a milder form, if nature becomes the vestibule of the mind, and the philosophy of nature teleology, to employ Steffens's phraseology. Thereby, further, the twofold beginning in the System of Identity is avoided, to which there corresponded the twofold ending: the theory of mind in its culminating point, the theory of religion, closes the system, which, therefore, no longer has for its schema the magnet, but moves forward in a continued straight line. There thus makes its appearance that difference between these three men (which is, perhaps, the only one in which Steffens falls behind the other two), which lies in the fact that von Berger and Solger would preface the philosophy of nature by logic or dialectic, and, just in so doing, avow their agreement with Hegel, whereas Steffens requires that the beginning should be made with the consideration of the natural All, and speaks of the man who saw in the philosophy of nature only applied logic, with a bitterness quite unnatural to him. Still another person experiences this unjust criticism, namely, Oken, who made the attempt to convert it into mathesis. It is characteristic, that precisely these two are placed very high by von Berger, who stands over against Steffens, who, otherwise, is allied with him, as the rationalist over against the mystic. From Solger, with whom Steffens agrees precisely in that in which he diverges from von Berger, viz., in the theory of evil, in the exaltation of corporations in the State, in clinging to the symbols of faith, etc., he differs, in that while the former is completely an artist, he is always the religious man, so that the expositions of the one aim at being works of art, whereas those of the other often border on the method of edification.

C.—SCHELLING'S DOCTRINE OF FREEDOM.

§ 323.

1. Earlier, in part much earlier, than the men last named, whose standpoint was closely allied to his, had Schelling himself made attempts to overcome the pantheism of the System of Identity. This was done in the doctrine which, because it was first presented to the world in the *Investi-*

gations relating to Freedom, and because this work was also later cited by himself and his disciples as an authority, will here be designated as the *Doctrine of Freedom*, in contradistinction to the earlier doctrine of the All-Unity. Since these attempts fall in the period in which his dispute with Fichte, which was carried on partly in letters, partly before the public, was most violent, he would hardly at that time have confessed, what was acknowledged by him at a much later period,—that the apotheosis of the Fall of man, which he then condemned in the Science of Knowledge, was a permanent discovery; that is, that, as the System of Identity had driven the author of the Science of Knowledge beyond his own doctrine, just so the Science of Knowledge made it impossible that the father of the System of Identity should still hold to his own doctrine. He would not have been wholly in the wrong if he had denied this, for what gave the first occasion to the new direction to his philosophizing was, not the study of Fichte but of another Lusatian, to whom his attention had been very particularly directed by Baader—Jacob Böhme. Even the one leading idea in his treatise on Freedom, viz., that nothing has reality except the will, an idea of which it has been said that Schelling, just as Schopenhauer did later, borrowed it, without doubt, from Fichte, might very well have been taken from Böhme. This fact, now, that the theosophy of the Middle Ages became for him the instrument whereby he should deliver himself from pantheism, together with the fact that the much greater influence (connected therewith) which this theory of his has had and still has, justifies the fact that in this account it is separated from the attempts just named, and, in spite of the fact that it existed merely as a fragment until Schelling's death, is placed after, *i.e.*, ranked above, them.

2. The *Philosophical Investigations relating to Freedom*, which appeared in the year 1809 in Schelling's Philosophical Works, with which connects itself as supplementary to it, the *Memorial of the Work on Divine Things*, which appeared in 1812, as also the *Letter to Eschenmayer*, written in 1813, (the former in the seventh, the two latter in the eighth, volume of the Collected Works), take for their problem the obviating of pantheism, which makes God the author of evil, and of dualism, which is a system of entire distrust of the reason, by answering the question as regards human freedom.

This is possible only in a system the soul of which is the idealism which, alone, Fichte admitted to be valid, and the body of which is the realism which, alone, Spinoza maintained, and as little fears the charge of naturalism as that of mysticism. This system starts with the position that there is, in the last instance, no other being than willing, that willing is original being; and combines with that the distinction that had been made already in the *Authentic Exposition*, between essence, in so far as it exists, and, in so far as it is only a ground of existence, and arrives at the principle that, therefore, even in God, the true real, a distinction must be made between God as the ground of existence and as the existing God. The former would be that in God which is not God, and may be termed eternal nature; the latter, on the contrary, may be termed understanding because in it God *exists*, is revealed. Both are will, the former dark, intelligenceless, natural will, longing, the latter, on the contrary, the expression of this longing; in their identity God is love, mind, free-creative will. As such, He is to be distinguished from the presupposition of that opposition, the indifference, the original ground, which as being impersonal is not at all affected with that opposition, is God as alpha, whereas the personal God is God as omega. As all personality rests upon a dark ground, inasmuch as it is natural selfhood transformed by the mind, so also does the Divine personality. God becomes personality by transforming this dark ground, that which was earlier called the Absolute, and the irrational, since it is the extreme opposite of the mind, into personal mind. Between that point of indifference (alpha) and this of identity (omega) there falls, now, the "separation of forces," as Schelling here calls it, which is necessary that a perfect subordination of the dark principle to the light may take place. The philosophy of nature shows how natural existences form a series of stadia, in which everywhere is recognisable a duality of principles, self-will and universal will, of which the former appears everywhere in the irrational residuum that is not embraced under the law, but is not to be regarded as evil although evil may spring out of it. This happens in man, in whom both principles, the nature of which is to form, as vowels and consonants, the word of transformed spirituality, are separable, that man may subject the dark principle, self-will, to the light, the universal will. If this is done,

the spiritually transformed selfhood rises superior to them both. But—and to this the natural will continually solicits—if self-will is exalted above universal will, then arises thereby evil, which, therefore, consists not in self-will, nor in the separation of the same from the universal will, but rather in a false unity of the two. Evil is not a privation, but it is opposition to the good, just as also, in the good, self-will is not wanting but is subordinate to the universal will. In animal appetite and in instinct, both come to light, but not good and evil. Man can stand only above or beneath the animal. The first ground of evil is contained, of course, in God, in that in Him which is not God, but not evil itself. The irrational, the horror-exciting in nature, which still is not the evil, also has its root in that dark ground. Hence the analogies between that which the realm of nature and that which the realm of history present, the periods of which run parallel one to another. The universal necessity that sin become purified and the necessity that the evil be, nevertheless, arbitrary choice, that the Fall be one's own sin, coincide, as, already, Kant has shown by his doctrine of the "intelligible" character, which is in the most exact harmony with that of radical evil; so that the nature of man from which his transgressions flow is his own deed, which lies in eternity, *i.e.*, which does not indeed affect his nature as a state pre-existent to life but non-temporally. As such a nature man posits himself from all past eternity, as such a nature, a certain bodily organization being added, is man born. Hence it is a predestination, which, because a self-determined predestination, does not destroy freedom. And it is conceivable that the original act implicitly contains in itself conversion also. Through the false union of the two principles there makes its appearance, inasmuch as the personal God is ideal, another spirit, the inverted God, that nature having the character merely of a potency, which never is but always merely will be, and can be really comprehended (actualized) only by the false imagination (*νόθῳ λογισμῷ*), which is just sin, the self-nullifying and self-consuming contradiction. Hence the destination of the evil is not a conversion of it into good but a reduction to the condition of a potency. This subjection is the final goal. But the perfect is not in the beginning, since God is a life and therefore also has a fate. He is subject to suffering and becoming, as the holiest mysteries confess in the doctrine of a suffering God and the promise,

that He will be (not is) all in all. A completed God were no God. The new kingdom, which follows the appearance of that in which God became man in order that men might again become God, reveals God as spirit, *i.e.*, as *actu* real. Herein consists His personality, which therefore realizes itself by a process of transformation entirely similar to that by which human personality forms itself by the fact that feeling is actualized through the understanding.

3. More at length than in the treatise on Freedom this last point is discussed in the *Stuttgart Private Lectures*, which were delivered immediately after the appearance of that treatise and first appeared in print after Schelling's death (Wks., vii. pp. 418–484). Here the thought is, If we demand a God whom we may regard as a living personal being, we must assume that His life has the greatest analogy with human life, that, in a word, He has everything in common with man, dependence excepted (Words of Hippocrates). All that God is, He is of Himself; He begins with Himself in order at last also to end purely in Himself. God makes Himself, and hence He is not already from the beginning a completed being. As human life begins in unconsciousness, so also does the divine, as the silent thought of itself, without expression or revelation, a condition, which may be called the indifference of the potencies, because the two principles, which, as in us, so in God, are the dark unconscious and the conscious, are unseparated. As in us self-formation consists in the fact that we transform the former by the latter and attain to clearness, and begin to separate ourselves in ourselves, to elevate the better part above the lower, so also does God. The two principles in God are being (real), which is the predicate of the existent, and the subject of being, the existent (ideal) itself. In order to exist as a living being, God, according to the fundamental law that without opposition there is no life, must as existent separate Himself from His being (in this making of self independent of self consists moral growth even in man), must separate Himself from that which may be termed God's nature, matter, the individual, the selfhood, or even the egoism in God. When God makes this a substratum of the universal, and ceases to be the Self-enveloped, the Dark,—this is love, through which He, expanding, becomes the being of all beings. If the egoism prevailed, there would be no creature; the overcoming of the divine egoism by the divine love is

creation (nature = subdued force). Divine egoism is the matter out of which real living nature is created. In the *Answer to Eschenmayer*, of April, 1812 (Wks., vii. pp. 161–193), Schelling expresses himself as follows: "You would seek the irrational in the heights; I in the depths. I call that which is most opposed to mind being as such, or what Plato called the non-*existent*. God has the ground of His existence in Himself, in His own primal nature, to which God as subject of His existence belongs. I have called it elsewhere, in order to distinguish it from the subject of existence, not God but the Absolute. Those persons are shy of the humanization of God who would fain be regarded as philosophers by profession. But suppose it were discovered by continued speculation that God is really self-conscious, personal, living, in a word, man-like, that He *is* human, who can offer any objection to that? You say, *God must* be absolutely superhuman. But if He would be human—if He would humble Himself? Understanding proceeds from that which is without understanding, light from darkness, but darkness extinct, overcome, as salvation proceeds from extinct sin, as heaven were effectless without hell, which it vanquishes. If God *is* and shall live in man, the Devil must *die* in Him. But just for that reason must be earnestly repudiated the calumnious assertion that the ground in God is the Devil. That the evil is actualized only in the creature, is repeatedly asserted in the treatise." Shortly before this *Answer to Eschenmayer* was written, appeared the merciless reply to Jacobi: *Memorial of the Work on Divine Things* (Tübingen, 1812, Wks., viii. pp. 19–136), in which he defends his doctrine particularly against the charge of naturalism. I asserted, he would say there, that nature is the (as yet) non-*existent* (merely objective) absolute identity. Since, further, the existent in general must be above that being which is merely the substrate of its existence, it is manifest that the *existing* identity (God as eminent being, God as subject) is placed above nature. Hence was it, even in the *Authentic Exposition*, said of nature that she lies beyond the absolute being of identity. That is to say, the *absolute* being of identity is the subjective; nature regarded from the absolute standpoint is *yonder side* of mind, from the finite standpoint, *this side*. Here, therefore, the existent identity, or God as subject, is explained to be supernatural, as *vice versa*, the mere *being* of

identity is explained as sub-divine. As the real desideratum, is given, further, a scientific theism that conceives God as personality. But this is possible only if it be maintained as a fundamental principle that the ground of development always stands below that which is developed, and after it has served to the development, subjects itself as matter or instrument to it. Hence must even God, so surely as He is *causa sui*, have something before Himself, namely Himself; *ipse se prior sit necesse est*, if it be not an empty word that God is absolute. This view, which, like the ecclesiastical *aseitas*, puts prior to the real essence of God the nature of this essence, does not exclude naturalism but surmounts it, makes it the foundation of theism. This fundamental being presents a double aspect. First, God makes a part, a potency, of Himself the ground, in order that the creature be possible; that is what has been termed the condescension of God to the act of creation; but likewise, secondly, He makes Himself the ground of Himself, that, by the subordination of the non-intelligible part to the higher, He may live free in the world, precisely as man, by the subordination of the irrational part of his nature, transforms himself into a moral nature. Such a God is not, of course, for those who would have a God complete once for all, *i.e.*, a dead God. These deny that in God without which He would be subjectless, without personality. God is, therefore, first and last, alpha and omega; only as this last is He God, *sensu eminenti*, hence the former should not at all be called God, or at least should be so called only with the addition that He is *Deus implicitus*. This latter, God as alpha, is it which in the *Authentic Exposition* is called the impersonal indifference, in the treatise on Freedom the original ground; only of it have the earlier works treated in treating of the Absolute; these works, therefore, give a knowledge of God only *implicite*, inasmuch as they treat of that which has still to transform itself into God. They have not given, did not profess to give, a theory of the real personal God, but only of that which is the absolute *prius* of all, hence also of the personal God. That this becoming-personal of God has for the proper theatre of its manifestation the human spirit, particularly the religious consciousness, is variously suggested in the treatise on Freedom. Just so the idea that mythology forms the entrance to the most perfect religious consciousness. If, therefore, the work the composition of which Schelling

undertook immediately after the treatise, viz., *The Ages of the World*, of which a number of sheets were printed in the year 1811, and again in 1813, but were not published, and the first part of which first appeared in the Collected Works (vol. viii. pp. 195–344) in a redaction of the year 1814, had been then published by Schelling himself, there would not have been seen in the academical lecture *On the Divinities of Samothrace* (1815, Wks., viii. pp. 345 *et seq.*), with which Schelling bade farewell for a long time to the reading public, a declaration that he had substituted mythology for philosophy. Just as little would the title of the withheld work and the circumstance that the suppression of the already printed sheets coincided with the fall of Bonaparte, have furnished ground for the error that it related to the philosophy of history, particularly of modern history. And, finally, astonishment would have been less great, when in North Germany it became known, first after Hegel's death, that Schelling propounded a system in which the philosophy of mythology and the philosophy of revelation constituted the chief parts. It also proved, that the treatise on Freedom and the polemical works against Jacobi and Eschenmayer had not been read with very great attention. The *Ages of the World* were to treat, in three Books, the Past, *i.e.*, the Age before the World; the Present, or the Age of this World; finally, the Future, or Age after the World. Only the first Part, as has been said, was published. It develops still more completely what was suggested in the treatise on Freedom and further carried out in the *Stuttgart Private Lectures;* inasmuch as, maintaining the saying of Hippocrates, that the truly human is the divine, and that the true divine is human, he everywhere shows the parallelism between the growth of personality in man and the self-realizing divine personality. The dark ground in God is here identified with necessity, and it is pointed out that freedom is to be thought not without it, but as transformation and subordination of it. As already in the *Stuttgart Private Lectures*, so also here he speaks of the relation of his philosophy to pantheism in general and Spinozism in particular. He recognised in it the grandest phenomenon in the course of modern philosophy, but at the same time declares that it is only the foundation of the true philosophy, which has to explain the personality and freedom not only of God but also of the creature—a thing that to him

remains unintelligible. His agreement with Jacob Boehme appears in individual passages still more here than in the works thus far described. Just so is to be remarked the appreciative manner in which the Bible, particularly the Old Testament, is brought forward. At the point at which Genesis begins the first Part closes.

4. Since the doctrines of Schelling that became known later are, according to the plan of this account, discussed in another place, the critical observations on his Doctrine of Freedom find here their proper place. That by this doctrine he has sought to overcome pantheism not by excluding it, but by incorporating it into his system, he has stated so often that not another word need be spent on that topic. That this is done by emphasizing the two points which Spinozism and the System of Identity deny, personality and freedom, which with Fichte had been everything, and hence by an approximation to Fichte, Schelling would not at that time, perhaps, have confessed, though he did so later. As his Doctrine of Freedom herein occupies a place beside the doctrines of von Berger, Solger, and Steffens, or rather as those doctrines fall in with Schelling's Doctrine of Freedom, so their agreement appears also in another point following naturally from that, which was discussed in § 322, 7. That nature is the absolute, is to be reconciled with the fact that it is only for us, or relative, if we see in it something absolute but not existing in an absolute manner, *i.e.*, if we regard it as a lower stage, as the sphere of transition to the absolute mode of existence of the absolute. This has already been done, very distinctly. At one time nature is characterized as a stage in the becoming of mind; at another overlapping subjectivity is spoken of; at another it is said that identity has the office of being instrument for it as subjective; at another, finally, man is characterized as the terminal point of nature, who has to lead it to God, a fact by which finality in nature is explained, etc. (In verbal agreement with the last expression is Steffens's assertion that the philosophy of nature becomes teleology.) Accordingly, the schema of the magnet is as little suited to Schelling's Doctrine of Freedom as to the theories of the men last named; the rather, the system advances from the beginning-point of the absolute, the *prius* of nature and spirit, to nature, and from this through its goal, man, to spirit, since its highest point proves to be spirit

living in spirits, and the spirits living in God. Since in this modification nature has, as before, the absolute and the intelligence awakening in man as its limiting points, it is entirely explicable why Schelling treats the philosophy of nature as for ever valid. It is otherwise as regards spirit. This, now, has nature for its presupposition, does not any longer require to be treated, as earlier, in such a manner that nature is entirely abstracted from. Thus is explained why Schelling says of the treatise on Freedom, Now *for the first time* (as if he had not written the *Transcendental Idealism*) something is laid before the public from the ideal part of philosophy. The earlier ideal-philosophy had in fact entirely lost its meaning, for it had been made co-ordinate with the philosophy of nature. Now, on the other hand, the theory of spirit is to have for its foundation the philosophy of nature, and such a theory of spirit has really not hitherto existed.

§ 324.

Transition.

Summing up, according to the foregoing presentation, what Schelling achieved in philosophy—we find, first, that as the earliest adherent of the Science of Knowledge, and still more as the author of the System of Identity, he solved more perfectly than any one before him the first problem of the most modern philosophy; for if any system can be called ideal-realism *and* real-idealism, it is his. But, secondly, in advocating, first, the Science of Knowledge and becoming clearly conscious in so doing that in this the choice between the Ego and God (*vid.* § 269, 2) falls in favour of the former, and then the System of Identity, in which choice falls in favour of God, he brought to light in these two phases the opposition of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, within the philosophy of the nineteenth century (Criticism). Thirdly, as the precursor of his friends, von Berger, Solger, and Steffens, he attempted to solve the problem presented by this opposition, the second problem of the most modern philosophy, inasmuch as he proposed a theory that reduced pantheism and the theory of Egohood, "apotheosis of the Fall of man," to moments in a concrete monotheism, and thereby surmounted them. One might be tempted, respecting the solution of this problem, to place the three men named above Schelling, because they have presented

the result of their speculations in more or less complete, rounded systems, whereas Schelling had communicated to the world only individual fragments of his own; still more because they set forth their resolution of pantheism in strict scientific form, in a method and terminology, which since Descartes, Leibnitz, and Kant had been universally received as such form, whereas Schelling in a manner suggesting the Theosophists and, in particular speculations, the Schoolmen, in short, the Middle Ages, not so much deduced as, as he announced in the very first lines of the *Ages of the World*, stated or related. To the former, one is obliged to grant the preference, even though one would include the works written by Schelling in that period, but withheld. Such finished expositions as are presented in Berger's *Outlines*, or Steffens's *Anthropology*, Schelling's Doctrine of Freedom had not received; it remains a mere fragment. Not so simple is the decision as regards the second point; what may be criticised as a defect in Schelling's Doctrine of Freedom is, on the contrary, precisely a merit. As, that is to say, he had by his adoption of the entirely opposite standpoints of the Science of Knowledge and the System of Identity opened up for himself and those who went with him, the problem of reconciling the two theories, just so must the opposition between the philosophizing which produced the treatise on Freedom and the *Ages of the World*, and that out of which the *Authentic Exposition* had sprung, make it intolerable to the subject of both, and to those who had followed him in that, to allow the two to remain unreconciled. How could he —to repeat Schelling's own words—give up the philosophy that he himself had founded earlier, the invention of his youth? And again, ought not he and those who had been stimulated by him to combine it with what the mature man taught? Such an attempt, however, coincides with the solving of the third problem which, above (§ 296, 3), was assigned to the most modern philosophy. In fact, not only individual doctrines of the System of Identity, but its whole spirit is naturalistic, pagan. Reflect upon the antipathy to the Bible which Schelling avows in his *Lectures on Academical Study*, on his admiration for the Neo-Platonic philosophy, which had found so much that was speculative in the wretched stuff of the Bible and its Jewish fables; reflect upon the deification of nature and the position allowed by the System of Identity to the State. Consider how high the youthful Schelling sets

art above religion, and how these theories, certainly not accidentally, appear in a classical presentation so often suggesting the ancients, and compare with that what Schelling wrote after the year 1809. Not Plato, nor Giordano Bruno, nor Spinoza, is his guide, but Jacob Boehme, and always there appear in the forefront of his speculations the conceptions of the mediæval Aristotelians, *potentia* and *actus*. The *Stuttgart Private Lectures* explain the State as an institution merely of fallen man. The *Ages of the World* exhorts to inquiries in the Bible, and particularly in the Old Testament. Later dogmas are neglected as the product of the saddest period of philosophy, for the historical facts of the plan of salvation; religion and its mysteries are the culmination of development; over Nature is cast a veil of mourning, which conceals only with a light covering, dread, horror, etc. In short, if Schelling had, as a naturalist who was pagan and antique in his thought, produced the System of Identity, his Doctrine of Freedom presents to us the mediæval-minded theosophist; and as the appearance of Reinhold and his opponents had proved that even by Kant the opposite tendencies of the eighteenth century were not yet definitely fused, and the opposition of the Science of Knowledge and the System of Identity had proved the like as regards the philosophy of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, so now does Schelling, the young man and the old, prove that not only naturalism, but also theosophy can draw nourishment from Kant's writings. It cannot be regarded as an accident that Schelling first began to occupy himself with Kant's *Religion within the Limits of Mere Reason* after his Doctrine of Freedom. If the fact that the two opposite standpoints were occupied one after another by the same man had suggested the problem also of the objective union of the two; this, nevertheless, could hardly succeed so long as both were before the public in so fragmentary a form, which failed to perceive many connecting links, indeed, whole parts of the system, and, as was shown above, very important ones. It is otherwise when the naturalism of the System of Identity and the theosophy contained in the Doctrine of Freedom are presented in a complete exposition, an exposition embracing every detail. The only thing that makes it possible to do this is the devotion of an entire life to this problem; and there appear two men, friends of Schelling, in whom the two sides which he had exhibited in suc-

cession are so separated that the one occupies, throughout the whole of his long life, the naturalistic standpoint, to which he rose with Schelling's assistance, but from which, however, he has supplied to Schelling a variety of material for the improvement of the System of Identity; the other was throughout his life, longer by some years than that of the first, a grateful pupil of the Mystics and other philosphers of the Middle Ages, and might, before all others, have contributed to the circumstance that Schelling also, who highly honoured for a long time the man who was about ten years his senior, entered this path. Both are to be considered in the following section.

SIXTH DIVISION.

Cosmosophy, Theosophy, and their Mediation upon a Critical Basis.

[*See* § 321.]

A. — OKEN AND BAADER.

§ 325.

1. Although since the time when in the work of mine which has been frequently mentioned, I designated Oken and F. Baader as the two men who had, in fully finished systems of philosophy, advocated separately, and hence with much greater logical consistency, the two views which Schelling had successively put forth, when a young man and when advancing in years, this position has been disputed, particularly by friends and pupils of Baader, I cannot acknowledge myself disabused of my opinion; and hence refer to § 44 of my often mentioned book, because up to the present I know of no exposition of the philosophy of Oken more complete, and because, although my respect for Baader has since then been made still higher by the works of Hoffman, Lutterbeck, and others, I hold essentially the same view regarding his place as I then held.

2. LORENZ OKEN (born Aug. 2nd, 1779; professor in Jena after 1807, in Munich after 1827, and after 1832 in Zürich, where he died Aug. 11th, 1851) had written, already in the year 1802, his *Outlines of the Philosophy of*

Nature, of which only a synopsis appeared in print, but copies of which exist in the handwriting of Eschenmayer and others; probably of Schelling also, for his Würzburg lectures contain much that had been first said by Oken,—for example, that the classes of animals are representations of the sense-organs, and hence are to be arranged according to these. Before the *Outlines* appeared he had given to the reading public his work: *Procreation* (1805), as also the Commemoration treatise: *On the Significance of Skull-bones* (1807), and the, *On the Universe* (1808). The thoughts contained in the first-named work would, perhaps, have met with approbation earlier, if he had called the "vesicles," which he supposed to be the elements of all organic bodies, and which in water are formed into animals and in the air into plants, *cells* instead of *infusoria*. The second work develops the thought which, unknown to Oken, had been broached by Peter Frank, that the skull is a combination of modified vertebræ, and has become epoch-making in morphology. The third, finally, is occupied with the glorification, in an oratorical fashion, of nature as the only absolute; and shows how the macrocosm is given inward existence and is concentrated in the microcosm, so that we can just as well call the senses the qualities of the universe become inward, as the universe a continuation of the sense-system. In the same year in which *The Universe* appeared, appeared a second Commemoration treatise, *Ideas for a Theory of Light, Darkness, Colours, and Heat* (1808), in which light is conceived as a tension of the æther, produced by the polarity of the central body and the planets, the motion of light being heat, which therefore appears whenever light is materialized. Finally, in the year 1809, appeared in its first edition his *Text-Book of the Philosophy of Nature* (Jena, 3 vols.; the second edition in 1 vol.; likewise the third, much revised, Zürich, 1843, in which he at the same time expresses himself regarding his performance). His *Text-Book of Natural History* has been characterized by investigators of nature as his most solid work; his *Natural History for all Classes* has found the largest circle of readers (13 vols., Stuttgart, 1833–41).

3. Oken's express declaration that his doctrine is through-and-through *physica* contradicts neither the fact that he defines the philosophy of nature as the theory of the eternal conversion of God into the world, nor the fact that in his theory he treats of art, science, the State, etc.; for by *God* he

understands merely the Whole, or the All (hence in the third edition he employs these terms also); while by the *world* he understands individuals; and art, science, etc., are to him only natural phenonema. The Philosophy of Nature treats, in its three parts, of the Whole, Individuals, finally the Whole in Individuals, and falls accordingly into Mathesis, Ontology, and Biology (earlier Pneumatology). *Mathesis*, or the theory of the whole, treats as the highest mathematical conception "zero," which another would rather perhaps have designated by the term indefinite quantity. From it flow by virtue of opposition definite quanta. This separation into *plus* and *minus* is the primal act of the self-revelation by which the Monad becomes numbers, Unity many, God the world, and hence self-consciousness. The particular phases in this transition are :—primal rest as the substantial form of the primal act, or as the essence of God; motion as the entelechy of God, or the entelechy form of the primal act, with which the All is time; finally, permanent time, space, or the form of God, who must be thought as a sphere, so that the existent God, or the universe, is an infinite globe. Hence also every image of the same or everything that is a totality. These same stages repeat themselves, only in a more real way, in the primal matter, the æther, in which the first stage would be mere æther, darkness, chaos, gravity; the second would appear as the æther under tension, light; the third, finally, would give heat, which extends itself in all dimensions, hence tending to fluidity, *i.e.*, the nullification of all definite dimensions. All the three are united in fire. The fire-ball of æther forms the transition to the Second Part of the Philosophy of Nature, *Ontology*, as the theory of the individual. The Cosmogeny, in which the attempt is made "not to create the world by thrusting and knocking but by imparting life," and to present central body, planets, and comets as the work of the self-effecting polarity, and the Stoichiogeny and Stoichiology connected with that, which discuss the elements, earth, water, air, fire, as also their functions, it being here expressly pointed out that these elements must be chemically composite stuffs, form the transition to the individual provinces of nature, and in such a manner that the combination of the earth-element gives, according as this combination is a combination with one, two, or three elements, binary, ternary or quaternary combinations, *i.e.*, minerals, plants, or animals.

The first are treated, under the superscription Mineralogy and Geology, still in Ontology, and are divided into earth-, water-, air-, and fire-, minerals, *i.e.*, earths, salts, inflammables, and metals, of which the first form the real body of the planets, the rest its interior portion. As regards the formation of the planet, it is shown what share magnetism, electricity and chemism have in that. Plants and animals are treated in the Third Part of the Philosophy of Nature, *Biology*, and in this is first considered, in the Organosophy, life in general, to which the transition is made through Galvanism. The primal slime, out of which everything was formed, is a soft mass of carbon, or earth-stuff, mixed with air and water, and exists as sea-slime, out of which even men originate; perhaps only in a single favourable moment. The primal slime mediates also the transition of life from one individual to another, by virtue of which the individuals cease to exist and only the whole subsists. The first elements of all that is organic are the vesicles, or organic points, into which the dead organism is again resolved. Thrown upon the land, these primal vesicles become plants, in which the planetary life repeats itself; thrown into the water, they become animals, in which the cosmical life repeats itself (*microplaneta*, microcosm). The former are treated in the Phytosophy. The plant is defined as an organism fixed to the earth, which depends upon carbon and is drawn into the air towards the light. The necessary organs of the plant give at the same time the system of the vegetable kingdom, for this kingdom is only the independent exhibition of these organs, is the plant anatomized by nature itself. Hence the entire vegetable kingdom falls into the three sub-kingdoms of the pith, sheath, and joint plants (acotyledons, monocotyledons, dicotyledons), each sub-kingdom again into several provinces, etc. Following Phytosophy is Zoösophy. The animal may be called a self-movable flower, because in it there is added to the highest function of the plant self-locomotion. As the plant was merely a planetary organization, so the animal is also a solar and cosmic organization. It shares with the plant the sexual activity, but has individually the power of sensation. The three parts of Zoösophy, which correspond entirely to the three of Phytosophy, are:—Zoögeny, which treats of the tissues of the animal organism; Zoönomy, which treats of its functions; finally, Zoölogy, which treats of the system of the animal kingdom. Also here what is an

organ of the (whole or highest) animal, appears as an independent animal. The animal kingdom is dismembered man. Hence we have, first, the two sub-kingdoms of vegetative animals (ruminating animals) and carnivorous animals (flesh-animals). The former comprise in three sub-divisions nine classes. These latter comprise, in the first of their two sub-divisions, the tenth, eleventh, and twelfth classes (fishes, amphibia, birds), in the second, the class of mammiferous animals, which divides into five sub-classes. These are the animals having senses; and the highest place among them is occupied by the eye-animal, man. He forms only one sub-class and one family; only one genus, is distinguished merely into species (races), which, again, differ as the senses do, the eye-man being the European. The highest functions of the animal, and particularly of the highest animal, are treated in the last part of Zoölogy, Psychology. By the soul is to be understood the activity not only of an organ but of the whole body. The lowest phenomena of the psychic life, therefore, will be those above which the lowest animals never rise; since man in the abnormal condition of somnambulism falls back to that, Oken calls the condition of the molluscs, in which the functions of hearing and seeing are performed indiscriminately by one organ, mesmerism. From that point the animal rises though the feeling of caution (snails), of strength and fitness of members (insects), etc., to the point where all its organs become objects to it, where, therefore, it is like the animal kingdom, and the universe becomes man. His understanding is universal understanding; in it God has become flesh; in it the art-impulse has become art-sense, comparison has become science. As in the art-impulse of the lower animals, so also in the actualization of human art, the highest is that which nature aims at. This we call beautiful. Since, now, nature aims at and produces nothing higher than man, man is also the true subject of art. The man whom art represents is in heathen art the hero, in the Christian, the saint; for the gods of the heathens were men; Christian saints, however, are men who were gods. In science, which is the exposition of the world of reason, are to be distinguished various stages in which the various arts repeat themselves. Philosophy occupies the highest place, and, within it, the art of government. But all arts and sciences are united in the art of war, *i.e.*, the art of freedom, of right, of the condition of blessedness

of man and humanity, the principle of peace. Hence is the hero the highest man. Through him humanity is free; he is God.

4. Oken's conversion of the whole of philosophy into the philosophy of nature is a carrying out of what Schelling in the period of the System of Identity only touched upon, and Blasche is not to be censured when he characterizes Oken as the perfecter of the philosophy of nature; what one does exclusively one usually does with mastery, and up to this very day one who makes the philosophy of nature his problem would be able to learn more from Oken than from any other man. That, now, among natural phenomena the State occupies the highest place of all, is, like the apotheosis of the statesman (hero) with which the system closes, entirely apart from the fact that it suggests Schelling's divine conqueror, something that may, indeed, seem foreign to the Christian view, but is, on the other hand, vital to the ancient, according to which man was a political animal. But how strenuously Oken exerted himself to place himself outside the Christian mode of view is proved most strikingly by the circumstance that he assigns to the pagans the hero, to the Christians the saint, but finds no place in his system, which embraces everything, for the community of saints. The Church is not mentioned among the human, *i.e.*, natural, phenomena. On account of this position it cannot seem strange, if in his sea-slime theory he suggests Anaximander (§ 24, 3), if in his reduction of physics to mathematics he appeals to the Pythagoreans, if in the stress that is laid upon the spherical form of the All, as of the human skull, he recalls to memory Xenophanes and the Platonic *Timæus* (§ 28, 5), etc. But just as natural will it appear that there are, throughout, no points in common with mediæval ideas, and that just so soon as the first traces of an inclination to these appeared in Schelling, Oken, who had dedicated to him as his friend his juvenile work, turned a cold shoulder to him. If, again, Schelling in his Munich period calls Oken's theory almost childish, and yet during his activity as teacher in Würzburg borrowed so much from it, this is as explicable as that the man calls what he has laid aside childishness. But though between these two men there was possible, at least for a long time, the relation of mutual recognition, such a relation could never exist between Oken and the man in whom from the beginning to the end of

his scientific activity just those moments had prevailed to which Schelling first later, Oken never, had given place in himself. To Baader Oken stands opposed as Maimon to Reinhold, as Troxler to Wagner, as Schopenhauer to Herbart, indeed even more, for the opposition between the Middle Ages and antiquity is a sharper one than that between Hume and Leibnitz, or between the Eleatics and the Atomists. Whether it be an accident that this sharp opposition made its appearance between two who were born inside the Catholic Church, might be a question not without interest, but, at the same time not altogether easy to answer.

5. Benedict Franz Xavier Baader (born March 27th, 1765, in Munich, and died on the 3rd of May, 1841, in Munich) appears to have received his very first philosophical stimulus from Herder, then to have occupied himself with Kant, particularly as a counterweight to the sensationalist doctrines the influence of which he felt while in England, but found this still more in the writings of Jacob Boehme, to whom he had been introduced by Kleuker and St. Martin. Boehme, then also other philosophers of the Middle Ages, Mystics as well as Scholastics, later still the Church Fathers, were very important influences in his development, which never, as was the case with almost all his contemporaries, afforded place in itself for Spinozism. Hence, also, Baader, who even in the philosophy of nature was never merely receptive, rejected, when, after his return from England, he came into closer contact with Schelling, everything pantheistic in Schelling's writings, indeed even combated it, though without naming Schelling. On the contrary, when Schelling, not without being incited thereto by Baader, began to make himself thoroughly familiar with Boehme's doctrines, and traces of that became visible in his Doctrine of Freedom, it was explicable why Baader expressed his agreement with these later works of Schelling much more unconditionally. In doing so, he, similarly as Steffens, who likewise regarded the later works of Schelling as the more perfect, could hardly admit Oken to be a philosopher. But how far the denomination of Baader as a Schellingian, repeated up to the present day, is from being correct, was long ago shown by Franz Hoffmann in the preface (which has also appeared as a work proper) to the second edition of Baader's short works (*Baader in Relation to Hegel and Schelling*. Leipzig,

1850). With the exception of the: *Fermenta Cognitionis* (6 Parts, 1822–25), the *Lectures on Religious Philosophy*, as also those on *Speculative Dogmatics* (4 parts, 1827–1836), all the works of Baader are separate treatises of only a few pages, originating partly in his extended correspondence and partly out of daily topics. I have given a complete chronologically ordered list of them in my larger work. Since then the edition of Baader's collected works, which at that time was only begun, has been completed. Professor Franz Hoffmann in Würzburg, together with several friends, has the credit of having arranged these and of having added to every division, within which the works are chronologically arranged, a very instructive introduction. Of the sixteen volumes, the last contains a register of names and contents by Lutterbeck, the fifteenth a biography of Baader by Hoffmann, besides letters of Baader's, the eleventh, extracts from his diaries.

Cf. Lutterbeck: *Ueber den philosophischen Standpunkt Baader's.* Mainz, 1854. Hamberger: *Die Cardinalpunkte der Franz Baader'schen Philosophie.* Stuttgart, 1855. Hoffmann: *Acht Abhandlungen über Baader's Lehren.* Leipzig, 1857. The Same: *Franz Baader als Begründer der Philosophie der Zukunft.* Leipzig, 1856. The Same: *Die Weltalter, Lichtstrahlen aus Franz Baader's Werken.* Erlangen, 1868.

6. To found a philosophy in which philosophy and theosophy should not be separated, by showing that the kingdoms of Nature and of Grace run parallel, that every natural event has also an ethical meaning—this Baader has repeatedly defined as his problem. To solve this, one must, obviously, take neither Aristotle among the ancients, nor Spinoza among the moderns, for his master, but must be guided by Master Eckhart and other theologians of the Middle Ages, by Paracelsus and Jacob Boehme. In contrast to the Enlightenment of the eighteenth century, he laments the breach between philosophy and tradition, and recalls, on every occasion, the heroes of the patristic, scholastic, and transition period of the Middle Ages, from whom we can learn to heal it. Not, of course, by returning to them *puré*, but in such a way that what they have taught be further developed, a requirement which persons of a mediæval turn have not forgiven Baader, whereas to the Enlightened it was much too mediæval in character. In contrast to the fact that Oken converts philosophy into mere *physica*, in which religion and Church are given no place, Baader demands that philosophy be through-and-through

religious,—that there follow upon the religious fundamental science a religious philosophy of nature, upon this a religious philosophy of mind, which, since mind realizes itself only in society, culminates in the religious philosophy of society, which is, at the same time, a philosophy of religious society. What Baader calls sometimes logic, sometimes transcendental philosophy, sometimes theory of knowledge, forms the introduction to the whole system, and is just for that reason prefixed also to the fundamental philosophy. He conceives it to be one of the greatest merits of Kant that he brought to light the necessity of such a theory of knowledge. Of course the presupposition that human knowledge is still a *res integra*, and the absurd attempt to begin with mere self-certainty and so (*i.e.*, without God) try to find God, is a solipsism and subjectivism which Descartes introduced, and which is not to be approved of. From this solipsism and the opposite extreme, pantheism, which conceives our knowledge as part of the divine self-knowledge, the right doctrine, according to which our knowing is a participation in the divine self-knowing, a knowing with Him, true *con-scientia*, is far removed. From the fact that God's being is not to be separated from His self-revelation and that, as Fichte has proved, every true being is self-consciousness, follows (what pantheism caricatures) that undoubtedly God knows Himself (also) in us. Here, now, is to be distinguished a series of stages, according as the divine knowledge merely permeates that of the created being, where the latter is constrained by God to know (as is the Devil), or is merely present with the same, which gives the ordinary empirical knowledge as also the belief resting on authority, or is immanent in it, whereby knowledge becomes free and speculative. Hence knowledge is not exempt from authority, but stands opposite to it free, and destroys the possibility of unbelief, not by introducing the use of the reason but by leading, through resignation to the divine reason, to the right use of the reason. In its truth, logic is the theory of the Logos, and those who make only the laws of thought its content forget that, as law and constraint, the Logos would speak only to the non-rational. To him who surrenders himself to reason it is not a constraining burden but a liberating pleasure. *Fata volentem ducunt nolentem trahunt.* As the self-revelation of God is a self-forming, self-shaping, so is the co-knowledge, a co-shaping; hence speculative knowledge is

creative, genetic, original. *Scimus quod facimus.* But originality as little excludes classicity as knowledge does authority, and the opposition of faith and knowledge, which both the Pharisees of faith (Pietists) and the Sadducees of (false) knowledge maintain, is the scandal of our age.

7. With such a theory of knowledge, it is natural that the real fundamental science with Baader should be *Theology.* Not to begin with God, he characterizes as a denial of Him. The development of his theology is such that he everywhere leans upon Jacob Boehme and St. Martin, often becoming merely a commentator upon these men. The two rocks, abstract theism, which conceives God as lifeless being and dead rest, and modern pantheism, which makes God first come to consciousness in man, Baader, after having finished his course (a logical course with Hegel and a historical with Schelling) attempts to avoid by distinguishing the *immanent* (logical) life-process of God (that eternal self-begetting of God, as his pupil Hoffmann termed it, or His self-production out of His unrevealedness), in which God is eternally manifest to Himself, as the active ternary embraced by a passive recipient (the Idea),—by distinguishing such a process from an *emanent* (real) process, in which God becomes a tri-personality, which takes place through the eternal nature, or the principle of selfhood, to overcome and sublate (to negate, conserve, and elevate) this principle being as necessary for God as for every other life which must rupture the mother in order to be born again and be perfect. If in the immanent, esoteric revelation God had expressed Himself, so in the emanent, exoteric, He unfolded Himself. Considering the great agreement of these doctrines with Jacob Boehme's, it is conceivable that Baader continually appeals to this authority, and these *Outlines* are justified in referring back to § 234, 3. But besides thus appealing to the authority of Boehme, Baader often attempts, particularly in the lectures on *Speculative Dogmatics*, to give to his doctrine a basis which he calls anthropological, or, also, retrogressive, because it reasons back from what results from the consideration of man (as a copy) to the eternal occurrings in the prototype. A more complete account of these processes is to be found in an exposition by Fr. Hoffmann, which was written under Baader's eye and recognised in his preface as a correct exposition: *Speculative Development of the Eternal Self-begetting of God, gathered*

from Baader's Works. Amberg, 1835. This was employed in the more complete development contained in § 44 of my larger work. They have been very well presented since then by Lutterbeck in the summary of Baader's doctrine which he prefixed to the index to Baader's Works. Not only are the two processes confounded by pantheism, which puts the doctrine of the All-One in the place of the true doctrine of the All-in-One, but are confounded with a third, the *Act of Creation*, which, because it is an act of freedom, is not to be construed, but only to be described; to which God is brought by no necessity or want but rather by a superabundance. Hegel and other pantheists make God first return upon Himself in the act of creation, whereas it is only His image with which He unites, and only in this sense can we, with St. Martin, call creation a *re*creation of God. Not speculation but history teaches us that God enters into the process from love,—desiring to be born again image-wise in the creature. Moses does not recount the beginning, but a later section, of this history; but trustworthy myths tell of what preceded. Whether he reckons among these also Boehme's speculations, he does not say. Enough that here also the relationship is so great that we may refer back to § 234, 4, and Baader's doctrine may be very briefly presented. The matter out of which, and the efficient cause by which, the triune God produced the world is eternal nature, without which creator and creature would coincide. Of the two parts of creation, the intelligent (heaven, angels) and the selfless (earth, natural beings), between which, then, man falls, the former must be transient, in order that, by overcoming absolute necessary temptation, man may step out of involuntary innocence into the condition of a free child of God. Whereas true speculation places the possibility of evil in eternal nature (selfhood) and declares it to be necessary, the false, pantheistic speculation asserts this of self-seeking or real evil. True speculation says, further, that this fall could be of a double nature, through pride and baseness. To this, history adds that the first fall took place with Lucifer, who, through his rebellious hate, put himself out of the pleasure of God into His displeasure, and now experiences the fact,—*fata nolentem trahunt.* This lying spirit wills, hence is personality, but never attains what he wills, real being; he is the tantalizing longing to realize himself. He will have, as a means to that, man, to whom,

through the separation of the abysmal and heavenly regions, has fallen the destiny of becoming, through the devolution of Egohood to the Ego, the deliverer of the selfless creature corrupted by Lucifer's fall, a destiny for which his *dominium in naturam* fits him. But that man be this restorer it is necessary that God withdraw for a moment in order that man may choose whether, by overcoming temptation, he will make sure this unmerited, and hence uncertain, good fortune of Paradise, or will trifle it away. What choice he will make speculation cannot determine, but can assert that whatever choice he may make, freedom of choice will give place to the being-determined, so that now man must *yield* to his inclinations and must act as he is made to act. History, now, teaches us that man also fell, not, like Lucifer, from pride, but through basely becoming bewitched by nature beneath him and becoming beast-like. Once fallen away from God and after a choice once made and hence a vanished choice, man and the whole of creation with him would quickly have been precipitated into Hell, if God had not checked them in their fall and held them hovering over the abyss. This detartarization, or founding of the earth, over which the morning stars rejoice, and with which the *opus sex dierum* of Moses begins, is effected through temporal-spatial, *i.e.*, material, becoming, so that matter, the concreteness of time and space, is not, as the Gnostics teach, the ground of evil but rather a punishment; hence a consequence of evil; it is at the same time also a means of defence against it. Since, that is to say, man has come into being out of eternity as the true time, which is the unity of all three time-dimensions and hence the Always, just so—as if out of the Everywhere into space, in which (apparent, or usually so-called) time is placed,—God's love has therein shown itself temporizingly. Through constantly repeated mortifications man can now deny *en détail* what he had affirmed as a whole in the Fall; he who was subject to tempta*tion* now has time to withstand tempta*tions*. In this condition of suspension, the man living in the (apparent) time, is indeed removed out of eternity (true time), and, as one who only seeks or bewails the present (enjoyment), lives, properly speaking, without it; at the same time, however, he is thereby separated also from the more deeply fallen evil spirit, which lives in the false or the sub-temporal condition of despair which has no future; so that, therefore, matter or, if one, in agreement with

the Holy Scripture, calls the first matter water, this latter is the tear of sympathy with which God extinguishes the world-conflagration. Matter, thus, conceals the abyss of chaotic forces, is itself not the solution of the contradiction but only its arrest, hence is nothing rational or eternal but is at some time to vanish. It is the lodge in which the true process of embodiment takes place, since man forever overcomes the material; a fact that, among others, is witnessed in culture, which is therefore not merely verbally related to cultus. Since in matter is given the *enveloppe* that defends against wrath, the rejected infra-natural spirit can win entrance to the material world only through man, so that that is true of the Devil which pantheism fables of God, viz., that only in man does he come to reality, *i.e.*, activity.

8. With the meaning just now given of matter, the passage is made to Baader's *Philosophy of Nature* (Physiology, Physics), which appears as the Second Part of his Theology. Here, now, is to be mentioned, first of all, the decided opposition to materialism, which identifies nature and matter. The merit of Kant, and of the philosophy of nature based upon him, is that it contains at least indications as to how to get beyond that point. That the essence of matter is placed in gravity points, since gravity is dislocation, the being removed from the centre, to the conclusion that material existence can be neither the original nor the normal existence. Just so the discord everywhere pointed out by Schelling, and by him regarded, of course, as the normal condition, should lead us to attend more to the condition preceding the discord, and to recognise that life consists merely in the overcoming of the opposition. But the modern philosophy of nature has won for itself the most decided credit by the fact that it has restored the conception of penetrability, which the mechanistic view denies, and has by dynamism pointed out that the visible is a product of immaterial principles, that, therefore, it is not inconceivable that the product may at one time be invisible. A primary law, obviously, which can perhaps be called the fundamental law of nature, has hitherto been neglected: that everything that has its ground and nourishment in occultation is deprived of these in manifestation, or that what as latency is necessary to life, is as potency hostile to it. (Hegel is the only one who recognises this, in his "sublation" [*aufheben*].) Without this law neither the main problem of Physiology,

How has the selfless creature become material? nor that of Anthropology, How has man become evil? which has the closest connection with the first, is solvable. The stages of this disintegration are carried out in agreement with the Mosaic narrative, just as by Boehme,—through appetite for the gratification of the animal function, sinking into sleep in consequence of that, becoming sexual, falling—and it is shown how, now that the trinity which man bears in himself as a counterpart of the tri-personality is marred, so that he who should by the spiritualization of body and soul be wholly spiritual, is so only in part, and is a merely composite, fragmentary nature, the three constituent parts of which may also be separated. It is so in death, in the equivocal and often morbid phenomena of somnambulism, and in religious ecstasy.

Cf. Lutterbeck: (*Fünf Artikel*) *Aus Baader's Naturphilosophie*, in Frohschammer's *Athenäum*, II. und III. The same: *Baader's Lehre vom Weltgebäude*. Frankfort, 1866.

9. The third and last part of the system is, according to Baader, constituted by *Ethics*. Frequently he also says,—Anthropology takes its place beside Theology and Physiology as the third part of the system. As only matter that is removed from its centre is heavy, so also only to the man devoid of moral character has *it* appeared as a burden, *i.e.*, as law. Hence the Kantian system of morals with its tantalizing striving towards an unattainable conscious goal is properly a system of morals for the Devil. The true, *i.e.*, religious and hence Christian, Ethics knows that He who gives the law also fulfils it in us, so that from being a burden it becomes a pleasure and ceases to be law. Hence its cardinal point is reconciliation [*Versöhnung*] which has more than a merely verbal connection with the Son [*Sohn*]. Every system of morals that is without a saviour is without salvation; fallen man has not the capacity to reintegrate himself; hereditary sin, the seed of the Serpent, hinders him in this. But with this seed there remains in him, at the same time, the Idea, the seed of the woman, *i.e.*, redeemability. This mere possibility is actualized by God's placing Himself on a level with fallen man, and the reviving of the image of God that had receded before that of Satan, in the conception of Jesus by the virgin, the nuptual abode of God, so that in her Son man appears as he should be, the moral law become man, which is of course then not law, but is realized. Like hereditary sin,

hereditary grace propagates itself *per infectionum vitæ*, one may say. Prayer and particularly sacrament, by which man, who is only what he eats, eats into heaven, are the means by which *rapport* with Christ is produced, who effects in one, happiness, in another, a loathing of grace that is suggestive of hydrophobia. After the Saviour, by overcoming temptation, has destroyed evil at its centre, has crushed under foot the Serpent's head, it must be destroyed successively in the entire periphery, which is done by the constant mortification of Ego-hood, in which man co-operates with others in the attainment of his happiness,—is neither a solitary worker, as the Kantians would say, nor completely inactive, as Luther teaches. The good is not made a possession without heart-breaking, and this is not mere suffering. With the possession of salvation all disintegration is annulled, hence also indissolubility and immortality are given. The guaranty of immortality lies in being unique, inasmuch as every individual completes the race to a totality; the guaranty of eternal happiness lies in the inamissibility of the same where temptation is destroyed. Since time and matter are the suspension of the alienation, this succeeds when they have ceased and the lodge is destroyed. Then follows the separation of Heaven and Hell, in both of which God dwells; only, in the former, he is immanent in co-operating spirits, in the latter he permeates the refractory. The restoration of all things in the sense that all, even the maligners of the Holy Ghost, shall at some time be forgiven, is declared by Baader to be a sentimental non-Christian doctrine. The fact that the "payment of the last farthing" becomes a "purification through the pool" by which only the lowest stages in the kingdom of heaven can be attained does not conflict, however, with "*ex infernis nulla redemptio.*" All the propositions that relate to the nature of man, so far as he is a member of a greater community, have been excepted from Baader's works and brought into a collection, under Baader's supervision, by Franz Hoffmann, in *Main Features of the Philosophy of Society by Franz Baader*, Würzburg, 1817. As the leading proposition amongst these must be regarded, That there is no union without common subjection, and hence all disunion is sedition. Hence also a bond between rulers and ruled is inconceivable without religious character, and to the false dogma, *état athée*, must be opposed

the correct one, *état chrétien*. Experience teaches that not this state, but the atheistic, causes tolerance to disappear. With the Christian character of the State appears also that unlikeness of the members which is indispensable to every true unity. Christianity, itself a world-association, is everywhere combated where there is a fight against associations and corporations. Impious practice in France, and still more impious theory in Germany, by the fact that in the place of the only sovereign, God, there has been put the sovereignty either of the prince or the people, and thereby the only defence against the despotism of the ruler (whether he be one or the mass), viz., the State or the corporation, been destroyed, has strained all relations; the mobile, money, has become immobile in the hands of the few; argyrocracy has the servants of the chamber for masters of the chamber; and the peasant, who should be attached, not to the soil but, through possession, to the territory, is made an outcast. Instead of the doctrine that the State is a contract with earlier and later generations, people see in it, with Rousseau, a contract between the individuals of one generation only, and suppose that it has a constitution only when every one can put it in his pocket. A presentiment of the truth is evinced, in our century of deputies instead of membership in the diet, in its caricature of the deputy, the chamber of representatives. Since such is the case, and since *non progredi est regredi*, the way must be paved for new forms. Free associations must again beget an *esprit de corps*, and since instead of serfs represented by lords of the manor have appeared a proletariat, we have to do with the fact that these are not represented by deputed persons but are protected by an advocateship, which would be the only worthy function of the priest, who thereby best counteracts that hatred of priests which is, with most persons, the hatred of religion. Before all, must the delusion be given up that everything must be done by the government. Instead of overmuch formalism, the desideratum is the holding fast of certain vital truths: That property is a business, ruling a duty, and being ruled a right; that to be subject to merely human (especially one's own) authority is unfreedom, etc. The succession of the forms of State among the Jewish people—theocracy, judge, king, is also that of the theories of the State that have appeared. These are related one to another as love, law, and authority. For the rest, the State

in which the nation stands as a distinct individual (party) over against other individuals, is a temporary institution, subsisting solely only so long as the Idea does not penetrate all persons. It is otherwise with the religious society, which transcends all nationalities and is thereby universal (catholic) viz., the Church. In analogy with his doctrine of the State, Baader constantly points out that where the antiquated is clung to men do not follow the good old times, which clung to the living. The opposite of stagnation is revolution, which Baader sees in rationalism, religious liberalism. This, with him, nearly coincides with protestantism. Since, upon the appearance of this the Church did not see in it, as it formerly did in every heresy, the stimulus for a new evolution, did not seek to answer the questions raised by the age of the Reformation (the relation of ecclesiastical and political authority, the relation of faith and knowledge), it has only prolonged an obligation which should have been discharged. Protestantism which, for the rest, in its original form is no longer divided *inter vivos*, but into pietism and nihilism, has accomplished still less, and it bears the blame, if, instead of Scripture, tradition and science forming a unity (*tres faciunt collegium*), one-sidednesses have formed themselves, which they who speak of a Petrine, Pauline and Johannine Christianity would make perpetual. Nothing, therefore, is more needed than an alliance with speculation. An excommunication of intelligence, which the servile counsel, would be answered with an excommunication from intelligence. The Catholic has first to disabuse the Protestants of the delusion that they are the sole possessors of science. He does that when he shows that unscientific and irrational rationalism is a product of protestantism. Then he has to establish a really scientific theology, which, at the same time, is a true science of nature, in order that also the error of supposing that the physics of the present day, which is possessed by a real ideophobia, is the only rational physics, may disappear. In opposition to the alien blindly-believing party, which desires to know nothing of religion but pays others to know it for them, in opposition to the equally alien anti-religious natural science, it is time that the old German science should rise to the thought of how in the *philosophus teutonicus* it has had its hero, to guide itself according to whom is the problem of the present.

Hamberger: *Fundamentalbegriffe von Franz Baader's Ethik, Politik und Religionsphilosophie.* Stuttg., 1851.

§ 326.

Transition to the Concluding Systems.

1. As in the presentation of the doctrines of Herbart and Schopenhauer the citing of particular instances of opposition could be omitted all the more that this would have been a mere repetition of what § 41 of my larger work has said, just so is it with a comparison of Baader and Oken, and what was said in that work in § 44, 19. Even where they agree, even verbally, the diametrical opposition still remains, and though Baader approves Oken's conception of man as the iron which has as its magnet that to which his attention is directed, Oken might have seen in the sense in which Baader understands this, such a perversion of his own meaning, as Baader would if Carl Vogt should say, that he entirely agrees with him in holding that man is what he eats. This opposition may be stated thus: By Oken the whole of philosophy is converted into the philosophy of nature, by Baader into the philosophy of religion. But just for that reason philosophy, if it should aim at being everywhere not both at the same time, as Baader will have it, but the one in one part of the system and the other in the other, will do well to seek instruction from Oken there, and from Baader here. But the latter was given (§ 296, 3) as the problem of the most modern philosophy; hence they have brought philosophy considerably nearer the solution,—more perhaps than if they had been less one-sided.

2. But if we review, now, the manner in which the moments combined in Kant have developed themselves, there has, in the first place, again made its appearance even within Criticism itself, through the opposition between Reinhold and his critics, who both regarded themselves as the true followers of Kant, the opposition that had divided the eighteenth century up to the time of Kant; and where it was again resolved (by Fichte and Schelling), there is given a more enduring reconciliation than Kant himself could have brought about. That philosophy must be ideal-realism, is settled. It has, in the second place, been shown in the opposition of the Science of Knowledge and the System of Identity, that the union of pantheism and individualism, as attempted by Kant, was far from being the complete solution of the second problem of

the latest philosophy, but that it was necessary to get beyond the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries by the setting up of a theory that made possible a concrete monotheism and a view of the State in which neither the individual is sacrificed to the whole, nor *vice versa*. This, Schelling, together with his friends, attempted in his Doctrine of Freedom. But now, since, in the third place, the sides that had been united by the bond of his personality, and which had caused to appear in him, first, the philosopher who adopted ancient views and deified Nature and State, then the philosopher who adopted the mediæval way of thinking and immersed himself in God, had become, in the most marked manner, free and distinct in Baader and Oken, the period has come in which the third problem also may find its solution, namely, the problem of framing a system in which (without the giving up of the two conquests just mentioned) Antiquity and the Middle Ages appear in the service of the nineteenth century; where cosmosophy and theosophy become moments in anthroposophic philosophy.

3. Of the three systems which until now appear to have most fully solved this problem, the *panentheism* of KRAUSE, the *panlogism* of HEGEL, and the *positive philosophy* of SCHELLING, the third, since Schelling expressly confesses that he gained through Hegel the insight that what he had taught up till then was only a part of the whole system, and, because the latter did not begin to become known till after Hegel's death, and, even after being put forth in the *Authentic Exposition*, contains only individual parts entirely wrought out, and, regarding many things, only fruitful hints, must be separated from the other two and assigned to the section which considers the ferment in German Philosophy since Hegel's death. But it may be mentioned even here that the union, not easily again to be found, of early ripeness, long life, and youthful-minded old age, made it possible that the same person should become a successor in that in which he had been a predecessor.

B.—KRAUSE'S PANENTHEISM.

§ 327.

1. KARL CHRISTIAN FRIEDRICH KRAUSE (born May 6th, 1781, after 1802 *Privatdocent* in Jena, after 1804 in retired

life in Dresden, in Berlin in 1814, in the following year again in Dresden, after 1823 *Privatdocent* in Göttingen, died, when about to habilitate himself in Munich, on the 27th of September, 1832). A complete list of his works, both those published by himself and those published after his death by his pupils, is to be found in § 45 of the work of mine which I have so often cited. As the most important are to be mentioned: *Plan of a System of Philosophy* (Jena, 1804); *System of a Theory of Morals* (1810); *The Prototype of Humanity* (1811); *Sketch of the System of Philosophy:* the first division, *Analytical Philosophy* (1825); *Sketch of the System of Logic* (1828); *Sketch of the System of the Philosophy of Right* (1828); *Lectures on the System of Philosophy* (1828); *Lectures on the Fundamental Truths of Science* (1829). To these are to be added the works that came out after his death through the exertions of von Leonhardi: *The Theory of Knowledge, The Absolute Philosophy of Religion, Spirit of the History of Humanity, Biology and Philosophy of History.* (His many works on mathematics, and on music, in which he was a virtuoso, as also the works in Freemasonry, which are decisive as regards the fortunes of his life, are here passed by.)

Lindemann: *Uebersichtliche Darstellung des Lebens und der Wissenschaftslehre C. Chr. F. Krause's und dessen Standpunktes zur Friemaurerbrüderschaft.* München, 1839.

2. According to Krause,—Spinoza, Schelling, Wagner and Hegel are right in representing philosophy as absolutism, *i.e.*, as the theory of the absolute. This theory, particularly as developed by Schelling in his riper (later) works, as, *e.g.*, in the *Memorial*, should not be called a theory of the All as God, but of the All as in God, not pantheism but panentheism, since it merely teaches that "God essentiates everything finite in, under, and through Himself." To the philosophy of faith and feeling a theory is obviously repugnant which, in opposition to its unknowability of God, makes God the proper object of knowledge, in opposition to its certainty (only) of the finite, makes precisely this the most uncertain of all things. Just so also does it stand in opposition to the subjective science of self represented by Kant and Fichte, to which the individual rational being is the highest. And yet, in spite of this opposition to absolutism, true philosophy must concede to those subjective tendencies their due,

for its problem is to overcome all one-sided tendencies that have appeared in the entire course of philosophy, by the reconciliation of them. How this is done can be shown only after a survey of the entire organism (organic structure) of science. Here it is important, first, that this should not be identified with philosophy, since there is also a science of experience or history, which now has a place beside philosophy as its co-ordinate science, and, again, that it be subordinate to the first part of philosophy, the foundation science; and, finally, that it be united with philosophy also in a science—the philosophy of history. If, now, we abide by philosophy, this so solves the just-mentioned problem of the reconciliation of subjectivism and absolutism that it falls into two "courses," the first of which, the subjective-analytic, starts with self-consciousness as the first certain knowledge, rises gradually to the highest fundamental thought, from which then in the objective-synthetic course we descend to that with which we started; whence it appears in an obvious manner that in the whole system everything twice comes to view.

3. The *Subjective-Analytic* Course, on which, particularly the *Fundamental Truths*, *The Lectures on the System of Philosophy*, and the posthumous work, *Theory of Knowing*, are to be consulted, shows how the question regarding the relation of knowledge to the object, which the pre-scientific consciousness does not at all put to itself, introduces us into philosophy, which therefore begins with the question: How do we come to ascribe to ourselves a true knowledge of objects? Primarily, we know only of our bodily conditions, with the help of the phantasy, which functions according to definite non-sensuous presentations (time, space, motion), and of the understanding, which functions according to definite conceptions, judgments, and syllogisms, these become external objects; and thus that first question drives us further back, to the question: How come we to know of our bodily conditions? It appears that this happens only because we attribute them all to a single Ego. In the self-viewing of the Ego, of the truth of which there can be no doubt, is found a fixed starting-point, as also a subjective criterion of truth. What is as certain as I am, *is*. But if we inquire more closely into *what* or *how* we find ourselves in this Inner, it appears that the self-viewing of the Ego contains a unity of body and mind (soul), or is human Ego. Further, the finitude which is to be

found in the self-viewing of the Ego, leads beyond the Ego, both because of the being limited by other Egos, of whose existence I cannot doubt, and of the fact that the individual functions of the Ego limit themselves. Finitude or limitedness belongs only to what is part of a whole; since the part stands related to the whole as the consequent to the ground, not every existence, but every finite existence, postulates a ground or whole, in which or by which it is founded. The Ego, since it is a unitary essence and is also finite, points to two wholes—to nature, of which its body (it as bodily nature) is part, and to reason, of which its mind (it as thought-nature) is a part. But just so do these two, since they are limited, point to an essence that is above them, which may therefore be termed original essence (*Urwesen*). But even this points to a still higher thought. The syllable *ur* (=*ueber*, over) indicates a relation; that which transcends all relations, hence is absolutely non-relative, is to be designated God or essence absolutely, hence not with the article. The viewing of essence or God is the one and unconditioned viewing which as presentiment accompanies all others and gives them support, so that "As true as God lives" is the highest asseveration, and guarantees reality to all that, without the intuition of essence, would have only the validity of a problematical thing, a dream. The viewing of essence, Schelling's intellectual perception, Hegel's absolute Idea, is the terminal point of the Analytical Course, which is necessary because we find ourselves outside it, and philosophy is, therefore, the theory of essence, knowledge of God; the expression knowledge of the world is far from being adequate.

4. If, in the Analytical Course, subjectivism received due recognition, so does absolutism in the *Objective-Synthetic* Course, which, just because it is the correlate of the former, follows the diametrically opposite way. In the *Encyclopædia of Philosophical Sciences* accompanying his posthumous work on Knowledge, Krause gives a *conspectus* of the organic structure of this, by far the more important, part of his philosophy. It begins with the consideration of "Essence," and science as occupying itself with essence, before the latter is conceived as original essence, and hence, as pure theory of essence, constitutes the real *Foundation-Science*, is at the same time Ontology and Theology. With the exception of Hegel, the moderns have unjustifiably neglected this, a fact that has

led them also to judge so unjustly the Schoolmen, but particularly also Wolff. All other sciences are reached by descending from the foundation-science, which contains their principles. First is reached the science that considers essence-as-original-essence, and could, therefore, be distinguished from the highest science, the theory of essence, as the theory of original essentiality, unless one prefers to incorporate it in the foundation-science as its last part. If this is done, the foundation-science has nothing else to consider than essence in itself, just as in geometry we must first know what space is in itself before we can know what it is within itself, *i.e.*, what it contains. In this investigation there presents itself an organic body of essentialities, a system of categories, which constitute the content of the foundation-science, or metaphysics. Although the tables of categories of Aristotle, Kant, and Hegel are defective, it is yet a merit to have laid down such tables. Krause pays the penalty for his otherwise unfortunate fancy for substituting for all technical expressions that have been naturalized in German newly-formed German ones by disheartening his readers; and to make one's way through his theory of categories, which he regards as a chief merit, has thereby been made a much more difficult labour than it would otherwise have been. For this reason not many are wont to undertake it. The investigation of essence inquires first *what* it is, *i.e.*, regarding its essentiality, and finds in this, since God is One, *i.e.*, a Self and a Whole, that in the essentiality, unity, sameness and wholeness are to be distinguished; but at the same time they must be united to constitute essential unity or unitary essentiality. The positive character which we find in the essentiality of God leads to the conclusion that to Him belongs propositionality, by virtue of which He is assertive essence. In propositionality are distinguished moments exactly analogous with those distinguished in essentiality (rightness, compass or comprehension, unity of propositionality) so that if they both are again combined into a unity in "propositional essentiality" or beingness (existence), it will appear strange to no one if, in the moments of these last combinations, the first, second, third members of the first two triads always again make their appearance (to selfhood and rightness there corresponds here relationality, to wholeness and compass, containedness or intention, to unity of essentiality and of proposition, unity of being). Since everything must be considered with reference to imposition-

ality, oppositionality, and compositionality (*i.e.*, thesis, antithesis, and synthesis), there must then again be opposed to these categories their opposites (hence to wholeness parthood, to rightness counter-rightness as, in negative quantity, limit or finiteness is opposed to comprehension, etc.); finally, those opposed to one another must be combined with one another in order to have the entire organic structure of the absolute essentialities, under which at last appears perfection, also, as the actual proof that it is attained. The combinations of individual categories, the possibility of which lies in the fact that of every essentiality of God every other can be predicated, are to be numerically determined by calculation of combinations. (Krause very often praises the Schoolmen just because of that for which they are ridiculed, viz., the fact that they had formed such words as *alteritas*, *quiditas*, *hæcceitas*. This is explicable: the last-mentioned words show a literal agreement with Lully [*vid.* § 206, 5], of whom he otherwise appears to know nothing.) Whereas the theory of essence as such, or the eternal essentialities, forms the foundation for a group of philosophical disciplines which Krause designates as formal theories, or theories of essentiality, like mathematics, the fundamental conception of which results from a union of wholeness and limitation, etc., the content of the material theories, or theories of essence, is formed by the answering of the question as to what God is *within* and *under* Himself. (Instead of *is*, it would perhaps be better to say *has*, since Krause expressly says, What God is *in* Himself, signifies entire essentiality of essence; while what God is [has] *within* Himself is only a partial aspect of essence; and in another place, Beauty is an essentiality not only *within*, but *in* [*as*] essence.) The transition to this is formed by the fact that if we consider more closely the notions oppositeness, order and ground, which were found in all the complete tables of categories, this leads to the result that essence must be conceived as original (*i.e.*, over-) essence. Whereas, now, essence only feels and thinks *itself*, is in itself or within itself, essence-as-original-essence is within that which is comprehended by it, the totality of things, the world, thinks the world and in relation to it. Therefore the ordinary consciousness, when God is in question, always thinks of essence-as-original-essence. The pre-supposition to that, essence, transcends its horizon.

5. The essences which God is *within* Himself or which stand

in and under essence, out of and under essence-as-original-essence are embraced under the term *world;* and hence that part of philosophy which follows the foundation-science may be called *Cosmology*, which, therefore, considers the things that fill God's essence and display the God that is like-in-Himself and affected with no opposition. Here first meet us, as the first eternal parts, Nature and Reason as the finite (real) and infinite (ideal) unity of the infinite and finite, which, if the Analytical Philosophy had found them in its ascent by induction, whereas the Synthetic Philosophy has deduced them, are now construed. Since both are united in man, there are therefore three parts of Cosmology: *The Science of Reason, Philosophy of Nature*, and *Anthropology.* On the first of these, which shows the necessity that reason exist as a realm of conscious essences, there are to be found suggestions in Krause's *System of the Theory of Morals;* on the second, the *System of the Philosophy of Nature* of the year 1804, and, likewise, the *Theory of Morals* enlighten us. As coördinate with the realm of mind, nature must present a parallelism with it. If there the antithesis of Ideas and the individual was the supreme antithesis, here that of suns and planets is, which, inasmuch as their atmospheres interpenetrate, generate the dynamical processes. As the crown of these, there appears the living being, which corresponds to the marriage of the Idea with the individual, to the beautiful. In details Krause allies himself in many things with Schelling, but particularly with Oken; with the latter also in that he puts mathematics very much in the foreground. Much more extendedly treated than the two theories of Essence just named is that of unitary Essence, Anthropology; partly in the above-named works, partly in the *Prototype of Humanity*, the *Fundamental Truths*, the *Philosophy of History*, and in other places. Man is, it is true, not the only, but the highest, union of nature and reason, since here the highest syntheses in the realm of reason, viz., self-conscious spirits, are united with the highest in the realm of nature, the most perfect animal bodies, in unchangeable never-increasing number, since the humanity of the All never grows. Only one part of humanity, earthly humanity, do we now know. The highest destiny of man is, not to remain in self-union but to rise into union with others, finally with God. Hence the philosophy of religion forms the terminal point not only of Anthropology but of all theories of Essence, because

it shows how man comes, here, to manifest God in his life, and how God comes to resign Himself to man, which is not to be understood as if God lapsed into any change. God is not love, but He displays the attribute of love. Man means here not only the individual; even the combinations of men have for their basis the Divine bond, to which the Church is related merely as a weak reflection, since it does not even embrace the whole of earthly humanity.

6. Besides the various theories of Essence, which, as material philosophical disciplines, had treated of what is *within* God, there are, in the second place, the formal disciplines, which, inasmuch as they draw further consequences from what God is *in* Himself, can be called (applied) theories of Essentiality. Here appears first *Mathesis*, which, since magnitude unites the two categories of wholeness and limitedness, may be termed the theory of wholeness; and when it treats of the whole as regards its content it is analysis, when as regards its form, the theory of combination, when these united, combinatory analysis; in its application to time, space, motion, and force, chronology, geometry, mechanics, and dynamics. The endeavour to replace formulæ by words, and the demonstration that all arithmetical combinations express not only numerical operations but real relations, often place Krause in coincidence with J. J. Wagner. Next in the series after Mathesis, as the second formal science, is *Logic*, which has, not merely, as heretofore, to describe analytically and historically, but also to show that the laws and forms of thought have objective validity. Hegel, who obviously errs when he makes logic the whole of metaphysics, is the only one, says Krause, who has divined the true significance of logic. He then points out violations of the three well-known laws of thought, which govern thought because the categories upon which they rest are essentialities of Essence, to which (Essence) all thought is directed. Just so, conception, judgment and inference are not only subjective forms, but, since Essence is a self, we must self-view (comprehend), since it is relation, we must view relation (judge), etc. As the third formal science, is to be mentioned *Æsthetics*, because beauty, whose realization in art it treats of, is a characteristic of Essence, so that all represented beauty is properly God-likeness, harmonious union of unity and multiplicity. Krause sees in the opera the perfect work of art; just as all other

works of art will become realized when the artists shall have united themselves in an art-union and this is united with the science-union. In view of the recognition which as a tribute Krause pays to Herbart's application of mathematics to psychology, one might be tempted to regard also this as an agreement with him, that his *Ethics* follows Æsthetics as the fourth formal science. But the agreement goes no further. Besides the *Theory of Morals*, are to be employed, as sources for Krause's ethical theories, the *Prototype of Humanity*, the *Philosophy of Right*, and the posthumous works, particularly the *Philosophy of History*. As the category of beauty forms the foundation for Æsthetics so does that of life for Ethics. The sum of Ethics is the essential represented in life, or the reproduction in life of that part of the highest good (God) which can be actualized by man. Inasmuch as the original and fundamental will works in the volition of the fully conscious man, it operates therein in archetypal conceptions, as universal will and law. "Do thou will and do the good as good," is the ethical formula which Krause lays down, and out of which he deduces, among others, also the Kantian. Evil embraces both badness and misfortune, is conceived by Krause as nothing positive, as mere limitation, as transitory, indeed, in the majority of cases, as mere illusion. The theory of morals (theory of rational life), however, treats man not only as a particular individual but shows how he makes himself a member of society, which must be regarded as higher man. This is done in a society of the virtuous, the description of which is given particularly by the *Prototype of Humanity*. Since the fulfilling of the destiny of man is conditioned not by him alone but also by temporal circumstances, and, among these, by such as depend upon the freedom of others, the organism of these temporally free conditions of rational life, *i.e.*, the *Right*, is to be considered more closely. Every one is a person of right, *i.e.*, has a claim of right and an obligation of right, for the protection of which the State exists. But conversely, only the person has rights, though it does not conflict with the conception of the person, that he should become a means for a higher person of right. Only, from this must not be inferred that the individual person first gets his right through society; he has it from God. Just as little is there a right of the State that is first given by the State-compact, but, on the contrary, right is prior, the compact only the form of its

existence. Among the powers of the State, which in the immature condition of the State do not at all work in separation from one another, though in the perfect condition they work autonomically and harmoniously, the judicial is treated most fully, and in particular, punishment, which is regarded merely as an educating agency. The theory of retaliation and punishment by death find in Krause a decided opponent. Constitutional monarchy he considers as a transition to the perfect form of the State. In no form of the State has the individual the right of revolution, in all there is error, but providence leads to the goal, even through blood and tears.

7. Although, with the foundation-science, the theories of essence and the theories of the essentialities, philosophy, according to Krause, properly, is concluded, it is nevertheless entirely correct, when an adherent of his theory designates the *Philosophy of History* as the real culminating point of his system. In this, that is to say, there unite themselves philosophical and historical knowledge, which he had first opposed to one another in his discussions on science. Inasmuch as both sides of science are here united, this is not only the crown of science in general but also of philosophy, and must therefore be considered here. As is ethics, so also is the *Philosophy of History* connected with the foundation-science by the category, life. To what was developed there, is added here the narrower qualification that the life, not, it is true, of essence absolutely considered, nor even of the infinite essences in God, nature, reason, and humanity, but in limited humanities and individuals, passes through the three stages of germination, youth, and maturity, each of which again exhibits the same three in diminished scale. Earthly humanity, which had its origin through *generatio æquivoca* (as Oken holds), has its germinal period of life, in which it lived in a magnetic primitively serene condition with the original essence, behind it, and only the memory of which continues in the sayings about the golden age. The age of growth closed its first period, that of polytheism, with Jesus, who allied himself with the society of Essenes; its second period, that of the monotheistic union with God, which led to contempt of the world and to the rule of priests, with the restoration of the sciences. Its third, the two opposite tendencies of which produced the powerful secret organizations of the Freemasons and the Jesuits, expires, and there dawns the age of maturity, in which

will fall the consummation of all partial societies, as also that of all genuine human endeavours, of the life of right, virtue, and union, in great as in small. Certainly all members of earthly humanity and, perhaps even it itself, as a member of the great humanity, will join in social union with all others. Perhaps such an intercourse transcending earth will be possible for us only after we have become spirits. But it must appear; for, since the number of spirits does not increase, there must, after maturity is completed and death has appeared, begin another, higher life. But even the present is not the first; the fruit of every life passes over into the next, perhaps up to a higher planet. Genius is such a fruit of the fore-life. Just for this reason also approaching old-age, is, neither for the individual nor for (partial) humanity, a mere misfortune, for at the same time approaches also the new birth to a higher existence. Just for this reason the highest goal, the universal union of humanity, approaches ever nearer.

§ 328.

Transition to Hegel.

Of a system the author of which boasts that it may bear all names that have ever been given to a philosophical view, but has in particular mediated and united absolutism with subjectivism, it may be demanded that none of the sides that have hitherto had validity, be allowed by it to fall short. If this be done, it is discovered that the (one-sided) view represented by Spinoza and Schelling is much more favoured than that of which Kant, Fichte and Jacobi are representatives. Even the fact that the Analytical Course has more the character of a mere introduction, and that the possibility is assumed that no one can place himself without it on the standpoint of the viewing of Essence, proves this; although Krause by the fact of his dependence upon the analytical philosophy for his deductions repeatedly proves that it is still more, the concessions to subjectivism appear almost as if they were made against his will. And now, indeed, in the content of the Theory of Essence,—the eagerness with which everything is banished from God that could make Him a process, contrasts so strongly with Fichte's assertion that God is a suc-

cession of occurrences, that one cannot avoid remarking a preponderance of the System of Identity. Just on that account, hardly an adherent of Schelling is so frequently cited as he who was an adherent only so long as Schelling advocated the System of Identity, viz., Wagner. But, for this reason, Krause does not get beyond conceiving nature and the realm of spirit as standing upon a level and as ranged one beside the other. Fichte's contempt for nature made so little impression upon him that he was unable to conceive nature as the point of transition to spirit, as did Schelling in his Doctrine of Freedom. But just in consequence of this, spirit remains, with him, merely soul, which is of course co-ordinate with the body, and he attributes spirit even to animals. With this harmonizes that fondness which Krause displays for the naturalist Oken, and the aversion which he displays towards the theosophist Baader. Like the former, he sees in evil at most only a lawless accident, which does not at all change the course of the whole, and nothing fills him with such indignation as the theory of the Devil and the punishments of Hell, to which the latter so often recurs. Hence the contrast with what Baader teaches at this point, regarding the conception of the person of Christ, who is for Krause only an enlightened Essene, of the Church, which is to him only a religious association, and of the ecclesiastical philosophers, who have no other merit than to have introduced new terms. On account of this one-sidedness, and because Hegel himself does not go so far where the opposite one-sidedness prevails, as Krause does in his, the former must be given a place above the latter. But this does not prevent the recognition of the fact that Krause has, in his Foundation-Science, analysed, like Hegel, most precisely that *prius* of nature and spirit, the consideration of which Schelling, before the philosophy of nature and spirit, only demands, and has given again to philosophy the ontology of which Kant had robbed it. One may always criticise his theory of categories: that also his critics themselves regard such a theory as necessary, is his justification. With this merit is joined another: by the union of the two Courses, and the position harmonizing with that, that in the system of philosophy everything must be twice considered, viz., in the ascent to Essence and the descent from it, he has again suggested what Fichte had demanded of philosophy, and yet had just as little accomplished as the System of Identity

and the Doctrine of Freedom, viz., that the course of philosophy should be a line returning upon itself (cf. § 316, 1). One who retains the line to which the magnet of the System of Identity gave place in the Doctrine of Freedom converts, with Krause, that *prius* of nature and spirit, or that God as alpha, that God who is not God, into a system of categories, and who, like the Doctrine of Freedom, and, like Krause, passes from this ontology to the philosophy of nature, and proceeds from that point, like the Doctrine of Freedom, but otherwise than Krause, to spirit, as that to which nature is subordinated, and then like Krause, but otherwise than the Doctrine of Freedom, bends the terminal point of the line back to its beginning in such a manner that it becomes a closed curve,—to him will necessarily be given the evidence that he more than all the rest has accomplished what is required by the philosopher of the nineteenth century. This honour would remain his even if it could be shown that he had discovered much less even than many others, and that a great part of what he reaped was sown by others. The system of Hegel to which this place is here assigned presents, in performing all this, that justification which has hitherto always been called philosophico-historical necessity. The world-historical necessity lies in the fact, that the human mind had become weary of permitting the omnipotence of a brilliant despot lawlessly to appear against all individuals, that the extremes of anarchy and despotism to which he had gone had aroused against him the longing for a condition that obviated both. In the same way as, in France, the Restoration was related to the Empire and the Republic, so, in Germany, Hegel's Panlogism is related to the Science of Knowledge and the System of Identity. This name, *Panlogism*, is intended to designate a system according to which the reason is everything, or what means the same thing, unreason is nothing. It is misunderstood, if there is found in it the suggestion that only the All (in opposition to individuals) is reason and actuality. How reason and individuality are related is an investigation the result of which that name does not at all anticipate, so that it does not in any way designate the same that others have called logical pantheism.

C.—HEGEL'S PANLOGISM.

§ 329.

1. GEORG WILHELM FRIEDRICH HEGEL was born in Stuttgart on the 27th of August, 1770, allied himself in Tübingen with Schelling, who was five years younger than himself, but to whom at that time he always subordinated himself, lived several years, as family tutor, in Switzerland and Frankfort, in the latter of which places the ideas that until then had been in a chaos of ferment crystallized into a system, the main divisions of which were Foundation-Science, Science of Nature, and Science of Spirit. In the year 1801 he betook himself to Jena, and published, before he habilitated himself as *Docent*, his *Difference between the Systems of Fichte and Schelling* (1801), a work the title of which is really the foreshadowing of Hegel's definition, that to decide means to place one's self on a higher standpoint than the contending sides. Hegel at that time supposed himself to be wholly in agreement with Schelling. But when he applies the formula, first employed by Schelling, that the System of Identity is objective idealism and the Science of Knowledge subjective idealism, there lies in that formula really the confession that philosophy must transcend both, must be subjective-objective, *i.e.* absolute idealism. A real deviation from Schelling, and a proof that the Fichtean element is powerful in him, is that Hegel assigns to art a place below religion. From 1801 to 1806 Hegel lectured, first as *Privatdocent*, then as extraordinary professor, at first as a colleague of Schelling, with whom he edited the *Kritische Journal für Philosophie*. The fact that a dispute could arise, regarding the authorship of one of the articles appearing in the *Journal*, proves how much the two men were in agreement with one another. (My view that the dissertation, *On the Relation of the Philosophy of Nature to Philosophy in General*, belongs to Schelling, whereas those on Rückert and Weiss, as also that on *Construction in Philosophy*, belong to Hegel, is supported by the testimony of trustworthy contemporaries. Weiss himself ascribes the first dissertation, Bachmann the second, to Hegel. The late privy-councillor, Joh. Schulze, possessed a copy of the *Kritische Journal* of his student days, in which an index, written by himself at that time, ascribes the Intro-

duction to the two Editors, the dissertation on the Philosophy of Nature to Schelling, the two other Essays to Hegel. The editors of Schelling's works are, as regards both, and Haym as regards one of them, of different opinion.) In the essay by Hegel, *Faith and Knowledge*, the Science of Knowledge is represented as the culminating point of the philosophy of subjective reflection and Enlightenment, which is of course necessary in order that we may come to true speculation. Not this itself, but the striving towards it, is said to be displayed in Schleiermacher's *Discourses on Religion.* In the essay, which is, likewise, Hegelian, *On the Scientific Methods of treating Natural Right*, appears for the first time the distinction between *Moralität* (abstract, individual, morality) and *Sittlichkeit* (concrete, social morality), as also the proposition that spirit stands above nature and reaches beyond it. His view of the State approximates very closely to that of the ancients. After the year 1804, Hegel was occupied with the *Phenomenology of Spirit*, which as the first (introductory) part of philosophy, was to be followed by the Logic, as the second, the Philosophy of Nature and of Spirit, or the two "real sciences," as the third and fourth parts. When the printing of the *Phenomenology* was finished (1807), its author had already left Jena, to edit the *Bamberger Zeitung.* Called to Nürnberg a year later, as Director of the Gymnasium, he published there his *Science of Logic* (two vols., 1812–16), (Wks., iii.–v.) In the year 1816 he accepted the professorship of philosophy in Heidelberg, where his *Encyclopædia of the Philosophical Sciences* (Wks., vii.) appeared in the following year, as also his *Criticism of the Würtemberg Assembly of the States* (Wks., xvii. pp. 214–360). In response to a new call he went, in the year 1818, to Berlin, where, in the year 1820, his *Philosophy of Right* appeared. The *Berliner Jahrbücher für wissenschaftliche Kritik*—to the founding of which he particularly contributed, while its appearance marks the highest point of his influence—contain some reviews by him. Otherwise his entire activity was devoted to his lectures. One of these, on the *Proofs for the Existence of God*, was prepared by Hegel himself for the press, when he was snatched away by the cholera, on the 14th of November, 1831. Immediately after his death friends combined for the publication of his works, which appeared in eighteen volumes from the house of Duncker & Humblot, in Berlin.

Of these, vols. ix.–xv. and xviii. contain the lectures published after his death, all the rest having already been printed.

K. Rosenkranz: *Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel's Leben.* Berlin, 1844. R. Haym: *Hegel und seine Zeit.* Berlin, 1857. On the opposite side, K. Rosenkranz: *Apologie Hegel's gegen Dr. R. Haym.* Berlin, 1858. The same: *Hegel als deutsche National Philosoph.* Leipzig, 1871.

2. It is necessary, in the first place, to avoid the extremes presented by Fichte and Schelling, in that the former gives us to understand that only moral turpitude hinders man's rising to intellectual perception, whereas the latter would grant the capacity for this, like poetic talent, only to a select few. Both had brought philosophy into an equally negative relation to the ordinary consciousness, in that they, and particularly their adherents, could only say, in the one case, that it would not, in the other, that it could not, rise to the absolute standpoint. This assumed superiority, particularly of many Schellingians, who with their master regarded any explanation regarding philosophy as a desecration of it, and contemned it as a lapsing into the philosophy of reflection and mere metaphysics of the understanding, Hegel, now, antagonized in his *Phenomenology*, the preface of which has not unjustly been called a public disavowal, addressed, if not to Schelling, nevertheless to his school. He recognised therein not only the "wonderful power of the understanding," which has a right to be considered in rational knowledge, as also the justification of reflection, by which the absolute knowledge becomes a mediated knowledge and no longer, as if shot out of a pistol, begins with the absolute; but he says expressly that the common consciousness can demand that a ladder be furnished it upon which it can ascend to the absolute standpoint. This demand is especially justified by the character of the present age. The powers which, as the spiritual substance of the individual subjects, earlier ruled this age have lost their might; just so is man weary of empty and mere subjectivity; it is required that the subject may again become certain of that lost substantiality, hence that the true be not only substance but subjective. This comes to pass just by the fact that the true, which is primarily only spiritual substance, becomes, in uniting with self-consciousness, absolute spirit, or science. The *Phenomenology*, now, undertakes the problem of showing in its necessity, the growth of science from the lowest form of knowledge to the highest, by pointing out

that each of the stages previous to the highest is really involved in a self-deception, in that it believes itself to be something other than it really is; so that an understanding with it regarding its proper place will drive every lower form of knowledge beyond its limits up to a higher stage of knowledge. For this reason the method that is here pursued is the same that Schelling, following Fichte's example, had pursued in his *Transcendental Idealism:* it is shown that upon every higher stage there is given for consciousness itself what, upon the lower, had been only for us, the contemplators, *i.e.*, what it previously was only in itself. Hegel constantly recognised that the discoverer of this (dialectical) method was Fichte; his own merit is not only to have applied it in much greater detail, but particularly to have supposed the essence of the same to lie much less in the fact that it aims at syntheses, which, as Fichte's example shows, easily become diminutions of opposition, but rather in the fact that, if opposition is negatived, that which is negatived does not vanish *puré*, but is at once annulled and preserved (*aufgehoben*), or becomes a "moment." Inasmuch as Hegel shows by this method that, if the mind would not misunderstand itself, it cannot rest before it has raised itself to the absolute standpoint, it may, since it has been shown above that as regards the position of philosophy he antagonized Fichte and Schelling, be likewise said that he had conceded both to be right; with Schelling, he grants that not all but only the select few, *i.e.*, those who begin to reflect upon their standpoint, attain to philosophy. Of these, however, he asserts with Fichte, that they are (not morally but logically) bound not to rest before they attain to absolute knowledge. Up to this point the difference which Hegel in the *Phenomenology*, Schelling in the *Transcendental Idealism*, and Fichte in his *Pragmatical History of Intelligence*, had supposed to exist between them appears to be not very great. But now there appears a moment that might, perhaps, likewise have hovered before the minds of his two predecessors, but which they had not, like himself, emphasized: the stages which the consciousness of the individual subject passes through, have already been passed through by the universal mind, this great individual in which the individuals appear, as it were, as accidents, and have shown themselves in its development as individual historical phenomena which, now, the individual passes through in itself, as "one

who studies a higher science again passes through the preparatory branches without dwelling upon them." If, now, Hegel shows that the individual mind, when it refuses to remain lodged in an unsolved contradiction, must progress from consciousness to self-consciousness, from this to (the law-discovering and law-giving) reason, from this to (the ethical) spirit, from this to (art and) religion, finally from this to absolute knowledge, in which last the content of thought, the absolute Spirit, is freed from the form of objectivity, which it has for the religious idea, he presents these six stages as at the same time forms through which humanity (the world-spirit) has passed; and the presentation acquires a feature in the highest degree original by the fact that frequently merely the repetition of the world-historical course in the individual consciousness, now again precisely this or that world-form, hovers before the author's mind, when seeking to show the transitory or partial character of a stage of view. The *Phenomenology* shows, therefore, through what forms humanity passed before absolute knowledge was attained in it, and through what conditions the individual must pass before it can arrive at absolute knowledge. Upon this stage of comprehensive knowledge, which has all earlier stages for its presupposition, that knowledge which upon the preceding stage was felt, believed, etc., *i.e.*, what had existed there as (its) substance (ruling it), is known as the act of the subject; this change into the subject is then knowledge. Science is, therefore, comprehended history, the Recollection and the Calvary of the absolute Spirit, to which only out of the cup of this realm of spirits mantles its infinity.

3. The fundamental science, which Hegel calls *Logic*, but remarks at the same time that it may equally well be called Metaphysics or Ontology, begins with the determination, produced by the *Phenomenology*, which in so far may be termed as regards this subject the First Part of the investigations, to comprehend, or to think purely (not with an object or a presentation before the mind). It has for its subject what, according to Schelling's expression, which was adopted by Hegel, is the *prius* of Nature and Spirit, or God, as alpha and not as omega, in short, what in the System of Identity was called the Absolute, or Reason. But where Schelling's *Authentic Exposition* held a definition to be sufficient, Hegel deemed a whole science necessary, which

closes with what Schelling had begun with, namely, with the position that the Absolute, or Reason (instead of these terms Hegel usually employs *Idea*, frequently also *Logos*, which explains the name Logic), is the unity of subjectivity and objectivity. The passage from the determination to think purely (which recalls Fichte's fact-act) to the just-mentioned result of the foundation-science, yields thoughts of such a character that, because the opposite of objectivity had vanished in absolute knowledge, they are likewise objective relations. Since the entire system of them is called reason (Idea), they may be termed relations of reason. Hegel calls them Categories, and means thereby not only, as did Kant, subjective conceptions of the understanding, but, like Krause, essentialities. They are the universal relations of reason, which, because they govern every rational system may be called souls of all reality; but because they are only the laws that govern everywhere the same, are not affected by the distinction of nature and spirit, they are abstractions, so that Logic introduces us into a realm of shadows. It is necessary to enter such a realm, because the problem of all sciences, of recognising reason in the various spheres, can be solved only if we know, first, *what* reason is, and, secondly, *how* to find it. Logic teaches both, and teaches only this: it teaches the former by the thought-determination of reason, which is not completed until the end is reached; it teaches the latter by the fact that it is the theory of method. Hence it is the real *philosophia prima*. Hegel's definition of logic, that it is the science of the Idea in the abstract element of thought, implies that it considers the truth (not merely its form), but as it takes form in abstract thought, hence not as perceived (nature), nor as it knows itself (spirit). As regards, now, the content of the Hegelian Logic, it falls into three parts, the first two of which, as they first appeared, were taken together, as objective logic, as distinguished from the third, the subjective, — a distinction which Hegel afterwards dropped. In correspondence with the position which Hegel assumes towards the System of Identity and the Science of Knowledge, he develops in the *First Part* the various forms of Being (qualitative, quantitative, and modal), and closes with a reconstruction of the System of Identity, as also a reference to Spinoza. For both these deniers of all mere ideality (*Sollen*) there is in fact nothing that transcends Being. In entire opposition thereto, the

Second Part, which treats of *Essence* (likewise in three sections: Essence as such, Appearance, Actuality), closes with that category which was for Fichte the most important, Reciprocity (*vid.* § 312, 3), that full development of transient causality, which the pantheist Schopenhauer combats, just as Spinoza had antagonized causality. It is the thought of the Must in contradistinction to Being which in the second Part of the *Logic* is explained as the highest, the real absolute. The process does not end there; rather, the *Third Part*, as uniting the two main thoughts of the other two parts, transcends them. By the term conception (*Begriff*) in the wide sense, which he applies to this Part as its title, Hegel designates, that is to say, inner, self-active Nature, or essence impelling itself into Being, hence what he calls also subjectivity. (Conception, Objectivity, and Idea are the headings of the three sections.) Here now, particularly in the first section, is especially maintained the point of view (as already by Schelling, after the *Bruno*, and also by Wagner and Krause) that the forms of thought treated in formal logic, Conception, Judgment, Syllogism, have at the same time the meaning of real relations, so that we judge only because and as objectivity is a judgment, syllogize only as it *is* a syllogism. This is carried through the individual forms of judgment and figures of the syllogism. Through the conception of teleological connection, which proves to be the highest objective relation, just as the syllogism had been the highest subjective relation, Hegel makes the transition to the highest category, or, what means the same thing, the totality of all. This is the Idea, and the Idea as it is with the stages of immediacy and mediation behind it, as the absolute, self-mediating Idea. By *Idea* is to be understood self-end, final end; by absolute *Idea*, not the final end which has yet to be realized (as with Fichte), just as little the real, hence accomplised end (as with Schelling), but the self-realizing final end. It is the real absolute. It is reason; and is this, only as the self-connectings of the relations of reason, as their passage into one another, or as their dialectic. In the dialectic of the Idea, the course of reason, consists the actual logic, which we perceive, for example, in the world; the *science* of logic is merely an accompaniment of this (hence method, μέθοδος); and as it has taught us, in the first place, what reason is (self-realizing end), just so, secondly, it has taught us what the way is by which

it is discovered (the dialectical method). The Idea as absolute is the only subject of philosophy, which has only to recognise it again in the various modes of its existence. Hence logic is not the whole of science, but its universal, pure part. But it contains implicitly what the other parts should contain, so that it may in so far be called the formal and they the real parts of the system; which, however, is not to be understood as if logic treated only the form of the real; rather is the absolute which it treats, reason, the Logos, the true and only actual. It is therefore clear why Hegel prides himself most upon the *Logic*, as wholly his own work. In it he had given the logical foundation which according to him was wanting to the system of Schelling, with which as the latest and most perfect he was in the habit of closing his lectures on the history of philosophy.

4. Following the *Logic* is the *Philosophy of Nature*, which presents the Idea or the Absolute, the growth of which in us the *Logic* had treated, as an accomplished external existence, as unchangeable order. Although in this Part Hegel appears least independent, inasmuch as the three parts of the Philosophy of Nature—Mechanics, Physics, and Organics —correspond entirely to those parts in the work of Schelling, there is here nevertheless a synthesis of the System of Identity and the Science of Knowledge. With the former, he maintains that nature is Idea, reason, an absolute, but with Fichte, and in opposition to Schelling, who was inclined to a deification of nature, he sees in nature an inadequate phenomenon of reason, the Idea only in its being-out-of-itself, and takes seriously what Schelling had said in the Doctrine of Freedom, viz., that nature is the transition-point which spirit reaches beyond. Its real goal is therefore, that by becoming transformed in knowledge it should give spirit the conditions for existence and development. This, to a certain extent, as Hegel confesses, teleological point of view, according to which nature exists to become known, is frequently so emphasized that it appears as if it existed solely for that. Not, it is true, an antipathy of nature, as with Fichte, but still a disparaging view of it, is the consequence of this. Impatience at the fact that so much is still unknown makes him free with the charge that nature is too weak to exhibit reason everywhere, that much is accidental and wholly without meaning. To the "pranks of nature," of which formerly Bacon had spoken,

there appears here, as counterpart, the fact that Hegel is annoyed when a nebula is again analysed, etc. In harmony with this rather unjust estimate of nature, is Hegel's unfairness towards the Empiricists, and, among the Philosophers of Nature, those who had set the greatest store by Empiricism, viz., towards Steffens, and above all Oken. If he had paid to the latter in the *Philosophy of Nature* the honour which in his *Philosophy of Religion* he rendered to Franz Baader much would be different. Reverence for Kepler, and friendship with Goethe, occasioned the attacks upon Newton, which Hegel himself in the successive editions of the *Encyclopædia* softened by withdrawing the most acrimonious expressions. In no direction has Hegel left so much to be done as in the *Philosophy of Nature*, and in no direction has his school accomplished less. As regards that in which Hegel's *Philosophy of Nature*, above all, falls short of the requirements set by himself, and the fact that there appears here frequently a corresponding but diametrically opposed one-sidedness, as in Krause,—on this point there are some remarks in the critical observations which, in my often-mentioned larger work, §§ 47–52 of which set forth the system of Hegel, I have appended to the account of his *Philosophy of Nature* (§ 49). The *Philosophy of Nature* closes with the consideration of death, in which the inadequateness of the individual to universality permits the individual to perish in the interests of the latter. This is, however, only one side, the abstract; at the same time, it is thereby said, that the distinction of the universal and the individual has disappeared, a unity of both is posited in which the former is with itself, *i.e.*, thinks. Therewith is posited the conception of Spirit, and the destiny and tendency of nature to destroy itself, like the phœnix, and to come forth as spirit, attains fulfilment. Spirit, inasmuch as it makes nature its presupposition, is the power over it, is as its end prior to it, sees in it its own reflex,—which is just what the Philosophy of Nature affords.

5. The *Philosophy of Spirit* forms the Third Part of the system. Spirit also is, like nature, Idea, Reason, Absolute. It is such, as being-with-itself, as conscious freedom, hence adequate, absolute form. First in order is Hegel's *Doctrine of Subjective Spirit.* (The name *psychology*, which is commonly applied to this science, he uses only for the last part of the same.) The few propositions in which

Schelling had expressed himself on psychology, prove that he, like Spinoza, counted it as a part of natural science, that to him the soul is the Idea of a certain body, etc. Fichte, on the contrary, had conceived spirit only as Ego, and had attributed to it, this potentiation of the monad of Leibnitz, a negative relation to nature as the mere limit of the Ego. Hegel, who in the First Part treats spirit in its natural character, expressly declares at the conclusion of the same, that now we step beyond the limits of Spinozism; just so he declares that in the Second Part (Phenomenology of Consciousness) we find ourselves wholly in the Fichtean standpoint, since here spirit is considered only as it is—Ego distinguishing itself from nature. Just as in the *Logic*, so also here, there is in addition to these two parts a third part (psychology), which shows that the negative position which spirit as Ego assumes towards objectivity, is also not the highest, but that this presents it as it is when again in alliance with objectivity, reconciled to it, and has thereby attained to true freedom, which is the essence of spirit (even the subjective); partly because it, as knowledge, finds itself in it, partly because it, as volition, enters into it and fills it with itself; hence as the synthesis of that which the Anthropology and Phenomenology had presented.

6. The same mediating and reconciliatory position towards his predecessors is taken by Hegel in his *Ethics*, or, as he terms it, the *Doctrine of Objective Spirit*. Pantheism, the metaphysics of which reaches the result that the individual creature is a nullity, must, as the example of all consistent pantheists proves, come, in ethics, to the sacrificing of the subject to the whole. Such is the case with Spinoza in his theory of the State, which recalls Hobbes; such is the case with Schelling in his omnipotence of the Executive, and his fanatical enthusiasm for the imperial despot. Fichte, on the contrary, like the whole eighteenth century, gave to the subject the highest place, but in doing so his exaltation of the individual bordered on Jacobinism; and in his ethics conscience occupies the highest place. Hegel, retaining Kant's separation of the legal and the moral, assumes a sphere in which the individual subject is entirely subject to ethical powers, which is the sphere of *Right*, which pitilessly neglects to inquire after the individual person. Nevertheless, he himself does not mean, in this sphere, that right be conceived

as a limitation of freedom. Rather is it the reality of that: what *is* limited by right is only arbitrary will. But just so he shows that *morality* has for its highest principle conscience, this subjective power in which the good is united with the possibility of evil, and which Hegel could treat the more briefly in his *Philosophy of the State*, since the inner dialectic of this principle had been so fully treated in the *Phenomenology of Spirit*. As to the assumption of a sphere above these two, which had been separated by Kant, a hint had really been given by Kant himself, which suggests even the name to be chosen for it,—the Doctrine of Right and Virtue. Later, Kant prefixed a common title, and called them together *Metaphysics of Morals*. Instead of a mere title, we have in Hegel an integral, with him the leading, chapter of Ethics, the Doctrine of Social Morality, which (upon the basis of such expressions as *moral certainty*, etc.) he distinguished from individual morality in such a way that the latter is made to rest only upon a subjective obligation. Here, now, are treated only such ethical institutions as suffer equally much if they are regarded merely as legal and if they are regarded as only moral, the Family, Civil Society, and the State; hence what Schleiermacher had called Goods (§ 315, 8). In all these communities there is shown to be rationality, *i.e.*, justification or ethical necessity; so that, therefore, they do not need another, *e.g.*, a religious, sanction; for religion, since in general it had not thus far appeared in his system, can, wherever it is in question, be considered only by a digression. It was above remarked that Hegel in his treatise on Natural Right places in the forefront the conception of ethical organisms, after the manner of the ancients. When his *Philosophy of the State* appeared, the subjective view of Natural Right greatly prevailed; and although Hegel himself now conceded much more than formerly to the right of subjectivity, his theories are, nevertheless, too much in contrast with what was taught by the school of Fries, and by other schools, not to have been decried as inimical to freedom. Even among its readers of to-day many will find too old-fashioned his declaring it a more ethical initiation of marriage if the parents' than one's own inclination makes the choice; not liberal enough his defending corporations and guilds, or his requiring that those who constitute the authority in communities, and not chosen representatives, should represent them in the chambers, etc., Here

Hegel deviates from the true position, just as much perhaps on the one side, as Krause does on the other. Of all ethical organizations, that which is treated with most exactness is the State, in which the family and the community have their truth, hence also their ground. As a youth Hegel had shared the revolutionary views of Rousseau and Fichte; then came a time later when he, like Schelling, could characterize the Emperor as "the world-soul." He advanced beyond both, and the period of restoration, of which his first lecture delivered in Heidelberg almost serves as a schedule, appeared to him as the highest approximation to the Idea of the State that had as yet been attained; because here the sovereignty of the State, actualized in the yet living Monarch, appeared reconciled with the privilege of the individual citizen, who obeys laws the grounds of which he perceives and approves. Whether this takes place formally through conference, or materially by voluntary observance, makes no essential difference. That Hegel regards the *Philosophy of History* as a part of the theory of objective spirit has its reason in the fact that he, like Kant, regards the history of the world as primarily only the development of the rational State. So long as it is nothing more than this, to treat of it in the *Philosophy of the State* as an appendix to the theory of the State, is entirely proper. But in his, *Lectures on the Philosophy of History*, which were published from students' lecture-notes (Wks., xi.), Hegel has introduced in the account of the Judgment which is passed regarding nations, and in which the lesser freedom must make place for the higher, so that the world-historic sceptre passes from one people to another, so much that does not concern the essence of the State, and so much, too, not only that could, since it appears again later (in the *Æsthetics* and the *Philosophy of Religion*), properly have been omitted, but anthropological and psychological matter, without which the history of the world is not to be comprehended—that one cannot avoid the thought that he would have done better to separate the Philosophy of History from the Ethics, and to have added it to Psychology and Ethics as the Third Part of the doctrine of the Finite Spirit. In the presentation of history, Hegel fuses the anthropological view (of Herder), according to which humanity passes through the four periods of life, with the political view (Kantian), that humanity passes from the condition in which only one is free to that in which

all are, and thus gives an account of the four kingdoms of the world—the (Oriental) despotism, the (Grecian and Roman) republic, and (Germanic) freedom, the political form of which is monarchy.

7. Hegel, precisely as Schelling, knows that the restless praxis which rules in the ethical sphere, and allows of no attainment of the goal, cannot, as Fichte had supposed, be the highest, but that there must be a sphere in which passion, without which nothing whatever can be accomplished, must cease, and where the subject does not yield to the course of circumstances in cold resignation, but Psyche washes from her wings the dust gathered there in disagreeable labour. This sphere is that in which the subject knows itself as reconciled with the universal powers, natural as well as spiritual; and which, because the subject is delivered from fear, just as those powers are from their wrath, displays the *absolute Spirit*, a term by which is meant, therefore, a relation of spirit to spirit, or spirit that is reconciled with spirit. Such absoluteness, now, Schelling rightly saw in the enjoyment of art, and Hegel therefore treats, in the *Lectures on Æsthetics* (Wks., x. pp. 1, 2, 3) of Art as the first manifestation of enjoyed harmony, *i.e.*, of the absolute Spirit. The work of art as the representative of the beautiful displays the absolute in sensuous existence, the Idea as existing, and is an appeal to the responsive breast, a summons to the mind, to which it affords not only theoretical knowledge, not only practical satisfaction, but raises it above both forms of finitude to the highest enjoyment. This the work of art does, as well where it represents symbolical (oriental, sublime) beauty, as where it represents classical (real) beauty, and, finally, where it represents romantic (spiritual, modern) beauty. The various forms of Art embody themselves in the individual arts; so that within each there are again repeated the three forms, the—even in order of time—first, symbolic art, architecture appearing as symbolic in the monument, as classical in the house of God, the temple, as romantic in the dome or house of the people, etc. The romantic arts, music and painting, present between them the relation of the symbolical (architecture) and classical (sculpture), and repeat themselves in the art *par excellence*, which is the totality of art, and hence appears everywhere—poetry; which, being pictorial in the epic, musical in lyric poetry, reaches perfection in the drama, although at the same time it points to a higher sphere.

8. This sphere, to which Hegel, therefore, otherwise than did Schelling in the period of their association, assigns a position above art, is religion, and the *Lectures on the Philosophy of Religion* (Wks., xi. xii.) so connect themselves with those on Æsthetics that they show first that it is necessary to pass over to a higher form of consciousness, in which the sensuous element has given place to the inward life of the emotional nature; what art revealed in external sensuousness (annulled dissonance), exists as inner presence in thought and inwardness of sensation. As is required by the term *Philosophy of Religion*, which is formed similarly to the terms *Philosophy of Right*, and *Philosophy of Art*, Hegel designates as its object, Religion, *i.e.* not God (alone), but the existence of God for the religious consciousness. This last means with him absolute spirit, of which, therefore, God is only the one side. Hence the proposition so much decried, The Absolute Spirit requires the finite spirit, is perhaps a triviality, but certainly is no heresy. This being for consciousness, or self-revelation, belongs to the essence of God, as shining does to the light: He is this *actus;* and the *Philosophy of Religion*, therefore, treats God not as a spirit beyond the stars, but as the spirit in all spirits, in the depths of which, consequently, the ground of religion and its development must be found. This is done in the *Philosophy of Religion* as follows. In the *First Part* of it, the conception of religion is determined. Since religion is consciousness, but in consciousness are to be distinguished the known and the knowing, the former is first considered, *i.e.*, God, and it is shown that the first essential element in this conception is that which, regarded as absolute, leads to Spinozism, but beyond which it is necessary to pass to the religious relation, *i.e.*, to the distinction of God from human consciousness, and from its being as related to God. Here, now, the various forms of the religious consciousness, feeling, intuition, presentation are treated *in extenso*, and it is shown of the last that by its contradictions it contains a reference to religious knowledge, the subordinate forms of which, the immediate and the demonstrative, are sublated in the highest, speculative knowledge, in which religion is perceived as knowledge had by the Divine Spirit of itself through the mediation of the finite spirit. At this point is taken up the investigation of Cultus, as the practical carrying out of the religious relation, and of self-union with God.

Therein is contained a double self-surrender, grace from one side, sacrifice from the other, which are united, in that God dwells in the self-renouncing self-consciousness. Hence the culminating point of the cultus is constant self-surrender to the moral community, *i.e.*, the life in the State, the relation of which to religion can be discussed here for the first time. To the *Second Part* of the *Philosophy of Religion* Hegel has given the superscription, Definite Religion. As the First Part had treated of the essence or conception of religion, so this Part treats of it as phenomenon, or, as it objectifies itself, *i.e.*, as it gradually approximates the complete realization of its conception. Hegel cannot call this Part, Philosophy of Mythology, as Schelling later calls it, because he treats also of the forms of religious consciousness which do not take cognizance of myths and are not regarded by Schelling as religion, and, again, such as no longer have myths. The first characterization is true of the lowest of religions, which Hegel treats under the heading Natural Religion, the religion of magic, in which the individual man mastered by his desire comes in the moment of need to feel himself to be and act as if he were absolute power itself. Schelling will concede religion to neither the savage peoples nor the Chinese, whom Hegel here treats of. The second characterization finds application in the Jewish religion, which, as the religion of sublimity, Hegel treats of before the (Grecian) religion of beauty and the (Roman) religion of conformity to end; of course in such a manner that in the transition to the Christian religion he refers back to it. The *Third Part*, entitled Absolute Religion, treats of religion in that form which in its manifestation has become adequate to its essence, its objectivity to its conception, hence the real or true (ideal) religion. Since in this religion the essence of religion, the reconciliation of God and man, forms the real content, itself becomes known, it is the revealed religion; whereas the fact that it is the revealed religion, *i.e.*, comes into consciousness as something positive, appears as that which is unessential, since it is not to remain positive but to become changed, by the witness of the Spirit, into something rational. (These propositions may be compared with what Schleiermacher [§ 315, 6] and Lessing [§ 294, 16] have said.) This religion of truth and freedom appears in the Christian. Corresponding to the three *momenta* which Hegel's *Logic* distinguishes in the Conception (universal, par-

ticular, individual), the process of investigation here takes such a form that, in the first place, God is considered in His eternal Idea and for Himself; and, then, it is shown that reason is contained in that form of consciousness in which the religious consciousness conceives God, not as a mere object but as the process of self-distinction and the sublation of the distinction, as which God is called love or holy trinity, makes himself objectivity, and thereby knows himself. Here absolute religion is extolled on the ground that it is not satisfied with merely superficial distinctions, but allows these distinctions to deepen into separate persons, not, of course, mutually exclusive, but (as in the love of the family) sinking into one another. But further, and, in the second place, the Idea is known in the element of consciousness and presentation, *i.e.*, as it appears in the character of finitude. Inasmuch as the other, which, in God and being held by unity is the Son, enters into real separation from and disunion with God, it becomes a reality outside of and without God, is discharged from God as an independent and free being. It is the world of the finite, which is therefore not the same with the Eternal Son of God, as He is not the same with it. What was one in God, appears, with the separation from God, as the duality of nature and the finite spirit, to which latter the former, which is only a passing moment, a gleam of lightning, something relative and null, appears extended as a spatial, sensible world, which of itself has no relation to God, but is only brought into such a relation by man, inasmuch as he has in nature the means whereby, both where he sees in it a means of the revelation of God, and where he transcends it (particularly his own natural man), to raise himself to God. If he does not do this, if he allows nature to rule in himself and remains the natural man, he is evil. Since this consists in self-seeking, which is not possible without knowledge, apprehension (knowledge) is really the forbidden fruit; obviously it is also alone that which makes man capable of raising himself above his mere being-for-self, a two-sidedness which that mythical account which narrates of the first man what is true of man in general, recognises when it represents the eating of that fruit as counselled by the tempter, but the progress thereby made as acknowledged by God. The real union is in that consciousness of reconciliation which is as far removed from abstract humility as from abstract self-conceit,

a reconciliation that is for the subject primarily a presupposition, hence is presented to him as accomplished. To all, without distinction of character, it, like everything else, is accessible only when it exists as a something perceptible to the senses; thus it is this one God-man, whose history (not whose theory, for this by the later communion has been, in part, modified and, in part, set aside) exhibits the reconciliation between God and man as real. Then the death of this one displays the transition to that status in which the reconciliation which has become certain in him has universal spiritual presence. Such it is to be considered, in the third place; *i.e.*, the Idea is to be considered in the element of the communion. (This section also bears such relation to the two first, which considered the sovereignty of the Father and the Son, that in it the sovereignty of the Spirit is discussed.) Inasmuch as the reconciliation no longer exists as external, but has become inward, the true return of Christ has come to pass, the Comforter has come. The individual soul has thereby acquired the character of being a citizen in the Kingdom of God, a character that does not correspond to the present, and hence is conceived at the same time as future also, so that immortality becomes a settled doctrine in the Christian religion. The communion arises by the fact that what had appeared in Christ is changed into what is spiritual, in which, although the sensible forms the beginning-point, there is contained a negative relation to the former. The external attestation afforded by the transcendence of spirit over nature, where faith heals cripples, gives place to the more essential one afforded by the testimony of the spirit, to faith which consists in the circumstance that the spirit which exists in the individual consciousness constantly accumulates itself out of it; out of the ferment of the finite the spirit is exhaled, which is real in the communion and searches the depths of the Godhead. The Church, the reality of the communion, exists through the theory of faith. This has its origin in the Church through the instrumentality of science, and is promulgated by a class of teachers, and embraces, through baptism, even the child, which, now, finds already prepared for it reconciliation as well as speech, morals, etc., and has by living to learn the meaning of it. The heart of life in the Church is sacrifice; hence the Sacrament, which is recognised in its truth only in the Lutheran conception of it. But the

Church is further realized in such a manner that it permeates the whole Ethical World, the forms of which now become divine institutions, permeated by religion. At the same time religion enters into relation with thought. The negative relation between the two produces, on the one side, the "enlightened" Deism which is scarcely to be distinguished from Islamism; on the other, Pietism, which reduces the Church to atoms. In philosophy, which opposes both, and (which it is the merit of the Schoolmen to have attempted) sees in the essential dogmas of the Christian Church—trinity, incarnation, etc.,—a rational content, orthodoxy has now taken refuge. But those who profess it form but a handful, and it is left to the rest who find themselves in that state of division to determine how they will find their way out of it.

9. As the *Æsthetics* closed with a reference to religion, so the *Philosophy of Religion* closes with noting that religion leads to a division in thought, which *Philosophy* alone is able to resolve. It, or Science, forms, therefore, the third and highest form in which the absolute spirit exists. (This is only an apparent deviation from Schelling, to whom philosophy and science were not the same, but the former was just as much art and virtue [religion] as knowledge.) It is with explicable sarcasm that Hegel was accustomed to mention those who, when the exposition had reached this point, supposed that now for the first time (as if in a philosophy of philosophy) that which was peculiar and distinctive had been reached. Rather has everything already been treated, and it only remains to complete by a survey of it the circle of the system, so that its presentation becomes an *Encyclopædia*. If, that is to say, religion fallen into discord with thought (as, for the rest, the *Phenomenology of Spirit* had already shown) leads to speculative, free thought, but logic had begun with the determination to realize such thought, then the end of the *Philosophy of Religion* coincides with the beginning of the *Logic*, and the requirement laid down by Fichte that the system be a circle is fulfilled. If we survey it as a whole, it appears that in the *Logic* the Idea (Reason) is considered as it is in and for itself; in the *Philosophy of Nature* it is considered in its external, from itself self-alienated, existence; finally, in the various parts of the *Philosophy of Spirit*, both in the theory of the finite spirit and in that of the absolute spirit, reason (Idea) is exhibited in the various forms

of its freedom, of which the highest is that in which it frees itself from all division, is reconciled and knows itself to be free. Since it is everywhere the absolute Idea which has been considered, the system is Absolute Idealism; since absolute Idea and reason are the same, we have called it Panlogism. But philosophy is not given merely with the knowledge of its organic character, but presupposes also a knowledge of how it came by this; hence in the system of Hegel the *History of Philosophy*, since in it philosophy is comprehended and reason is exhibited in the course of its development, becomes an integrant part of philosophy. It brings together beginning and end in so far as it is shown that what the present age possesses as self-conscious rationality results from the labour of all preceding generations, inasmuch as what each of these expressed as its world-view and wisdom is preserved, and is contained demonstrably, in the philosophy of the present, *i.e.*, the thought-comprehension of the substance of our age. Hegel boasts that in his *Logic* no category has been overlooked which any philosophy has ever declared to be the highest. (He has even supposed that he could point out in the order of time in which they prevailed the same succession as his *Logic* follows,—a thing that he soon abandoned.) Here, as in his *Phenomenology*, Hegel defines the relation of philosophy to other forms of spiritual activity as follows: it first makes its appearance where a breach with actuality has taken place, where a certain form of life has become old; it paints grey in grey, and finds in the ideal sphere the reconciliation which is no longer presented in actuality. Particularly with religion, it enters first into a relation of harmony, then into one of opposition, and at last into that in which philosophy does full justice to the content of religion, as does the philosophy of the present age, which originated within Christianity. Since Hegel's treatment of the History of Philosophy became known to the world only through his lectures (Wks., xiii., xiv., xv.), which were gathered from students' lecture-notes of various periods, it shows a great want of proportion as regards completeness. *Greek Philosophy*, from Thales to the Neo-Platonists, extends into the third volume, the *Mediæval Period* is run through with "seven-league boots," *Modern Philosophy* occupies, it is true, a much greater number of pages, but is the most hastily treated part. In the period of the latest German philosophy,

Jacobi's merit is stated to lie in the fact that he has revived Spinoza, of whom Hegel had said in the preceding period, Either Spinoza, or no philosophy; but also, it is true, that Leibnitz's principle of individuation remedies a defect of Spinozism, and hence makes it whole. Fichte, as the perfecter of the subjective in Kant's philosophy, and Schelling as opposed to him, are characterized as the latest philosophers. The fact that the latter's Doctrine of Freedom is always placed among the earlier works, as if it were in entire agreement with them, proves that Hegel always understood Schelling in the sense of his later works; hence also the saying, Schelling has united the subjectivity of Fichte with the substantiality of Spinoza. What he misses in Schelling is logical foundation and dialectical development. The result is stated thus: Our standpoint is the apprehension of the Idea, the knowledge of the Idea as spirit, as absolute spirit, which is thus opposed to another spirit, the finite, and the principle of this spirit is to apprehend; so that, the Absolute Spirit comes to be spirit for the finite in a series of forms which is the true kingdom of spirits; a series which is not a plurality of isolated units, but constitutes the moments in the One, the present spirit, the pulse-beats of which that plurality proves to be.

10. To the fortunate position of the harvester which was above (§ 328) assigned to Hegel, the good-fortune was also added that, just as the first steps of those who intended to carry him out were heard before the door, and the first signs indicated that even upon the basis laid by him dispute was possible, he died. He lived to see the culmination of his doctrine, and the existence of a completely formed School, which in the *Berliner Jahrbücher für wissenchaftliche Kritik*, called into life by him, as well as in their own works, sought to maintain the principles of his philosophy in the most varied spheres. Among those whose activity Hegel still lived to witness are to be mentioned, of the Jena period, GEORG ANDREAS GABLER (born July 30th, 1786, in Altdorf; Hegel's successor, after 1835, in Berlin; died in Teplitz in the year 1853), who in his *Text-Book of Philosophical Propædeutic*, Erlangen, 1827, has set forth in a clear light the points of *Hegel's Phenomenology* which could be of service for introduction to philosophical study. In Heidelberg there was an enthusiastic pupil of Hegel, HERMANN FRIEDRICH WILHELM HINRICHS (born in 1794, in Karlseck, in the Duchy of Oldenburg;

originally a jurist; in 1822 professor of philosophy in Breslau, after 1824 in Halle; died Sept. 17th, 1861, in Friedrichsrode in Thuringia), whose *Religion in its Inner Relation to Science* (1822) Hegel introduced with a preface which occasioned a sensation by a bitter attack on Schleiermacher, and who in the year 1825 published his *Lectures on Goethe's Faust* (delivered in Halle), in which what is admirable has been overlooked because of its bombastic style and of certain particulars. To the *Outlines of the Philosophy of Logic* (1826) is also to be added the *Genesis of Knowledge* (1835), which appeared, of course, after Hegel's death. The later works of Hinrichs, in which he attempts to write in a more readable style and for a larger public, viz., *Schiller's Poems* (1837), *Political Lectures* (1844), have much less scientific value than the *History of the Philosophy of Right and the State* (1848–52), which obviously is more a collection of materials for a book than a book. In the year 1852 appeared his *Kings* (an attempt to present the various forms of the kingdoms that have appeared in history, as moments of the complete modern kingdom), and his *Life in Nature*. He was labouring on a great work on the History of the Earth when death removed him. In Berlin, there was one of the first to ally himself with Hegel, LEOPOLD VON HENNING, who published in 1824 a little book, *Principles of Ethics;* at the same time he contributed much, as *Docent* and as editor of the *Berliner Jahrbücher*, to the spreading of Hegel's doctrine. Later he passed over entirely to the political sciences, and died as ordinary professor in the University of Berlin in the year 1866. Also KARL LUDWIG MICHELET (born in Berlin on the 4th of Dec., 1801; after 1829 extraordinary professor of philosophy in Berlin) was originally a jurist, but early went over entirely to philosophy, in which he was active, first in the sphere of Ethics, as is proved by his *Ethics of Aristotle* (1827), and his *System of Morals* (1828). He gave, even in the life-time of Hegel, lectures on the most modern philosophy, out of which originated his work to be mentioned later. HEINRICH GUSTAV HOTHO (born in Berlin May 22nd, 1802; died as professor there, Dec. 24th, 1873), likewise originally a jurist, passed, under Hegel's guidance, over to philosophical and particularly æsthetic studies, the fruits of which he first embodied in a romance (*The Unknown*) which was printed only for a few friends, until they later appeared entirely recast in his *Preliminary Studies to Art*

and Life (Stuttgart, 1835). *The History of Painting in Germany and the Netherlands* (2 vols., Berlin, 1842–43), as also the *School of Painting of Hubert Van Eyk*, besides *German Predecessors and Contemporaries* (2 vols., 1855–58), belong to a later period. His reviews in the *Berliner Jahrbücher* are justly very highly valued. Another writer on æsthetics of the Hegelian School is HEINRICH THEODOR RÖTSCHER, who first attracted attention by his work cited in § 13, note 9, and § 60 lit., and gave occasion for attacks upon Hegel relative to the standpoint of Socrates, but later devoted himself entirely to æsthetics, particularly to dramaturgic works. Somewhat older than the last-named was EDUARD GANS (born March 22nd, 1798), who, after having studied law in Göttingen and Heidelberg, and in the latter learned to know Hegel, allied himself closely with him in Berlin, where he taught after 1820. After 1825 he was ordinary professor of law, a post which he retained until his death, May 5th, 1839. He effected more for the spread of Hegel's ideas by his brilliant productions, and by the founding of the *Berliner Jahrbücher*, in which he had a larger share than any other, than he did by his *Right of Inheritance in its Historical Development* (4 vols., 1825–1835). His lectures on the *History of the last Fifteen Years*, in Raumer's Historical Memorandum Book (1833–34), already touch upon the points in which he had come to differ from Hegel. Connected with him are SALING (*Justice in its Historical Development*, 1827), and SIETZE (*Fundamental Conception of the History of the Prussian State and Right*, 1825). In the relation not of pupils but of friends of Hegel stand the two men who first applied his ideas to theology, Daub and Marheineke. CARL DAUB (March 20th, 1765 to Nov. 22nd, 1836), the founder of Protestant speculative theology, occasioned the call of Hegel to Heidelberg, and when the latter went to Berlin, remained his truest, most appreciative friend. Of his (unfortunately bombastically written) works it is particularly his *Judas Iscariot* (1816–18), his *Treatise on the Logos*, as also *The Dogmatic Theology of the Present Age* (both in 1833), that make it intelligible that Hegel could entrust to him with such confidence the office of correcting and revising for the press the *Encyclopædia* in its second edition. The lectures that were published after his death make still more apparent his agreement with Hegel. PHILIPP CONRAD MARHEINEKE

(May 1st, 1780 to May 31st, 1846) showed in the second, entirely revised, edition of his *Dogmatics* (1827) how thoroughly he had studied the system of his friendly colleague, and by his lectures led many theologians to Hegel. More decisive, almost, as regards the position of Hegel's system with reference to theology, than the works of these two men, whose method of presentation did not facilitate comprehension, was a non-theologian, CARL FRIEDRICH GÖSCHEL (born Oct. 7th, 1781, in Langensalza, for a long time counsellor of the provincial court in Naumburg, later, as president of the Consistory, partly in Berlin, living partly in Magdeburg, died on the 22nd of Sept., 1861, in Naumburg), who, in an anonymous work, very highly esteemed by Daub (*On Goethe's Faust and its Continuation*, Leipsic, 1824), had already shown his acquaintance with Hegel's works, published in the year 1829 his work, signed only by his initials, *Aphorisms on Non-Knowledge and Absolute Knowledge*, which Hegel welcomed with a "grateful pressure of the hand," and from which he borrowed literally certain statements to insert in his Encyclopædia as his own. Göschel at the same time applied the principle of this philosophy to legal subjects, as appears from his *Scattered Leaves* (3 vols., 1832–42). His later works will be discussed further below. Also the first works of JOHANN KARL FRIEDRICH ROSENKRANZ (born on the 23rd of April, 1805; after 1833 professor of philosophy in Königsberg), who was attracted to Berlin by both Schleiermacher and Hegel, but who gradually allied himself wholly with the latter, appeared during Hegel's life. There were, not only the smaller literary historical works, and the *History of German Poetry in the Middle Ages* (1830), with which connect themselves, later, the *Handbook of a Universal History of Poetry*, but also his admirable review of *Schleiermacher's Theory of Faith*, and his *Encyclopædia of the Theological Sciences* (1831). An almost idolatrous follower of Hegel, at first, was JOHANN GEORG MUSSMAN, who died as professor in Halle, after the earlier slavish dependence had given place to just as morbid a cavilling with the theory of the master. His *Text-Book of the Science of the Soul* (1827), as also his *Outlines of the Universal History of Philosophy* (1830), present the first applications of Hegelian principles to Psychology and the History of Philosophy, upon which first at a later period other and better ones based themselves. That the greatest physiologist of our century, JOHANNES

MÜLLER (July 14th, 1801 to April 28th, 1858) had, while studying in Berlin, listened to Hegel's lectures not merely out of a calculating worldly prudence, is best proved by his clever *Outlines of Lectures on Physiology* (Bonn, 1827), which the Hegelians, who appear to lay great stress upon including many names in the School, are wont to pass over, whereas they count among their number Schultz-Schultzenstein, who might never have reckoned himself with them. Even when Müller had entered upon an entirely different path, he showed himself to be philosophically well-trained by the fact that he preferred not to raise questions that can be answered, if at all, only by philosophy, rather than to try them by the retort or the microscope.

§ 330.

CONCLUDING REMARK.

1. In my work, here mentioned for the last time: *Entwickelung der deutschen Speculation seit Kant*, the criticisms, which follow the order of presentation of the individual disciplines (Criticism of the Logic § 48, 7; of the Philosophy of Nature § 49, 6; of Psychology § 50, 8; Ethics § 51, 5; Æsthetics, Philosophy of Religion, and History of Philosophy, § 52, 3, 5, 7) have given the objections which, according to Hegel's own premises, can be made to his system. They appeared to me, and appear to-day even, not to be of a kind to make it a duty really to abandon the system. The agreement, that appears upon a review of the six Divisions in which the third period of modern philosophy is here treated, with the result there (§ 53) given, need not therefore cause surprise. In the *first*, the three problems of modern philosophy were stated (§ 296), and it was shown how Kant had begun the solution of them all (§ 298–302). In the *second* (§ 306–308), it was shown how the first of the problems apparently solved in Kant was presented by Reinhold and his opponents *de novo* for solution. In the *third* and *fourth* divisions, it was shown that Fichte (§§ 310–313) and Schelling (§§ 317, 318) succeeded even better with this solution, and in such a way, indeed, that the Science of Knowledge and the System of Identity, by their opposition, brought forward the second problem that was to be solved. Further, in the *fifth* division (321–323),

among those who not only rejected, like Herbart and Schopenhauer, those two one-sided systems, but sought also to reconcile them, appeared Schelling, who had meanwhile become a theosophist; so that in his person alternated the two world-views, the reconciliation of which had been the third problem of modern philosophy, and which, as the *sixth* division (§§ 324–328) proved, had meantime, in Oken and Baader entered into the most complete opposition to one another. The course which the latest philosophy has passed over, and the reason why the title of Concluding Systems, was given to its last division, may be represented to the eye in a table; regarding which it should be remarked that the sign =, is intended to indicate combination, the sign ‖, on the contrary, opposition, and that the §§ mentioned refer to the present *Outlines:*

I. Realism = Idealism. *i.e.,* Locke and Hume = Leibnitz and Berkeley. §§ 280–282 = §§ 288 and 291.	Kant, §§ 298–302.	Critico-Realistic Dogmatism.	Critico-Sceptical Idealism.	(Krause, § 327.)
		i.e.,		
		Reinhold. § 307.	Maimon and Beck. § 308.	
II. Idealism = Pantheism. *i.e.,* Eighteenth Century = Seventeenth Century. §§ 274–294 = §§ 264–273.		Critical Individualism.	Critical Pantheism.	Hegel, § 329.
		i.e.,		
		Science of Knowledge. §§ 311–313.	System of Identity. § 318.	
III. Cosmosophy = Theosophy. *i.e.,* Antiquity = Middle Ages. §§ 15–115 = §§ 116–256.		Modern Naturalism.	Modern Theosophy.	
		i.e.,		
		Oken. § 325, 2, 3.	Baader. § 325, 5–9.	

2. Krause's assertion that his theory may be designated by all the names of schools hitherto in use; or, Hegel's, which comes to the same thing, that his system has taken up into itself all earlier systems, has been, as regards the latter, really confirmed even by opponents of the system, if one takes them altogether. There is scarcely a standpoint that would not

have been given out as the Hegelian, by those occupying some other. (Confused heads have employed, at one and the same time, very inconsistent terms of abuse, and have talked of atheistic pantheism, *i.e.*, wooden iron). Pupils and adherents of course assent to that saying of their master, and the above-given table is designed to afford, in a synoptical manner, a basis for such assent. But therewith is also justified, what was pointed out at the very beginning of these *Outlines* (§ 10) to be inevitable, that this exposition carries the colours precisely of the Hegelian school, inasmuch as every transition from one system to another has been regarded as necessary, so soon as there appeared developed or realized in a following system what the earlier had been in itself, or really,—a presupposition that coincides with the acceptation of what Hegel calls the dialectical method. But, conversely, the attainment of the point aimed at justifies the historian, who so regards it, in laying aside his pen, if indeed it does not oblige him to do so. If, in spite of the fact that regard for my own convenience counsels the opposite, this is not done, and there is here really attempted what the preface to the last volume of my larger work held in prospect in the year 1853, namely, an account of the movements in the sphere of philosophy since Hegel's death, it is prompted by the conviction that if, from the ferment in which philosophy has been since that time there is to result a clear and invigorating beverage, the clarification must begin at a certain point. To contribute to such a clarification by showing, at least in one point, that apparently quite different tendencies may yet move in one and the same direction, is the aim of the immediately following §§, which, because they neither rest upon a complete investigation of a daily-increasing material, nor—what is the most important and the permanent element in a work—can be so positive in their statements as is possible where one reads history backwards, will not be included, in a continuous series, with the foregoing development, but joined to it as an Appendix.

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